Government Of Cuba Revenues, Shareholders In Canada's Sherritt International Corporation Will Suffer From Low Nickel, Cobalt, Lithium Prices Expected In 2024. Cuba Consistently Owes Sherritt Money.

The Wall Street Journal
New York, New York
29 December 2023

Sustainable Business

Low Battery Metal Prices Set to Persist in 2024, Adding Friction to Energy Transition Oversupply and weak Chinese demand are likely to peg back prices for another year

By Yusuf Khan

Prices for metals used in batteries swooned in 2023, as rising supply and weak demand drove lithium to its cheapest level in two years, cobalt to its lowest point in four and nickel to its pandemic-era nadir. Next year looks likely to bring more of the same. 

Lower battery metal prices have made electric vehicles and electrical grid storage cheaper in the near term, but persistently low prices could delay the investment required to ramp up supply of these key energy-transition materials, ultimately making the shift to a green economy slower and more expensive.

What happened?

Mining companies and battery investors had bet on EV sales growing faster than projected in 2023, while analysts had expected a rebound in the purchase of battery metals for EVs in the year as China came out of Covid-19 induced lockdowns. But slow economic growth in China and globally, combined with rising interest rates, put a damper on both.

Global EV sales in 2023 are now expected to reach 14 million, with about 63% in China, according to Bloomberg NEF, an energy-focused research service.  “Expectations across the industry may have been too high,” Bloomberg NEF said.

More than 20 lithium mines opened in 2023, according to commodity data provider Fastmarkets. Miners have also been expanding production with an eye on the long term because new mines on average take 10 to 15 years to come online.  With supply increasing and demand falling short of expectations, prices have fallen. The price of lithium carbonate—a raw material in batteries—fell 70% this year, Benchmark Mineral Intelligence data shows. Prices for cobalt are down 25%, according to the research firm and price provider, while nickel prices on the London Metal Exchange are down 45%.

“Pre-Covid there were supply concerns,” said Kwasi Ampofo, head of metals and mining at Bloomberg NEF. Producers in China and Australia ramped up their supplies as economies reopened, but demand hasn’t kept up, he said.  “We did not come out of Covid with a bang as expected,” Ampofo said.

What’s in the cards for 2024?

Supply of all three battery metals is expected to outpace demand in the year ahead. “The outlook is quite bearish,” Ampofo said.  Lithium prices are likely nearing the bottom because producers are now selling close to or below their cost of production, according to Jordan Roberts, battery raw materials analyst at Fastmarkets. “Producers [will] consider further production cuts to balance the market and stem further losses,” he said. 

Roberts forecasts a 30% jump in lithium supply in 2024, but lithium-demand expectations are mixed.  He projects a 30% increase in lithium demand for next year, which could help lift prices, but “Chinese market participants expect downstream demand to remain weak, with demand only expected to increase 10-15% year-on-year,” Roberts said. In the latter case, the outcome would be a considerable surplus in the market, he said.  Benchmark Mineral Intelligence projects a 30,000 metric ton surplus in the global lithium market for next year. 

Cobalt prices look likely to remain under pressure too. Jack Bedder, founder and director of critical-minerals consulting firm Project Blue, said the cobalt market is currently very oversupplied due to sluggish demand and high inventories. “All of this is bad news for cobalt prices,” Bedder said, adding that he expects more of the same in 2024 as producers run down stocks.  Benchmark forecasts worldwide supply of cobalt to outstrip demand by 20,000 tons in 2024.  And nickel is no different. “There’s not much positive movement and we’re not expecting this oversupply to change,” Benchmark analyst Spencer Ingall said. A number of producers in Indonesia have halted production on the low prices, he said. The global surplus of nickel is projected to far exceed that of lithium and cobalt next year, according to Benchmark, which puts it at 200,000 tons. 

Why does this matter?

Demand is expected to soar for both electric vehicles and the minerals that go into them. Bloomberg NEF is forecasting global battery demand of 3.6 terawatt hours in 2030, up from 0.95 terawatt hours in 2023. The market for lithium-ion batteries alone is expected to surpass $300 billion by 2031, more than double what it is today. 

But the supply of battery metals is determined largely by market conditions, including prices high enough to motivate miners to dig and explore.  Persistently low prices for cobalt, lithium and nickel could delay the development of needed new sources, creating shortfalls and driving up battery prices in the longer term, thereby slowing decarbonization efforts. 

While lower prices aren’t good news for miners, they can help cell makers cut the cost of a battery pack, making it cheaper to buy an electric car. Battery pack prices are forecast to fall further in 2024, to $133 per kilowatt-hour, after sliding to $139 per kWh this year from $161 per kWh in 2022, according to Bloomberg NEF. Prices are sharply lower than the $780 per kWh in 2013, but some of that cost reduction has come from scaling up production and reducing the amount of battery materials used, rather than a drop in commodity prices.  

“The long-term [demand] prospect still remains…[so] supply is going to have to go faster than in the last few years if we are to keep up,” Ampofo said. “There has to be a sweet spot for miners and battery manufacturers.”

LINK: Toronto, Canada-based Sherritt International Corportaion Internet Site

“Sherritt is a world leader in the mining and refining of nickel and cobalt -- metals essential for the growing adoption of electric vehicles. Its Technologies Group creates innovative, proprietary solutions for oil and mining companies around the world to improve environmental performance and increase economic value.  Sherritt is also the largest independent energy producer in Cuba.”

U.S. Department Of State Issues "U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Outer Limits" But Reports U.S. And Cuba Have ECS Agreement.

United States Department Of State
Washington DC
19 September 2023

Announcement of U.S. Extended Continental Shelf Outer Limits
Fact Sheet

What is the ECS?  The continental shelf is the extension of a country’s land territory under the sea.  The continental shelf holds many resources (e.g., corals, crabs) and vital habitats for marine life.  The portion of the continental shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the coast is known as the “extended continental shelf,” or ECS.  The ECS includes the seabed and subsoil, but not the water column.

Where is the U.S. ECS?  The United States has ECS in seven regions:  the Arctic, Atlantic (east coast), Bering Sea, Pacific (west coast), Mariana Islands, and two areas in the Gulf of Mexico.  The U.S. ECS area is approximately one million square kilometers – an area about twice the size of California.  The geographic coordinates and maps of the seven U.S. ECS regions are available in the Executive Summary posted on the U.S. ECS website at state.gov/shelf.

Why determine the ECS limits?  The United States, like other countries, has an inherent interest in knowing, and declaring to others, the extent of its ECS and thus where it is entitled to exercise sovereign rights.  Defining our ECS outer limits in geographical terms provides the specificity and certainty necessary to allow the United States to conserve and manage the resources of the ECS.

What are U.S. rights in the ECS?  Like other countries, the United States has exclusive rights to conserve and manage the living and non-living resources of its ECS.The United States also has jurisdiction over marine scientific research relating to the ECS, as well as other authorities provided for under customary international law, as reflected in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

What’s down there?   Much of the ocean – especially the deep ocean – remains unexplored.  Continued mapping and exploration of the ECS will be important to gaining a better understanding of its habitats, ecosystems, biodiversity, and resources.
How are ECS limits determined?  The continental shelf is defined in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and the ECS outer limits are determined using the complex rules found in Article 76.  Applying these rules requires knowledge of the geophysical and geological characteristics of the seabed and subsoil.

What information is needed to determine ECS outer limits?  Two primary datasets are needed to determine the outer limits of the ECS.  The first is bathymetric data, which provide a three-dimensional map of the surface of the seafloor.  The second is seismic data, which provide information on the depth, thickness, and other characteristics of the sediments beneath the seafloor.  Geological samples and other geophysical techniques, where available, are used to augment these primary data types.  U.S. data collection began in 2003 and constitutes the largest offshore mapping effort ever conducted by the United States.   

Who did the work?  The ECS Task Force, an interagency body of the U.S. Government, coordinated the delineation of the outer limits of the U.S. ECS.  The Department of State chairs the Task Force, leads the ECS Project Office, and manages the project’s diplomatic and legal aspects.  The U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) leads the effort to collect, process, and interpret the seismic and geologic data.  The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) leads the effort to collect, process, and analyze the bathymetric data.  Many other Federal and academic partners collaborated to complete the work over the course of more than 20 years.

Is the United States extending its exclusive economic zone (EEZ)?  No.  The ECS is not an extension of the EEZ.  The continental shelf includes only the seabed and subsoil, whereas the EEZ also includes the water column.  In addition, while the maximum extent of the EEZ is 200 nautical miles from the coast, the continental shelf may extend beyond 200 nautical miles.  Some of the rights that a country has in its EEZ, especially sovereign rights over water column resources (such as fish), do not apply to the ECS.

Does the U.S. ECS overlap with the ECS areas of any neighboring countries?  Yes.  The U.S. ECS partially overlaps with ECS areas of Canada, The Bahamas, and Japan.  In these areas, the United States and its neighbors will need to establish maritime boundaries in the future.  In other areas, the United States has already established ECS boundaries with its neighbors, including with Cuba, Mexico, and Russia.  

Does the Administration still support joining the Law of the Sea Convention?  Yes.  Like past Administrations, both Republican and Democratic, this Administration supports the United States joining the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.  The announcement of the U.S. ECS limits in no way changes the Administration’s position toward the Convention.  

More information: Visit the U.S. ECS website at state.gov/shelf.

Key graphics:
S. ECS areas – Map showing the seven U.S. ECS regions
Maritime zones – Diagram showing maritime zones under the international law of the sea, including the extended continental shelf

After Almost Seven Years... Biden-Harris Administration "Transmitting Two Maritime Treaties" One With Cuba To The United States Senate

The White House
Washington DC
18 December 2023

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES: With a view to receiving the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, I transmit herewith two bilateral maritime boundary Treaties:  the Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Cuba on the Delimitation of the Continental Shelf in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico beyond 200 Nautical Miles (the "United States-Cuba Treaty"), and the Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the United Mexican States on the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Eastern Gulf of Mexico (the "United States-Mexico Treaty") (together, the "Treaties"), both of which were signed at Washington on January 18, 2017. 

I also transmit, for the information of the Senate, the report of the Department of State with respect to the Treaties. The purpose of the Treaties is to establish our continental shelf boundaries in the eastern Gulf of Mexico with Cuba and Mexico in areas beyond 200 nautical miles from shore.  The United States-Cuba Treaty establishes a maritime boundary of approximately 30 nautical miles in length, and the United States-Mexico Treaty establishes a maritime boundary of approximately 79 nautical miles in length.  The boundaries define the limit within which each country may exercise maritime jurisdiction with respect to its portion of the continental shelf. 

The boundaries address the only remaining area in the Gulf of Mexico where the maritime boundaries between the United States and its neighbors had not been agreed.The United States-Cuba Treaty also establishes procedures for addressing the possibility of oil and gas reservoirs that extend across the continental shelf boundary, which will help protect related United States interests. 

With respect to Mexico, such procedures were developed and set forth in a separate agreement that is already in force, as described in the report of the Department of State accompanying this message.I believe the Treaties to be fully in the interest of the United States. 

In light of the relevant coastal geography, the Treaties allocate approximately two-thirds of the area in question to the United States, and they provide legal certainty with respect to United States sovereign rights and jurisdiction over the continental shelf.I recommend that the Senate give early and favorable consideration to the Treaties, and give its advice and consent to ratification.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.
THE WHITE HOUSE, December 18, 2023.

U.S. Department Of State Discusses Cuba's Inclusion On List Of State Sponsors Of Terrorism.

United States Department of State
Washington DC
14 December 2023

Briefing excerpts:

QUESTION: Matt, follow-up. Question on Cuba. At the end of the Trump administration, they designated Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terror. Last week in a briefing with Congress, the State Department told members of Congress that they have not even begun a review of whether Cuba should be removed from the State Sponsor of Terror list. As you know, there’s been 450,000 migrants that have flown out of Cuba over the last two years. The economy has been decimated as a result of this designation. Why hasn’t the review begun?

MR MILLER: So I’m not going to speak to either an internal deliberative process here inside the State Department or our conversations with members of Congress, though they of course are —

QUESTION: Matt, follow-up.

MR MILLER: I’m in the middle of answering someone else’s question right now. You might – maybe hold for just a second. As we have said previously, should there be any rescission of the State Sponsor of Terrorism status, it would need to be consistent with a specific statutory criteria for rescinding that determination. Any review of Cuba’s status on the list, should one ever happen, would be based on the law and the criteria established by Congress, but the President and Secretary Blinken remain committed to the policies that we have advanced that will advance the democratic aspirations of the Cuban people.

QUESTION: There’s a six-month statutory requirement, as you know. Is the administration nervous that you will run out of time in this term in order to make a decision if you haven’t started the review yet?

MR MILLER: So again, I don’t think I can answer that with violating what I said I wasn’t going to do at the outset, which is comment on internal deliberations.

Another Reason From OFAC For Financial Institutions To Avoid Cuba- The Range Of A Penalty: US$1.2 Million Settlement With US$327.3 Million Potentiality.

“Enforcement Release: December 13, 2023 OFAC Settles with CoinList Markets LLC for $1,207,830 Related to Apparent Violations of the Ukraine-/Russia-Related Sanctions Regulations CoinList Markets LLC (“CLM”), a San Francisco, California-based virtual currency exchange, has agreed to pay $1,207,830 to settle its potential civil liability arising from processing 989 transactions on behalf of users ordinarily resident in Crimea between April 2020 and May 2022, in apparent violation of OFAC’s Russia/Ukraine sanctions. The settlement amount reflects OFAC determination that CLM’s apparent violations were not voluntarily self-disclosed and were nonegregious.”

“Penalty Calculation and General Factors Analysis The statutory maximum civil monetary penalty applicable in this matter is $327,306,583. OFAC determined that the Apparent Violations were not voluntarily self-disclosed and were non-egregious. Accordingly, under OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines (“Enforcement Guidelines”), the base civil monetary penalty amount applicable in this matter equals the applicable schedule amount, which in this case is $3,097,000. The settlement amount of $1,207,830 reflects OFAC’s consideration of the General Factors under the Enforcement Guidelines.”

LINK TO DECISION IN PDF FORMAT

U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decrease 26.3% In October 2023; Remain Up 4.95% Year-To-Year. US$1.1 Million In "Aerial Reflectors" And US$30 Million In Donated Goods Already Exceeds Full Year 2022.

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
December 2023

October 2023 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decrease 23.6%- 1
59th Of 228 October 2023 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 4.95%- 2
Cuba Ranked 54th Of 228 2023 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets- 2
October 2023 Healthcare Product Exports US$65,173.00- 2
October 2023 Humanitarian Donations US$2,745,566.00- 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue- 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 19

OCTOBER 2023 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA DECREASE 23.6%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in October 2023 were US$15,928,609.00 compared to US$20,852,560.00 in October 2022 and US$22,271,632.00 in October 2021. 

October 2023 exports included: Chicken Meat (Frozen), Chicken Leg Quarters (Frozen), Chicken Legs (Frozen), Meat Of Swine (Fresh), Preserved Chicken Meat, Meat Of Swine, Processed (Frozen), Meat Of Swine (Frozen), Pig Fat (Frozen), Preserved Chicken Meat (Paste), Coffee Roasted Decaffeinated, Fresh Cheese, Rice, Confectioner Sugar, Infant Preparations, Juices, Ice Cream, Gelatin, Mineral Water, Detergents, Toilet Paper, Sweaters, Brace Overalls, Footwear, Hair Nets, Umbrellas, Turbochargers, Air Conditioners, Weighing Machinery, Electric Self-Propelled Work Trucks, Machine For Working Hard Materials, Cooking Stove/Range/Oven Parts, Aerial Reflectors (US$1,135,439.00), Used Vehicles (US$476,625.00), Passenger Motor Vehicles (US$288,955.00).

January 2023 through October 2023 TSREEA exports were US$268,733,465.00 compared to January 2022 through October 2022 exports of US$256,057,483.00. Total TSREEA exports since first deliveries in December 2001 exceed: US$7,172,459,831.00.

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA and CDA. The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

Bacardi Spent Approximately US$690,000.00 And 251 Days Later Its Cuba Trademark Legislation Moved From House To Senate- With No Objection. Where Were Pernod Ricard Lobbyists? NGO's? Members?

Rocket Docket For Cuba-Related Legislation? 

Bacardi Spent Wisely US$690,000.00 Thus Far In 2023 

How Did Cuba Trademark Legislation Designed To Protect Hamilton, Bermuda-Based Bacardi Limited Move Through United States House Of Representatives Absent Any Opposition From Members Who Have Advocated For An Expansion Of Commercial, Economic, Financial, And Political Relations Between The United States And The Republic Of Cuba? 

Surprise Jarrold Nadler (D- 12th District, New York), Ranking Member Of The Judiciary Committee Of The United States House Of Representatives, Supported The Legislation Given His Previous Positions On Republic Of Cuba-Related Issues. 

No Objections?  Not One Member 

Where Were Lobbyists And NGO’s?  

Bacardi North America Reports 2023 Thus Far Spending US$570,000.00 On Various Issues And The Cormac Group LLC Reports Spending US$120,000.00 Lobbying On Various Issues For Bacardi North America. 

From Hamilton, Bermuda-Based Bacardi Limited (2022 Revenue Approximately US$4.6 Billion) Through Coral Gables, Florida-Based Bacardi North America (Formerly Bacardi USA, Inc.) 2023 United States Congress Lobbying Reports.  Lobbying Focuses Include: 

• “Bacardi Limited, the ultimate parent of Bacardi North America, has an indirect general interest in U.S. trademark laws.” 

• “HR 1505 and S 746, No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act, amending Section 211 of the Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1999 to protect the original owners of confiscated Cuban trademarks in America.” 

• “Issues related to the economic embargo of Cuba.” 

From Hamilton, Bermuda-Based Bacardi Limited (2022 Revenue Approximately US$4.6 Billion) Through Coral Gables, Florida-Based Bacardi North America (Formerly Bacardi USA, Inc.) 2023 United States Congress Lobbying Reports By Washington DC-Based The Cormac Group, LLC Which References Up To Five Lobbyists Servicing Bacardi North America.  Lobbying Focuses Include: 

• “Cuban Trademark Protection Legislation and US-Cuba relations” 

• “Cuban Trademark Protection Legislation and US-Cuba relations. H.R. 1505/S.746 - No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act.” 

Who Represents Paris, France-Based Pernod Ricard (2022 Revenue Approximately US$11.6 Billion) To The United States Congress (United States Senate And United States House of Representatives)?  From 2023 Lobbying Disclosures: ABI Associates, Arent Fox Schiff LLP, Ballard Partners, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck LLP, Crossroads Strategies LLC, Ernst & Young LLP, And Miller Strategies LLC. 

A Few Too Many Havana Club Mojito Cocktails… And Fell Asleep? 

What May Happen In The United States Senate?  Will Marco Rubio (R- Florida) Seek To Attach An Amendment To The New Farm Bill- As He Successfully Attached Republic Of Cuba-Related Amendment To Previous Farm Bill In 2018? 

• Cuba Provision In Farm Bill A Confliction Of Accuracy By Senators Heitkamp & Rubio; OFAC Rule Making Could Be Problematic June 29, 2018 

• Will Cuba FMD/MAP Provisions In 2018 Farm Bill Be Retained In 2023 Farm Bill? In Five Years, Only 4.4% Uses Of Programs. In 2018, Advocates Said "Important" Oct 26, 2023  

U.S. House Of Representatives Legislation Background 

5. H.R.1505 — 118th Congress (2023-2024) No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act of 2023 Sponsor: Issa, Darrell E. [Rep.-R-CA-48] (Introduced 03/09/2023) Cosponsors: (18) Committees: House - Judiciary | Senate - Judiciary Committee Report: H. Rept. 118-232 Latest Action: Senate - 11/14/2023 Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. (All Actions) 

11/14/2023- Senate; Received in the Senate and Read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary.
11/13/2023-4:41pm- House; Motion to reconsider laid on the table Agreed to without objection.
11/13/2023-4:41pm- House; On motion to suspend the rules and pass the bill, as amended Agreed to by voice vote. (text: CR H5676)
11/13/2023-4:32pm- House; DEBATE - The House proceeded with forty minutes of debate on H.R. 1505.
11/13/2023-4:32pm- House; Considered under suspension of the rules. (consideration: CR H5676-5677)
11/13/2023-4:31pm- House; Mr. Issa moved to suspend the rules and pass the bill, as amended.
09/29/2023- House; Placed on the Union Calendar, Calendar No. 188.
09/29/2023- House; Reported (Amended) by the Committee on Judiciary. H. Rept. 118-232.   
05/24/2023- House; Ordered to be Reported (Amended) by Voice Vote. Action By: Committee on the Judiciary
05/24/2023- House; Committee Consideration and Mark-up Session Held Action By: Committee on the Judiciary
03/09/2023- House; Referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary.
03/09/2023- House; Introduced in House

Page H5676- 13 November 2023
1. PLEDGE OF   ALLEGIANCE; Congressional Record Vol. 169, No. 187 | PDF (257KB)
2. COMMUNICATION   FROM THE CLERK OF THE HOUSE; Congressional Record Vol. 169, No. 187 | PDF (245KB)
3. COMMUNICATION   FROM CHIEF OF STAFF, THE HONORABLE NANCY PELOSI, MEMBER OF CONGRESS; Congressional Record Vol. 169, No. 187 | PDF (245KB)
4. RECESS;   Congressional Record Vol. 169, No. 187 | PDF (245KB)
5. AFTER RECESS;   Congressional Record Vol. 169, No. 187 | PDF (245KB)
6. ANNOUNCEMENT   BY THE SPEAKER PRO TEMPORE; Congressional Record Vol. 169, No. 187 | PDF (245KB)
7. NO STOLEN   TRADEMARKS HONORED IN AMERICA ACT OF 2023; Congressional Record Vol. 169, No. 187 | PDF (259KB)

https://www.congress.gov/congressional-record/volume-169/issue-187/house-section/page/H5676 

[Pages H5676-H5677] From the Congressional Record Online through the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov] 

NO STOLEN TRADEMARKS HONORED IN AMERICA ACT OF 2023
13 November 2023         

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I move to suspend the rules and pass the bill (H.R. 1505) to modify the prohibition on recognition by United States courts of certain rights relating to certain marks, trade names, or commercial names, as amended.  The Clerk read the title of the bill. The text of the bill is as follows: H.R. 1505 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ``No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act of 2023''. 

SEC. 2. MODIFICATION OF PROHIBITION. 

Section 211 of the Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 (as contained in section 101(b) of division A of Public Law 105-277; 112 Stat. 2681- 88) is amended-- (1) in subsection (a)(2)-- (A) by inserting ``or entity of the executive branch'' after ``U.S. court''; (B) by striking ``by a designated national''; and (C) by inserting before the period ``that was used in connection with a business or assets that were confiscated unless the original owner of the mark, trade name, or commercial name, or the bonafide successor-in-interest has expressly consented''; (2) in subsection (b)-- (A) by inserting ``or entity of the executive branch'' after ``U.S. court''; and (B) by striking ``by a designated national or its successor-in-interest''; (3) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); (4) by inserting after subsection (c) the following: ``(d) Subsections (a)(2) and (b) of this section shall apply only if the person or entity asserting the rights knew or had reason to know at the time when the person or entity acquired the rights asserted that the mark, trade name, or commercial name was the same as or substantially similar to a mark, trade name, or commercial name that was used in connection with a business or assets that were confiscated.''; and (5) in subsection (e), as so redesignated, by striking ``In this section:'' and all that follows through ``(2) The term'' and inserting ``In this section, the term''. 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Pursuant to the rule, the gentleman from California (Mr. Issa) and the gentleman from New York (Mr. Nadler) each will control 20 minutes.  The Chair recognizes the gentleman from California. 

General Leave 

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks and to insert extraneous material on H.R. 1505. 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?  There was no objection. 

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.  Mr. Speaker, it is hard for the American people to believe, but it is true that foreign actors--foreign countries--have, in fact, stolen trademarks, absconded with the actual factories and the ability to produce various items and then had the gall to, in fact, use American law to sell America products that they in reality had already stolen. This is no more truer than in the case of the communist nation of Cuba. Under Fidel Castro, Cuba took everything. They took Coca-Cola. They took every possible item they could take, and then they took trade names. In some cases, like Coca-Cola, Coke continued to be produced in the United States, so it had no rights. In the case of Bacardi, Bacardi moved to Puerto Rico and began making it there and selling it in the United States. In the case of, for example, Havana Club, they found themselves without any factories, so they worked together with other producers to continue their brand. While their brand was, in fact, being produced in America, the Castro regime--and now the Cuban Government--continued to apply year after year until eventually, due to what we would consider to be a wrongful act by the United States Patent and Trademark Office, awarded this country, who had stolen and still to this day uses the factories and the lands belonging to the family that produced Havana Club, they continue to sell Havana Club. Now, to make matters worse, we are only talking about the United States because most of the world, in fact, took that brand name and was able to sell it in other countries. So the family that owned worldwide rights lost all but the United States, and if not for this piece of legislation, they and others would lose even their right here. I am delighted to join with my colleague, Ms. Wasserman Schultz of Florida, to introduce this bill. It has 17 cosponsors, and it passed through the Judiciary Committee on a bipartisan basis. We all agree that the U.S. Government should not award those who steal and exploit trademarks or any other intellectual property from its legitimate owners to then benefit from U.S. law. Allowing Cuba to propagate its misappropriations would be and is currently a travesty.  Mr. Speaker, I urge my colleagues to support this bipartisan legislation, and I reserve the balance of my time. 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 1505, the No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act. H.R. 1505 would build on existing law to ensure that executive agencies do not recognize, enforce, or otherwise validate the assertion of trademark rights used in connection with a business whose assets were confiscated by the Cuban regime unless the original owner expressly consented to the transfer of that mark. It also makes technical amendments to ensure that we are in compliance with certain international obligations. This legislation largely involves a long-running dispute over the rightful ownership of a specific trademark that has played out over the course of many decades. It is a tale with more twists and turns than a John Grisham novel. This bill is really about a much larger principle--that we stand with the Cuban people whose property was seized by the Castro regime, and we will not give the protection and benefits of the U.S. trademark system to the holders of stolen property. Our trademark system must not be allowed to be a vehicle for the perpetrators of stolen property to profit from their theft. I thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Issa) and the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Wasserman Schultz) for bringing this legislation forward. Mr. Speaker, I urge all Members to support it, and I reserve the balance of my time. 

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, I yield 3 minutes to the distinguished gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Wasserman Schultz), the cosponsor of this legislation. 

Ms. WASSERMAN SCHULTZ. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding and for his longstanding support of this important legislation that really reflects the values that we stand for here in the United States of America. I particularly thank the gentleman from California (Mr. Issa) for the back and forth--depending on who is in the majority in our Chamber in each successive Congress--as we sort of trade responsibility for who leads this bill. In addition, I have also previously co-led this legislation with our former colleague, Congresswoman Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, and Mr. Diaz-Balart also joins us, as well. There is really broad bipartisan support for this bill, and I am so proud to lead this legislation on the Democratic side of the aisle. This legislation would ensure that our government is never complicit in theft and expropriation ordered by autocracies.  By prohibiting U.S. recognition of illegally confiscated trademarks, this bill stands strongly against attempts by the Cuban regime to profit from hijacked intellectual property. Representing a diaspora community as I do, I have heard countless constituents recount how their home countries stripped them of hard-earned wealth. Many Cuban families had to start from scratch when they arrived. They had property and their businesses confiscated. Our Nation has benefited immeasurably from their cultural contributions and entrepreneurial spirit. We are not just a nation of immigrants. We are a nation of innovators. We should always reward creativity and punish piracy. Our most fundamental responsibility is protecting Americans and those living in our country from being victimized by our adversaries. Our failure to do so would only embolden global despots who seek to target their exiles. I hope my colleagues join us in refusing to tolerate trademarks being held hostage, as this one is in particular, and the many others that are held hostage by the Cuban regime and other regimes, as well. I am hopeful that our friends on the other side of the Capitol, once we send this bill to them, will send it to the President of the United States for his signature. 

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time. 

Mr. NADLER. Mr. Speaker, this legislation makes a minor clarification to our trademark laws while serving notice to corrupt regimes across the world that America's intellectual property system must not be used to further their efforts to steal property from their own people. Mr. Speaker, I urge all Members to support this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

Mr. ISSA. Mr. Speaker, in closing, I will make it very clear, if this product's trademark becomes available to its rightful owners again, the well-known company Bacardi will, in fact, have this product on the shelves again. If it is not passed, Cuba will not be able to sell under this name. In fact, these products would be prohibited if they came from Cuba. The only purpose of Cuba trying to take this was to deny Cuban Americans the ability to sell a product that they owned before it was taken from the country. There was an injustice that occurred before many in this room were born. We can only cure that injustice now by, in fact, passing this legislation. I join with the gentlewoman from Florida (Ms. Wasserman Schultz) in urging all to vote for this bill as they have in this body, and then we will work on the people across the dome. Mr. Speaker, I urge passage of this bill, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

The SPEAKER pro tempore. The question is on the motion offered by the gentleman from California (Mr. Issa) that the House suspend the rules and pass the bill, H.R. 1505, as amended. The question was taken; and (two-thirds being in the affirmative) the rules were suspended and the bill, as amended, was passed. A motion to reconsider was laid on the table. 

U.S. Senate Legislation Background 

S. 746 was introduced on 9 March 2023 by Robert Menendez (D- New Jersey), then Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.  S. 746 was referred to the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary.   

Co-sponsors include Marco Rubio (R- Florida), Catherine Cortez Masto (D- Nevada), Mike Braun (R- Indiana), Thomas Tillis (R- North Carolina), Robert Marshall (R- Kansas), Mazie Hirono (D- Hawaii), and Todd Young (R- Indiana).   

Co-sponsors who are members of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary include: Senators Rubio, Hirono, and Tillis.  Ted Cruz (R- Texas) is a member of the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary and likely to co-sponsor S. 746. 

Senators Cruz, Menendez, and Rubio are of Cuban descent. 

The language in S. 746 is identical to the language in H.R. 1505, meaning a promising candidate for moving successfully through any bicameral (United States Senate and United States House of Representatives) conference committee.  

S. 746 

“To modify the prohibition on recognition by United States courts of certain rights relating to certain marks, trade names, or commercial names. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

9 March 2023  

Mr. Menendez (for himself, Mr. Rubio, Ms. Cortez Masto, Mr. Braun, Mr. Tillis, Mr. Marshall, Ms. Hirono, and Mr. Young) introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To modify the prohibition on recognition by United States courts of certain rights relating to certain marks, trade names, or commercial names.  Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,  

SECTION 1. Short title.

This Act may be cited as the “No Stolen Trademarks Honored in America Act”.

SEC. 2. Modification of prohibition. 

Section 211 of the Department of Commerce and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1999 (as contained in section 101(b) of division A of Public Law 105–277; 112 Stat. 2681–88) is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)(2)— (A) by inserting “or entity of the executive branch” after “U.S. court”; (B) by striking “by a designated national”; and (C) by inserting before the period at the end the following: “that was used in connection with a business or assets that were confiscated unless the original owner of the mark, trade name, or commercial name, or the bona fide successor-in-interest has expressly consented”; (2) in subsection (b)— (A) by inserting “or entity of the executive branch” after “U.S. court”; and (B) by striking “by a designated national or its successor-in-interest”; (3) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); (4) by inserting after subsection (c) the following:  “(d) Subsections (a)(2) and (b) of this section shall apply only if the person or entity asserting the rights knew or had reason to know at the time when the person or entity acquired the rights asserted that the mark, trade name, or commercial name was the same as or substantially similar to a mark, trade name, or commercial name that was used in connection with a business or assets that were confiscated.”; and (5) in subsection (e), as so redesignated, by striking “In this section:” and all that follows through “(2) The term” and inserting the following: “In this section, the term”.” 

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Links To Related Analyses 

Bacardi Condemns Decisions By Government Of Cuba, And Companies Operating In Cuba, Robustly Uses U.S. Political Process, But Defends Its US$474 Million Business In Russian Federation. Consistency? Nov 18, 2023  

The Kyiv Independent: Ukraine designates Bacardi as 'international sponsor of war' 10 August 2023 

U.S. Federal Court Rules Bacardi Must Use USPTO Rules For "Havana Club" Trademark Issue. April 08, 2022 

Eight Senators, Two Representatives Supporting Trademark Legislation To Benefit Bacardi. But, Does Legislation Help Resolve 5,913 Certified Claims Against Cuba? March 12, 2023 

With Three Days Remaining In 2021, Bacardi Sues United States Patent And Trademark Office For In 2016 Authorizing The Registration Of "Havana Club" Rum December 29, 2021 

Irony: Bacardi Assets Seized In 1960 By Cuba. Venezuela And Cuba Are Allies. Venezuela Seizes U.S. Company Assets. Bacardi Marketing Venezuela Rum Benefits Venezuela Financially & Politically November 03, 2021

U.S. Department Of State Explains Again Why Cuba Is A "State Sponsor Of Terrorism"

United States Department of State
Washington CC
30 November 2023

On the Release of the 2022 Country Reports on Terrorism 

Matthew Miller, Department Spokesperson 

“The Department of State issued the 2022 Country Reports on Terrorism (CRT).  Each year, the CRT provides insight on important issues in the fight against terrorism and helps the United States make informed decisions about policies, programs, and resource allocations as we seek to build counterterrorism capacity and resilience around the globe.  As the United States confronts a diverse and dynamic range of national security challenges, the U.S. government is deploying the full range of CT tools to ensure a sustainable whole-of-government and whole-of-society CT approach with allies and partners around the world.  The 2022 CRT is available on the Department’s website.

Chapter 2 -- State Sponsors of Terrorism  

This report provides a snapshot of events during 2022 relevant to countries designated as State Sponsors of Terrorism.  It does not constitute a new announcement regarding such designations. 

To designate a country as a State Sponsor of Terrorism, the Secretary of State must determine that the government of such country has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism.  Once a country is designated, it remains a State Sponsor of Terrorism until the designation is rescinded in accordance with statutory criteria requiring the President to certify either that a) a designated country has not provided any support for acts of international terrorism during the previous six months and has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future, or 2) there has been a fundamental change in the leadership and policies of the designated country, that the country is not supporting acts of international terrorism, and that the country has provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future.  A wide range of sanctions is imposed because of a State Sponsor of Terrorism designation, including the following: 

• A ban on arms-related exports and sales;
  Controls over exports of dual-use items, requiring 30-day Congressional notification for goods or services that could significantly enhance the terrorist-list country’s military capability or ability to support terrorism;
  Restrictions on U.S. foreign assistance;
  Visa processing requirements;
  Imposition of miscellaneous financial and other restrictions.

CUBA 

On January 12, 2021, the Department of State designated Cuba as a State Sponsor of Terrorism.  The Secretary determined that the Cuban government repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism in granting safe harbor to terrorists. 

Cuba was previously designated as a State Sponsor of Terrorism in 1982 because of its long history of providing advice, safe haven, communications, training, and financial support to guerrilla groups and individual terrorists. 

Cuba’s designation was rescinded in 2015 after a thorough review found that the country met the statutory criteria for rescission.  In 2021 the Secretary of State determined that Cuba had repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism in the six years since its designation had been rescinded.  Citing peace negotiation protocols, Cuba refused Colombia’s request to extradite 10 ELN leaders living in Havana after that group claimed responsibility for the 2019 bombing of a Bogotá police academy that killed 22 people and injured 87 others. 

The Cuban government did not formally respond to the extradition requests for ELN leaders Victor Orlando Cubides (aka “Pablo Tejada”) and Ramírez Pineda (aka “Pablo Beltrán”) filed by Colombia. 

In November, pursuant to an order from Colombian President Petro, the Attorney General announced that arrest warrants would be suspended against 17 ELN commanders, including those whose extradition Colombia had previously requested. 

Cuba also continues to harbor several U.S. fugitives from justice wanted on charges related to political violence, many of whom have resided in Cuba for decades.”