116th Congress Will Have Cuba Legislation: Boxing Match May Look Like This

The 116th United States Congress will have Republic of Cuba-related legislation introduced in the United States House of Representatives and in the United States Senate. 

If legislation becomes law, it will be a result of mixing the perspectives of two members of the United States Congress: 

The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- Florida): “What the Cuban government is trying to do is they are trying to create an economic dictatorship to build on the military one and the political one.”  

The Honorable Rick Crawford (R- Arkansas 1st District): “I applaud my Senate colleagues for working to get this provision into their bill and I worked hard to make sure it made it into the final conference report. The Heitkamp amendment is an important first step towards exporting American agriculture goods into Cuba… We look forward to building on this momentum in the 116th Congress.” 

The unknowns for the legislative contest in the 116th United States Congress are a) what will be in the initial legislative language b) what will be in the final legislative language and c) will any of the legislative language become law. 

The likely legislative match-up will include one boxer supporting language to re-authorize United States companies and United States financial institutions to provide, should they believe in their interests to do so, payment terms and financing to Republic of Cuba government-operated entities for purchase of agricultural commodities and food products from the United States.  The other boxer will be supporting language that 1) prohibits- or rather does its best to do so, any benefit to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba (FAR) and its commercially-focused entities 2) provides greater benefits for purchases by non-Republic of Cuba government-operated entities (i.e. private cooperatives, private farms, self-employed) and 3) requires a stipulated settlement process for the 5,913 certified claimants- who want prompt support from the Trump Administration. 

The legislative language guide will be based upon a provision in the recently-enacted H.R. 2 (The “Farm Bill”) which authorized the use in the Republic of Cuba of funding from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) for Market Access Program (MAP) and Foreign Market Development (FMD).  The provision in the Farm Bill was co-authored (reluctantly) by two members of the United States Senate: The Honorable Heidi Heitkamp (D- ND), who lost her 2018 re-election, and Senator Rubio.  Senator Heitkamp agreed to include language submitted by Senator Rubio that would prohibit MAP and FMD funding to be used with Republic of Cuba entities that are controlled by the FAR, consistent with policies of the Trump Administration.  That is the reason the provision became law.   

The specific language: “(d) Cuba. — Notwithstanding section 908 of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 ( 22 U.S.C. 7207 ) or any other provision of law, funds made available under this section may be used to carry out the programs authorized under sections 222 and 223 in Cuba. Funds may not be used as described in the previous sentence in contravention with directives set forth under the National Security Presidential Memorandum entitled ‘Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba’ issued by the President on June 16, 2017, during the period in which that memorandum is in effect. 

Penalizing the government of the Republic of Cuba for permitting the FAR to have a substantive role in the commercial, economic and political infrastructure throughout the country of 11.3 million citizens is unlikely to have opposition in the United States Congress (and certainly not within The Trump Administration) and unlikely to have opposition from United States companies, United States financial institutions and rational advocacy organizations. 

There is a legislative inevitability to re-authorizing (a change in United States law is required) United States companies and United States financial institutions to provide, should they believe in their interests to do so, payment terms and financing to Republic of Cuba government-operated entities for purchase of agricultural commodities and food products from the United States.   

Management of United States companies and United States financial institutions believe they, not the United States government, should determine whether a customer is worthy of payment terms or financing and worth the risk of incurring a delay or default.   

A change in United States law will expectantly arise a response from the government of the Republic of Cuba similar to that after the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) was enacted in 2000- that it would not purchase a grain of rice or a kernel of corn because payment terms and financing were not re-authorized.   

United States companies and United States organizations, after expending two years advocating for the TSREEA, were appalled by the position of the government of the Republic of Cuba and, as a result, substantially decreased their collective focus upon the Republic of Cuba.  United States exporters had quietly opposed a provision to the TSREEA to include payment terms and financing for fear a delay or default would doom future legislative and regulatory changes; the goal was to construct a multi-year track record from which future legislation would emerge.   

More than one year later, in December 2001, the government of the Republic of Cuba made its first purchases (US$4,318,906.00) of corn and poultry under TSREEA; stating the purchases were a “one-off” to supplement requirements after a hurricane and there should be no expectation for additional purchases. 

Since December 2001, the Republic of Cuba has purchased, on a cash-in-advance basis, more than US$5.8 billion in agricultural commodities and food products from United States companies.   

For United States companies, most believe that an eighteen-year track record of purchases suffices for shifting to the next stage in re-developing the bilateral commercial landscape between the United States and the Republic of Cuba.  And, that next stage necessarily means having a choice of accepting commercial transaction risk.  The government of the Republic of Cuba is expected to argue that after eighteen years of payments as required, and spending more than US$5.8 billion, aren’t they entitled, haven’t they earned the right to move beyond cash-and-carry? 

However, the government of the Republic of Cuba is likely to respond to any legislative change (including that within the Farm Bill although that provision is about spending funds in the Republic of Cuba, which would logically incur favor rather than scorn) soon after learning that payment terms and financing terms from United States companies and United States financial institutions are not as expansive as required given the abject perilousness of payment reliability by Republic of Cuba government-operated entities, by reducing (but not eliminating) purchases from the United States until it has access to programs which provide United States government payment guarantees to United States exporters and their customers.  Senator Rubio is likely to require there be no such access in any legislation.  Access to the following programs are the “holly grail” for the Republic of Cuba and in many respects is the final chapter for re-stablishing the bilateral commercial transaction process:   

United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Commodity Credit Corporation
Export Credit Guarantee Program
Facilities Guarantee Program 

Export-Import Bank (ExIm)
Export Working Capital Program
Working Capital Guarantee Program
Loan Guarantee Program
Direct Loan Program
Finance Lease Guarantee Program 

Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
Direct Loans and Loan Guarantees 

Small Business Administration (SBA)
Export Express Program
International Trade Loan Program 

For reference: The “pathway forward” for Republic of Cuba-focused (more accurately, Republic of Cuba-benefiting) legislative initiatives in the 116th United States Congress, may follow a pathway similar to the following:   

On 3 June 2015, The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- Florida), a member of the United States Senate, introduced S. 1489, the “Cuban Military Transparency Act.”  

S.1489 — 114th Congress (2015-2016) Cuban Military Transparency Act Sponsor: Sen. Rubio, Marco [R-FL] (Introduced 06/03/2015) Cosponsors: (8) Committees: Senate - Foreign Relations Latest Action: Senate - 06/03/2015 Read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations.  

On 25 June 2015, The Honorable Devin Nunes (R- California), a member of the United States House of Representatives, introduced H.R. 2937, the “Cuban Military Transparency Act.”  

H.R.2937 — 114th Congress (2015-2016) Cuban Military Transparency Act Sponsor: Rep. Nunes, Devin [R-CA-22] (Introduced 06/25/2015) Cosponsors: (49) Committees: House - Foreign Affairs, Financial Services Latest Action: House - 06/25/2015 Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Financial Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee.  

On 13 January 2017, The Honorable Rick Crawford (R- Arkansas), a member of the United States House of Representatives, introduced H.R. 525, the “Cuba Agricultural Exports Act.”   

H.R. 525 115th Congress (2017-2018) Cuba Agricultural Exports Act Sponsor: Rep. Crawford, Eric A. “Rick” [R-AR-1] (Introduced 01/13/2017) Cosponsors: (66) Committee: House - Foreign Affairs, Financial Services, Agriculture Latest Action: House - 01/13/2017 Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Financial Services, and Agriculture, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of. 

Current Statistics 

United States agricultural commodity and food product exports to the Republic of Cuba continue to decline; 16.1% thus far in 2018 compared to the same period in 2017- and have done so when commodity inventories have been high, commodity prices have been low and there would have been political value in purchases during a time of pain for United States farmers.  Healthcare product exports have also declined; 44.1% thus far in 2018 compared to the same period in 2017. 

Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSREEA) exports (agricultural commodities and food products) since first use by the Republic of Cuba in December 2001 are US$5,849,925,838.00 through October 2018: Clinton Administration: US$0.00. Bush Administration: US$2,697,501,426.00. Obama Administration: US$2,700,145,225.00. Trump Administration: US$452,279,187.00.  TSREEA requires that payments be made on a cash-in-advance basis; no other payment terms are permitted.

LINK To PDF Of Analysis

President Trump Mentions Cuba When Signing Farm Bill.... And It Wasn't Positive

The Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018 (H.R. 2) is valued at US$867 billion, to be expended during a five-year period; the document is more than 600 pages.

Yet The White House, when issuing a two-paragraph statement by the President of the United States, determined important to mention a provision within H.R. 2 which relates to the Republic of Cuba.

The background to the insertion of mention of the Republic of Cuba is relevant for those who believe there is a “pathway forward” and momentum for the 116th Congress in 2019 to pass legislation that will further expand the commercial relationship between the United States and the Republic of Cuba; specifically, authorizing the provision of payment terms and financing for agricultural and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.

For the statement about the Republic of Cuba to be inserted into a public document relating to a bill signing, it would likely have been specifically requested by the National Security Council (NSC) and Office of Legislative Affairs; and perhaps at the request of a Member of the United States Congress.

So, advocates need be sober and appreciate the peril arising from believing that after A will automatically come B. The last B took eighteen years to follow A.

Office of the Press Secretary

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
December 20, 2018

STATEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT

Today, I have signed into law H.R. 2, the "Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018" (the "Act").  Section 12303 of the Act requires the Secretary of Agriculture (Secretary) to establish a Tribal Advisory Committee (Committee), predominantly composed of individuals appointed by Members of Congress, to advise the Secretary on matters relating to tribal and Indian affairs.  My Administration supports the policy aims of this Committee.  Because it includes legislative branch appointees, however, the Committee cannot be located in the executive branch, consistent with the separation of powers.  I will therefore instruct the Secretary not to establish this Committee.  I will, however, instruct the Secretary to work with the Congress to revise section 12303 to permit a properly constituted committee to be established within the Department of Agriculture to perform similar functions.  My Administration will also take additional steps to further develop and advance its important relationships with tribal leaders.
 
In addition, section 3201 permits the Department of Agriculture to use funds to carry out certain programs in Cuba.  The Act prohibits such funds from being used in contravention of the policy outlined in National Security Presidential Memorandum 5 of June 16, 2017, (Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba).  I appreciate the recognition of the Congress that these funds must not be used to undermine the foreign policy of the United States with respect to Cuba.  As such, my Administration will not use any taxpayer funds from these Department of Agriculture programs to benefit the Cuban regime.
 
DONALD J. TRUMP

Another Obama (Ben Rhodes) Administration Legacy Decision Harms Major League Baseball

Ben Rhodes Again Takes Credit; Leaves Orphaned Failure About Payments 

MLB Challenge: Prove No Funds Benefiting Cuba’s Military 

Trump Administration Challenge: Ending Third-Country Benefit For MLB Transactions 

Once again, Mr. Ben Rhodes, Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Communications at the National Security Council (NSC) during the Obama Administration has offered his perspective on a commercial transaction involving the United States and the Republic of Cuba.  And, as expected, leaves unspoken his role in a third-country receiving financial benefits when there is no reason for doing so. 

From Mr. Rhodes: “Huge deal. We spent the end of the Obama Administration trying to set the conditions to make this possible, including Obama and Raul attending an MLB game in Havana. At a time of political division baseball is something that can bring Americans and Cubans together.” 

New York, New York-based Major League Baseball (MLB) has announced an agreement with Republic of Cuba-based Federacion Cubana de Beisbol (FCB) a component of which will require potentially tens of millions of dollars payments by electronic transfer from MLB to FCB. LINK To English Text & LINK to Spanish Text.

The current process: MLB will transfer funds from a United States-based financial institution to a financial institution located in a third-country and then that third-country financial institution will transfer the funds to a Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institution in the Republic of Cuba.  Third-country financial institutions will receive commissions for every transaction from MLB to FCB. 

The Trump Administration and Members of the United States Congress have expressed qualifications about the MLB/FCB agreement.  They want to know how MLB will ensure no funds delivered to FCB are directed to entities controlled by or affiliated with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba (FAR).  The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury may require MLB and FCB to certify, in writing, that no funds delivered from MLB to FCB will be subject to the influence of FAR.  For the government of the Republic of Cuba to put that type of clause into a document may be problematic.  And, the Trump Administration may require FCB to certify, subject to audit, that no payments from MLB will be used by the government of the Republic of Cuba to make payments on non-athletic-related debt or be used for Venezuela-related and Nicaragua-related transactions.  

MLB will look to the Trump Administration, and specifically to the NSC and then to the OFAC to solve the electronic payment process issue.  The solution is a simple one.  No regulation needs to be changed.  OFAC just issues the 50% of a license that it previously issued 2015 to a financial institution located in Florida and which is now owned by a financial institution in Arkansas.  

Had Mr. Rhodes (and the Obama Administration) thought more about, or more accurately, listened to what others were urging from 20 January 2009 through 20 January 2017, what was required to re-establish a United States-Republic of Cuba bilateral commercial infrastructure, the Obama Administration would have fully-implemented Direct Correspondent Banking (DCB) for authorized transactions.   

The Trump Administration appreciates that DCB benefits United States entities: It’s faster, It’s less expensive and it requires increased transparency on the part of the Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions.  DCB means less time for United States entities to be paid and less cost to receive those payments; and less cost, less time and more transparency for those United States entities which send payments to the Republic of Cuba.  It also means that financial institutions in Canada, Europe and in The Americas will not be receiving commissions on every transaction. 

DCB Background 

For the last seventeen years, financial institutions in Canada, Europe and in The Americas have received a commission on every authorized United States export to the Republic of Cuba; that’s a percentage on more than US$5.8 billion since December 2001.  It’s the equivalent of winning a bank lottery. 

This triangular payment process has remained in force because the Obama Administration (channeling Mr. Rhodes) instructed the OFAC to only issue 50% of a license to Pompano Beach, Florida-based Stonegate Bank. 

The Obama Administration provided a license to a U.S. bank to have an account at a bank in Cuba but did not provide a license for the bank in Cuba to have an account at the U.S. bank.  Thus, no DCB.   

In September 2017, Conway, Arkansas-based Home BancShares (2018 assets approximately US$14 billion) through its Centennial Bank subsidiary purchased Stonegate Bank.  In 2015, the OFAC authorized Stonegate Bank (2017 assets approximately US$2.9 billion) to have an account with Republic of Cuba government-operated Banco Internacional de Comercia SA (BICSA), a member of Republic of Cuba government-operated Grupo Nuevo Banca SA, created by Corporate Charter No. 49 on 29 October 1993 and commenced operation on 3 January 1994.  Stonegate Bank also provides commercial operating accounts for the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in Washington, DC. 

Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSREEA) exports (agricultural commodities and food products) since first use by the Republic of Cuba in December 2001 are US$5,849,925,838.00 through October 2018: Clinton Administration: US$0.00. Bush Administration: US$2,697,501,426.00. Obama Administration: US$2,700,145,225.00. Trump Administration: US$452,279,187.00 (through October 2018).  TSREEA requires that payments be made on a cash-in-advance basis; no other payment terms are permitted. 

With DCB, the Republic of Cuba-based entity would transfer funds (using SWIFT codes) from its account at BICSA directly to Stonegate or would use existing funds at the BICSA account at Stonegate.  The funds would then be transferred from Stonegate to the financial institution selected by the United States-based company.  The process generally can be confirmed in hours; and the transfer costs are substantially less. 

Why did the Obama Administration refuse to issue the 50% of the license that would be required to implement DCB?  Because the Obama Administration did not comprehend what companies require to engage globally.  They were so excited about doing something, that there was little focus upon the consequences of what they did. 

After the OFAC issued the 50% of the license to Stonegate Bank, representatives of the United States business community pleaded with the Obama Administration to issue the complete license.  Their response was “we have done as much as we can do.”   

The Trump Administration can eliminate a three-way payment process and create a two-way payment process resulting in more efficiency and less cost to United States entities; and, important to the Trump Administration, removing an unnecessary seventeen-year (17) multi-million-dollar revenue stream for third-country financial institutions that the Obama Administration unwisely permitted to remain in place. 

An unnecessary and painful and egregious irony that the Obama Administration’s lack of follow-through negatively impacts “America’s Greatest Pastime.”  Another mind-meld gone awry.    

Congress Should Encourage U.S. Companies To Import Products From Cuba

Instead of focusing upon legislation, Members of Congress should encourage United States companies in their states and districts to import authorized products from Cuba; and Cuba should do more to present those opportunities. 

The Obama Administration authorized specifically-sourced agricultural commodities, food products and non-food products to be exported from the Republic of Cuba directly to the United States.   

From the United States Department of State: To be eligible for import into the United States, a listed 515.582 product must be produced by independent Cuban entrepreneurs, as demonstrated by documentary evidence.  Persons subject to US jurisdiction engaging in import transactions involving goods produced by an independent Cuban entrepreneur pursuant to 515.582 must obtain documentary evidence that demonstrates the entrepreneur's independent status, such as a copy of a license to be self-employed issued by the Cuban government, or in the case of an entity, evidence that demonstrates that the entity is a private entity that is not owned or controlled by the Cuban government. 

Although the Trump Administration has not instituted changes to Obama Administration eligibility requirements, not unreasonable to expect importers to certify that the Republic of Cuba-based exporter is not be controlled by or affiliated with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba (FAR). 

Thus far, charcoal and coffee have been sourced in the Republic of Cuba and then exported (or re-exported) from the Republic of Cuba to the United States. 

Links To Previous Posts: 

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2016/6/20/nespresso-to-indirectly-import-coffee-from-cuba-to-usa?rq=nespresso 

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2016/7/14/update-hecho-en-cuba-begins-to-mean-something-obama-administration-will-help-accept-certification-from-cuba?rq=nespresso 

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2016/6/26/nestle-sa-positioning-to-be-an-importer-of-consumables-from-cuba-with-obama-administration-assistance?rq=nespresso 

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/1/5/charcoal-joins-coal-to-become-second-commodity-exported-from-cuba-to-the-united-states?rq=Fogo 

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2018/10/23/fogo-in-florida-reports-2nd-charcoal-purchase-from-cuba-two-20ft-containers?rq=Fogo 

HAVANA, July 7 (Xinhua) – [EXCERPTS]: Cuba seeks to increase exports of non-conventional agricultural products like honey, charcoal, coffee and pine resin to various markets around the world and contribute to the government's strategy of diversification of foreign markets. 

According to top officials at the island's Agroforestry Group (GAF), part of the Ministry of Agriculture, the group plans to generate 34 million U.S. dollars through the export of its leading products.  "Our plan this year is to exceed the 30 million dollars the group exported in 2017 and continue helping the Cuban economy reduce imports by manufacturing goods here with our own resources," said Arturo Forteza, GAF's first vice president, at a recent press conference. 

Forteza explained that beekeeping and the products derived from it, like honey, wax and royal jelly, generate the most income to the group, with an average of 28 million dollars in exports each year. 

These sound returns are the reason that investments are heavily concentrated on the industry, specifically in the installation of honey processing plants and smaller product packaging. 

"We seek to create added value for our beekeeping industry that goes beyond the production of honey. We want to develop our own marketing and production structures," Forteza said. 

Mercedes de la Cruz, acting director of marketing at GAF, said that the main market for Cuban honey is Europe, with Germany in the highest demand.  The group is also exploring markets in other countries, such as Canada, Costa Rica, Colombia and China. 

"The goal is to increase the added value of our products by producing smaller and more varied formats that sell for a higher price. In the case of honey, the price is above 4,000 dollars per ton," De la Cruz said.  Cuba currently exports its honey in large formats to various markets in Europe. 

Lazaro Garcia, director of honey producer Apicuba, explained that each year Cuba produces about 8,000 tons of honey, of which around 95 percent is destined for exports. 

The producer's intention, according to Garcia, is to have a total of 220,000 hives, increasing production in the near future to 15,000 tons of honey annually. If current prices are maintained, the honey production could generate 61 million dollars. 

Another promising product of the group is charcoal, with exports of more than 28,000 tons, mostly sent to Europe, particularly Turkey, Greece, Spain and Italy.  De la Cruz said that currently seven state companies are producing charcoal, which is expected to reach 130,000 tons for export this year. 

These favorable results came from the diversification of charcoal production from highly valued hardwoods and African marabou which is abundant in Cuba. 

Increasing coffee production on the island is another objective of the agricultural group, which is expected to grow substantially.  According to Forteza, the group is collaborating with Vietnam to develop high-quality coffee after last year's all-time low production rate because of storms. 

"We want to develop our own high-quality Arabica coffee in Vietnam and their robust coffee here in Cuba. This project is focused on the eastern provinces of Granma and Santiago in Cuba and we plan to extend it to other areas," he said. 

Despite the industry's setbacks, significant steps have been taken, such as the introduction of ecological coffee bean pulpers.  "We also improved the technology in the two plants we have in Guantanamo and Santiago in Cuba, which has raised the quality of our strongest product," Forteza said.  Currently Japan is the main market for Cuban Arabica coffee, purchasing the product for around 10,000 dollars per ton. 

Cuba is also engaged in diversifying and expanding production of other items like pine resin, cocoa, coconut and henequen plant fibers to bring in foreign currency and replace imports.

LINK To Complete Document In PDF Format

President Trump To Sign Farm Bill; It Will Include Cuba Provision. Is It Significant?

The Honorable Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, will sign into law legislation known as the “Farm Bill” passed by the United States Congress. 

For the first time since 28 October 2000- more than eighteen (18) years (6,622 days) ago, legislation which includes the Republic of Cuba will become law.  

The Republic of Cuba-related provision within the Farm Bill will become law, somewhat ironically, because of one (1) United States Senator representing the State of Florida- who initially opposed the provision, but supported the provision when language was added which prohibited the use of United States taxpayer funds with entities in the Republic of Cuba controlled by the military.  The United States business community did not oppose that prohibition. 

The Farm Bill includes a provision authorizing the use in the Republic of Cuba of funding from the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) for Market Access Program (MAP) and Foreign Market Development (FMD).  

The provision in the “Farm Bill” was co-authored by two members of the United States Senate: The Honorable Heidi Heitkamp (D- ND) and The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- FL).  

Senator Heitkamp agreed to include language submitted by Senator Rubio that would prohibit MAP and FMD funding to be used with Republic of Cuba entities that are controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba (FAR), consistent with policies of the Trump Administration.   

The specific language: “(d)  Cuba .— Notwithstanding section 908 of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 ( 22 U.S.C. 7207 ) or any other provision of law, funds made available under this section may be used to carry out the programs authorized under sections 222 and 223 in Cuba. Funds may not be used as described in the previous sentence in contravention with directives set forth under the National Security Presidential Memorandum entitled ‘Strengthening the Policy of the United States Toward Cuba’ issued by the President on June 16, 2017, during the period in which that memorandum is in effect. 

Is provision optically significant?  Yes, it is.  How United States organizations seek to use the funds and how the government of the Republic of Cuba permits the funds to be used will be the baseline for determining effectiveness.  If the funds are disproportionally purposed to make payments for travel to the Republic of Cuba and for larger booths at trade shows in the city of Havana, likely will be scrutiny by members of the United States Congress.  If the Republic of Cuba permits funds to be used for what would not be expected to be authorized- permitting activities perceived in the United States as bold, members of the United States Congress and those within the Trump Administration would take positive note.      

Will the provision result in an increase in agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba?  There is no straight-line calculation which justifies that belief.  United States agricultural commodity and food product exports to the Republic of Cuba continue to decline; 16.1% thus far in 2018 compared to the same period in 2017- and have done so when commodity inventories have been high, commodity prices have been low and there would have been political value in purchases during a time of pain for United States farmers.  Healthcare product exports have also declined; 44.1% thus far in 2018 compared to the same period in 2017. 

Is there value in spending United States taxpayer funds to promote corn, dairy, poultry, rice, soy and wheat in the Republic of Cuba?  Arguable given there is one contracting entity in the Republic of Cuba, cash-in-advance payment terms remain unchanged and the Republic of Cuba seeks payment term of up to two years due to its chronic shortage of foreign exchange.  Unlikely a significant number of the United States organizations (approximately eighty-one in fiscal year 2018) applying for USDA reimbursement will shift previously-allocated country-targeted funds to the Republic of Cuba for fiscal year 2019.   

Does the inclusion of the provision suggest a “pathway forward” and “momentum” for additional Republic of Cuba-related legislation to become law, specifically relating to authorizing private-sector payment terms and private-sector financing for agricultural commodity and food product exports to the Republic of Cuba?  Uncertain, as there is an eighteen-year-old legislative graveyard filled with headstones of initiatives that were “on the cusp” of success.   

Legislative initiatives suffer from 1) lack of public support from specific exporting companies stating on-the-record (at hearings, in media releases, etc.) that they would today provide payment terms- and what those payment terms would be, to Republic of Cuba government-operated entities and 2) lack of public support from financial institutions including Greenwich Village, Colorado-based CoBank stating on-the-record (at hearings, in media releases, etc.) that they would today provide loans to Republic of Cuba government-operated entities based upon the credit profiles of those entities.  In addition, Conway, Arkansas-based Home BancShares, which has an authorized account with a Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institution, has refused to comment as to why it has not sought authorization from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury for the Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institution to have an account with Home BancShares.  If each financial institution had an account with the other, the implementation of Direct Correspondent Banking (DCB) services would be operable- meaning that third-country financial institutions would no longer receive a commission for each United States-Republic of Cuba transaction.  DCB saves money, saves time, is more transparent, and more safe.  Ironically, the four (4) members of the House of Representatives and two (2) members of the United States Senate from Arkansas (exporter of poultry, rice, etc.) have not demonstrated an interest in public engagement with Home BancShares to implement DCB.         

Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSREEA) exports (agricultural commodities and food products) since first use by the Republic of Cuba in December 2001 are US$5,849,925,838.00 through October 2018: Clinton Administration: US$0.00. Bush Administration: US$2,697,501,426.00. Obama Administration: US$2,700,145,225.00. Trump Administration: US$452,279,187.00.  TSREEA requires that payments be made on a cash-in-advance basis; no other payment terms are permitted.

LINK To PDF Format

Failure Of Agreement Between FedEx & Cuba Is A Problematic And Oft-Repeated Symbol

That Memphis, Tennessee-based FedEx Corporation (2017 revenues exceeded US$60 billion) and the government of the Republic of Cuba have not been successful during more than two years of discussions/negotiations to create a viable delivery infrastructure is a highly visible and thus impactful symbol that dissuades United States-based companies from seeking commercial engagement with the Republic of Cuba.

Memphis Business Journal

Memphis, Tennessee

14 December 2018 

It’s a no-go for FedEx’s scheduled service to Cuba.  

The Memphis-based logistics and delivery giant received approval from the Department of Transportation (DOT) in July 2016 to be the first all-cargo airline to start service to Cuba. That approval was followed by multiple launch date extensions filed by FedEx Corp. — with the latest set for Saturday, Dec. 15.  

With that date approaching, the Memphis Business Journal asked FedEx if service would, in fact, begin this weekend.  FedEx provided the following statement Dec. 14, in response:  

“FedEx will not be filing for an extension of the start-up date for U.S. – Cuba cargo air service between Miami and Varadero (VRA.) We are evaluating alternative all-cargo service options to Cuba.” 

The original plan was for FedEx to run flights, Monday through Friday, from Miami to Matanzas/Varadero starting in April 2017. The extension pushed that to Oct.15, 2017, then to June 15, 2018, and then finally to the Dec. 15.  

Posts About FedEx And The Republic Of Cuba: 

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2018/6/16/fedex-seeks-another-delay-from-usdot-to-initiate-services-to-cuba?rq=FedEx 

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2016/7/19/dot-approves-fedex-for-first-scheduled-all-cargo-service-to-cuba?rq=FedEx

Troika To Negotiate Settlement Of Certified Claims Against Cuba? Kushner, Greenblatt & Feinberg

Troika To Negotiate Settlement Of Certified Claims Against Cuba?

Kushner, Greenblatt & Feinberg

The Process: Briefings, Lunch, Travel

It’s Primarily About Real Estate; So Why Not Use Real Estate Executives?

Two Largest Claims Account For 24%; Thirty Account For 56% Of Total

President Trump Can Negotiate A Deal That Eluded Eleven Of His Predecessors  

Settlement Is Possible Without Cuba Putting Up Cash

Every Country Cuba Owes Will Benefit From A Settlement

EU Should Be Advocating For A Swift Agreement 

The Trump Administration has created the political moment for tag-team negotiators Mr. Jason Greenblatt (DOB 1967; Assistant to the President and Special Representative for International Negotiations) and Mr. Jared Kushner (DOB 1981; Senior Advisor to the President & Director- Office of American Innovation) to expand their bilateral portfolios to include the Republic of Cuba.   

Why Mr. Kushner? 

Irrespective of one’s thoughts as to the appropriateness of a role at The White House for the son-in-law of the president of the United States, what matters is the level of confidence by the President of the United States in his son-in-law.  Nearing two years into a four-year term, Mr. Kushner retains a prominent presence in Trump Administration.   

On 30 November 2018, while at the signing ceremony for the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) in Buenos Aires, Argentina, The Honorable Donald Trump, President of the United States, began his remarks with thanking six (6) people by name; the first was the United States Trade Representative and the second was Mr. Kushner- before the United States Secretary of State, the United States Secretary of the Treasury, Director of the National Trade Council and Director of the National Economic Council.    

Prior to the signing ceremony for the USMCA, Mr. Kushner received the highest civilian award, Order of the Aztec Eagle, from the government of Mexico for his work relating to the USMCA.  During the presentation, Mr. Kushner shared that his experience working for the USMCA was the equivalent of earning a “PhD in Trade.”  President Trump attended the presentation- but the event was not on his public schedule.  

At the first meeting of the leaders of the G20 in Buenos Aires, President Trump was accompanied by two individuals: The United States Secretary of the Treasury and Mrs. Ivanka (Trump) Kushner. Not the United States Secretary of State, United States Trade Representative, Director of the National Trade Council or Director of the National Economic Council.   

At an evening dinner for leaders of the G20, President and Mrs. Trump were accompanied by Mr. and Mrs. Kushner; and included the couple in official photograph opportunities with H.E. Mauricio Macri, President of Argentina and Mrs. Macri. 

On 1 December 2018, Mr. Kushner was a member of the official delegation at the working dinner with President Trump and H.E. Xi Jinping, President of the People’s Republic of China.

On 1 December 2018, Mrs. Kushner was a member of the official United States delegation, accompanying The Honorable Mike Pence, Vice President of the United States, attending the inauguration of the president of Mexico. 

On 27 November 2018, H.E. Eduardo Bolsonaro (34 years of age), a two-term member of the National Congress of Brazil and son of the president-elect of Brazil, H.E. Jair Bolsonaro, met with Mr. Kushner at The White House; and departed with a baseball cap with “Trump 2020” printed on the front.  According to media reports, the two discussed a plan to relocate the Brazil Embassy in Israel and undisclosed subjects.   

The Trump Administration has identified Mr. Kushner as having a significant role in portfolios that include the Middle East, relocating the United States Embassy in Israel, China, Mexico, trade and prison reform among others.    

Issue Importance 

Senior-level officials within the Trump Administration confirm that resolution of the certified claims, and only the certified claims, is a focus and the United States Department of State, United States Department of the Treasury, United States Department of Commerce, and National Security Council (NSC) at The White House are committed to dedicating necessary resources.   

The United States government retains broad discretion to negotiate a settlement on behalf of the claims certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC).  There exists a highly-motivated pre-positioned constituency among the certified claimants in support of a prompt resolution. 

However, identification of the causes for health-related issues impacting United States government personnel located in the city of Havana, Republic of Cuba, remains the primary focus of the Trump Administration and lack of resolution, until which the United States Embassy in Havana will operate at a less than optimal level of personnel, will continue to contaminate all aspects of the bilateral relationship.  Within the Trump Administration there exists a confidence that negotiations to resolve the certified claims can develop independent of a resolution to other bilateral issues. 

There is bipartisan political party support and bipartisan ideological support within the United States Congress for a robust and sustained effort to obtain a resolution to the certified claims, particularly from those who represent exporters whose expansion of commercial engagement with the Republic of Cuba remains infringed: agricultural commodities, food products and healthcare products and providers of travel-related services.  

The Obama Administration deemed resolution of the certified claims was a “top priority,” but had only three (3) discussions (not bilaterally confirmed negotiations) with representatives of the government of the Republic of Cuba in 2,923 days (766 days if calculated from 17 December 2014- the date upon which the United States and the Republic of Cuba announced an intention to re-establish diplomatic relations).  During a 20 July 2016 background briefing by a senior official of the United States Department of State:  

REPORTER QUESTION (Miami Herald):  My question has to do with the property rights issue. I wonder if you could give us any details there.  And two, whether Cuba still has outstanding property rights issues with any other countries, and is there a target number we’re looking for, like settling on 20 cents on the dollar, 10 cents on the dollar, whatever?   

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL:  As I mentioned, property claims is one of our top priorities.  We had an initial – or first-round meeting with the Cubans on this issue last December in Havana.  We will have a second round of talks here in Washington at the end of this month.  We certainly have not laid out any kind of – the details which you’ve described.  That will emerge from the negotiations, but we’re committed to pursuing all of the registered claims, as well as other claims that U.S. citizens have against Cuba.  So it’s a process.  We had a good round last December.  We hope to make further progress this month in moving forward on the issue. 

The Certified Claims 

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC- https://www.justice.gov/fcsc) at the United States Department of Justice which are valued at US$1,902,202,284.95.  

The largest certified claim (Cuban Electric Company) valued at US$267,568,413.62 is controlled by Boca Raton, Florida-based Office Depot, Inc.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International.  The smallest certified claim is by Sara W. Fishman in the amount of US$1.00 with reference to the Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust. 

The two (2) largest certified claims total US$449,377,207.76, representing 24% of the total value of the certified claims.  Thirty (30) certified claimants hold 56% of the total value of the certified claims.  This concentration of value creates an efficient pathway towards a settlement. 

The USFCSC permitted interest to be accrued in the amount of 6% per annum; with the current value of the 5,913 certified claims approximately US$8,521,866,156.95.

“The Foreign Claims Settlement Commission of the United States (FCSC) is a quasi-judicial, independent agency within the Department of Justice which adjudicates claims of U.S. nationals against foreign governments, under specific jurisdiction conferred by Congress, pursuant to international claims settlement agreements, or at the request of the Secretary of State. Funds for payment of the Commission's awards are derived from congressional appropriations, international claims settlements, or liquidation of foreign assets in the United States by the Departments of Justice and the Treasury.” 

Certified claimants with current or recent activity within the Republic of Cuba include: New York, New York-based Colgate-Palmolive, Moline, Illinois-based Deere & Company, Atlanta, Georgia-based Delta Air Lines, Boston, Massachusetts-based General Electric, Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International, Chicago, Illinois-based University of Chicago, Denver, Colorado-based Western Union and New Haven, Connecticut-based Yale University among others. 

Real Estate Experience Helps 

The 5,913 certified claims consist primarily of real estate- so who better equipped to negotiate essentially a multi-party real estate deal than two real estate executives?  One individual from a multi-generational real estate family.  The other a former senior-level executive of a real estate company.  Each a hardened negotiator.  Each having the confidence of the president of the United States.  Each appreciating the focus by the President upon tackling (and resolving) problems left unresolved by predecessors.  A fifty-eight (58) year-old unresolved bilateral issue self-defines as a lip-smacking, saliva-creating opportunity for the Trump Administration.  

The Trump Administration has less than 800 days during which to identify, commence and complete initiatives that by 12:00 pm on Wednesday on 20 January 2021 will be defined as legacy achievements.  The Trump Administration would complete what eleven (11) presidential administrations could not achieve. 

The Day-To-Day Guy 

The Kushner/Greenblatt tag-team would become a troika with the addition of Mr. Kenneth Feinberg (DOB 1945), the Washington DC-based attorney (www.feinberglawoffices.com) specializing in mediation and alternative dispute resolution, who served as Special Master for the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund and TARP Executive Compensation; Administrator of the BP Deepwater Horizon Disaster Victim Compensation Fund; retained to assist in the General Motors recall response and compensation for Volkswagen owners.  Mr. Feinberg, who could be appointed a Special Envoy, appreciates the singular importance of deadlines.  He is positioned to coordinate the day-to-day discussions and negotiations with the government of the Republic of Cuba. Mr. Feinberg has confirmed his interest in assisting with the settlement negotiations.

The troika would be the Trump Administration’s effort to conclude what the Obama Administration failed to do- and what previous occupants of The White House have failed to do on behalf of those 5,913 individuals and companies whose assets were expropriated without compensation by the government of the Republic of Cuba, beginning with an oil refinery owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73). 

How to begin? A Lunch   

The task for Messrs. Kushner, Greenblatt and Feinberg is to directly engage in negotiations with representatives of the government of the Republic of Cuba with the singular goal of obtaining a settlement of the 5,913 individual and company claims against the government of the Republic of Cuba certified by the USFCSC- and only those claims. 

First, the troika would convene a series of intimate briefings with representatives of the United States business community, specifically those with certified claims along with their respective legal counsels.  As two (2) certified claimants represent 24% of the total value of the certified claims and thirty (30) certified claimants represent 56% of the total value of the certified claims, briefings with each of the primary stakeholders would not be an unreasonable effort to undertake within a thirty (30) day period.   

Second, would be an invitation to lunch at The White House extended from the troika to H.E. Jose Ramon Cabanas Rodriguez, Ambassador of the Republic of Cuba to the United States or his successor.  The purpose of the lunch would be to establish a personal rapport and create a reasonable and measurable timeline towards resolving the issue of the certified claims; thirty (30) days to create a timeline should be adequate.   

Third, would be a visit to the Republic of Cuba by the troika within thirty (30) days of completion of the timeline.   

The troika would complete an effort of engagement with the Republic of Cuba awkwardly commenced by Mr. Ben Rhodes, Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor for Communications at the National Security Council (NSC) during the Obama Administration. 

The youthful Mr. Kushner, of reserved demeanor; reared in the oft-described bitter chill of New York City real estate politics, appreciating the role of financial institutions, contracts, loan values, payback periods, incentives, and, most significantly, the development of creative financing packages, would bring a skill set to a bilateral dialogue which has been lacking in successive presidential administrations.  Mr. Greenblatt is his perfect partner.  Mr. Feinberg brings along the practical experience. 

Important that the negotiations have a timeline- a beginning and an end.  Six (6) months is more than adequate. 

Imperative there be no intermediaries between the governments; no third-parties arranging meetings or serving as couriers for messages.  Not a triangle.  A straight line of communication.  No meetings in third countries. 

Structure Of A Resolution 

A certified claims settlement should be based upon the payment of 100% of the value of each certified claim.  Even with a full settlement based upon principal and interest, the annual rate of inflation has substantially diminished the value of each certified claim.   

Opportunities for settlement include, but are not limited to, 100% compensation, debt-for-equity swaps and substitution investments (one structure for another; one piece of land for another, etc.).  

Portions of monies owed could be transformed into tradable equity positions which a certified claimant could use or could redirect or could market to a third-party. 

In combination with or separately from compensation formats, the government of the Republic of Cuba could provide transferable values to the certified claimants including: 

·       Income tax holidays

·       Import duty exemptions

·       Reduced energy rates

·       Property tax credits

·       Earned income tax credits

·       Issuance of commercial paper 

Resolution is the means to the goal in whatever form such resolutions may take for the largest United States corporate claimants (e.g. debt-for-equity swaps for new direct foreign investment opportunities, or property restitution combined with re-investment in once-owned properties, or the sale of development rights to third parties, United States-based or non-United States-based).  The goal is closure. 

Importance For Diaz-Canel Administration 

If the Trump Administration unleashed this troika, H.E. Miguel Diaz-Canel, President of the Republic of Cuba, would understandably be required to seriously consider the effort and promptly dedicate members of his team to the negotiations- rather than reply upon holdovers from previous administrations. 

Resolving the issue of the certified claims would cement the Trump Administration and the Diaz-Canel Administration firmly into legacy-claiming territory. 

Resolving the issue of the certified claims is the foundation for six decades of United States laws, regulations and policies. 

A re-normalized bilateral commercial, economic and political relationship would benefit the 11.3 million citizens of the 800-mile archipelago and the approximately two million individuals of Cuban descent residing in the United States, primarily in the State of Florida and State of New Jersey.  

For the Diaz-Canel Administration, resolving the issue of the certified claims would materially benefit the governments and the private sectors within those countries who have supported the Republic of Cuba- and in far too many instances, found their loans, rescheduling of loans, commercial credits, government-to-government assistance, and private sector investments habitually subject to multi-year and sometimes multi-decade disappointment.  Success in the Republic of Cuba has always strained to obtain enough oxygen to provide for consistent and positive performance. 

Not institutionally sustainable, nor fair, for the Republic of Cuba to not seek to resolve the one issue with the United States that most negatively impacts those to whom it owes much: European Union (EU)-member countries, Brazil, China, Mexico, Russia, Venezuela and Vietnam among others. 

Without the issue of the certified claims, the United States would be expected to remove much of the onerous, and for the commercial partners of the Republic of Cuba, extraterritorial financial sanctions infrastructure managed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and Office of Legal Advisor (OLA) of the United States Department of State.    

The OFAC, BIS, and OLA-administered sanctions against the Republic of Cuba inflict collateral damage to countries who directly engage with the Republic of Cuba and to countries which may tangentially engage with the Republic of Cuba.  All parties would be jubilant if the Diaz-Canel Administration would negotiate a settlement which resulted in an elimination of the sanctions. 

No government should build a long-term strategy of victimization when there exists means to remove a problem.  Both the United States and the Republic of Cuba have been guilty of such strategies with respect to their bilateral relationship.  The history may not be fair; the process for resolution may feel unjust.  Governments need weigh the cost of maintaining political pride against the impact upon their citizens (their shareholders) of not resolving an action taken by the government. 

The Republic of Cuba should not need to continue to define success by how much others will provide to it for the maintenance of commercial, economic and political systems which are neither self-sufficient nor sustainable.  The Republic of Cuba must not be perceived as an exhibit in a museum; and as a symbol of what only functions if others continue to fund it and fuel it. 

Resolution of the certified claims will not, on their own, transform the commercial, economic and political infrastructure of the Republic of Cuba.  However, it will remove a highly-visible pillar of resistance used to forestall provision of choice, of opportunities to its citizenry. 

The government of the Republic of Cuba would wisely accept the advances of the troika for Mr. Kushner, not dissimilar from Mr. Rhodes during the Obama Administration, maintains an intimate working relationship with the President of the United States where the distance between is often immeasurable; and Mr. Kushner has the additional bona fides of proximity due to marriage- which should not be undervalued. 

There is in the United States and within other countries an increasing lack of empathy for the Republic of Cuba.   

There is a shift of accountability from all that is unsound in the Republic of Cuba is the fault of the United States to its primarily the fault of the Republic of Cuba.  A shift from the United States should repair it to the Republic of Cuba should repair it.  This dynamic may not be fair, but it is a reality.  And successful negotiations are about reality rather than wishful thinking. 

For the bilateral relationship with the Republic of Cuba to re-normalize, there must be a resolution of the certified claims; there are no reasons the Trump Administration and Diaz-Canel Administration can’t make it happen during the next 700-plus days.

It’s important to exceed expectations… 

LINK TO ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

LINK TO CERTIFIED CLAIMS LIST 

Posts About Certified Claims & Trump Administration:

31 August 2018

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2018/8/29/ouktsdg4gyrblq7zudchikvdd6abdo?rq=certified%20claims 

14 June 2018

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2018/6/14/trump-administration-may-be-focusing-upon-certified-claims-unlike-obama-administration?rq=certified%20claims 

17 July 2017

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/7/11/memo-from-nsc-to-potus-this-week-for-title-iii-suspension-capitulate-incapacitate-or-negotiate?rq=certified%20claims 

29 May 2017

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/5/29/0t6ts1bv3by20ot3mi9bydvdqv3e86?rq=certified%20claims 

1 January 2017

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/1/12/h2uudthnn6be8hfgxifqsrdo4aqpb0?rq=certified%20claims 

1 December 2016

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2016/12/1/zigs56x0gme3a9rqg7aecx9vf2gqgk?rq=certified%20claims 

13 September 2016

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2016/8/6/obama-administration-wont-seek-dismissal-of-civil-judgements-against-cuba-to-help-certified-claimants?rq=certified%20claims

U.S. Food/Ag Exports To Cuba Decrease 54.7% In October; Decrease 16.1% Thus Far For Year

October 2018 Food/Ag Exports To Cuba Decrease 54.7%- 1

16.1% Decrease Year-To-Year-5

Cuba Ranks 55th Of 224 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2

October 2018 Healthcare Product Exports US$156,321.00- 2

October 2018 Humanitarian Donations US$829,293.00- 3

Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue To Increase- 3

U.S. Port Export Data- 15

OCTOBER 2018 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA DECREASE 54.7%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in October 2018 were US$9,698,149.00 compared to US$21,436,667.00 in October 2017 and US$21,994,945.00 in October 2016.

For the period January 2018 through October 2018, exports were US$197,629,030.00 compared to US$235,558,893.00 for the same period in 2017.

TSREEA exports since first use by the Republic of Cuba in December 2001 are US$5,849,925,838.00 through October 2018.

Clinton Administration: US$0.00. Bush Administration: US$2,697,501,426.00. Obama Administration: US$2,700,145,225.00. Trump Administration: US$452,279,187.00.

LINK To Complete Report

3G Internet Access Expanding In Cuba

From ETECSA: 

Internet service is extended in Cuba with access through the mobile network (3G) December 4, 2018  

The Telecommunications Company of Cuba SA (ETECSA) informs that as of December 6 of this year, the commercialization of the Internet access service will begin through the third generation (3G) mobile network for prepaid customers.

At the time of launching the service, it will be available to users with terminal equipment that supports 3G technology in the 900MHz frequency, duly configured with the Nauta Access Point Name (APN) and whose line has been identified as having used Data , on some previous occasion, about this Network.

Subscribers already recognized by the network with these characteristics will be able to acquire the package of their preference without having to go to a commercial office, dialing * 133 # from their own telephone and following the menu options, with discount of the main account of the mobile service.

From December 6, users will progressively receive a notification according to the numbering when their service is ready to proceed to acquire the package:  

December 6th day: 52xxxxxx and 53xxxxxx

December 7th day: 54xxxxxx and 55xxxxxx

December 8th day: 56xxxxxx and 58xxxxxx  

After these days, you can do any numbering with the conditions mentioned above, that is, those lines that use a terminal with access to 3G technology in 900MHz frequency and that have accessed Data in said technology.  

For users who use a cell phone with those characteristics and who have not made a connection so far, if they are interested in accessing the service; they must configure the Nauta APN, activate the data from a 3G coverage and make a first connection. It is suggested, taking into account that they are free ETECSA portals, access http://www.etecsa.cu, https://portal.nauta.cu or http://mi.cubacel.net.  From that moment on, it will be validated; after which a notification message will be sent in the next 48 hours, announcing that the desired offer can already be purchased.

In the first days of operation of this service, incidents could be experienced in certain areas or areas. In this sense, ETECSA is grateful to the clients that if there is any inconvenience with their service, they inform the company through the institutional channels.  

With this opening, the Company continues to expand the possibilities of access to the Internet as part of the process of computerization of Cuban society.  

The details of the offer, prices and other information can be obtained by the 118, 5264-2266, accessing the portals www.etecsa.cu or http://mi.cubacel.net.