White House Issues Executive Order Addressing Threats To The United States By The Government Of Cuba

EXECUTIVE ORDER
ADDRESSING THREATS TO THE UNITED STATES BY THE GOVERNMENT OF CUBA

  
By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code, I hereby determine and order:

Section 1.  National Emergency.  As President of the United States, I have an imperative duty to protect the national security and foreign policy of this country.  I find that the policies, practices, and actions of the Government of Cuba constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security and foreign policy of the United States.

The Government of Cuba has taken extraordinary actions that harm and threaten the United States.  The regime aligns itself with -- and provides support for -- numerous hostile countries, transnational terrorist groups, and malign actors adverse to the United States, including the Government of the Russian Federation (Russia), the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Government of Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah.  For example, Cuba blatantly hosts dangerous adversaries of the United States, inviting them to base sophisticated military and intelligence capabilities in Cuba that directly threaten the national security of the United States.  Cuba hosts Russia's largest overseas signals intelligence facility, which tries to steal sensitive national security information of the United States.  Cuba continues to build deep intelligence and defense cooperation with the PRC.  Cuba welcomes transnational terrorist groups, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, creating a safe environment for these malign groups so that these transnational terrorist groups can build economic, cultural, and security ties throughout the region and attempt to destabilize the Western Hemisphere, including the United States.  Cuba has long provided defense, intelligence, and security assistance to adversaries in the Western Hemisphere, attempting to thwart United States and international sanctions designed to enforce the stability of the region, uphold the rule of law, and safeguard the national security and foreign policy of the United States.  Cuba continues to try to thwart United States efforts to address threats to the United States posed by hostile countries, transnational terrorist groups, and malign actors, including in the Western Hemisphere. 

Further, contrary to the interests and foreign policy of the United States, the Cuban communist regime supports terrorism and destabilizes the region through migration and violence.  The communist regime persecutes and tortures its political opponents; denies the Cuban people free speech and press; corruptly profits from their misery; and commits other human-rights violations.  For example, families of political prisoners face retaliation for peacefully protesting the improper confinement of their loved ones.  Cuban authorities harass worshippers, block free association by civil society organizations, prohibit free press, and deny the ability to speak freely, including on the internet.  The Cuban regime continues to spread its communist ideas, policies, and practices around the Western Hemisphere, threatening the foreign policy of the United States.  

The United States has zero tolerance for the depredations of the communist Cuban regime.  The United States will act to protect the foreign policy, national security, and national interests of the United States, including by holding the Cuban regime accountable for its malign actions and relationships, while also remaining committed to supporting the Cuban people's aspirations for a free and democratic society.

I find that the policies, practices, and actions of the Government of Cuba directly threaten the safety, national security, and foreign policy of the United States.  The policies, practices, and actions of the Government of Cuba are designed to harm the United States and support hostile countries, transnational terrorist groups, and malign actors that seek to destroy the United States.  The policies, practices, and actions of the Government of Cuba are also repugnant to the moral and political values of democratic and free societies and conflict with the foreign policy of the United States to encourage peaceful change in Cuba and to promote democracy, the principle of free expression and press, the rule of law, and respect for human rights throughout the world.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, find that the situation with respect to Cuba constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security and foreign policy of the United States and hereby declare a national emergency with respect to that threat. 

To deal with the national emergency declared in this order, I determine that it is necessary and appropriate to establish a tariff system, as described below.  Under this system, an additional ad valorem duty may be imposed on imports of goods that are products of a foreign country that directly or indirectly sells or otherwise provides any oil to Cuba.  In my judgment, the tariff system, as described below, is necessary and appropriate to address the national emergency declared in this order.

Sec. 2.  Imposition of Tariffs.  (a)  Beginning on the effective date of this order, an additional ad valorem rate of duty may be imposed on goods imported into the United States that are products of any other country that directly or indirectly sells or otherwise provides any oil to Cuba, in accordance with subsections (b) and (c) of this section.  (b)(i)  The Secretary of Commerce, in consultation with the Secretary of State and any senior official the Secretary of Commerce deems appropriate, shall determine whether, after the effective date of this order, a foreign country directly or indirectly sells or otherwise provides any oil to Cuba.  After the Secretary of Commerce finds that a foreign country directly or indirectly sells or otherwise provides any oil to Cuba, the Secretary of Commerce shall inform the Secretary of State of his finding, including any information relevant to that finding.  (ii)  The Secretary of Commerce may issue rules, regulations, and guidance necessary or appropriate to implement this order.  The Secretary of Commerce may also make any other determinations or take any other actions necessary or appropriate to implement this order.  (c)(i)  After the Secretary of Commerce makes an affirmative finding pursuant to subsection (b)(i) of this section and informs the Secretary of State of his finding, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the United States Trade Representative, shall determine whether and to what extent an additional ad valorem rate of duty should be imposed on goods that are products of the foreign country found to directly or indirectly sell or otherwise provide any oil to Cuba.  (ii)   If the Secretary of State determines that an additional ad valorem rate of duty should be imposed on goods that are products of the country found to directly or indirectly sell or otherwise provide any oil to Cuba, the Secretary of State shall inform me of his recommendation, and the Secretary of Commerce shall inform me of his finding related to that recommendation.  I will then consider the recommendation and finding, among other relevant things, in determining whether and to what extent to impose an additional ad valorem rate of duty on goods that are products of the country in question.  (iii)  The Secretary of State may issue rules, regulations, and guidance necessary or appropriate to implement this order.  The Secretary of State may also make any other determinations or take any other actions necessary or appropriate to implement this order.

Sec. 3.  Modification Authority.  (a)  To ensure that the national emergency declared in this order is dealt with, I may modify this order, including in light of additional information, recommendations from senior officials, or changed circumstances.  (b)  Should a foreign country retaliate against the United States in response to this order or any action taken pursuant to this order, I may modify this order or actions taken pursuant to this order to ensure the efficacy of this order and the actions taken pursuant to this order to deal with the national emergency declared in this order.  (c)  Should the Government of Cuba or another foreign country affected by this order take significant steps to address the national emergency declared in this order and align sufficiently with the United States on national security and foreign policy matters, I may modify this order.  

Sec. 4.  Monitoring and Recommendations.  (a)  The Secretary of State, in consultation with any senior official the Secretary of State deems appropriate, shall monitor the circumstances involving the national emergency declared in this order.  The Secretary of State shall inform me of any circumstance that, in his opinion, might indicate the need for further Presidential action to deal with the national emergency declared in this order.  (b)  The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Homeland Security, the United States Trade Representative, and any other senior official the Secretary of State deems appropriate, shall recommend to me additional action, if necessary, if the actions in this order or taken pursuant to this order are not effective in dealing with the national emergency declared in this order.  (c)  The Secretary of Commerce shall monitor whether a foreign country directly or indirectly sells or otherwise provides any oil to Cuba.  The Secretary of Commerce shall continue such monitoring after a foreign country has been found to do so.

Sec. 5.  Delegation.  Consistent with applicable law, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Commerce are directed and authorized to take all actions necessary to implement and effectuate this order -- including through temporary suspension or amendment of regulations or through notices in the Federal Register and by adopting rules, regulations, or guidance -- and to employ all powers granted to the President, including by IEEPA, as may be necessary to implement this order.  The head of each executive department and agency (agency) is authorized to and shall take all appropriate measures within the agency's authority to implement this order.  The head of each agency may, consistent with applicable law, including section 301 of title 3, United States Code, redelegate the authority to take such appropriate measures within the agency.

Sec. 6.  Reporting Directives.  The Secretary of State, in consultation with any senior official he deems appropriate, is hereby authorized and directed to submit recurring and final reports to the Congress on the national emergency declared in, and authorities exercised by, this order, consistent with section 401 of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1641) and section 204(c) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)).

Sec. 7.  Definitions.  For the purposes of this order:  (a)  The term "oil" means crude oil or petroleum products.  (b)  The term "indirectly" includes selling to or otherwise providing oil to Cuba through intermediaries or third countries, with knowledge that such oil may be provided to Cuba, as determined by the Secretary of Commerce.  (c) Cuba through intermediaries or third countries, with knowledge that such oil may be provided to Cuba, as determined by the Secretary of Commerce.  The term "Cuba" means the territory of Cuba and any other territory or marine area, including the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf, over which the Government of Cuba claims sovereignty, sovereign rights, or jurisdiction, provided that the Government of Cuba exercises partial or total de facto control over the area or derives a benefit from economic activity in the area pursuant to international agreements.  (d)  The term "Government of Cuba" includes the Government of Cuba, any political subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, and any person owned or controlled by, or acting for or on behalf of, the Government of Cuba.

Sec. 8.  Effective Date.  This order is effective at 12:01 a.m. eastern standard time on January 30, 2026.

Sec. 9.  Interaction With Other Presidential Actions.  Any provision of previous proclamations and Executive Orders that is inconsistent with the actions directed in this order is superseded to the extent of such inconsistency. 

Sec. 10.  Severability.  If any provision of this order or the application of any provision of this order to any individual or circumstance is held to be invalid, the remainder of this order and the application of its provisions to any other individuals or circumstances shall not be affected.  If the action in this order or any action taken pursuant to this order is held invalid, the other actions imposed to deal with the national emergencies declared with respect to the Government of Cuba shall not be affected and shall remain in effect.

Sec. 11.  General Provisions.  (a)  Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:  (i)   the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency, or the head thereof; or(ii)  the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.  (b)  This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.  (c)  This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.  (d)  The costs for publication of this order shall be borne by the Department of State.

DONALD J. TRUMP

LINK TO WHITE HOUSE FACT SHEET

Day Before 2024 U.S. Presidential Election, Employee Of CIA Accepted Box Of Cuba-Origin Cigars

DEPARTMENT OF STATE [Public Notice: 12937] Office of the Chief of Protocol; Gifts to Federal Employees From Foreign Government Sources Reported to Employing Agencies in Calendar Year 2024

All information reported to the Office of the Chief of Protocol, including gift appraisal and donor information, is the responsibility of the employing agency, in accordance with applicable law and GSA regulations. The Office of the Chief of Protocol, Department of State, submits the following comprehensive listing of the statements which, as required by law, federal employees filed with their employing agencies during calendar year 2024 concerning gifts received from foreign government sources. The compilation includes reports of both tangible gifts and gifts of travel or travel expenses of more than minimal value, as defined in 5 U.S.C. 7432 and GSA regulations. For calendar year 2024 (January 1, 2024 through December 31, 2024), minimal value is $480.00. Consistent with Title 22 of the Code of Federal Regulations Section 3.4, the report includes all reported gifts given on a single occasion when the aggregate value of those gifts exceeds minimal the State Department’s Office of the Chief of Protocol’s request for data. The U.S. Senate maintains an internal minimal value of $100; therefore, all gifts over the $100 limit are furnished in the U.S. Senate report. value. Also included are one gift from 2017, one gift from 2021, three gifts from 2022, and nineteen gifts from 2023. These latter gifts are being reported in this year’s report for calendar year 2024 because the Office of the Chief of Protocol, Department of State, did not receive the relevant information at the time of reporting to include them in earlier reports. Agencies not listed in this report either did not receive relevant gifts during the calendar year, did not transmit a listing to the Secretary of State of all statements filed during the preceding year by the employees of that agency pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 7432(f)(1), or did not respond to Authority: Section 7342(f) of Title 5, United States Code, as added by Section 515(a)(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1978 (Pub. L. 95–105, August 17, 1977, 91 Stat. 865). Jason S. Evans, Under Secretary for Management, U.S. Department of State.

AGENCY: THE WHITE HOUSE—EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT [Report of Tangible Gifts Furnished by the White House—Executive Office of the President]

“An Agency [Central Intelligence Agency] Employee.  Box of Swedish/Cuban Cigars. Rec’d- 11/4/2024. Est. Value- $543.00.  Disposition- Official Use.  5 U.S.C. 7342(f)(4).  Non-acceptance would cause embarrassment to donor and U.S.”

Seaboard Marine Of Florida Settles Cuba Libertad Act Port Use Lawsuit

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
Case No. 20-cv-25176-BLOOM 
ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. SEABOARD MARINE, LTD., Defendant.
 

JOINT NOTICE OF CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT AND JOINT STIPULATION REGARDING STAY OF DEADLINES 

Pursuant to the Court’s Amended Order Scheduling Trial and Order of Instructions Before Calendar Call, ECF No. [356] and S.D. Fla. L.R. 16.4, Plaintiff Odette Blanco de Fernandez née Blanco Rosell (“Plaintiff”) and Defendant Seaboard Marine, Ltd. (“Defendant”) (collectively, "Parties"), by and through their respective undersigned counsel, hereby notify the Court as follows: 1. The Parties participated in a mediation with William S. Ohlemeyer, Esq., Phillips ADR Enterprises. 2. 3. On January 25, 2026, the Parties reached a settlement in principle.  Having reached a settlement, the Parties will prepare and execute a settlement agreement with the assistance of Mediator Ohlemeyer on or before February 6, 2026. 4. Having agreed to a settlement, the Parties agree, stipulate, and respectfully request that the Court enter an Order staying all deadlines in this case pending execution of the settlement agreement or upon such further order of the Court.  A proposed Order is submitted herewith.  Date: January 26, 2026    
 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
Case No. 20-cv-25176-BLOOM
 

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. SEABOARD MARINE, LTD., Defendant. 
[PROPOSED] ORDER THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon the Parties’ Joint Notice of Settlement and Joint Stipulation Regarding Stay of Deadlines informing the Court that the Parties have reached an agreement to settle.  Upon due consideration and for good cause shown, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: All deadlines for all parties in the litigation are stayed and tolled pending execution of the Parties’ definitive settlement agreement or upon such further Order of the Court.  DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this  day of , 2026.  BETH BLOOM, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

ORDER ADMINISTRATIVELY CLOSING CASE

JOINT NOTICE OF CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT AND JOINT STIPULATION REGARDING STAY OF DEADLINES

Elderneedslaw

CMA CGM Of France Settles Cuba Libertad Act Port Use Lawsuit

U.S. District Court
Southern District of Florida (Miami)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:21-cv-22778-MD

JOINT NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT AND JOINT STIPULATION REGARDING STAY OF DEADLINES 

Pursuant to the Court’s Order Setting Pretrial Schedule and Trial (D.E. 217) and S.D. Fla. L.R. 16.4, Plaintiff Odette Blanco de Fernandez née Blanco Rosell (“Plaintiff”) and Defendants CMA CGM S.A. and CMA CGM (America) LLC (“Defendants”) (collectively, "Parties"), by and through their respective undersigned counsel, hereby notify the Court as follows: 1. Pursuant to the Court’s Order Granting Joint Motion to Modify Mediation Orders (ECF No. 266), the Parties participated in a mediation with Hon. Michael Hanzman (rtd.). 2. 3. On November 29, 2025, the Parties reached a settlement. Having reached a settlement, the Parties will prepare and execute a settlement agreement with the assistance of Mediator Hanzman on or before December 15, 2025 4. Having agreed to a settlement, the Parties agree, stipulate, and respectfully request that the Court enter an Order staying all deadlines in this case pending execution of the settlement agreement or upon such further order of the Court. A proposed Order is submitted herewith.

De Fernandez et al v. CMA CGM S.A. et al
Assigned to: Judge Melissa Damian
Referred to: Magistrate Judge Panayotta D. Augustin-Birch
Cause: 22:6082 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996    
Date Filed: 07/30/2021
Date Terminated: 12/01/2025
Jury Demand: Plaintiff
Nature of Suit: 890 Other Statutory Actions
Jurisdiction: Federal Question

12/30/2025- PAPERLESS SUA SPONTE ORDER Extending Deadline to file Stipulation of Dismissal. As set forth in this Court's Administrative Order on Notice of Settlement 442 , the current deadline to submit a stipulation for dismissal is December 31, 2025. It is hereby ORDERED that the deadline to submit a stipulation for dismissal as set forth in ECF Number 442 is EXTENDED to January 20, 2026. Accordingly, the parties shall submit a Stipulation for Dismissal, as set forth in ECF Number 442, by January 20, 2026. Signed by Judge Melissa Damian on 12/30/2025. (MD)
12/01/2025- ORDER ON JOINT NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT. Closing Case for ADMINISTRATIVE purposes. Signed by Judge Melissa Damian on 12/1/2025. See attached document for full details. (gqa) 
12/01/2025- Joint NOTICE of Settlement and Joint Stipulation Regarding Stay of Deadlines by Odette Blanco De Fernandez (Attachments: # 1 Text of Proposed Order) (Gaebe, John)

LINK TO SETTLEMENT FILING

LINK TO ORDER ON JOINT NOTICE OF SETTLEMENT

From the company: Present in 177 countries through more than 400 offices, 1,000 warehouses and 160,000 staff members, equipped with a modern fleet of more than 700 vessels, [Marseille, France-based] CMA CGM [2025 revenue approximately US$52 billion] serves 420 of the world's 521 commercial ports and operates on more than 250 shipping lines."

US Supreme Court Permits US Solicitor General To Deliver Ten Minute Argument On 23 February 2026 Supporting Exxon Mobil Corporation Against Cuba Government In Libertad Act Lawsuit

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES No. 24-699
EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, PETITIONER v. CORPORACIÓN CIMEX, S.A. (CUBA), ET AL. ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.  MOTION OF THE UNITED STATES FOR LEAVE TO PARTICIPATE IN ORAL ARGUMENT AS AMICUS CURIAE AND FOR DIVIDED ARGUMENT


Pursuant to Rules 21, 28.4, and 28.7 of the Rules of this Court, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the United States, respectfully moves for leave to participate in the oral argument in this case as amicus curiae and requests that the United States be allowed ten minutes of argument time. Petitioner has agreed to cede ten minutes of argument time to the United States and consents to this motion. Accordingly, if this motion were granted, the argument would be divided as follows: 20 minutes for petitioner, 10 minutes for the United States, and 30 minutes for respondents.  This case concerns the interaction between the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, 22 U.S.C. 6021 et seq., and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. 1330, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602 et seq. As relevant here, Title III of the LIBERTAD Act allows a private party to bring suits against “any person” who traffics in property confiscated by the Cuban government. 22 U.S.C. 6082(a)(1)(A). The Act also defines “person” as “any person or entity, including any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.” 22 U.S.C. 6023(11). The question presented here is whether the LIBERTAD Act permits suits against Cuban agencies and instrumentalities, or whether such claims are barred by foreign sovereign immunity unless they also satisfy an exception to foreign sovereign immunity codified in the FSIA.  The United States’ brief as amicus curiae supporting petitioner argues that Title III’s text -- including the definition of “person” and other provisions that specifically contemplate that Cuban agencies and instrumentalities could be liable for trafficking -- clearly abrogates Cuban agencies’ and instrumentalities’ immunity from suit. The brief further argues that contrary to the court of appeals’ decision below, a Title III plaintiff need not separately satisfy an FSIA exception to foreign sovereign immunity to sue a Cuban agency or instrumentality.  The United States has a substantial interest in the resolution of the question presented. The United States has significant foreign-policy interests in encouraging democracy in Cuba by promoting accountability for the Cuban government’s wrongful seizures and in supporting compensation for U.S. victims of unlawful Castro-era expropriations. The United States also has a substantial interest in the proper interpretation of the FSIA. Civil litigation against foreign sovereigns in U.S. courts can have significant foreign-relations implications and can affect the reciprocal treatment of the United States in other nations’ courts.  The United States has participated in oral argument as amicus curiae in numerous cases concerning the interpretation and application of the FSIA. See, e.g., CC/Devas (Mauritius) Ltd. v. Antrix Corp. Ltd., 605 U.S. 223 (2025); Republic of Hungary v. Simon, 604 U.S. 115 (2025); Cassirer v. Thyssen-Bornemisza Collection Found., 596 U.S. 107 (2022); Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp, 592 U.S. 169 (2021); Republic of Hungary v. Simon, 592 U.S. 207 (2021); Opati v. Republic of Sudan, 590 U.S. 418 (2020); Republic of Sudan v. Harrison, 587 U.S. 1 (2019); Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 583 U.S. 202 (2018). The United States’ participation in oral argument in this case could therefore materially assist the Court. Respectfully submitted.  D. JOHN SAUER.  Solicitor General.  Counsel of Record.  JANUARY 2026

No. 24A330 
Title: Exxon Mobil Corporation, Applicant v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), et al. 
Docketed: October 7, 2024
Linked with: 24-699
Lower Ct: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Case Numbers: (21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020)


No. 24-699 
Title: Exxon Mobil Corporation, Petitioner v. Corporación Cimex, S.A. (Cuba), et al. 
Docketed: December 31, 2024
Linked with: 24A330
Lower Ct: United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit Case Numbers: (21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020)
Decision Date: July 30, 2024
 

24-699 EXXON MOBIL CORP. V. CORPORACION CIMEX
DECISION BELOW: 111 F.4th 12
CERT. GRANTED 10/3/2025

PLAINTIFF QUESTION PRESENTED: In 1960, the Cuban government confiscated the property of American nationals and transferred it to state-owned enterprises. After years without a diplomatic resolution, Congress enacted the Helms-Burton Act, which created a damages action for American nationals against "any person ... that traffics in" such confiscated property. 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1). The Act defines "person" to include "any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state," id. § 6023(11), and expressly contemplates "judgment[s] against an agency or instrumentality of the Cuban Government," id. § 6082(d). The question presented is: Whether the Helms-Burton Act abrogates foreign sovereign immunity in cases against Cuban instrumentalities, or whether parties proceeding under that Act must also satisfy an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.

DEFENDANT QUESTION PRESENTED: Petitioner mistakenly frames the Question Presented as pertaining only to Cuban agencies and instrumentalities.  Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996, including its provision establishing liability for trafficking in confiscated property, is expressly applicable to “any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state.” See 22 U.S.C. § 6023(11); 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1).  Accordingly, the Question Presented is properly framed as follows: Whether Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 abrogates the immunity from suit provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604-1605, and replaces 28 U.S.C. § 1330 with 28 U.S.C. § 1331, thereby allowing a Title III action against any agency or instrumentality of a foreign state (whether Cuban or third-country) regardless of whether the action satisfies any of the FSIA’s enumerated exceptions to immunity.

Jan 02 2026    SET FOR ARGUMENT on Monday, February 23, 2026. 
Jan 05 2026    Record requested from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
Jan 06 2026    Record received electronically from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and available with the Clerk. 
Jan 06 2026    Record received from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. The record is electronic and is available on PACER. 
Jan 09 2026    Brief of respondents Corporación CIMEX, S.A. (Cuba), et al. filed. 
Jan 12 2026    Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument filed.
Jan 16 2026    Brief amici curiae of Foreign Relations and Separation of Powers Scholars filed. 
Jan 16 2026    Brief amici curiae of Foreign International Law Scholars, et al. filed. 
Jan 16 2026    Brief amici curiae of Foreign Sovereign Immunity Scholars filed. 
Jan 21 2026    CIRCULATED 
Jan 26 2026    Motion of the Solicitor General for leave to participate in oral argument as amicus curiae and for divided argument GRANTED.

LINK To Plaintiff Filing
LINK To Defendant Filing

US Supreme Court Review Requested By Plaintiff In Cuba Libertad Act Lawsuit Against Seaboard Marine

No. 25-283
Title: Seaboard Marine Ltd., Petitioner v. Odette Blanco De Fernandez, aka Blanco Rosell
Docketed: 11 September 2025
Lower Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Case Numbers: 22-12966
Decision Date: 14 April 2025
Rehearing Denied: 10 June 2025


QUESTIONS PRESENTED

“Title III of the Helms-Burton Act creates a right of action against businesses that traffic in property confiscated by the Cuban government. See 22 U.S.C.§§ 6023, 6082. In the decision below, the Eleventh Circuit stretched the Act’s text beyond its breaking point: the court of appeals held that shipping companies that, in accordance with federal regulations, lawfully carry agricultural commodities from the U.S. to Cuba could be traffickers, each of whom owes Respondent personally hundreds of millions of dollars, based on her theory that Cuba’s principal container terminal partially extends onto land once owned by a Cuban corporation in which she claims to be the lone surviving shareholder. The questions presented are: 1. Does the Helms-Burton Act abrograte basic corporate law and permit shareholders to maintain Title III actions based on confiscated corporate property the shareholders never personally owned? 2. Does delivering cargo to a facility partially constructed atop confiscated land qualify as trafficking in confiscated property under the Act? 3. Do companies that lawfully carry agricultural commodities from the U.S. to Cuba engage in lawful travel under the Act?”

https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/25-283.html

Sep 08 2025- Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due October 14, 2025) 
Oct 13 2025- Waiver of right of respondent Odette Blanco De Fernandez, et al. to respond filed.  
Oct 14 2025- Brief amici curiae of Crowley Latin America Services, LLC, et al. filed. 
Oct 22 2025- DISTRIBUTED for Conference of 11/7/2025. 
Oct 30 2025- Response Requested. (Due December 1, 2025) 
Nov 20 2025- Motion to extend the time to file a response from December 1, 2025 to January 15, 2026, submitted to The Clerk. 
Nov 24 2025- Motion to extend the time to file a response is granted and the time is extended to and including January 15, 2026. 

November 20, 2025- BY ELECTRONIC FILING

The Honorable Scott S. Harris
Clerk, United States Supreme Court
Supreme Court of the United States
One First Street, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20543

Re: Seaboard Marine Ltd. v. Odette Blanco de Fernandez, No. 25-283

Dear Mr. Harris:

I write on behalf of respondent in the above-captioned case. On October 30, the Court called for a response to the petition for a writ of certiorari in this case. The response is currently due December 1. Under Rule 30.4, respondent respectfully requests that the time to file a response be extended by forty-five days, to and including January 15, 2026. The requested extension will allow respondent sufficient time—accounting for the intervening Thanksgiving, Christmas, and New Year’s holidays—to prepare a response that will be helpful to the Court. Respondent needs that additional time to review the petition, the amicus brief in support, and the records in two pending cases (Nos. 24-699 & 24-983) involving the same statute at issue in this case. Counsel for petitioner have indicated that they do not consent to this extension. Thank you very much for your time, attention, and assistance. Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions or concerns.

Eugene A. Sokoloff
MoloLamken LLP
300 N. LaSalle Street
Chicago, IL 60654
T: 312.639.8410
esokoloff@mololamken.com
www.mololamken.com

Expedia In Cuba Libertad Act Lawsuit Argues "Plaintiffs lack a good faith basis to allege trafficking conduct after 2020"

U.S. District Court
Southern District of Florida (Miami)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:25-cv-20711-FAM


Echevarria et al v. Expedia Group Inc. et al
Assigned to: Judge Federico A. Moreno
Referred to: Magistrate Judge Ellen F. D'Angelo
Cause: 22:6082 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996    
Date Filed: 02/14/2025
Jury Demand: Plaintiff
Nature of Suit: 890 Other Statutory Actions
Jurisdiction: Federal Question

01/22/2026- PAPERLESS Minute Order for proceedings held before Magistrate Judge Ellen F. D'Angelo: Motion Hearing held on 1/22/2026 re 26 Amended MOTION TO DISMISS 18 Amended Complaint/Amended Notice of Removal, FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM and Incorporated Memorandum of Law filed by Expedia Group Inc., Expedia Inc., Hotels.com GP, LLC, Hotels.com L.P., Orbitz, LLC. Hearing held. The Court heard the arguments of the parties on the pending Motion to Dismiss (DE 26). Total time in court: 3 hour(s). Attorney Appearance(s): Andres Rivero, Lorayne Perez, David D. Shank (Digital 15:14:25 to 17:05:47 / Back up 260122164230) (ar24)
01/21/2026- Defendant's RESPONSE to 52 Notice of Supplemental Authority by Expedia Group Inc., Expedia Inc., Hotels.com GP, LLC, Hotels.com L.P., Orbitz, LLC. (Perez, Lorayne) 
01/21/2026- Notice of Supplemental Authority re 27 Response in Opposition to Motion, by Aureliano A Echevarria, Maria Echevarria Ochoa (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Composite Exhibit A) (Rivero, Andres)
01/20/2026- Plaintiff's NOTICE REGARDING ORDER SETTING HEARING ON MOTION TO DISMISS by Aureliano A Echevarria, Maria Echevarria Ochoa re 50 Notice (Other), 49 Order Setting Hearing on Motion, (Rivero, Andres)
01/20/2026- Defendant's NOTICE Regarding Position Regarding Order Setting Hearing on Motion to Dismiss by Expedia Group Inc., Expedia Inc., Hotels.com GP, LLC, Hotels.com L.P., Orbitz, LLC re 49 Order Setting Hearing on Motion, (Perez, Lorayne)
01/13/2026- ORDER SETTING DISCOVERY MOTIONS HEARING. Discovery Motion Hearing (DE 26) set for 1/22/2026 02:00 PM in Miami Division before Magistrate Judge Ellen F. D'Angelo. Signed by Magistrate Judge Ellen F. D'Angelo on 1/13/2026. See attached document for full details. (kpe)

DEFENDANTS’ RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY (ECF NO. 52): The ruling in Mata v. Expedia Group, Inc., does not compel this Court to hold that Plaintiffs’ action is not time barred.  First, the plaintiffs in Mata, like Plaintiffs here, alleged that the defendants trafficked in confiscated property “until at least” a time before the two-year repose period, see Mata, slip op. at 15, and argued that this allegation “acknowledges possible trafficking until a later date,” Pls.’Opp’n Mot. Dismiss at 9, Mata, ECF No. 159. From this, the Mata court concluded that the plaintiffs’ allegations were “ambiguous” as to when the alleged trafficking ceased and, thus the claims were not time barred on their face. Mata, slip op. at 14–15. But here there is no ambiguity because Plaintiffs’ counsel conceded that there is no “good-faith basis that there was any bookings, any activity relevant to…the subject hotels…after 2020.” (Hr’g Tr. 44:21–45:6, Dec. 16, 2025.) Because Plaintiffs lack a good faith basis to allege trafficking conduct after 2020, their allegations cannot be interpreted as pleading any such conduct. Second, even without Plaintiffs’ concession, Mata is not binding authority, and contrary rulings from two other courts are more persuasive. See Rodriguez, 2023 WL 9228332, at *10; Moreira, 573 F.Supp.3d at 928.

LINK To Response By Plaintiff
LINK To Response By Defendant

Trump’s Message To Cuba To “Make A Deal” May Not Be A Bad Deal For Cuba. Witkoff And Kushner Add Another Assignment. 23 February 2026 Is Consequential.

Trump’s Message To Cuba To “Make A Deal” May Not Be A Bad Deal For Cuba 

On The Road Again… Witkoff And Kushner Adding To Their Envoy, Son-In-Law Portfolios 

Return Of Mauricio Claver-Carone 

Compensation For Certified Claimants 

Cuba Had Opportunity From 2015-2017 To Extinguish At Least Three Highly Visible Claims Without “Paying” Anything.  They Refused. 

Watch 23 February 2026 For Arguments In Two United States Supreme Court Decisions Which Will Influence Trump-Vance Administration 

United States Supreme Court Decisions Could Be Impetus To Change Libertad Act To Make It More Expansive For Plaintiffs And More Expensive For Defendants 

Donald Trump, President of the United States (2017-2021 and 2025-2029), upon confirming the abduction of Nicolas Maduro, President of Venezuela (2013-2026), shared that the government of the United States was “running” Venezuela. 

He stated the export of oil from Venezuela would be controlled by the government of the United States.   

He spoke of compensating United States-based companies whose assets were expropriated without compensation by successive governments of Venezuela. 

The government of the Republic of Cuba dismissed overtures from the last three occupants of The White House to resolve- or at least attempt to resolve or pretend to attempt to resolve the issue of United States-based company assets expropriated without compensation by the government of the Republic of Cuba.

Successive governments of the Republic of Cuba believed they could rely upon Angola, Belarus, China, Iran, Russia, Turkiye, Venezuela, and Vietnam among other countries to prevent settling its obligations to United States-based companies and mitigating the impact of policies, regulations, and statues implemented by the government of the United States.  They were correct.  Until they were not.   

The mention of using assets (gas, gold, minerals, oil) of the government of Venezuela to compensate United States-based companies should pique Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, President of the Republic of Cuba (2019- ), at the Palacio de Revoluciones in Havana, Republic of Cuba.  It is a threat and can be an opportunity. 

There are 8,821 claims against the government of the Republic of Cuba of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for nearing sixty-five years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).   

The USFCSC permitted simple (not compound) interest of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10).  The current value of the certified claims is approximately US$9.3 billion.

While the Central Bank of the Republic of Cuba does have US$9.3 billion in assets and the archipelago’s resources (cobalt, gold, nickel, oil) are limited currently in quantity and extractability, there are mechanisms (duty free, fee exemption, tax suspension, a marketplace for claim values) the government of the Republic of Cuba could deploy to provide compensation for expropriated assets.  One result could be a hastened return by United States companies with their capital, market access, and management strategies.  Another result, perhaps more desired by the government of the Republic of Cuba would be engagement and re-engagement with non-United States-based companies who would now view or view again, the Republic of Cuba as a viable location to disperse assets.

United States-based accounting firms and United States-based law firms could become the new best friends for the government of the Republic of Cuba as they seek to successfully align the desires of their clients with the realities of the Republic of Cuba marketplace. 

Given the outcomes thus far in Venezuela, not unreasonable to expect the Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) to engage and re-engage with the government of the Republic of Cuba if the government of the Republic of Cuba changes its behavior rather than await engagement and re-engagement until all of the desired changes in personnel within the government of the Republic of Cuba.  

Not unreasonable to expect South Florida residents Steven Witkoff, Assistant to the President, Senior Advisor, and Special Envoy (2025- ) of the Trump-Vance Administration, and Jared Kushner, a son-in-law (2009- ) of President Trump, to be tasked by President Trump with negotiating a solution with the government of the Republic of Cuba.  South Florida is home to approximately 2 million inhabitants identifying as of Cuban descent. 

Whatever the post-Maduro-abduction decisions by the Trump-Vance Administration relating to the Republic of Cuba, Mauricio Claver-Carone, who resides in South Florida, and retains proximity throughout the Trump-Vance Administration, particularly with Marco Rubio, United States Secretary of State (2025- ), who has a home in South Florida, is among those who will have relevance.  The government of the Republic of Cuba will hallucinate at the prospect and recoil at the reality.  When appointed Senior Director, Western Hemisphere Affairs at the National Security Council (2018-2020), everyone involved in anything relating to the Republic of Cuba was terrified because for the first time in The White House was an individual whose previous life’s focus was the Republic of Cuba- and how to dismantle anything that smelled of engagement, re-engagement, cooperation, or appeasement.  He had the authority and desire to use the authority- which he did with immense impact.   

Two United States Supreme Court Cases 

President Trump will be listening for the outcome of two cases before the United States Supreme Court both of which have oral arguments scheduled for 23 February 2026.  In each case, the United States Department of Justice submitted briefs in support of the plaintiffs.   

One United States District Court Judge suggested the United States Congress consider making changes to the text of Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”) if it disadvantaged plaintiffs. 

A decision for the plaintiffs in both cases may result in new Libertad Act Title III lawsuits filed in United States District Courts- many in the State of Florida.  A result could be an increase in non-United States-based company and United States-based company operational departures from the Republic of Cuba and an increase in financial institution reticence to engage with Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions.  The tourism sector and re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba will likely suffer additional hardship.

SCOTUS BLOG: Havana Docks Corporation Issue: Whether a plaintiff under Title III of the LIBERTAD Act must prove that the defendant trafficked in property confiscated by the Cuban government as to which the plaintiff owns a claim, or instead that the defendant trafficked in property that the plaintiff would have continued to own at the time of trafficking in a counterfactual world "as if there had been no expropriation." 

SCOTUS BLOG: Exxon Mobil Issue: Whether the Helms-Burton Act abrogates foreign sovereign immunity in cases against Cuban instrumentalities, or whether parties proceeding under that act must also satisfy an exception under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 

From 2015 to 2017, during the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017), Raúl Modesto Castro Ruz, President of the Republic of Cuba (2008-2018), had opportunities to engage deeply and widely with United States-based companies including to begin a negotiation about the certified claims.  He did not. 

One consequence was during the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) much, but not all, of the commercial, economic, and financial engagement commenced in 2015 was interrupted.  Although anticipated due to President Trump’s real estate dealing background, the Trump-Pence Administration did not seek negotiations on behalf of the certified claimants. 

The Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025) reversed some, but not all, decisions implemented by the Trump-Pence Administration.  One new initiative was the 10 May 2022 license issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury authorizing from the United States private sector direct financing and direct investment into a Republic of Cuba-based private company owned by Republic of Cuba national.  Unfortunately, the government of the Republic of Cuba has yet to issue regulations necessary to deliver the financing and investment.  The lack of regulations- now nearing four years, impacts sourcing of financing and investment for all countries, including those which the government of the Republic of Cuba deems as friendly- Belarus, China, Iran, Russia, Spain, Turkiye, and Vietnam.   

Opportunities Missed To Settle Certified Claims 

Delta Air Lines & Western Union Plus US$1.15 Million Could Be Keys To Resolving Certified Claims June 04, 2019 

The Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) on 2 May 2019 made operational Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”).  

Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.   

Certified Claims Background 

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for nearing sixty-five years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).   

The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims is approximately US$9.3 billion.  

The first asset (along with 382 enterprises the same day) to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery on 6 August 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).  

  • From the certified claim filed by Texaco: “The Cuban corporation was intervened on June 29, 1960, pursuant to Resolution 188 of June 28, 1960, under Law 635 of 1959.  Resolution 188 was promulgated by the Government of Cuba when the Cuban corporation assertedly refused to refine certain crude oil as assertedly provided under a 1938 law pertaining to combustible materials.  Subsequently, this Cuban firm was listed as nationalized in Resolution 19 of August 6, 1960, pursuant to Cuban Law 851.  The Commission finds, however, that the Cuban corporation was effectively intervened within the meaning of Title V of the Act by the Government of Cuba on June 29, 1960.” 

The largest certified claim (Cuban Electric Company) valued at US$267,568,413.62 is controlled by Boca Raton, Florida-based Office Depot, Inc.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International; the certified claim also includes land adjacent to the Jose Marti International Airport in Havana, Republic of Cuba.  The third-largest certified claim valued at US$97,373,414.72 is controlled by New York, New York-based North American Sugar Industries, Inc.  The smallest certified claim is by Sara W. Fishman in the amount of US$1.00 with reference to the Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust. 

The two (2) largest certified claims total US$449,377,207.76, representing 24% of the total value of the certified claims.  Thirty (30) certified claimants hold 56% of the total value of the certified claims.  This concentration of value creates an efficient pathway towards a settlement.   

Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 requires that an asset had a value of US$50,000.00 when expropriated by the Republic of Cuba without compensation to the original owner.  Of the 5,913 certified claims, 913, or 15%, are valued at US$50,000.00 or more.   

The ITT Corporation Agreement 

In July 1997, then-New York City, New York-based ITT Corporation and then-Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based STET International Netherlands N.V. signed an agreement whereby STET International Netherlands N.V. would pay approximately US$25 million to ITT Corporation for a ten-year right (after which the agreement could be renewed and was renewed) to use assets (telephone facilities and telephone equipment) within the Republic of Cuba upon which ITT Corporation has a certified claim valued at approximately US$130.8 million.  ETECSA, which is now wholly-owned by the government of the Republic of Cuba, was a joint venture controlled by the Ministry of Information and Communications of the Republic of Cuba within which Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based Telecom Italia International N.V. (formerly Stet International Netherlands N.V.), a subsidiary of Rome, Italy-based Telecom Italia S.p.A. was a shareholder.  Telecom Italia S.p.A., was at one time a subsidiary of Ivrea, Italy-based Olivetti S.p.A.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International. 

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

US Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decreased 3.1% In October 2025; Increased 13.3% Year-To-Year; Private Sector Exports Since 2015 Reach US$360 Million Including US$200 Million In Vehicles Since 2022

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
December 2025

October 2025 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decrease 3.1%% -
Year-To-Year Increase 13.3%
51st Of 221 October 2025 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Cuba Ranked 49th Of 221 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets – 2
Re-Emerging Private Sector Exports - 3
October 2025 CDA Healthcare Product Exports US$102,609.00 - 6
October 2025 Humanitarian Donations US$17,198,344.00 - 7
U.S. Port Export Data- 20


OCTOBER 2025 AG/FOOD EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 3.1%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in October 2025 were US$40,293,718.00 compared to US$41,611,234.00 in October 2024 and US$15,928,609.00 in October 2023.  

US$399,716,952.00 for the period January 2025 through October 2025 compared to US$352,577,247.00 for the period January 2024 through October 2024, representing an 13.3% increase year-to-year.

Since 2022, when the first BIS license was issued for the export of vehicles to Republic of Cuba nationals and to private companies in the Republic of Cuba, the cumulative export value of the initiatives in place during the Obama-Biden Administration, Trump-Pence Administration, Biden-Harris Administration, and Trump-Vance Administration exceeds US$360 million of which electric and gasoline-powered new and used vehicles, bicycles, trucks, motorcycles and mopeds, and parts, exceeds US$200 million (Year 2025: January through October US$122,472,519.00; Year 2024: US$67,241,234.00; Year 2023: US$10,546,419.00; Year 2022: US$89,848.00), and purchases (equipment and products) for use by the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba driving the growth.

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and United States Department of State.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA, CDA, and other regulations, specifically including products exported from the United States to the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.

The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

U.S. PORT EXPORT DATA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2024 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

The Bank Shot Is How Departure Of Maduro From Venezuela Hastens Changes, Rather Than Departures From Cuba. The Law Of Intended Consequences 

The Bank Shot Is How Departure Of Maduro From Venezuela Hastens Changes, Rather Than Departures From Cuba 

The Law Of Intended Consequences 

The Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029) has confirmed the departure of Nicolas Maduro President of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (2013-2025), and Mrs. Maduro from the capital city of Caracas. 

Remaining unknown is if the type of departure was negotiated.  Meaning, President Maduro said he would not voluntarily depart, but if there is a viable effort to abduct him, he will not resist.  For him, where he will reside and how he will finance the remainder of his life is an important concern.   

Do not expect United States Navy Seals or United States Army Rangers to repel from a CH-A47F Chinnock helicopter and dislodge Miguel Díaz-Canel Bermúdez, President of the Republic of Cuba (2019- ) from his office at the Palacio de Revoluciones in Havana, Republic of Cuba. 

The Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ) has been modeling since 20 January 2025 for an outcome they desperately neither wanted nor knew they would not have the capacity to prevent if Donald Trump, President of the United States (2017-2021 and 2025-2029) directed the United States Department of Defense (War) to implement. 

For President Diaz-Canel, the immediate post-Maduro issues are short-term, medium-term, and long-term implications for the commercial, economic, financial, military, political, and social relationship with the government of Venezuela. 

The replacement of President Maduro with Delcy Rodríguez, Executive Vice President of Venezuela (2018-2026) may not result in an immediate impact upon the government of the Republic of Cuba. 

The government of the Republic of Cuba may need to replace commercial opportunities provided by Venezuela specifically payment for Republic of Cuba nationals providing education, healthcare, and military services in Venezuela; energy products sourced from Venezuela, direct financial support provided by the government of Venezuela, and even the provision of aircraft by the government of Venezuela to transport officials of the government of the Republic of Cuba. 

While finding sources for energy imports will not be problematic for Republic of Cuba government-operated enterprises, structuring payments for energy imports with the same terms as provided by Venezuela-based enterprises will be immensely challenging.  The government of the Republic of Cuba does not timely make payments for energy imports from Venezuela.   

The reason is the government of Venezuela has since 2000 agreements signed by Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías, President of Venezuela (1999-2013), and Dr. Fidel Castro Ruz, President of the Republic of Cuba (1976-2008).  Those agreements provided and continue to provide substantial energy product deliveries, substantial discounts to market prices, and long-term payment terms- which the government of the Republic of Cuba has not maintained.   

Other country sources for energy include Mexico (which has been providing donated and subsidized energy products despite increasing criticism from the Trump-Vance Administration and pressure likely with further intensity as Mexico City negotiates trade agreements with Washington DC); Russian Federation (which has been which has been providing donated and subsidized energy products); and Iran (which has been providing donated and subsidized energy products).  

This morning is a Shock and Awe moment for the government of the Republic of Cuba and for those governments interacting with the government of the Republic of Cuba.  However, if the behavior of the new government of Venezuela does not meaningfully and rather quickly pivot diplomatically and politically in directions desired by the Trump-Vance Administration, then officials in Beijing, Havana, Mexico City, Moscow, and Tehran may adapt to a different head on the same body.   

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increased 8.6% In September 2025; Up 15.5% Year-To-Year.

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
October 2025

September 2025 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increase 8.6% -
Year-To-Year Increase 15.5%
52nd Of 221 September 2025 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Cuba Ranked 49th Of 221 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets – 2
Re-Emerging Private Sector Exports - 3
September 2025 CDA Healthcare Product Exports US$55,194.00 - 6
September 2025 Humanitarian Donations US$11,878,011.00 - 7
U.S. Port Export Data- 20



SEPTEMBER 2025 AG/FOOD EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 8.6%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in September 2025 were US$33,851,193.00 compared to US$31,150,492.00 in September 2024 and US$20,317,573.00 in September 2023.  

US$359,423,234.00 for the period January 2025 through September 2025 compared to US$310,967,013.00 for the period January 2024 through September 2024, representing an 18.0% increase year-to-year.

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and United States Department of State.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA, CDA, and other regulations, specifically including products exported from the United States to the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.

The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

U.S. PORT EXPORT DATA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2024 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

Simple fee realty

Milestone Reached: U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Exceed US$8 Billion Since First Deliveries In December 2001

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and United States Department of State.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA, CDA, and other regulations, specifically including products exported from the United States to the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.

The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increased 5.6% In August 2025; Up 16.3% Year-To-Year.

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
October 2025

August 2025 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increase 5.6% -
Year-To-Year Increase 16.3%
48th Of 221 August 2025 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Cuba Ranked 48th Of 221 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets – 2
Re-Emerging Private Sector Exports - 3
August 2025 CDA Healthcare Product Exports US$25,456.00 - 6
August 2025 Humanitarian Donations US$17,679,678.00 - 7
U.S. Port Export Data- 20


AUGUST 2025 AG/FOOD EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 5.6%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in August 2025 were US$39,862,688.00 compared to US$37,729,568.00 in August 2024 and US$39,913,983.00 in August 2023.  

US$325,572,041 for the period January 2025 through August 2025 compared to US$279,816,521.00 for the period January 2024 through August 2024, representing an 18.0% increase year-to-year representing.

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and United States Department of State.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA, CDA, and other regulations, specifically including products exported from the United States to the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.

The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

U.S. PORT EXPORT DATA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2024 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

Inch calculator

U.S. Department Of State Issues Unusual Readout Of Specifically To Thank Country For Supporting US Position On Cuba At UN

United States Department of State
Washington DC
14 November 2025

Deputy Secretary Landau’s Call with North Macedonia Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Mucunski 

The below is attributable to Principal Deputy Spokesperson Tommy Pigott:

Deputy Secretary of State Christopher Landau spoke with Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade Timčo Mucunski to thank North Macedonia for its opposition to Cuba’s annual anti-embargo resolution at the United Nations General Assembly. The call underscored the strong bilateral relationship between the United States and North Macedonia.

Expedia Prevails As Judge In Libertad Act Cuba Lawsuit Rules On "Claim-Splitting"

U.S. District Court
Southern District of Florida (Miami)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 1:19-cv-22529-CMA

Mata et al v. Expedia, Inc., et al
Assigned to: Chief Judge Cecilia M. Altonaga
Referred to: Magistrate Judge Lisette M. Reid
Cause: 22:6082 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996    
Date Filed: 06/18/2019
Jury Demand: Plaintiff
Nature of Suit: 890 Other Statutory Actions
Jurisdiction: Federal Question


Link To Court Document

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendants, Expedia Group, Inc. (“Expedia Group”); Expedia, Inc.; Hotels.com L.P.; Hotels.com GP; and Orbitz, LLC’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs’ Third Amended Complaint [ECF No. 156]. Plaintiffs, Maricela Mata, Bibiana Hernandez, José Ramón López Regueiro, Mario Echevarría, Aureliano A. Echevarría, and Maria Echevarría Ochoa filed a Response [ECF No. 159]; to which Defendants filed a Reply [ECF No. 160]. The Court has reviewed the parties’ written submissions, the record, and applicable law. For the following reasons, the Motion is granted in part.

Because all four elements of claim preclusion are satisfied, the Court dismisses Mario Echevarría’s claim against Expedia Group, Hotels.com L.P., Hotels.com GP, and Orbitz, LLC. The Court does not dismiss his claim against Expedia, Inc.

Dismissal of Maria Echevarría Ochoa and Aureliano Echevarría’s claims based on claim-splitting is warranted.

Cuba’s 55-Page Annual Report To 2025 UNGA Includes Truths And Lapses From Realities About Commercial Engagement With The US Government And US Companies. Blame Not All North To South.

Government Of Cuba’s 2025 55-Page Annual Report To The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Includes Truths And Lapses From Realities About Commercial Engagement With The United States. 

Had The Government of The Republic Of Cuba From 2015 Accepted A Robust Return By United States-Based Companies, Many Of The Complaints Today Would Not Exist.  Havana Continues To Fail To Embrace What Is Authorized And That Has Consequences. 

Engagement With And Support For The Re-Emerging Private Sector Is The Only Viable Pathway For Government Of The Republic Of Cuba To Provide Value To Its Declining Population.   

Strategy Should Not Solely Focus On Survival- It Must Pivot To Focus On Prosperity. 

Link: Not "Ironclad" So At UN Why Does Cuba Government Continue To Misstate Realities Of US Company Exports To Government Companies And Private Companies? US$8+ Billion Is Real. September 27, 2025 

“CUBA’S REPORT [May 2025] Pursuant to United Nations General Assembly Resolution 79/7, entitled “Necessity of ending the economic, commercial, and financial blockade imposed by the United States of America against Cuba””  Link To Document In PDF Format 

Excerpts: 

“Until April, 2025, there were 11,233 private micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) registered in Cuba.  

The blockade also affects the activity of these private entrepreneurs, business owners and Cuban cooperatives. In 2024, 608 MSMEs -6 per cent of the total- reported losses. The US administration has repeatedly claimed that the blockade is only intended to punish the Cuban government and not the people or the private sector.   

The measures announced in May 2024, supposedly to benefit this sector in terms of access to digital and financial services, never materialized. The structural barriers of the blockade and its legal framework remain the main obstacle to any economic activity in Cuba. US technology companies intended to unlock tools face the challenge of discriminating between state and private actors. 

Coercive measures by the US government against financial institutions have led several payment and e-commerce platforms, such as PayPal, to refuse to provide services to these individuals simply because they are Cuban, regardless of the type of business they run. They are equally unable to access Visa or Mastercard cards to acquire supplies for their businesses, since these are banned for Cubans anywhere in the world. Therefore, they do not have a secure online payment method, not even through a third country. Consequently, bank branches do not complete their transactions and many customers decide not to continue their relationships with private Cuban entities.” 

Page 49 of 55 

Annex 3: Prerogatives of the US President to modify the implementation of the blockade against Cuba. 

Note: Comment and links to previously-published analyses relating to the respective prerogatives included under some of the nine (9) prerogatives, which are in bold.  

  • “Enable Cuban entities to open correspondent accounts in US banks.” 

Beginning in 2015, the government of the Republic of Cuba was requested, but refused, to have Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions officially request correspondent banking licenses from the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury.  The Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) had inexplicably authorized United States-based financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions, but did not authorize Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with United States-based financial institutions.  Applications to the OFAC from Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions would have been particularly of value in 2022 when the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025) directed the OFAC to license direct investment into and direct financing for privately-owned companies in the Republic of Cuba.   

Link: State Department, NSC, OFAC, BIS, USDA Don't Understand Requirements For Financial Plumbing To Function Efficiently.  They Excel In Creating, Maintaining, And Defending Clogs. May 16, 2023 

Link: Biden-Harris Administration Re-Engagement With Cuba’s Re-Emerging Private Sector Brings Urgency To Re-Authorization Of Direct Correspondent Banking, U-Turn Transactions. One-Way Does Not Work. October 06, 2022 

Link: Facing Extinction Like Javan Rhino? Non-U.S. Banks Engaging With U.S. And Non-U.S. Entities For Authorized Transactions Involving Cuba Due To Risk Of OFAC Penalties. Since 2015, Only Two U.S. Banks. October 17, 2022 

Link: American Airlines & United Airlines Are Correcting Their Internet Sites About Using Credit Cards In Cuba April 17, 2017 

  • “Authorize exports to Cuba of US products for key sectors of the economy, such as mining, tourism and biotechnology.”  

  • “Authorize the importation by the US of any merchandise manufactured or derived from products grown, produced or manufactured in Cuba by state-owned enterprises (nickel, sugar, tobacco, rum or others).”  

Link: Coffee & Charcoal Have Been Imported From Cuba; U.S. Companies Want More. Agricultural Commodities/Food Products/Healthcare Products Have Been Exported To Cuba; U.S. Companies Want More. October 02, 2021 

  • “Allow the export to Cuba of medical supplies and equipment that can be used in the manufacture of Cuban biotechnology products.”  

  • “Relax the policy to grant licenses to US companies to invest in Cuba.”  

Link: Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022 

Link: With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022 

  • “Authorize US citizens to receive medical treatment in Cuba.”  

  • “Authorize broader forms of cooperation for the development, marketing and supply of Cuban-made medicines and biomedical products, for example, through direct investments by US companies and joint ventures.”  

Link: Roswell Park Announces Joint Venture In Cuba For Healthcare Product Development September 26, 2018 

Link: Roswell Park In Buffalo, New York, Has Unique Partnership With Cuba; Has It Explored COVID-19 Treatment? June 15, 2020 

Link: Roswell Park Comprehensive Cancer Center References Its Clinical Trials For Cuba's CIMAvax-EGF. After Five Years Of Activity, RPCCC Continues Refusal To Provide Data/Comment On Joint Venture Status. November 02, 2021 

Link: Will Cuba Seek EUA From United States FDA? Not Required, But Politically Might Be Prudent Marketing Strategy To Reinforce What Cuba Can Do Under Sanctions June 23, 2021 

  • “Authorize sales of the raw materials that Cuba needs to produce medicines for the Cuban population and other developing countries.”  

  • “Authorize US subsidiaries to do business with Cuba that is not related to the import and export of goods to Cuba (prohibited by the Torricelli Act). [1992 Cuban Democracy Act]”

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Not "Ironclad" So At UN Why Does Cuba Government Continue To Misstate Realities Of US Company Exports To Government Companies And Private Companies? US$8+ Billion Is Real.

Why Does The Government Of The Republic Of Cuba Continue To Exaggerate Unnecessarily At The United Nations (UN) About The Impact On Purchases From United States Companies Using Provisions Within The CDA And TSREEA, And Authorizations By The BIS And United States Department Of State?  

Since 2001, United States Companies Have Exported More Than US$8 Billion In Products To The Republic Of Cuba- With Purchasers Both Government-Operated Companies And Re-Emerging Private Sector 

There is no reasonable debate using export data, import data, and exporter statements where the outcome supports that policies, regulations, and statutes do not constrain and restrain the export of products from the United States to the Republic of Cuba and imports from the Republic of Cuba to the United States.  There can be and is debate as to the impact of the impact, qualifying and quantifying the level of deterrents and inconveniences. 

Could there be an increase in United States exports to the Republic of Cuba within existing policies, regulations, and statutes in place by the government of the United States and the government of the Republic of Cuba?  Yes.  There is shared responsibility for Washington DC and Havana.  The two most important: Washington DC could authorize direct correspondent banking.  Havana could authorize the direct investment into and the direct financing for privately-owned companies- which the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025) authorized on 10 May 2022.   

Link: Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022 

Link: With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022 

Three statements by Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba, at the Human Rights Council (HRC) of the United Nations (UN). 

  • “For more than six decades, the Cuban people have been facing the consequences of an ironclad economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States Government…” Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba

Reality: 

Since 2022, when the first Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce license was issued for the export of vehicles to Republic of Cuba nationals and to private companies in the Republic of Cuba, the cumulative export value of the initiatives in place during the Obama-Biden Administration, Trump-Pence Administration, Biden-Harris Administration, and Trump-Vance Administration exceeds US$191 million of which electric and gasoline-powered new and used vehicles, bicycles, trucks, motorcycles and mopeds, and parts, exceeds US$128 million (January 2025 through July 2025: US$50,288,310.00; year 2024: US$67,241,234.00; year 2023: US$10,546,419.00; year 2022: US$89,848.00 by the end of 2025 and purchases (equipment and products) for use by the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba driving the growth. 

The following data is a guide with approximate values for non-agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  Primarily products (including vehicles) used for the benefit of the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba and Republic of Cuba nationals.  

Year    Approximate U.S. Dollar Value
2015    US$4,836,627.00
2016    US$7,644,628.00
2017    US$11,137,712.00
2018    US$32,690,672.00
2019    US$21,144,294.00
2020    US$10,326,641.00
2021    US$5,204,355.00
2022    US$11,812,859.00
2023    US$30,334,066.00
2024    US$85,615,889.00
2025    US$63,891,338.00 (through July)
Total    US$284,639,081.00
 

Link: Since 2022, US$191+ Million U.S. Exports To Cuba's Re-Emerging Private Sector- Including US$128 Million In Vehicles September 08, 2025 

In 2008, the highest value year, for example, the government of the Republic of Cuba purchased US$717,878,764.00 in agricultural commodities and food products from United States-based companies.  The transactions were on a cash-in-advance basis as required by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, which re-authorized the direct export of agricultural commodities and food products from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 re-authorized the direct export of healthcare products (medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, medicines, and pharmaceuticals from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  Payment terms are authorized within the CDA. 

Link To 2008 Export List In PDF Format 

  • “… impact of a policy that threatens the food security of our population, as it prevents the acquisition of fertilizers, agricultural machinery, fuels, chemical products and essential technologies to guarantee national food production.”  Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba 

Reality: 

In 2017, Deere & Company (2024 revenues approximately US$61.3 billion) established a distribution center in the Republic of Cuba, joining San Juan, Puerto Rico-based RIMCO, the Republic of Cuba distributor for Irving, Texas-based Caterpillar Inc. (2024 revenues US$66.5 billion) established the same year.  At the time, neither Deere & Company nor Caterpillar issued media releases or posted information on their respective Internet sites.  

Since November 2017, Deere & Company delivered nearing US$2 million in agricultural equipment to the Republic of Cuba for use at its distribution center. Antioch, Tennessee-based Wirtgen America, Inc., a subsidiary of Windhagen, Germany-based Wirtgen Group (2020 revenues approximately US$3 billion), a construction equipment machinery subsidiary (acquired in 2017) of Deere & Company has also delivered products to the Republic of Cuba.  RIMCO continues to deliver equipment for use at its distribution center in the Republic of Cuba, including excavators, backhoes, graders, scrapers, bulldozers, railway fixtures, and signaling equipment, valued at more than US$4 million since December 2018.  John Deere Financial Services was to provide payment terms/financing for the exports, primarily Series 5000 (price range US$25,000.00 to US$80,000.00) with a limited quantity of Series 7000 (price range US$219,000.00 to US$280,000.00).  According to the company, several hundred tractors, parts and accessories may be exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba during the next four years, with the first deliveries (for testing and evaluation) scheduled for mid-November 2017.  The potential value of the several hundred products exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba that would be financed could range from US$9 million to US$30 million.  John Deere Financial Services has not commented as to whether the product sales goals have been achieved or if there have been issues relating to the receipt of paymentsCaterpillar has not disclosed if the company has provided payment terms for its products exported to the Republic of Cuba.  

Since December 2017, Boston, Massachusetts-based General Electric (GE; 2024 revenues approximately US$64.6 billion) delivered from the United States to the Republic of Cuba “parts for steam turbines” valued at more than US$21 million. Some of the parts traveled from Atlanta, Georgia, to Port Everglades, Florida, then to Port Mariel in the Republic of Cuba. GE is the largest (by revenue) United States-based industrial company to have engaged with the Republic of Cuba. Although GE has not issued a media release relating to the project in the Republic of Cuba, in 2017 the government of the Republic of Cuba confirmed in a PowerPoint presentation used by the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in Washington DC that the company was providing parts and equipment for a power plant. The total value of the project has not been reported. The Obama Administration first authorized the transactions by GE as primarily advancing benefit to the citizens of the Republic of Cuba rather than to the government of the Republic of Cuba. This type of transaction was and remains licensable (general or specific) through the OFAC and BIS. In November 2015, GE purchased for approximately US$10.6 billion the power and grid division of Paris, France-based Alstom (2018 revenues approximately US$8 billion). In 2016, GE commenced a power generation project in the Republic of Cuba resulting, in part, from a relationship between Alstom and the Republic of Cuba prior to the 2015 acquisition by GE of the power and grid division of Alstom, which had exported products to the Republic of Cuba. On 31 March 1971, GE certified a claim against the Republic of Cuba in the amount of US$5,870,436.86 through the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) within the United States Department of Justice.  Interest accrued at 6% per annum from the respective date(s) of loss to the date of settlement.  

  • “… blockade hinders and disrupts even the arrival of supplies already paid for, affecting the availability of basic commodities such as rice, beans, powdered milk, oil, meat, bread and coffee.”  Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba 

Reality: 

United States exports to the Republic of Cuba (government-operated entities and the re-emerging private sectors) were US$285,709,353.00 for the period January 2025 through July 2025 compared to US$242,085,953.00 for the period January 2024 through July 2024, representing an 18.0% increase year-to-year representing.  The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the TSREEA and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and United States Department of State.

Link To Complete Report In Pdf Format

Link To Complete List Of Products In 2024 Exported From The United States To Cuba

Link To Complete List Of Products In 2023 Exported From The United States To Cuba 

Year    Value Of TSREEA Exports
2025    US$285,709,353.00
2024    US$433,662,216.00
2023    US$342,607,027.00
2022    US$328,536,988.00
2021    US$304,774,413.00
2020    US$163,354,728.00
2019    US$257,659,479.00
2018    US$224,910,413.00
2017    US$268,800,005.00 (revised +US$8,132,930.00 on 6/18)
2016    US$232,064,645.00
2015    US$170,551,329.00
2014    US$291,258,881.00
2013    US$348,747,293.00
2012    US$457,318,357.00
2011    US$358,457,389.00
2010    US$366,467,782.00
2009    US$528,482,955.00
2008    US$710,086,323.00
2007    US$437,564,824.00
2006    US$340,433,442.00
2005    US$350,218,040.00
2004    US$391,990,382.00
2003    US$256,901,471.00
2002    US$138,634,784.00
2001    US$4,318,906.00 (December- 1st sales under TSREEA)
Total Sales    US$7,966,705,182.00
 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Havana, Republic of Cuba
12 September 2025

Cuba denounces the impact of the blockade on the right to food at the Human Rights Council 

Geneva, September 12, 2025.- The Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, denounced before the Human Rights Council (HRC) of the United Nations (UN), the impact of the blockade imposed by the United States on the right to food and food security of the Cuban people. 

The Cuban Deputy Foreign Minister intervened, in virtual format, in the Biennial Panel on Unilateral Coercive Measures of the 60th session of the UNHRC, and pointed out that the U.S. policy towards the island had caused damage to the Cuban agri-food sector for more than 441 million dollars between March 2023 and February 2024 alone.  He also exemplified how extraterritorial pressure measures prevent and hinder the acquisition of fertilizers, agricultural machinery, fuels, chemical products and essential technologies to guarantee food production. He illustrated the consequences of the blockade for Cuba's access to financing for agricultural development programs, modernization of rural infrastructures and adaptation to climate change. 

The central theme of the Biennial Panel was "Impact of Unilateral Coercive Measures and Excessive Compliance on the Right to Food and Food Security". It was attended by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Volker Türk; the Special Rapporteur on Unilateral Coercive Measures, Alena Douhan; the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Michael Fakhri; the independent expert on Foreign Debt, Attiya Waris; as well as representatives of governments and civil society. 

Related information: 

Intervention of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, at the Biennial Panel on Unilateral Coercive Measures. Geneva, 12 September 2025. 

Mr. President, We are grateful to the Office of the High Commissioner for its efforts to fulfil the mandate of organizing this biennial panel, in the difficult context of the liquidity crisis facing the United Nations.  For more than six decades, the Cuban people have been facing the consequences of an ironclad economic, commercial and financial blockade imposed by the United States Government, which has been intensified in recent years with new pressure measures, extraterritorial actions and financial restrictions.  This unilateral policy constitutes a massive, flagrant and systematic violation of the human rights of the Cuban people, and directly affects national food security, limiting access to inputs, technologies, financing and international cooperation. 

During the period between March 2023 and February 2024, the damage caused by the blockade in the Cuban agri-food sector amounted to more than 441 million dollars.  This figure not only represents an economic loss, but also reflects the human impact of a policy that threatens the food security of our population, as it prevents the acquisition of fertilizers, agricultural machinery, fuels, chemical products and essential technologies to guarantee national food production.   

The blockade hinders and disrupts even the arrival of supplies already paid for, affecting the availability of basic commodities such as rice, beans, powdered milk, oil, meat, bread and coffee.  The chilling effect of the embargo has even reached entities of the United Nations system.  In 2024, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) attempted to procure tractors for small Cuban producers worth $1.5 million, but the manufacturer refused to take the risk of trading with Cuba, due to U.S. coercion. 

Mr. President, The embargo has also restricted Cuba's access to external multilateral financing for agricultural development programs, modernization of rural infrastructure, and strengthening climate resilience.  This limitation affects the Cuban state's ability to guarantee an adequate standard of living, especially in a context marked by global crises, economic volatility and environmental challenges.  Various mandate-holders of this Council have been categorical in pointing out that unilateral coercive measures, such as the blockade, contravene international law, the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of States and the purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.  In January 2024, Special Rapporteur Alena Douhan, together with the special procedures on the right to food, the right to development, extreme poverty and human rights, sent a joint communication to the Government of the United States, in which they described the blockade as a serious violation of the human rights of the Cuban people. including the right to life. 

Mr. President, Despite these adversities, the Cuban State has deployed multiple efforts to guarantee equitable access to food, protect vulnerable sectors and promote local food production.  One of the pillars of this strategy is the Food Sovereignty and Food and Nutrition Security (FSN) Law, approved in 2022 and which is articulated with the Sustainable Development Goals; and the National Economic and Social Development Plan until 2030.  On the other hand, the urban, suburban and family agriculture program has been revitalized as a strategic tool for municipal self-sufficiency.  In collaboration with the World Food Programme (WFP), Cuba has implemented actions to strengthen maternal and child nutrition, school feeding and care for the elderly.  WFP supports the Municipal Self-Sufficiency Program, the Plan for the Prevention and Control of Anemia, and the "Life" Task, a Cuban State program that, among other aspects, addresses the impacts of climate change on food security. 

Mr. President, We reiterate our call for the immediate and unconditional cessation of the blockade. This demand is not only a matter of justice for the Cuban people: it is an ethical, legal and humanitarian demand that calls into question the credibility of the international system for the protection of human rights.  The Human Rights Council must continue to promote events like this, which make visible the effects of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human rights by millions of people around the world.  We urge the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to continue to follow up on this important issue.  In that regard, we highlight the rigorous and professional work carried out by Special Rapporteur Alena Douhan in carrying out her mandate.  Cuba will continue to defend its right to live without blockade, to produce its food, and to build a model of fair, sustainable and solidary development.  Thanks a lot. 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Havana, Republic of Cuba
12 September 2025

Cuba denuncia en el Consejo de Derechos Humanos el impacto del bloqueo en el derecho a la alimentación 

Ginebra, 12 de septiembre de 2025.- La viceministra de la Relaciones Exteriores, Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, denunció ante el Consejo de Derechos Humanos (CDH) de la Organización de Naciones Unidas (ONU), el impacto del bloqueo impuesto por Estados Unidos, en el derecho a la alimentación y la seguridad alimentaria del pueblo cubano. 

La Vicecanciller cubana intervino, en formato virtual, en el Panel Bienal sobre Medidas Coercitivas Unilaterales del 60 período de sesiones del CDH, y señaló que la política estadounidense hacia la Isla había causado daños al sector agroalimentario cubano por más de 441 millones de dólares solo entre marzo de 2023 y febrero de 2024. 

Asimismo, ejemplificó cómo las medidas de presión extraterritoriales impiden y obstaculizan la adquisición de fertilizantes, maquinaria agrícola, combustibles, productos químicos y tecnologías esenciales para garantizar la producción de alimentos. Ilustró las consecuencias del bloqueo para el acceso de Cuba a financiamiento para programas de desarrollo agrícola, modernización de infraestructuras rurales y adaptación al cambio climático. 

El Panel Bienal tuvo como tema central "Impacto de las medidas coercitivas unilaterales y el cumplimiento excesivo en el derecho a la alimentación y la seguridad alimentaria". Contó con la participación del alto comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos, Volker Türk; la relatora especial sobre Medidas Coercitivas Unilaterales, Alena Douhan; el relator especial sobre el derecho a la alimentación, Michael Fakhri; la experta independiente sobre Deuda Externa, Attiya Waris; además de representantes de gobiernos y de la sociedad civil. 

Información relacionada:  

Intervención de la viceministra de Relaciones Exteriores, Anayansi Rodríguez Camejo, en el Panel Bienal sobre Medidas Coercitivas Unilaterales. Ginebra, 12 de septiembre de 2025.

Señor presidente: 

Agradecemos a la Oficina del Alto Comisionado los esfuerzos para cumplir el mandato de organizar este panel bienal, en el difícil contexto de la crisis de liquidez que enfrentan las Naciones Unidas. 

Desde hace más de seis décadas, el pueblo cubano enfrenta las consecuencias de un férreo bloqueo económico, comercial y financiero impuesto por el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, que ha sido recrudecido en los últimos años con nuevas medidas de presión, acciones extraterritoriales y restricciones financieras. 

Esta política, de carácter unilateral, constituye una violación masiva, flagrante y sistemática de los derechos humanos del pueblo cubano, y afecta de manera directa la seguridad alimentaria nacional, limitando el acceso a insumos, tecnologías, financiamiento y cooperación internacional. 

Durante el período comprendido entre marzo de 2023 y febrero de 2024, los daños provocados por el bloqueo en el sector agroalimentario cubano ascendieron a más de 441 millones de dólares. 

Esta cifra no representa únicamente una pérdida económica, sino que refleja el impacto humano de una política que atenta contra la seguridad alimentaria de nuestra población, pues impide la adquisición de fertilizantes, maquinaria agrícola, combustibles, productos químicos y tecnologías esenciales para garantizar la producción nacional de alimentos. 

El bloqueo obstaculiza e interrumpe incluso la llegada de suministros ya pagados, afectando la disponibilidad de productos básicos como arroz, frijoles, leche en polvo, aceite, carne, pan y café. 

El efecto intimidatorio del bloqueo ha alcanzado incluso a entidades del sistema de las Naciones Unidas. 

En 2024, la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Agricultura y la Alimentación (FAO) intentó adquirir tractores para pequeños productores cubanos por un valor de 1,5 millones de dólares, pero el fabricante se negó a asumir el riesgo de comerciar con Cuba, debido a la coerción estadounidense. 

Señor presidente: 

El bloqueo también ha restringido el acceso de Cuba a financiamiento multilateral externo para programas de desarrollo agrícola, modernización de infraestructuras rurales y fortalecimiento de la resiliencia climática. 

Esta limitación afecta la capacidad del Estado cubano para garantizar un nivel de vida adecuado, especialmente en un contexto marcado por crisis globales, volatilidad económica y desafíos medioambientales. 

Diversos titulares de mandatos de este Consejo han sido categóricos al señalar que las medidas coercitivas unilaterales, como el bloqueo, contravienen el Derecho Internacional, el principio de no intervención en los asuntos internos de los Estados y los propósitos de la Carta de las Naciones Unidas. 

En enero de 2024, la Relatora Especial Alena Douhan, de conjunto con los procedimientos especiales sobre el derecho a la alimentación, el derecho al desarrollo, la extrema pobreza y los derechos humanos, enviaron una comunicación conjunta al Gobierno de los Estados Unidos, en la que calificaron el bloqueo como una grave violación de los derechos humanos del pueblo cubano, incluido el derecho a la vida. 

Señor presidente: 

A pesar de estas adversidades, el Estado cubano ha desplegado múltiples esfuerzos para garantizar el acceso equitativo a los alimentos, proteger a los sectores vulnerables y promover la producción local de alimentos. 

Uno de los pilares de esta estrategia es la Ley de Soberanía Alimentaria y Seguridad Alimentaria y Nutricional (SAN), aprobada en 2022 y que se articula con los Objetivos de Desarrollo Sostenible; y el Plan Nacional de Desarrollo Económico y Social hasta 2030. 

Por otra parte, el programa de agricultura urbana, suburbana y familiar, ha sido revitalizado como herramienta estratégica para el autoabastecimiento municipal. 

En colaboración con el Programa Mundial de Alimentos (PMA), Cuba ha implementado acciones para fortalecer la nutrición materno-infantil, la alimentación escolar y la atención a adultos mayores. 

El PMA apoya el Programa de Autoabastecimiento Municipal, el Plan para la prevención y control de la anemia, y la Tarea “Vida”, Programa del Estado cubano que, entre otros aspectos, aborda los impactos del cambio climático sobre la seguridad alimentaria. 

Señor presidente: 

Reiteramos nuestro llamado al cese inmediato e incondicional del bloqueo. Esta demanda no es solo una cuestión de justicia para el pueblo cubano: es una exigencia ética, jurídica y humanitaria que interpela la credibilidad del sistema internacional de protección de los derechos humanos. 

El Consejo de Derechos Humanos debe continuar fomentando eventos como este, que visibilicen las afectaciones de las medidas coercitivas unilaterales en el disfrute de los derechos humanos de millones de personas en el mundo. 

Exhortamos a la Oficina del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos a mantener el seguimiento a esta importante temática.  

En ese sentido, destacamos el trabajo riguroso y profesional que ha realizado la Relatora Especial Alena Douhan en el desarrollo de su mandato. 

Cuba continuará defendiendo su derecho a vivir sin bloqueo, a producir sus alimentos, y a construir un modelo de desarrollo justo, sostenible y solidario.  Muchas gracias.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Another Cuba Libertad Act Case To U.S. Supreme Court. Seaboard Marine Writes 11th Circuit Court of Appeals "stretched the Act's text beyond its breaking point"

From The Filing: "QUESTIONS PRESENTED- Title III of the Helms-Burton Act creates a right of action against businesses that traffic in property confiscated by the Cuban government. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 6023, 6082. In the decision below, the Eleventh Circuit stretched the Act’s text beyond its breaking point: the court of appeals held that shipping companies that, in accordance with federal regulations, lawfully carry agricultural commodities from the U.S. to Cuba could be traffickers, each of whom owes Respondent personally hundreds of millions of dollars, based on her theory that Cuba’s principal container terminal partially extends onto land once owned by a Cuban corporation in which she claims to be the lone surviving shareholder.  The questions presented are: 1. Does the Helms-Burton Act abrograte basic corporate law and permit shareholders to maintain Title III actions based on confiscated corporate property the shareholders never personally owned? 2. Does delivering cargo to a facility partially constructed atop confiscated land qualify as trafficking in confiscated property under the Act? 3. Do companies that lawfully carry agricultural commodities from the U.S. to Cuba engage in lawful travel under the Act?"

No. 25-283 
Title: Seaboard Marine Ltd., Petitioner v. Odette Blanco De Fernandez, aka Blanco Rosell
 
Docketed: September 11, 2025
Lower Ct: United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
Case Numbers: (22-12966)
Decision Date:  April 14, 2025 
Rehearing Denied: June 10, 2025
 
Proceedings and Orders
Sep 08 2025- Petition for a writ of certiorari filed. (Response due October 14, 2025) 
Petition Appendix Certificate of Word Count Proof of Service 

Attorneys
Attorneys for Petitioners 
Bryan Michael Killian
Counsel of Record
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP
1111 Pennsylvania Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20004
bryan.killian@morganlewis.com
Ph: 202-373-6191
Party name: Seaboard Marine Ltd.

Link To PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Link To APPENDIX
Link To WORD COUNT

ODETTE BLANCO DE FERNANDEZ née BLANCO ROSELL, Plaintiff, v. SEABOARD   MARINE, LTD., Defendant. [1:20-cv-25176; Southern Florida District]

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