U.S. Department Of State Confirms "No" Vote Today At United Nations On Cuba Government-Sponsored Resolution
/United States Department of State
Washington DC
29 October 2024
Press Briefing- Matthew Miller, Spokesperson
QUESTION: Before we get into the Middle East, I just wanted to ask you if you got an answer to my question about the Cuba vote, UN.
MR MILLER: I know there’s going to be a vote today. I don’t believe it’s happened yet; it’s occurring this afternoon.
QUESTION: Yes.
MR MILLER: So what was your question? How we will vote?
QUESTION: Yeah.
MR MILLER: We will vote no, but –
QUESTION: You’ll vote no?
MR MILLER: We will vote no.
QUESTION: And have you lined up anyone to – other –
MR MILLER: As I said – as I previewed yesterday, it was likely.
QUESTION: Have you lined up anyone –
MR MILLER: I didn’t think we were going to vote, I think —
QUESTION: Okay.
MR MILLER: — for a resolution condemning ourself.
QUESTION: Fine. But —
MR MILLER: And in fact, we will vote no.
QUESTION: But have you lined up anyone to vote with you?
MR MILLER: I think I’ll wait until we see the vote results to talk about the outcome.
QUESTION: So no, you’re not sure if you’ll get one or two others?
MR MILLER: I would not expect an outcome –
QUESTION: Dissimilar to previous –
MR MILLER: — dissimilar – as I was saying, inconsistent – “dissimilar” is a better word – to previous outcomes. This is a resolution –
QUESTION: In other words, it will be another demonstration of the entire – virtually the entire world’s opposition to this, to the embargo. Right?
MR MILLER: I wouldn’t expect a dissimilar result, but we have made our position clear —
QUESTION: All right.
MR MILLER: — on it for some time, and we’ll continue in our vote at the UN today.
LINKS TO RELATED ANALYSES
U.S. Department Of State: Cuba UN Vote Not On Spokesperson's "Bingo Card" Oct 29, 2024
Hesitant To Engage With Cuba? Read Second Paragraph Of Forward-Looking Statements In Sherritt International Corporation's Cuba Impact Statement. Cringeworthy For Legal Counsel
/Sherritt Reaffirms 2024 Guidance Following the Nationwide Power Outage in Cuba
NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION TO UNITED STATES NEWSWIRE SERVICES OR FOR DISSEMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES
October 28, 2024 05:05 PM Eastern Daylight Time
TORONTO--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Sherritt International Corporation (“Sherritt” or the “Corporation”) (TSX:S) today announced an update on its operations in Cuba following the nationwide power outage that began on October 18, 2024 (please refer to Sherritt’s press release dated October 21, 2024 titled “Sherritt Provides an Operational Update”). Despite the power outage and adverse weather from the tropical storm that occurred shortly after, Sherritt maintains its 2024 guidance ranges.
The Moa nickel mine and all Energas S.A. (“Energas”) facilities returned to full operating capacity on October 27, 2024. Following the power outage, the Moa nickel mine was operating at a reduced capacity of 50% to 60% with power sourced from the mine site’s own power generating capabilities. Despite this, there was not a material impact to mixed sulphides production. Moreover, the Corporation’s refinery in Alberta had strategically built-up feed inventory earlier in the year, ensuring reliable feed throughput for finished nickel production. At Energas, operations had partially resumed by Saturday, October 19, 2024 although some temporary disruptions continued due to the complexities involving the power grid. Energas was instrumental in assisting to restore power to the Cuban national grid. The Energas facilities, which are comprised of two reliable combined cycle plants, generate low-cost electricity from domestically sourced natural gas and are among the lowest carbon emitting power sources in Cuba.
Throughout the nationwide power outage, all environmental protection and safety activities at sites in Cuba continued uninterrupted, and there were no environmental incidents or injuries reported among personnel.
About Sherritt International
Sherritt is a world leader in using hydrometallurgical processes to mine and refine nickel and cobalt – metals deemed critical for the energy transition. Sherritt’s Moa Joint Venture has a current estimated mine life of 25 years and has embarked on an expansion program focused on increasing annual mixed sulphide precipitate production by approximately 20% of contained nickel and cobalt. The Corporation’s Power division, through its ownership in Energas S.A., is the largest independent energy producer in Cuba with installed electrical generating capacity of 506 MW, representing approximately 10% of the national electrical generating capacity in Cuba. The Energas facilities are comprised of two combined cycle plants that produce low-cost electricity from one of the lowest carbon emitting sources of power in Cuba. Sherritt’s common shares are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol “S”.
Forward-Looking Statements
This press release contains certain forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements can generally be identified by the use of statements that include such words as “believe”, “expect”, “anticipate”, “intend”, “plan”, “forecast”, “likely”, “may”, “will”, “could”, “should”, “suspect”, “outlook”, “potential”, “projected”, “continue” or other similar words or phrases. Specifically, forward-looking statements in this document include, but are not limited to, statements regarding, the Corporation’s 2024 guidance.
Forward-looking statements are not based on historical facts, but rather on current expectations, assumptions and projections about future events, including commodity and product prices and demand; the level of liquidity and access to funding; share price volatility; production results; realized prices for production; earnings and revenues; global demand for electric vehicles and the anticipated corresponding demand for cobalt and nickel; the commercialization of certain proprietary technologies and services; advancements in environmental and greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction technology; GHG emissions reduction goals and the anticipated timing of achieving such goals, if at all; statistics and metrics relating to Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) matters which are based on assumptions or developing standards; environmental rehabilitation provisions; environmental risks and liabilities; compliance with applicable environmental laws and regulations; risks related to the U.S. government policy toward Cuba; and certain corporate objectives, goals and plans for 2024. By their nature, forward-looking statements require the Corporation to make assumptions and are subject to inherent risks and uncertainties. There is significant risk that predictions, forecasts, conclusions or projections will not prove to be accurate, that the assumptions may not be correct and that actual results may differ materially from such predictions, forecasts, conclusions or projections.
The Corporation cautions readers of this press release not to place undue reliance on any forward-looking statement as a number of factors could cause actual future results, conditions, actions or events to differ materially from the targets, expectations, estimates or intentions expressed in the forward-looking statements. These risks, uncertainties and other factors include, but are not limited to, uncertainty in the ability to accurately forecast the timing of operations operating at full capacity following the power outages of the Cuban national grid, security market fluctuations and price volatility; level of liquidity and the related ability of the Moa Joint Venture to pay dividends; access to capital; access to financing; the risk to Sherritt’s entitlements to future distributions (including pursuant to the Cobalt Swap) from the Moa Joint Venture, the impact of infectious diseases, the impact of global conflicts; changes in the global price for nickel, cobalt, oil, gas, fertilizers or certain other commodities; risks related to Sherritt’s operations in Cuba; risks related to the U.S. government policy toward Cuba, including the U.S. embargo on Cuba and the Helms-Burton legislation; political, economic and other risks of foreign operations; uncertainty in the ability of the Corporation to enforce legal rights in foreign jurisdictions; uncertainty regarding the interpretation and/or application of the applicable laws in foreign jurisdictions; compliance with applicable environment, health and safety legislation and other associated matters; risks associated with governmental regulations regarding climate change and greenhouse gas emissions; risks relating to community relations; maintaining social license to grow and operate; risks related to environmental liabilities including liability for reclamation costs, tailings facility failures and toxic gas releases; uncertainty about the pace of technological advancements required in relation to achieving ESG targets; risks to information technologies systems and cybersecurity; identification and management of growth opportunities; the ability to replace depleted mineral reserves; risk of future non-compliance with debt restrictions and covenants; risks associated with the Corporation’s joint venture partners; variability in production at Sherritt’s operations in Cuba; risks associated with mining, processing and refining activities; potential interruptions in transportation; uncertainty of gas supply for electrical generation; reliance on key personnel and skilled workers; growth opportunity risks; the possibility of equipment and other failures; uncertainty of resources and reserve estimates; the potential for shortages of equipment and supplies, including diesel; supplies quality issues; risks related to the Corporation’s corporate structure; risks associated with the operation of large projects generally; risks related to the accuracy of capital and operating cost estimates; foreign exchange and pricing risks; credit risks; shortage of equipment and supplies; competition in product markets; future market access; interest rate changes; risks in obtaining insurance; uncertainties in labour relations; legal contingencies; risks related to the Corporation’s accounting policies; uncertainty in the ability of the Corporation to obtain government permits; failure to comply with, or changes to, applicable government regulations; bribery and corruption risks, including failure to comply with the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act or applicable local anti-corruption law; the ability to accomplish corporate objectives, goals and plans for 2023; and the ability to meet other factors listed from time to time in the Corporation’s continuous disclosure documents.
In addition to the risks noted above, factors that could, alone or in combination, prevent the Corporation from successfully achieving the benefits from expansion opportunities may include, without limitation: identifying suitable commercialization and other partners; successfully advancing discussions and successfully concluding applicable agreements with external parties and/or partners; successfully attracting required financing; successfully developing and proving technology required for the potential opportunity; successfully overcoming technical and technological challenges; successful environmental assessment and stakeholder engagement; successfully obtaining intellectual property protection; successfully completing test work and engineering studies, prefeasibility and feasibility studies, piloting, scaling from small scale to large scale production; procurement, construction, commissioning, ramp-up to commercial scale production and completion; unanticipated cost increases; supply chain challenges and securing regulatory and government approvals. There can be no assurance that any opportunity will be successful, commercially viable, completed on time or on budget, or will generate any meaningful revenues, savings or earnings, as the case may be, for the Corporation. In addition, the Corporation will incur costs in pursuing any particular opportunity, which may be significant. Readers are cautioned that the foregoing list of factors is not exhaustive and should be considered in conjunction with the risk factors described in the Corporation’s other documents filed with the Canadian securities authorities, including without limitation the “Managing Risk” section of the Management’s Discussion and Analysis for the three and six months ended June 30, 2024 and the Annual Information Form of the Corporation dated March 21, 2024 for the period ending December 31, 2023, which is available on SEDAR at www.sedarplus.ca.
The Corporation may, from time to time, make oral forward-looking statements. The Corporation advises that the above paragraph and the risk factors described in this press release and in the Corporation’s other documents filed with the Canadian securities authorities should be read for a description of certain factors that could cause the actual results of the Corporation to differ materially from those in the oral forward-looking statements. The forward-looking information and statements contained in this press release are made as of the date hereof and the Corporation undertakes no obligation to update publicly or revise any oral or written forward-looking information or statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by applicable securities laws. The forward-looking information and statements contained herein are expressly qualified in their entirety by this cautionary statement.
For further information, please contact:
Tom Halton
Director, Investor Relations and Corporate Affairs
Email: investor@sherritt.com
Telephone: (416) 935-2451
www.sherritt.com
U.S. Department Of State: Cuba UN Vote Not On Spokesperson's "Bingo Card"
/United States Department of State
Washington DC
28 October 2024
Press Briefing- Matthew Miller, Spokesperson
QUESTION: Tomorrow, as you may know, is the annual vote in the UN General Assembly condemning the U.S. embargo on Cuba. You were aware of that?
MR MILLER: I was not tracking this on my bingo card, so go right ahead.
QUESTION: I’m just wondering how the U.S. is going to vote this year.
MR MILLER: I doubt we’ll be voting to condemn ourselves, so —
QUESTION: Well, you abstained one year. The last year of Obama’s presidency, you guys abstained on it and it caused a bit of a ripple. But as you probably know, it’s basically the entire world votes to condemn it, and you and Israel – and in some cases, Palau or another Pacific Island nation joins in voting against. This year it’s most likely just going to be U.S. and Israel. So do you have anything to say about this —
MR MILLER: I don’t —
QUESTION: — yearly display of isolation on the international stage —
MR MILLER: I don’t.
QUESTION: — at least in terms of this one policy?
MR MILLER: I’m sure I will tomorrow – I’m sure I will tomorrow if the vote takes place, but no, not today. So —
QUESTION: Yeah? Okay. Thank you.
Links To Related Analyses
U.S. Exports To Cuba Decrease, But Remain Up 20% Year-To-Year. Another US$8.7 In Vehicle Exports. Razors Too Oct 11, 2024
Cuba Included In U.S. Presidential Determination Regarding Trafficking In Persons Oct 1, 2024
Cuba Government Describes Commercial, Economic, Financial Impact Of U.S. Policies, Regulations, And Statutes Sep 29, 2024
2024 Address By Minister Of Foreign Affairs To The United Nations General Assembly Sep 29, 2024
Cuba Is Governance Example Of The Medical Term “Failure To Thrive” United Nations Resolution Will Not Fix Cuba- Nor Force Others To Fix Cuba. Python Suffocating Re-Emerging Private Sector.
/Cuba Is Governance Example Of The Medical Term “Failure To Thrive”
A UNGA Resolution Will Not Fix Cuba- Nor Force Others To Fix Cuba
Forcefully Embracing The Anachronistic Rather Than Chasing The Dynamic
Cuba’s Government Decisions Resembling A Public Sector Python Suffocating Private Sector Prey- Excruciatingly Painful And Slow
“Failure to Thrive” in older adults “may represent a final common pathway toward death unless interventions can reverse the course.”
For a government, “Failure to Thrive” is defined as a pathway toward ruin where a government continues to repeat mistakes despite knowing in advance the outcome of those decisions. Or worse- a failed state.
For a government official in the city of Havana, Republic of Cuba, taking a sedative, falling asleep and hoping the morning brings news that 25 December 1991 was only a horrible nightmare is not an effective strategy for governance. 11,997 days ago, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) ceased to exist, and its fifteen republics became fifteen countries. The U.S.S.R. was created on 30 December 1922.
The government of the Republic of Cuba will find broad support this week for its resolution submitted annually to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) which criticizes policies, regulations, and statutes of the United States government which impact the Republic of Cuba.
There will also be a less visible question each of the 193-member country delegations of the UNGA will discuss among themselves.
That question is why does the government of the Republic of Cuba not avail itself, and actively so, to all of the commercial, cultural, economic, financial, and political opportunities for engagement with the United States which are specifically authorized by policies, regulations, and statutes as implemented by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, and United States Department of State?
“The meaningful part of the relationship- the economic blockade and the aggression against the Cuban economy- has not changed” since the end of the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021). “It has been faithfully applied by the Biden administration.” Carlos Fernandez de Cossio, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba
“Economic blockade means #Cuba can’t sell any product in the US or export any product to any company in any country that exports to the US.” Senior Official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba. Fact Check: In 2016, coffee was first authorized for import to the United States. Since 2016, healthcare products have been imported to the United States for evaluation. In 2017, charcoal was first authorized for import to the United States. New York, New York-based Nespresso USA Inc., a subsidiary of Lausanne, Switzerland-based Nestle S.A. (2023 revenue approximately US$105 billion) exports products to the United States and imports products from the Republic of Cuba.
Most egregious remains the unwillingness of successive governments in the Republic of Cuba, beginning with the [Raul] Castro-Machado Ventura Administration (2006-2018) and continuing with the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2018- ) to embrace fully commercial opportunities authorized during the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) and continuing thus far through the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025).
Whereas the [Fidel] Castro-[Raul] Castro Administration (1976-2008) knew how to create and then use leverage, subsequent governments in the Republic of Cuba only knew and know how to abdicate the creation of and use of leverage.
For example, when the Trade Sanctions Reform and Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 was signed into law during the final months of the Clinton-Gore Administration (1993-2001), President Fidel Castro proclaimed that since the law required payment of cash in advance and did not permit payment terms or provision of financing, there would be no purchases of agricultural commodities or food products from United States-based companies. However, sensing opportunities to create a commercial constituency throughout the United States, the first purchase of US$4.8 million in December 2001 described as a “one-off” due to the impact of a hurricane has since cumulatively totaled more than US$7.5 billion twenty-three years later with the Republic of Cuba ranking annually within the top sixty of two hundred and twenty United States agricultural commodity and food product export markets. The Republic of Cuba has ranked as high as 25th. The first export of corn from the United States was sourced from nine states, thus crystalizing what would become a substantive agriculturally based advocacy constituency.
If the Castro-Machado Ventura Administration and then Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration permitted fully those commercial opportunities authorized during the Obama-Biden Administration and thus far during Biden-Harris Administration, the impact of decisions by the Trump-Pence Administration could have been mitigated. Important to note that not all Obama-Biden Administration Republic of Cuba-focused decisions were halted or reversed by the Trump-Pence Administration.
Had there been by 20 January 2017 hundreds of United States-based companies with operations throughout the Republic of Cuba employing tens of thousands of Republic of Cuba nationals, the Trump-Pence Administration may have been constricted in what it decided to excise from then-authorized policy and regulations relating to the Republic of Cuba.
From 17 December 2014 to 20 January 2017 the government of the Republic of Cuba failed to authorize United States-based companies to create a presence that would be resistant to being rolled-up like a carpet. What the government of the Republic of Cuba did authorize was not wide, was not deep. There were no roots. The marquee examples consisted of one hotel management contract and port calls for cruise ships. All were easily cancelled- and they were.
Hundreds of small, medium, and large United States-based accountancies, assemblers, law firms, manufacturers, retailers, service providers, and wholesalers were prepared to establish a presence within the Republic of Cuba. They were rebuffed.
Additionally, from 2015 there were United States-based companies engaging and re-engaging with the Republic of Cuba who had claims certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC).
· There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the USFCSC and have not been resolved for more than sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s). The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims is approximately US$10 billion.
The government of the Republic of Cuba had opportunities to provide some certified claimants with full or partial settlements at little out-of-pocket cost to the government of the Republic of Cuba.
During the Obama-Biden Administration, some of the most high-profile certified claimants had engaged or re-engaged with the Republic of Cuba marketplace. The revenues earned in the Republic of Cuba by these claimants would have easily provided funding for not only the original value of the certified claim, but for the interest-compiling value of the certified claim.
The decision by the government of the Republic of Cuba to ignore those entreaties was the commercial equivalent of self-flagellation. The takeaway was then and remains today that the government of the Republic of Cuba would rather its people suffer.
Had that small number of certified claimants settled their claims against the government of the Republic of Cuba, a result would have been a substantial increase in interest by United States-based companies.
A settlement of certified claims would have also provided an opportunity landscape whereby United States-based companies could develop quickly a deep and wide presence not only throughout the Republic of Cuba, but throughout the economy of the Republic of Cuba.
There is no minimizing the commercial, economic, and financial impairment to the Republic of Cuba since 1960 by policies, regulations, and statutes implemented by successive occupants of The White House. Most, but not all the policies, regulations, and statutes implemented are designed to be coercive, even punitive.
However, not all can be rationally viewed as without off-ramps. These choices are not ideal from the perspective of successive administrations in the Republic of Cuba, but if engaged they would not singularly or collectively guarantee the demise of the political infrastructure within the country. Managed improperly, there would continue suffering. Managed with dexterity, there could be prosperity, depending of course upon one’s definition of prosperity.
LINK: Cuba Foreign Minister In Interview Reinforces Reasons For Unease By U.S. Companies Toward Cuba- Despite Their Wanting To Support Re-Emerging Private Sector. Sep 29, 2024
GlobalPost, Boston, Massachusetts, 4 October 2024: “Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel, meanwhile, is looking to China and Russia for help. If the US won’t permit American companies to invest and operate in Cuba, Newsweek magazine reported, the Cuban government has little choice but to seek out other powerful patrons whose governments share its autocratic bent. That is called “doubling down” in geopolitical parlance.”
What GlobalPost reported is untrue. What Newsweek was reported as writing was untrue. On 10 May 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration instructed the OFAC to issue the first license authorizing direct investment in and direct financing to a privately-owned company located in the Republic of Cuba owned by a Republic of Cuba national.
More than two years later, the government of the Republic of Cuba has yet to publish the regulations for delivering the investment and the financing. The delay does not only impact investors in the United States, but in all countries. The government of the Republic of Cuba is engaging in collective punishment of its entrepreneurs.
And recently the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration prohibited privately-owned companies in the Republic of Cuba from maintaining commercial bank accounts in the United States- which was recently authorized by the Biden-Harris Administration.
LINK: Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022
LINK: With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details. About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022
LINK: Biden Administration Will Use Cuba's Authorization Of SMSE's As Means To Expand Support For Cuba Private Sector- U.S. Investments And Loans May Be Next June 02, 2021
The government of the Republic of Cuba had means, motive, and opportunity during Obama-Biden Administration and continuing through the Biden-Harris Administration to create a commercial, economic, and financial landscape- both wide and deep throughout the country from Havana to Santiago de Cuba. All three were painfully squandered.
The Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration not only wants it both ways, it wants it all ways. Embracing governments which are in conflict with the government of the United States and then seeking commercial, economic, financial, military, and political support from those governments.
Simultaneously, the messaging from officials in Havana that the Republic of Cuba is “open for business” with United States companies and entrepreneurs.
Simultaneously, continuing for more than two years its refusal to enact laws and regulations which would make transparent, which would create accountability, and permit direct investment in and direct financing to privately-owned companies in the Republic of Cuba, which the Biden-Harris Administration first authorized on 10 May 2022.
In August 2024, the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration further restricted the re-emerging private sector by identifying one hundred and twenty-five sectors within which the re-emerging private sector is prohibited from operating in “forms of agriculture, manufacturing of pharmaceutical products, financial intermediation, trade, book editing and layout, television programming and broadcasting, telecommunications activities, forms of transportation and storage, defense, public security, and provision of social services. While the goals of the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration may not be to deprive the re-emerging private sector of the oxygen required for not only sustainability, but for prosperity and expansion, the result of decisions by the government of the Republic of Cuba is likened to constricting the caloric intake of a child- the result is stunted growth, anemic functioning, and potentially death.
The decisions by the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration resemble a public sector python suffocating its private sector prey… a slow and painful process for the prey.
Because Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration continues to recoil from sustainable commercial, economic, financial, and political reforms, its options for survival narrow to seeking disguised charity from governments and organizations whose interests are unaligned with those of the United States. Thus, China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Turkiye, and Venezuela become, for the government of the Republic of Cuba, its personal United Nations.
The Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration knows fully how these decisions reverberate throughout Washington DC and specifically in the State of Florida, home to the largest population of individuals of Cuban descent outside of the Republic of Cuba itself. A reported one million Republic of Cuba nationals have departed the island during the last four years- approximately 10% of its population.
On the one side of the “Pushmi-Pullyu” from the 1967 motion picture Doctor Doolittle is the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration continuing to publicly espouse for an improved commercial, economic, financial, and political relationship with the Biden-Harris Administration which will at 12:00 pm on 20 January 2025 transition to either the Harris-Walz Administration (2025-2029) or the Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029).
On the other side of the “Pushmi-Pullyu” is the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration doing and saying about everything that might be included on a how-to list specifically drafted to antagonize The White House and the United States Congress.
Engage and Support China, Iran, North Korea, Russia. Check.
Criticize Israel. Check.
Support (or not condemn) Hezbollah and Hamas. Check.
Not robustly support Ukraine. Check.
Permit Russian naval vessels to visit ports in the Republic of Cuba. Check.
Not enacting laws and publishing regulations which would respond positively to licenses issued by the OFAC authorizing direct investment in and direct financing to the re-emerging private sector in Cuba. Check.
Refusing to authorize private companies to have operating bank accounts in the United States. Check.
Failing to embrace all the decisions by the Biden-Harris Administration which benefit the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba. Check.
When a resolution submitted annually to the UNGA receives a substantial number of votes for, with some voting against and some abstaining, but what the resolution calls for is ignored year after year, probably an indicator that a new approach is required.
United Nations Vote This Week On Resolution Submitted Annually By Government Of Cuba About Relationship With The United States. Vote Outcome Certainty. Impact Not.
/United Nations
New York, New York
29 October 2024
10:00 am to 13:00 pm
General Assembly Hall
29th Plenary Meeting
Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba - Item 38: Report of the Secretary-General (A/79/80); Draft resolution (A/79/L.6)
Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba (A/79/80)
Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba (A/79/L.6)
Debate on the item.
LINK To United Nations Schedule
United Nations
New York, New York
30 October 2024
10:00 am to 13:00 pm
General Assembly Hall
30th Plenary Meeting
Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba - Item 38 : Report of the Secretary-General (A/79/80); Draft resolution (A/79/L.6)
Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba (A/79/80)
Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba (A/79/L.6)
Debate on the item (continued) and action on the draft resolution.
Cuba Obtains "Partner" Status With BRICS. Cuba Does Not Bring Anything To BRICS Members. Cuba Wants Access To Funds From NDB.
/Prensa Latina News Agency
Havana, Republic of Cuba
25 October 2024
“Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel today has highlighted his country's joining the BRICS+ as an associate member, which was approved at the group's 16th Summit held in Kazan, Russia.
In his profile on X social media, the Head of State wrote: “Cuba is honored to join the Brics+ as a partner country, five letters and a great hope for the countries of the South, in the arduous path towards a more just, democratic, equitable and sustainable international order.”
Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez also reaffirmed Cuba’s interest and commitment to work together with the members of this group in defense of multilateralism, peace, international law and the construction of a development and cooperation agenda that responds to the priorities of the South.
The Caribbean nation was admitted as an associate member of the BRICS together with 12 other countries; these are Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.”
BRIC/BRICS/BRICS+
BRIC was created in September 2006 and officially organized in June 2009 by the governments of Brazil, Russia, India, and China.
In December 2010, the government of South Africa became a member; and BRIC became BRICS.
In January 2024, the governments of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia became members of BRICS. The government of Argentina was granted an invitation to membership in BRICS, but the invitation was declined in December 2023.
In September 2024, the government of Turkiye applied for membership in BRICS.
In October 2024, the governments of Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkiye, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam were granted “partner” status in BRICS.
Government connectivity with BRICS is by consensus.
New Development Bank (NDB)
The president of NDB is H.E. Mrs. Dilma Rousseff, President of Brasil (2011-2016) and chief of staff to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva from 2005 to 2010. The NDB was created in 2014.
“The New Development Bank (NDB) is a multilateral development bank established by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) with the purpose of mobilising resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs). Our strong mandate and potential put us in a unique position to contribute to global growth and development.”
Cruise Lines Win Most Arguments Before 11th Circuit Court Of Appeals. Does Havana Docks Corporation Seek En Banc Review, U.S. Supreme Court Review, Or Accept Decision?
/Can Accept Decision, Appeal For En Banc Review- All Twelve Members Of The 11th Circuit Court Of Appeals, Or Can Seek Writ of Certiorari From The U.S. Supreme Court
No. 23-10171: HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross Appellant, versus ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD., CARNIVAL CORPORATION, a foreign corporation doing business as Carnival Cruise Lines, MSC CRUISES S.A. CO., MSC CRUISES (USA), INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants Cross Appellees.
Excerpts
After a review of the record, and with the benefit of oral argument, we hold that Havana Docks’ limited property interest had expired, for purposes of Title III, at the time of the alleged trafficking by the cruise lines. We therefore set aside the judgments in favor of Havana Docks and remand for further proceedings as to its other claims against Carnival.
We affirm the district court’s ruling that Havana Docks is a U.S. national under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act but reverse the judgments in favor of Havana Docks and against the cruise lines for conduct taking place between 2016 and 2019. We remand for further proceedings as to the trafficking claims against Carnival based on conduct taking place from 1996 to 2001.
10/22/2024- Opinion issued by court as to Appellant RCL in 23-10151, Appellant-Cross Appellee RCL in 23-10171. Decision: Affirmed in part, Reversed in part, and Remanded. Opinion type: Published. Opinion method: Signed. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions. [23-10151, 23-10171]
10/22/2024- Judgment entered as to Appellant RCL in 23-10151, Appellant-Cross Appellee RCL in 23-10171. [23-10151, 23-10171]
Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. 23-10151; 1:19-cv-23590-BB; Court Opinion; 10-22-2024; Hon. Adalberto J. Jordan authoring; Hon. Andrew Lynn Brasher dissenting
Dissent Excerpts
In my view, there are three problems with this judicially created prove-a-counterfactual requirement. First, it is not supported by the statute’s text. The text of the statute says that the trafficking must occur when a plaintiff “owns the claim,” not when the plaintiff would have owned the property. Second, the majority is focused on the wrong confiscated property. Here, Havana Docks argues that the cruise lines trafficked by using the physical docks that the Cuban Government confiscated, not by using its concessionary interest in those docks. Third, this test effectively voids many of the property interests that are expressly protected by the statute. The statute was enacted in 1994 and it expressly protects interests that were contingent, future, and time limited when the underlying property was confiscated in 1959, but none of those interests are protectible under the majority’s rule. I’ll address each of these issues in turn.
Unless and until the property confiscation claims of U.S. nationals are paid, those claims continue to exist and are enforceable under the Helms-Burton Act. But the majority opinion’s interpretation means that the Act provides no remedy for U.S. nationals with property interests that were confiscated in 1959 but, absent confiscation, would have “expired” before the present day. It does so even though there is no textual support for that result and even though the Act expressly protects interests that were contingent or time-limited when they were confiscated. And it adopts that rule even though there is a perfectly rational alternative that better conforms to the Act—that the time-limited nature of an interest in confiscated property goes to the value of a claim, not to the claim’s existence.
I believe the district court correctly interpreted the Act in this respect, and I would go on to address the other issues in the appeal. Because the majority opinion instead reverses on this ground, I respectfully dissent.
LINK TO COMPLETE OPINION IN PDF FORMAT
The White House Answers Questions About Providing Assistance To Cuba- And Reinforces Cuba Is Victim Of Its Own Decisions.
/The White House
Washington DC
21 October 2024
Briefing By Karine Jean-Pierre, Press Secretary
Q Thank you. I have a question about Cuba. There have been multiple power outages on the island in recent days. So, I was wondering: Is the White House monitoring the situation, particularly for signs of unrest? Thank you.
MS. JEAN-PIERRE: So, we are closely monitoring the blackouts on the island. And so, we are concerned about the potential humanitarian impacts on the Cuban people. And like we have seen over the past few years, Cuba’s economic condition stemming from long-term mismanagement of its economic policy and resources has certainly increased the hardship of the people in Cuba. And so — so — and so, certainly, just want to make clear that this is not — the U.S. is not to — is not to blame for the blackouts on the island or the overall energy situation in Cuba. So, the Cuban — the Cuban government has not requested any assistance at this time, and so we will assess the appropriate next steps if they do request any assistance. And so, a critical tenet of the Biden-Harris administration policy as it relates to — to — towards Cuba is to always advocate for the support of the Cuban people, and we’ve been always very clear about that. And so, we’ll continue.
Q — this is a hypothetical. But if the Cuban government were to request assistance, would the Biden-Harris administration be willing to provide it?
MS. JEAN-PIERRE: So, we’re going to — if that were to happen, we’re — certainly would assess the next best steps. I just — they have not. Again, it’s a hypothetical. And so, we’re going to assess what’s the next best step to do.
Thus Far In 2024, Cubans Imported More Than US$200,000.00 In Generators; More Than US$1 Million In Air Conditioners And Parts
/January 2024 through August 2024 United States Exports To The Republic Of Cuba
Air Cond Mach, Wndw Wall Type,not Slf Cntd, Nesoi (no) Miami, FL- US$169,923.00
Air Cond Machs Not Incorporat A Refrig Unit, Nesoi (no) Miami, FL- US$48,600.00
Parts, Nesoi, Of Air Conditioning Machines (kg) Miami, FL- US$732,968.00
Refrig-freez Comb, Sep Ext Doors, Exc Compress Typ (no) Miami, FL- US$140,743.00
Refrigerators, Household,comp Typ,vol Lt 184 Liter (no) Miami, FL- US$24,050.00
Refrig, household, Comp Typ, Vol 382 Liters & Over (no) Houston-Galveston, TX- US$7,000.00
Refrigerators, Household, Absorption, Electrical (no) Miami, FL- US$7,790.00
Freezers, Chest Type, Capacity Not Exc 800 Liters (no) Miami, FL- US$15,220.00
Reciprocating Liquid Chilling Refrigerating Units (no) Miami, FL- US$25,930.00
Refrig/freezing Equip, Nesoi (no) Miami, FL- US$71,216.00
Dc Generators, Not Exceeding 750 W, Nesoi (no) Miami, FL- US$26,216.00
Ac Generators (alt) Gt 10000 Kva But Lt= 40000 Kva (no) Miami, FL- US$120,430.00
Ac Generators (alternators) Exceeding 40,000 Kva (no) Miami, FL- US$39,605.00
Generating Sets, Elc, Diesel, Lt= 75kva Output (no) Miami, FL- US$2,700.00
Electric Generating Sets Except Gas Turbines Nesoi (no) Miami, FL- US$64,200.00
Electric Rotary Converters (no) Miami, FL- US$5,080.00
Batteries, Lead-acid, Piston Engine, Nesoi (no) Miami, FL- US$47,134.00
Storage Battery Parts (except Lead-acid Type) (kg) Miami, FL- US$3,209.00
U.S. Department Of Commerce Seeking Comments On "Effectiveness of Licensing Procedures for the Export and Reexport of Agricultural Commodities to Cuba"
/AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce.
ACTION: Request for comments.
SUMMARY: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is requesting public comments on the effectiveness of its licensing procedures as defined in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) for the export and reexport of agricultural commodities to Cuba. BIS will include a description of any comments it receives in its biennial report to Congress, as required by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, as amended (TSRA).
DATES: Comments must be received by November 15, 2024.
ADDRESSES: Comments on this notice may be submitted by either of the following methods:
Electronic Submission: Submit all electronic public comments via the Federal rulemaking portal. Visit http://www.regulations.gov and type “BIS-2024-0049” in the search box to find this notice.
Mail: Submit written comments by mail or delivery to Regulatory Policy Division, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Room 2099B, 14th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20230. Refer to RIN 0694-XC108. Comments sent by any other method, to any other address or individual, or received after the end of the comment period, may not be considered by BIS. All comments (including any personal identifying information) will be made public.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jerry Huang, Office of Nonproliferation and Foreign Policy Controls, Telephone: (202) 482-4252. Additional information on BIS procedures and previous biennial reports under TSRA is available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/policy-guidance/country-guidance/sanctioned-destinations/13-policy-guidance/country-guidance/426-reports-to-congress. Copies of these materials may also be requested by contacting the Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant to section 906(a) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) (22 U.S.C. 7205(a)), the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) authorizes exports and reexports of agricultural commodities, as defined in part 772 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (15 CFR parts 730-774), to Cuba. Requirements and procedures associated with such authorization are set forth in § 740.18 of the EAR (15 CFR 740.18). These are the only licensing procedures in the EAR currently in effect pursuant to the requirements of section 906(a) of TSRA. Under the provisions of section 906(c) of TSRA (22 U.S.C. 7205(c)), BIS must submit a biennial report to Congress on the operation of the licensing system implemented pursuant to section 906(a) for the preceding two-year period. This report must include the number and types of licenses applied for, the number and types of licenses approved, the average amount of time elapsed from the date of filing of a license application until the date of its approval, the extent to which the licensing procedures were effectively implemented, and a description of comments received from interested parties during a 30-day public comment period regarding the effectiveness of the licensing procedures. Consistent with TSRA's requirements, BIS is currently preparing a biennial report on the operation of the licensing system for the two-year period from October 1, 2022 through September 30, 2024.
Request for Comments
By this notice, BIS requests public comments on the effectiveness of the licensing procedures for the export and reexport of agricultural commodities to Cuba set forth under § 740.18 of the EAR. Parties submitting comments are asked to be as specific as possible. All comments received by the close of the comment period will be considered by BIS in developing the report to Congress. All comments will be publicly available. Any information that the commenter does not wish to be made available to the public should not be submitted to BIS.
Thea D. Rozman Kendler,
Assistant Secretary for Export Administration.
[FR Doc. 2024-23828 Filed 10-15-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-33-P
LINK TO COMPLETE PUBLICATION IN PDF FORMAT
LINK: U.S. Exports To Cuba Decrease, But Remain Up 20% Year-To-Year. Another US$8.7 In Vehicle Exports. Razors Too Oct 11, 2024
U.S. Exports To Cuba Decrease, But Remain Up 20% Year-To-Year. Another US$8.7 In Vehicle Exports. Razors Too
/ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
October 2024
August 2024 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decrease 5.4% - 1
46th Of 222 August 2024 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 20.0% - 2
Cuba Ranked 48th Of 222 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets - 2
August 2024 Healthcare Product Exports US$0.00 - 2
August 2024 Humanitarian Donations US$6,801,111.00 - 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue To Increase - 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 19
AUGUST 2024 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA DECREASE 5.4% - Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in August 2024 were US$37,729,568.00 compared to US$39,913,983.00 August 2023 and US$29,383,675.00 August 2022.
The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.
The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.
The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA and CDA. The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.
January 2024 through August 2024 TSREEA exports were US$279,815,521.00 compared to January 2023 through August 2023 TSREEA exports of US$232,487,373.00. Total TSREEA exports since first deliveries in December 2001 exceed US$7,526,148,914.00
Other products exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in August 2024 include: Turkey (US$176,682.00), Eggs, Chickpeas, Black Beans, Lentils, Safflower Oil, Human Blood (US$11,905.00), Handbags (US$9,749.00), Razors (US$17,160.00), Fork Lift (US$17,000.00), Ink Cartridges (US$7,587.00), Part of Cotton Gins (US$8,000.00), Used Vehicles (US$8,688,439.00).
Used Vehicle Exports January 2024 Through August 2024 Are US$38,752,488.00.
Truck Exports January 2024 Through August 2024 Are US$16,075,524.00
LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA
Cuba Included In U.S. Presidential Determination Regarding Trafficking In Persons
/The White House
Washington DC
September 30, 2024
Presidential Determination
No. 2024-14
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
SUBJECT: Presidential Determination with Respect to the Efforts of Foreign Governments Regarding Trafficking in Persons
Consistent with section 110 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107) (the "Act"), as amended, I hereby determine as follows:
As provided for in section 110(d)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, that the United States will not provide nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related assistance to the Governments of Burma and Iran for Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 until such governments comply with the Act's minimum standards or make significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with the minimum standards;
As provided for in section 110(d)(1)(A)(ii) of the Act, that the United States will not provide nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related assistance to, or allow funding for participation in educational and cultural exchange programs by officials or employees of, the Governments of Belarus, Cuba, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Eritrea, Macau (Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (PRC)), Nicaragua, the PRC, Russia, and Syria for FY 2025 until such governments comply with the Act's minimum standards or make significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with the minimum standards;
As provided for in section 110(d)(1)(B) of the Act, I hereby instruct the United States Executive Director of each multilateral development bank, as defined in the Act, and of the International Monetary Fund to vote against and use best efforts to deny any loan or other utilization of the funds of the respective institution (other than for humanitarian assistance; for trade‑related assistance; or for development assistance that directly addresses basic human needs, is not administered by the government of such country, and confers no benefit to that government) for the Governments of Belarus, Burma, Cuba, the DPRK, Eritrea, Iran, Macau (Special Administrative Region of the PRC), Nicaragua, the PRC, Russia, South Sudan, and Syria for FY 2025 until such governments comply with the Act's minimum standards or make significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with the minimum standards;
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, I determine that the provision of all nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related foreign assistance programs, projects, activities, and funding for educational and cultural exchange programs described in sections 110(d)(1)(A) and 110(d)(1)(B) of the Act to Brunei, Djibouti, Papua New Guinea, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States;
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, I determine that providing the assistance described in section 110(d)(1)(B) of the Act to Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Sudan would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States;
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, I determine that a partial waiver with respect to Belarus, Eritrea, Macau (Special Administrative Region of the PRC), the PRC, and Russia to allow funding for educational and cultural exchange programs described in section 110(d)(1)(A)(ii) of the Act would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States;
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, with respect to Afghanistan, I determine that a partial waiver of the restriction described in section 110(d)(1)(A)(i) of the Act to allow for Economic Support Fund and Global Health Programs (GHP) assistance would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States;
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, with respect to Cambodia, I determine that a partial waiver of the restriction described in section 110(d)(1)(A)(i) of the Act to allow for all assistance and programs other than education programs funded from Development Assistance (DA) would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States;
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, with respect to South Sudan, I determine that a partial waiver of the restriction described in section 110(d)(1)(A)(i) of the Act to allow for GHP assistance would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States; and
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, with respect to Sudan, I determine that a partial waiver of the restriction described in section 110(d)(1)(A)(i) of the Act to allow for DA and GHP assistance would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States.
In addition, with respect to the Government of Sint Maarten, consistent with the United States Government's firm stand against human trafficking, and until such government takes steps consistent with compliance with the minimum standards of the Act or makes significant efforts to do so, I hereby: (i) direct that executive departments and agencies shall not provide nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related foreign assistance, as described in section 110(d)(1)(A) of the Act, to the Government of Sint Maarten; (ii) instruct the United States Executive Director of each multilateral development bank, as defined in the Act, and of the International Monetary Fund to vote against and use best efforts to deny any loan or other utilization of the funds of the respective institution (other than for humanitarian assistance, for trade-related assistance, or for development assistance that directly addresses basic human needs, is not administered by such government, and confers no benefit to that government) to Sint Maarten, as described in section 110(d)(1)(B) of the Act; and (iii) direct that funding for participation by officials or employees of the Government of Sint Maarten in educational and cultural exchange programs shall continue to be permitted in FY 2025, consistent with the foreign policy and all applicable laws of the United States.
You are authorized and directed to submit this determination, the certification required by section 110(e) of the Act, and the Memorandum of Justification, on which I have relied, to the Congress, and to publish this determination in the Federal Register.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.
Cuba Foreign Minister In Interview Reinforces Reasons For Unease By U.S. Companies Toward Cuba- Despite Their Wanting To Support Re-Emerging Private Sector.
/Newsweek
Washington DC
26 September 2024
Excerpts
In a wide-ranging interview conducted on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla outlined a troubling state of global affairs, exacerbated by international conflicts, climate change and economic uncertainty. And while the Cold War that once placed Cuba at the forefront of nuclear brinkmanship has long passed, he argued that the nation continued to directly suffer the effects of a U.S. sanctions campaign first launched more than six decades ago.
Eased under former President Barack Obama and subsequently harshened under former President Donald Trump, the U.S. embargo has largely held throughout the administration of President Joe Biden, who has opted to retain much of his predecessor's most restrictive measures. With Biden soon set to depart as a contentious U.S. election looms, Rodríguez Parrilla saw a missed opportunity to reset ties and attract U.S. investment in Cuba.
“We have been able to make progress in our developments thanks to the cultural, academic, scientific and economic relations that we keep with all the countries of the world. Western Europe and China are important economic partners of Cuba. The American businesspeople could also be the same if not for this policy. During better times, the American farmers have taken advantage of a license that had violated the internationally standard commercial rules, and it was possible for Cuba to import as much as $1 billion in foodstuffs. These figures today are very small. We could retake those figures if they happen to be mutually beneficial.”
LINK: U.S. Agricultural Commodity/Food Product Exports To Cuba Remain Up 25.7%. Vehicle (New, Used, Truck) Exports For 2024 Exceed US$36 Million. Tequila Exported In July 2024. September 05, 2024
“But the most interesting things is that almost half of the Americans visiting Cuba accommodate themselves at small hostels and resort to small private businesses. And this ban on individual travel has led to all these people going into bankruptcy. What could be the logic behind the fact that the U.S. government is taking steps damaging the emerging private sector in Cuba?”
“And, meanwhile, they publish measures that are inapplicable because the oppressive, intimidating effect of the blockade makes it impossible for the owners of small and medium enterprises in Cuba to open a bank account in the U.S.”
“U-turn operations [transactions in which U.S. banks can process U.S. dollar payments involving Cuba that begin and end outside of the U.S.] could not be done before, not even now, because of these measures. And thinking about the possibility of a small Cuban farmer to be able to export directly to the U.S., I mean, this does not happen anywhere in the world.”
”Earlier, you mentioned the need to find a more efficient economic model to adapt to Cuba's current reality and this includes the expansion of private initiatives as well as some recent social reforms, all of which may not be widely covered abroad. But at this challenging time for the Cuban economy, are these plans bearing fruit for the nation?”
“We hope so. It is a need for our economy, and they are part of the design of our model. And these are not overnight measures. They are the result of a previous process. Curiously enough, very little attention was paid outside Cuba to the major development of agriculture production in the hands of private producers, and this has been so for decades. I'm referring to individual farmers or cooperatives. However, the medium and small enterprises have called great attention.”
“We do not have any legislation or any design for the creation of private small and medium sized enterprises, not even the creation of public small and medium sized enterprises. The entrepreneurial system in Cuba is unique. I mean, you do not legislate for public as separate from private enterprises. Some of the actions taken by the U.S. government intend to separate private small and medium sized enterprises from the rest of the Cuban economy and I don't think this will lead to any results.”
LINK: Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022
LINK: With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details. About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022
LINK: Biden Administration Will Use Cuba's Authorization Of SMSE's As Means To Expand Support For Cuba Private Sector- U.S. Investments And Loans May Be Next June 02, 2021
“It is, in fact, an international experience and there are very good examples in Cuba of the way in which either public or private small and medium sized enterprises have achieved very good results. For example, in the area of technology, in the development of software and applications, the Cuban biopharmaceutical industry or the genetic engineering industry are competitive in the world. They are among the best on the planet. They have produced some technologies that do not exist in the U.S. They manufactured better COVID vaccines as compared to the American vaccines, and this has been shown according to the immunization data.”
LINK: "Publication of New Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) on Basic Information and Updated FAQs on Cuba Sanctions" August 27, 2024
LINK: Cuba Again Constricts Re-Emerging Private Sector Embracing "Can't Live With It, Can't Live Without It" Strategy. Another Opportunity For Biden-Harris Administration To Embrace "Crock Pot" Theory August 22, 2024
LINK: For Cuba: Biden-Harris Administration Should Implement Crock Pot Theory And Quid Pro Quo With Quo Not Giving What Quid Wants. Jul 21, 2024
“There are small windows requiring specific licenses in order to carry out joint work on a couple of Cuban scientific results or technologies. It would be very possible to do that on a broader scale. But today the factor that determines the condition of the Cuban economy is the tightening of the blockade. This coincides over time.”
Cuba Government Describes Commercial, Economic, Financial Impact Of U.S. Policies, Regulations, And Statutes.
/“Bruno Rodríguez: “The U.S. measures for Cuban entrepreneurs are inapplicable” At the presentation of the report on the blockade, the foreign minister was skeptical about a possible benefit for this sector from Washington.”
OnCuba News
13 September 2024
Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez Parrilla called on the United States government to answer questions from Cuban entrepreneurs about the application of the measures announced by the Biden administration last May.
During the usual press conference that the Cuban Foreign Ministry (MINREX) calls every year to present its report on the impact of the blockade/embargo, before the vote in the UN on the issue, Rodríguez said that the possibility of opening bank accounts in dollars in the United States is inapplicable and so far no movement has occurred. “They have not been applied because the oppressive and suffocating framework of the blockade prevents it. You have to be crazy to interact with Cuban entities under such oppressive circumstances. The risks for U.S. banks, for example, are very great,” said the minister.
The Foreign Ministry also questions how technology companies could discern between state-owned and private enterprises to offer Internet services that are currently blocked, another of the measures that the Biden administration announced in May. It also recalled that non-immigrant visas are not yet being processed in Havana, which could benefit the exchange and search for supplies for private businesses in Cuba. On the other hand, Rodríguez also considered that Washington’s announcements are unfeasible due to “the absurd and foolish intention to fragment the business system that is unique in the country” and that “a small private enterprise import, export, make international financial transactions and be abstained, that there be a glass wall that prevents it from interacting with the public sector of the economy.”
Cuban government estimates damages from U.S. embargo at 5 billion dollars in twelve months September 12, 2024
For the first time in the report on the blockade that Cuba presents to the United Nations every year, on September 29 and 30, the effects that the blockade causes specifically to the island’s private sector are collected. In the text, the MINREX associates the economic losses of 685 MSMEs in 2023 with the effects of the U.S. sanctions. Private businesses that benefit from visits by Americans to Cuba stopped receiving about $107 million in the last year, due to travel restrictions. According to the Foreign Ministry, 163,455 citizens of that country arrived on the island between March 2023 and February 2024 and almost half stayed in private rental houses.
“Most of the services Americans enjoy in Cuba are in the private sector,” said Rodríguez. Bruno Rodríguez acknowledged that the economic crisis in Cuba is not exclusively due to U.S. sanctions, but insisted that it is its fundamental cause. “Not all difficulties are due to the blockade. There are also structural problems, difficulties in economic management, but the fundamental and determining weight is the extreme and unprecedented intensification and hardening of the blockade since 2019,” he stated. According to the foreign minister, the island faces social inequality, “distortions” in the economy, low income, crime, corruption, weakening of social policies, especially in health, education and the protection of low-income families. However, he considered that the errors in the management of the economy are “involuntary”, while Washington’s sanctions policy is deliberate. Cuban authorities estimate the impact of the blockade at around $5.056 billion, from March 1, 2023 to February 29, 2024. “Some $200 million more than in the same period of the previous year,” said the minister.
He stated that Cuba’s GDP in 2023 would have grown by 8% if the blockade did not exist, in contrast to the 1.9% drop that was reported. According to government estimates, the blockade’s impact after more than 60 years of application amounts to more than $164.141 billion at current prices.
Bruno Rodríguez said he feels confident that the international community will once again vote almost unanimously for the end of the blockade at the UN General Assembly at the end of the month. “This will be the welcome for the next president of the United States,” said the minister, who urged the future head of the White House to make up for the damage caused to Cuba.
He also stated that Biden has maintained Trump’s policy and that the possibility of easing sanctions, including removing the island from the list of State sponsors of terrorism, is in the hands of the Democrats. “He could do it tomorrow if he wanted to,” he said. The island has suffered 1,064 actions of denial of services by foreign banks, due to being included in that list that harms, among other things, Cuba’s access to the international financial system. Although the report presented includes one of the executive prerogatives that President Biden has to relax the application of the blockade — which could only be completely eliminated by Congress —, Rodríguez commented that under these circumstances, Cubans have the challenge of “overthrowing the blockade ourselves.” He thus hinted that, despite the impact of the sanctions on the island’s socioeconomic life, there is still room for maneuver.
Blockade actions taken by the United States government between March 2023 and February 2024 (MINREX, July 2024)
The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the Department of the Treasury announced a monetary settlement of $72,230.32 with Uphold HQ Inc. (“Uphold”), a money services company based in Larkspur, California, for apparent violations of the “sanctions” programs against Cuba, Iran and Venezuela. Transactions involving Cuba totaled 25, for a total of $142,683.74, between March 2017 and May 2022.
April 6, 2023. Microsoft Corporation, based in Redmond, Washington, agreed to remit $2,980,265.86 to OFAC and $347,631 to the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the Department of Commerce, for violations of various U.S. coercive programs, including the one against Cuba. The total penalty amounted to $3,327,896. 54 of the 1,339 apparent violations were of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.
May 1, 2023. Poloniex, LLC (“Poloniex”), headquartered in Delaware with its principal operations in Boston, Massachusetts, agreed to remit to OFAC $7,591,630 for violations of various U.S. coercive programs, including the one against Cuba. The agency’s statement said that the Poloniex trading platform apparently allowed clients located in “sanctioned” jurisdictions to engage in online transactions involving assets worth a combined $15,335,349.
September 29, 2023. By presidential memorandum, President Joseph Biden extended for one more year the restrictions on granting federal funds for cultural and educational exchanges with Cuba, among other measures. This action resulted from Cuba’s arbitrary and unjustified permanence in Level 3 of the Department of State’s Annual Trafficking in Persons Report.
November 6, 2023. OFAC announced through an official statement a monetary agreement with daVinci Payments (daVinci), a U.S. company that manages prepaid reward card programs, for apparent violations of several coercive programs, including the blockade laws against Cuba. DaVinci remitted $206,213 to the Treasury Department for apparently engaging between November 15, 2017, and July 27, 2022, in the exchange of reward cards from individuals in the sanctioned jurisdictions.
February 21, 2024. U.S. President Joseph Biden issued a notification extending for one year the State of National Emergency related to Cuba, declared by President William Clinton on March 1, 1996
Prerogatives of the President of the United States to modify the application of the blockade against Cuba (MINREX, July 2024)
Among the modifications to the framework of the blockade that the President of the United States could make from his executive prerogatives, and through regulatory announcements from the Departments of State, Treasury and Commerce, are:
Remove Cuba from the State Department’s List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.
Reverse the policy of financial persecution against Cuba, including that related to fuel supplies to the country.
Suspend the possibility of filing lawsuits in U.S. courts against U.S. and third-country companies, under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act.
Modify the permissible limit of 10% of U.S. components in goods that Cuba can import from any country in the world.
Request the State and Treasury Departments to eliminate the inclusion of Cuban entities in other unilateral lists, such as the List of Restricted Cuban Entities, the List of Prohibited Accommodations, and the List of Specially Designated Nationals.
Instruct U.S. representatives in international financial institutions not to block the granting of credits or other financial facilities to Cuba.
Allow Cuban entities, including banks or companies, to open correspondent accounts in U.S. banks.
Authorize exports to Cuba of U.S. products for key branches of the economy such as mining, tourism or biotechnology.
Authorize the import by the U.S. of any merchandise manufactured or derived from products grown, produced, or manufactured in Cuba by state-owned enterprises (nickel, sugar, tobacco, rum or others).
Allow the export to Cuba of medical supplies and equipment that can be used in the manufacture of Cuban biotechnological products.
Make the licensing policy for investments by U.S. companies in Cuba more flexible.
Authorize U.S. citizens to receive medical treatment in Cuba.
Allow broader forms of collaboration for the development, marketing and supply of medicines and biomedical products of Cuban origin, for example, through direct investments by U.S. companies and joint ventures.
Allow sales of raw materials that Cuba needs to produce medicines for the Cuban population and that of other developing countries.
Authorize U.S. subsidiaries to do business with Cuba, which is not related to the import and export of goods to Cuba (prohibited by the Torricelli Act).
Bruno Rodríguez, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba
United Nations General Assembly
28 September 2024
Excerpts
“The United States government continues to clearly demonstrate its impossible but pernicious determination to determine and control the destiny of Cuba. It is an old ambition anchored in the Monroe Doctrine, which defines the imperialist, dominant and hegemonic nature of U.S. policy towards Cuba and towards the region of Our America. The economic, commercial and financial blockade is also political, technological and communicational. It has been conceived as one of its main weapons of aggression to destroy the Cuban economy. It seeks to prevent the country's financial income, cause the collapse of the economy and generate a situation of political and social instability. The damage is visible and indisputable. It has repercussions on the lives of all Cubans. It is accompanied by the most ferocious campaign of disinformation and slander, by perennial attempts to interfere in our internal affairs and by the complicit tolerance of groups that organize violent and terrorist acts against Cuba from the territory of the United States. These actions violate International Law. They contravene the purposes and principles of this Organization and numerous resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. The siege thus conceived has been reinforced by the inclusion of Cuba on the arbitrary list of countries that are supposedly sponsors of terrorism by the U.S. State Department. This is a fraudulent designation, without moral authority or any international mandate. By virtue of it, retaliatory actions against Cuba are unleashed, which, in an extraterritorial manner, go beyond the framework of the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States and are manifested in and against any country.”
U.S. Senator From Nevada Newest Co-Sponsor For Bacardi Trademark Legislation. Unlikely To Become Law In 2024... But In 2025?
/S.746 - No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act (118th Congress)
Sponsor: Sen. Menendez, Robert [D-NJ] (Introduced 03/09/2023)
Has changes in: Committees
Committees: Senate - Senate Judiciary
Cosponsors: (1 new, 8 total)
Cosponsor: 09/25/2024: Sen. Rosen, Jacky [D-NV]
Official Title as Introduced: Official Title as Introduced: A bill to modify the prohibition on recognition by United States courts of certain rights relating to certain marks, trade names, or commercial names.
Cosponsors
Sen. Rosen, Jacky [D-NV]- 09/25/2024
Sen. Young, Todd [R-IN]*- 03/09/2023
Sen. Hirono, Mazie K. [D-HI]*- 03/09/2023
Sen. Marshall, Roger [R-KS]*- 03/09/2023
Sen. Tillis, Thomas [R-NC]*- 03/09/2023
Sen. Braun, Mike [R-IN]*- 03/09/2023
Sen. Cortez Masto, Catherine [D-NV]*- 03/09/2023
Sen. Rubio, Marco [R-FL]*- 03/09/2023
H.R. 1505 No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act of 2023
Cosponsors
Rep. Wasserman Schultz, Debbie [D-FL-25]*- 03/09/2023
Rep. Waltz, Michael [R-FL-6]- 03/14/2023
Rep. Salazar, Maria Elvira [R-FL-27]- 04/25/2023
Rep. Diaz-Balart, Mario [R-FL-26]- 04/25/2023
Rep. Rutherford, John H. [R-FL-5]- 05/11/2023
Rep. Gaetz, Matt [R-FL-1]- 05/16/2023
Rep. Green, Mark E. [R-TN-7]- 05/16/2023
Rep. Dunn, Neal P. [R-FL-2]- 05/16/2023
Rep. Reschenthaler, Guy [R-PA-14]- 05/16/2023
Rep. Lee, Laurel M. [R-FL-15]- 05/17/2023
Rep. Franklin, C. Scott [R-FL-18]- 05/17/2023
Rep. Gimenez, Carlos A. [R-FL-28]- 05/18/2023
Rep. Torres, Ritchie [D-NY-15]- 05/18/2023
Rep. Wilson, Frederica S. [D-FL-24]- 05/22/2023
Rep. Soto, Darren [D-FL-9]- 05/22/2023
Rep. Cline, Ben [R-VA-6]- 05/23/2023
Rep. Wild, Susan [D-PA-7]- 05/24/2023
Rep. Moskowitz, Jared [D-FL-23]- 07/18/2023
Links To Related Analyses
Bacardi Spent Approximately US$690,000.00 And 251 Days Later Its Cuba Trademark Legislation Moved From House To Senate- With No Objection. Where Were Pernod Ricard Lobbyists? NGO's? Members? December 07, 2023
Eight Senators, Two Representatives Supporting Trademark Legislation To Benefit Bacardi. But, Does Legislation Help Resolve 5,913 Certified Claims Against Cuba? March 12, 2023
2024 Address By Minister Of Foreign Affairs To The United Nations General Assembly
/Address by Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez
United Nations General Assembly
Saturday, September 28, 2024
Ms. President:
Mr. Secretary General:
Let me first reaffirm Cuba's solidarity and support for the brother and sister Palestinian people, victim of more than 75 years of colonial occupation, of flagrant violations of their legitimate rights as a nation, subjected to cruelty, aggression, collective punishment and apartheid.
In the last eleven months, the Israeli army has killed more than 40 thousand civilians. More children have died in this indiscriminate and disproportionate massacre than men and women. They die with the complicity and weapons provided by the United States government, with the complicit silence of others. We pay tribute to the more than 220 workers of this Organization, also murdered.
Cuba's position is clear and unequivocal. President Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez has said, and I quote: "History will not forgive the indifferent. And we will not be among them." It is a wound in the human conscience. The genocide against the Palestinian people must cease, unconditionally and without delay!
Israel, with the complicity of the United States, has placed the world before the imminent danger of a large-scale conflagration. The irresponsible aggression against Lebanon, Syria, Iran, and the peoples of the Middle East will have consequences that are difficult to estimate. Excellencies:
Seventy-nine years after the founding of this Organization, the continuous violations of the Charter of the United Nations and International Law, the aggressions, the interference in the internal affairs of States, and the imposition of unilateral coercive measures for political ends, occur as daily events.
Aggressive military doctrines of domination, expansionism and supremacy, alarmingly undermine international Peace and Security. The danger of a nuclear holocaust is real and immediate. For the ninth consecutive year, global military spending is increasing, reaching a record $2.44 trillion in 2023, including the development of nuclear weapons. It has been pushed back despite the enormous efforts of the States, Parties and Signatories of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and of clear-headed and broad sectors of international society. There will be no “peace without development” either.
Developed countries, inhabitants of the same planet, blindly refuse to invest even minimally in their own prosperity and security, and fail to meet their ever-insufficient commitments to Official Development Assistance. This selfish figure, boastfully promised in 2023 and quickly forgotten, represents less than 0.37 percent of national income. The illusion of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals has vanished. According to Forbes, in the last four years alone, the combined wealth of the world's five richest people has grown by $423 billion, while five billion people remain in poverty. Oxfam estimates that the richest 1% have almost twice as much wealth as the rest of the world's population. With a wealth tax on billionaires and multi-millionaires, two billion people could be lifted out of poverty. The crises are structural, determined by the imperialist system and the international order imposed on us. No problem will be solved by undermining the intergovernmental nature of the United Nations, as some claim, or by weakening its essential role in promoting sustainable development for all.
Climate change is advancing inexorably. It is an irrefutable fact. In July 2024, scientists announced that there had been 13 consecutive months of record-breaking temperature levels. If the irrational and unsustainable patterns of production and consumption of capitalism are not changed urgently and significantly, the increase in global average temperature will not be able to be contained to below 1.5 ◦C, with respect to pre-industrial levels. Responsibilities are shared, but differentiated; they are not the same for everyone, nor could they be fair. However, a positive step could be taken at the COP 29 Conference of the Parties in Azerbaijan and the adoption of the New Collective Financing Target. The countries of the North would have another opportunity to begin to close the gap in climate financing. Those of us in the South would have to design a sufficient target that responds to the needs, with guarantees for development and social justice, in the face of the enormous obstacles and challenges we face. The solution will inevitably have to include the cancellation of the foreign debt, already paid several times over. Excellencies and Delegates:
All this confirms the 1992 thesis of President Fidel Castro Ruz: “An important biological species is at risk of disappearing…: human beings.” Only overcoming imperialism and capitalism can definitively save it, and in that process, the founding of a new international order. A fair and democratic international order, which guarantees peace and “the balance of the world,” the exercise of the right to development by all States; on conditions of sovereign equality, which broadens and strengthens the participation and representation of developing countries in the processes of governance, decision-making and policy formulation at the global level; provides for the common good and prosperity of all peoples, in harmony with nature and the sustainable management of natural resources, and ensures the exercise of all human rights for all people.
A new civilized coexistence among nations where solidarity, international cooperation, integration and the peaceful settlement of disputes prevail, as alternatives to the “philosophy of plunder,” war, the use or threat of use of force, aggression, occupation; to cultural, political, financial, technological and military domination and hegemony or any other manifestation that threatens the peace, independence and sovereignty of States. An order without blockades or unilateral coercive measures, based on multilateralism and with full respect for the Charter of the United Nations and International Law. Ms. President:
The United States government continues to clearly demonstrate its impossible but pernicious determination to determine and control the destiny of Cuba. It is an old ambition anchored in the Monroe Doctrine, which defines the imperialist, dominant and hegemonic nature of U.S. policy towards Cuba and towards the region of Our America. The economic, commercial and financial blockade is also political, technological and communicational. It has been conceived as one of its main weapons of aggression to destroy the Cuban economy. It seeks to prevent the country's financial income, cause the collapse of the economy and generate a situation of political and social instability. The damage is visible and indisputable. It has repercussions on the lives of all Cubans. It is accompanied by the most ferocious campaign of disinformation and slander, by perennial attempts to interfere in our internal affairs and by the complicit tolerance of groups that organize violent and terrorist acts against Cuba from the territory of the United States. These actions violate International Law. They contravene the purposes and principles of this Organization and numerous resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. The siege thus conceived has been reinforced by the inclusion of Cuba on the arbitrary list of countries that are supposedly sponsors of terrorism by the U.S. State Department. This is a fraudulent designation, without moral authority or any international mandate. By virtue of it, retaliatory actions against Cuba are unleashed, which, in an extraterritorial manner, go beyond the framework of the sovereign jurisdiction of the United States and are manifested in and against any country.
Last May, the State Department itself recognized that Cuba fully cooperates in the fight against terrorism. This mere recognition of the truth, universally known, has not made the coercive measures of the blockade more flexible, but it does make Cuba's presence on this illegitimate list even more incongruous, confusing and unjustifiable. There will soon be new presidential elections in the United States, a matter that concerns only the Americans. Only them, despite the nefarious and historical habit of the government of that country of interfering in the elections and internal affairs of all the Member States of the United Nations, even its allies. History has shown us that, regardless of the result of these elections, the anti-Cuban politicians and sectors that have made aggression against Cuba a lucrative business will continue to have a voice and influence. They are those who have learned to manipulate the American political system based on a narrow and hostile agenda, very particular, only of interest to a small elite segment. They do not represent the will of the majority of the people of the United States, nor of the Cubans who live there. Whatever the electoral result, Cuba will continue to defend its sovereign right to independence and to build socialism, as we Cubans have decided, without foreign interference. We will also continue to advocate for a respectful and constructive relationship with the United States. Ms. President:
In 2014, the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) decided in Havana to proclaim our region a Zone of Peace. That historic commitment gains greater validity every day. We defend peace and multilateralism against unilateral coercive measures that seriously harm Syria, Belarus, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran, Russia, Cuba and other nations. We strongly reject any attempt to undermine the legitimate constitutional order in our countries through coup methods. This already happened in Bolivia in 2019 and on June 26th, and it is intended to happen again in Honduras.
We denounce the attempts to generate violence and destabilization in Venezuela. We reiterate our firm support and solidarity with the Bolivarian, Chavista government and the civic-military union of the Venezuelan people, led by President Nicolás Maduro Moros. The calls to ignore the election results are irresponsible and disrespectful of the popular will and its legitimate institutions. The destabilizing actions against the Government of Reconciliation and National Unity of Nicaragua must cease. The brotherly people of Sandino will continue to have our full support. We reiterate our support for the legitimate right to self-determination and independence of Puerto Rico. The Caribbean countries deserve fair, special and differentiated treatment to face their challenges. We support their fair claim for reparation for the damage caused by colonialism and slavery.
We welcome the efforts of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) to find a sustainable solution to the dramatic situation in Haiti, which respects the independence and sovereignty of that sister nation. The international community has a historical debt to Haiti, protagonist of the first independence and anti-slavery revolution on the continent. We support the legitimate right of sovereignty of the Argentine people over the Malvinas, South Sandwich and South Georgia Islands and the surrounding maritime spaces. We reaffirm our support and commitment to the peace efforts in Colombia, to which Cuba will continue to contribute in every way possible in its capacity as Guarantor. Africa, the cradle of humanity, can always count on Cuba in its efforts to advance on its path to development. We reaffirm our unwavering solidarity with the Sahrawi people and the exercise of their self-determination.
Cuba expresses its firm rejection of actions aimed at harming the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the People's Republic of China, condemns interference in its internal affairs and reiterates its unwavering support for the principle of "One China" in accordance with the decision of this General Assembly in its historic resolution 2758, recognizing the People's Republic as the sole and legitimate representative of the Chinese people. We advocate a serious, constructive, realistic diplomatic solution through peaceful means to the current war in Ukraine in accordance with International Law that guarantees the security and sovereignty of all. In this context, Cuba supports the joint proposal presented by China and Brazil for the political solution to this crisis.
Ms. President: Let us join forces to achieve the effectiveness of multilateral institutions and ensure that they respond to the interests of the humble, the poor, the needy and the exploited, who are the vast majority, on the basis of fair equality, the exercise of human rights by all human beings and respect for the sovereign rights of each nation. Thank you very much.
President Continues Trading With The Enemy Act Provisions Relating To Cuba
/The White House
Washington DC
13 September 2024
Presidential Determination No. 2024–11 of September 13, 2024
Continuation of the Exercise of Certain Authorities Under the Trading With the Enemy Act
Memorandum for the Secretary of State [and] the Secretary of the Treasury
Under section 101(b) of Public Law 95–223 (91 Stat. 1625; 50 U.S.C. 4305 note), and a previous determination on September 13, 2023 (88 FR 64347, September 18, 2023), the exercise of certain authorities under the Trading With the Enemy Act is scheduled to expire on September 14, 2024. I hereby determine that the continuation of the exercise of those authorities with respect to Cuba for 1 year is in the national interest of the United States.Therefore, consistent with the authority vested in me by section 101(b) of Public Law 95–223, I continue for 1 year, until September 14, 2025, the exercise of those authorities with respect to Cuba, as implemented by the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 CFR part 515. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and directed to publish this determination in the Federal Register.
Organization Reports 14 U.S. Grain Companies Refused To Sell (At Market Price) Wheat Flour For To Cuba. Was Then Sourced And Exported From Turkiye To Cuba. Organization Refusing To Provide Details.
/U.S. Organization Reports 14 U.S. Grain Companies Refused To Sell (At Market Price) Wheat Flour For Export To Cuba. Shipment Was Ultimately Reported As Sourced In And Exported From Turkiye To Cuba.
Thus Far, U.S. Organization Will Not Disclose Identity Of Companies.
Other U.S. Organizations Have Purchased Agricultural Commodities For Export To The Republic Of Cuba And Reported No Issues With Identifying Sources.
LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA
Peoples Dispatch
New York, New York
30 August 2024
Thousands of people in US send 800 tons of urgently needed flour to Cuba
US-based activists organized a massive flour distribution campaign to offset the effects of the deadly regime of US sanctions and the blockade against Cuba
On August 30, US-based activists delivered 800 tons of flour to Cuba via the “Let Cuba Live: Bread for our Neighbors” campaign. This campaign has been months in the making, with the US-based Peoples Forum raising hundreds of thousands in donations, and intends to offset the effects of the deadly regime of US sanctions and the blockade against Cuba. Over 1,300 people donated to the campaign.
“The concept of the campaign is simple: Cuba is our neighbor, and we can’t let our neighbors go hungry,” said Manolo De Los Santos, Executive Director of The People’s Forum. “This hunger is imposed directly by the White House, and Biden could end it right away by allowing Cuba to trade freely.”
Cuba is facing a significant food crisis due to the ongoing US economic war against the socialist island nation. Although, the US State Department claims that its blockade of Cuba exempts shipments of food, medicine, and other humanitarian goods. However, even US officials agree this does not reflect reality. As US Secretary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack said back in March, “There’s a significant impediment to trade in Cuba because of [US] legislation that requires payment in advance in cash in US dollars which makes it very, very difficult for a lot of [agricultural] trade to take place.”
Campaign organizers themselves reported facing significant challenges in sourcing the bread for Cuba, despite receiving donations from thousands of people of conscience in the US.
“The campaign organizers reached out to 14 different grain producers in the US to purchase the massive order but received not a single positive response. In order to successfully complete the delivery, the grain had to be shipped from Turkey and suffered delays because of the US government’s policy of extreme and arbitrary harassment of Cuba’s foreign trade, which is meant to create desperation for the people of Cuba and has brutal consequences,” Bread for our Neighbors activists reported.
Peoples Forum
New York, New York
30 August 2024
”US$207,986.00 of US$400,000.00
1,358 Donors
What would you do if your neighbor was starving? This is not a hypothetical. Right now the U.S. government is deliberately starving the Cuban people 90 miles to our South. We all must act now.
A food crisis is unfolding on the island of an unprecedented scale. A country where hunger had been made a thing of the past is now running out of bread and other essential food items.
We are launching an emergency campaign — Let Cuba Live: Bread for Our Neighbors. Our goal is to send 800 tons of wheat flour to Cuba as legal humanitarian aid, so that millions of people have bread for a month. Can you join with thousands of others to make a donation, as you would for your neighbor next door?
We aren’t just trying to feed a family or a single block. We want to bring bread to whole provinces. A $100 donation gets us enough wheat flour to produce 70,000 bread rolls.
The U.S. could end this suffering quickly if it were to lift the blockade and remove Cuba from the “State Sponsors of Terrorism List,” which Trump absurdly imposed on the island five years ago. This has totally blocked Cuba from a broad range of financial and trade transactions and made it impossible to get international credits.
As an example: in the last three weeks we called 14 grain companies in the United States offering to pay market rate for grain to go to Cuba as urgent humanitarian aid. We haven’t received a single positive reply.
This cannot stand. All people of conscience in the United States have to speak up and take action to let Cuba live. We’ve all been outraged to see the urgent aid for Rafah blocked at the border, while famine stalks the Palestinian people. We can’t allow the same thing to happen directly to our south. Please make a donation today — give bread to our neighbor.
Once the wheat flour arrives in Cuba, it will be received and distributed by the Martin Luther King Jr Memorial Center in Havana, Cuba. The People's Forum will match all donations up $100,000.
Please make a donation today — give bread to our neighbor.
To donate by check:
Make check out to: The People's Forum
On memo line write: "Bread For Our Neighbors" (*do not write Cuba on the check!*)
Mail to:
The People's Forum
320 W 37th St
New York, NY 10018”
Agencia Cubana De Noticias (ACN)
Havana, Republic of Cuba
30 August 2024
HAVANA, Cuba, Aug 30 (ACN) Some 800 tons of wheat flour was donated to Cuba by the US organization The People's Forum, and according to Manolo de los Santos, its executive director, many hands from all over the world offered solidarity help to achieve it…. The young friend of the Island, based in New York, denounced the genocide that constitutes the blockade of the US government against Cuba, and gave as an example that for this donation they talked to 14 different companies in the US and none dared to sell that flour, they had to look for others as far away as Turkey, when it is only 90 miles away from Cuba, he said.
