U.S. Department Of State Spokesperson Responds After UNGA Vote On Cuba... Comfortable Continuing To Be In The Minority With Israel Only Supporter.

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United States Department of State
Washington DC
30 October 2024
Press Briefing- Matthew Miller, Spokesperson

QUESTION: Well, let’s stay in that region – well, semi-in that region, and so the vote happened today in the UN on the Cuba embargo. Do you know what the vote was?

MR MILLER: Yeah, it was a predictable vote in line with past votes. (Laughter.)

QUESTION: Yeah. Exactly. But just for the record, let’s say, it was 187 to 2 —

MR MILLER: Yeah.

QUESTION: — with one abstention.

MR MILLER: I am —

QUESTION: And the one abstention wasn’t even a Pacific Island nation. It was Moldova.

MR MILLER: Yeah. I’m aware of the – I’m aware of the long history —

QUESTION: So two.

MR MILLER: — of UN votes on this matter.

QUESTION: So you – yes, okay. So at what point, though, are you guys going to realize that the entire world, with the exception of you and Israel, thinks that the embargo is a really bad idea and should be stopped?

MR MILLER: Look, I think we are quite clear on the opinion of other countries around the world. And it’s one with which we —

QUESTION: So that —

MR MILLER: And it’s one with which we disagree. We take their opinion seriously, but we make our own policy determinations, and —

QUESTION: You do? It’s 32 years in a row with the exception of one year when you guys abstained. That was 2019. And —

MR MILLER: We – look, we take their views quite seriously, but we make our own determinations about these matters.

QUESTION: All right. You know what? Well —

MR MILLER: And we disagree.

QUESTION: Then – you take their views quite seriously? That is not borne out by the facts, that you continue to persist with this.

MR MILLER: We take them seriously, but we make our own decisions on this policy and others. So —

QUESTION: Okay. And are you comfortable, then, with it’s – just once again, it’s just you and Israel standing up.

MR MILLER: Certainly we would welcome other countries sharing our opinion in this. But we’re not blind to the history of countries around the world having a very different view of this matter. It long predates this administration. But as I said, we make our own determinations.

QUESTION: But what about the Obama —

MR MILLER: And with that —

QUESTION: What about the Obama administration disagreement? Were they wrong?

MR MILLER: I don’t have anything to comment on previous administration decisions. Thanks, everyone.

Spelling Exaggerate? Responding To Cuba UN Resolution, U.S. Ambassador Says US$100 billion When Truth Was US$36,563,551.00. Not The First Time A U.S. Diplomat Voiced Untruths About Cuba.

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U.S. Department Of State Can’t Stop Exaggerating.  Then Ask Why Credibility Issues. 

Ambassador Folmsbee At United Nations: “nearly $336 million in agricultural products and authorized another $100 billion in humanitarian exports” To The Republic Of Cuba. 

Facts: US$342,607,027.00 In Agricultural Products And US$36,563,551.00 In Humanitarian Exports From The United States To The Republic Of Cuba. 

30 October 2024
Ambassador Paul Folmsbee
Senior Advisor for Western Hemisphere Affairs
New York, New York

AS DELIVERED 

“Thank you, Mr. President, and thank you members of the General Assembly.  The United States stands with the Cuban people. We strongly support their pursuit of a future with respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. 

Approximately 1,000 unjustly detained political prisoners remain behind bars in Cuba – more than at any point in Cuba’s recent history. Nearly 700 of those detentions are connected to the July 11, 2021, historic protests. These people have languished in horrible conditions in Cuban jails for exercising their freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly to demand better living conditions from their government. 

Despite Cuba’s membership in the UN Human Rights Council, the Cuban government has delayed responding to several requests by special procedures that mandate holders of the UN Human Rights Council send independent experts to Cuba, who would help advance respect for human rights, including freedom of expression, freedom of religion or belief, and the freedom of peaceful assembly. Some of these requests have remained pending for more than 10 years. 

Sanctions are one element of our broader effort to advance democracy and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms in Cuba. We therefore oppose this resolution.  That said, we recognize the challenges the Cuban people face. That is why U.S. sanctions include exemptions and authorizations relating to exports of food, medicine, and other basic goods to Cuba. 

The United States remains a significant source of basic goods to the Cuban people. In 2023, the United States exported nearly $336 million in agricultural products and authorized another $100 billion in humanitarian exports, demonstrating America’s desire to help the Cuban people. 

We encourage this body to urge the Cuban government to adhere to its human rights obligations and listen to the Cuban people and their aspirations to determine their own future. Thank you.” 

FACTS: 

Important for the United States Department of State to be accurate with its data and be accurate with its narrative.  Clarity is critical to diplomacy.  Unfortunately, this is not the first moment for the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025).  Nor is the problem limited to one political party- Democrats and Republicans have been culprits. 

The presentation by Ambassador Folmsbee suggests that the US$336 million in agricultural products and US$100 billion in humanitarian exports were due to executive branch largess when in fact the exports are authorized by United States statute- enacted by the United States Congress, and signed into law by a president. 

Most egregious is the statement about US$100 billion in humanitarian exports having been “authorized” in 2023.  The Biden-Harris Administration knows that license applications for transactions requiring a license often include valuations that are far above what may be actually delivered by an individual, group, company, or organization.  Where some licenses are two years or more in validity, applicants are encouraged by the respective United States government entities to increase the potential valuation, so another license is not required prior to the expiration of the license. 

The Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 regulates the export of agricultural commodities and food products from the United States to the Republic of Cuba. 

  • The value of TSREEA exports in 2023 was US$342,607,027.00 with the Republic of Cuba ranking 53rd of 227 export markets for United States agricultural commodities and food products. 

  • Since December 2001 when the first TSREEA-authorized exports departed the United States to the Republic of Cuba, the cumulative twenty-three year total exceeds US$7,526,148,914.00. 

The Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 regulates the export of medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, and healthcare products from the United States to the Republic of Cuba. 

  • The value of CDA exports in 2023 was US$839,500.00. 

  • The cumulative total from 2003 exceeds US$37,388,306.00.   

The export from the United States to the Republic of Cuba for other products and services are regulated by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.  

  • The value of humanitarian product donations in 2023 was US$36,563,551.00. 

  • The value of humanitarian product donations thus far in 2024 exceeds US$45,708,614.00. 

Tweet By Biden-Harris Department Of State Emulates Trump-Pence Department Of State.  So Much For Wanting To Be Different.  Channeling Michael Kozak. 

Tweet Published By The Embassy of the United States, Havana, Republic of Cuba (22 February 2023): “En 2021, Estados Unidos autorizó más de 4.200 millones de dólares en exportaciones humanitarias a Cuba. En 2022, autorizamos 7.600 millones de dólares de exportaciones humanitarias. Estas exportaciones tienen como objetivo ayudar directamente al pueblo cubano.” 

English Translation (Google): “In 2021, the United States authorized more than $4.2 billion in humanitarian exports to Cuba. In 2022, we authorize $7.6 billion of humanitarian exports. These exports are intended to directly help the Cuban people.” 

Follow-Up Email From The United States Department of State: “The 2022 figure is 7.6 billion dollars, the 2021 figure is 4.2 billion.  These are figures reflect the combined value of all goods authorized for export from the US to Cuba including food, medicine, and everyday goods.  These are not strictly confined to purchases from US companies but include humanitarian donations by individuals and organizations.  The authorized figure does not necessarily reflect actual exports or donations.” 

For perspective:  

Agricultural Commodity/Food Commercial Exports Delivered To Cuba

2022- US$328,536,988.00

2021- US$304,774,413.00 

For the period 2001 through 2022, from when the first agricultural commodity and food products were exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under provisions of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, the value delivered was US$6,903,726,366.00.   

Healthcare Products Commercial Exports Delivered To Cuba

2022- US$9,226,763.00

2021- US$487,886.00 

For the period 2003 through 2022, the value of healthcare products (medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, pharmaceuticals) delivered from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 was US$36,419,340.00. 

Donations Delivered To Cuba

2022- US$30,083,306.00

2021- US$11,074,090.00 

For the period 2014 through 2022, the value of humanitarian donations delivered from the United States to the Republic of Cuba was US$68,682,418.00. 

Why did not the United States Department of State not include the details, the context, in its initial tweet?  Because the intention was to deliberately mislead to the benefit of the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) and to the detriment of the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ).   

  • The message was designed to embarrass, humiliate the government of the Republic of Cuba.  That objective is perfectly acceptable when using facts to support the goal.  That objective is profoundly objectionable when using the imperator, the credibility of the government of the United States government. 

  • The misuse of data in this manner permits the government of the Republic of Cuba to justifiably respond- it is accused by the United States Department of State of lying and misusing statistics and here the United States Department of State engages in equally egregious behavior. 

This official statement from the United States Embassy in Havana, Republic of Cuba, is a repeat of what previous administrations have done- be reckless with the facts, and present information that they know fully is misleading.  It’s disrespectful.  It's disgraceful. 

The Biden-Harris Administration knows that the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce has since the Bush-Cheney Administration (2001-2009) and during the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017), and Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) encouraged companies, organizations, and individuals who are exporting products from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- whether commercial (sold) or donated, not be required to seek a BIS license (if one is required) for the precise U.S. Dollar value of a particular shipment.   

Rather, to reduce paperwork, the exporter is encouraged to bundle expectations.  For example, if a company has an order for US$2 million in poultry, then the exporter might seek a license value of US$75 million or more or less so that if there are subsequent orders within the validity of the BIS license (usually three years to four years) additional BIS licenses are not required.  Same is true for donations- if an organization is hopeful to have US$10 million, then include US$100 million or more or less in the BIS license application.  

One example of how the data in the Tweet published on 22 February 2023 by the United States Department of State is misleading- the US$7.6 billion value is more than the value of all agricultural commodity, food product, healthcare product, and donations since December 2001.  

LINK TO STATISTICS IN PDF FORMAT 

Related Tweets From United States Department Of State 

“On 23 September 2019, The Honorable Michael G. Kozak, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs “retweeted” a “tweet” from the Embassy of the United States in Cuba.  LINK: https://twitter.com/WHAAsstSecty/status/1176240454104473601  

The publication of a US$12 billion “authorized” value since January 2018 is misleading and unnecessarily reinforces questions of credibility for statements by the United States Department of State.  Context is important.  Thus far in 2019, approximately US$186,114,479.00 (through 30 July 2019) in ag/food products have been exported from the United States to Cuba. Thus far in 2019, Cuba ranks 50th among 229 United States ag/food export markets.  Exports in 2018 were US$224,910,413.00 and exports in 2017 were US$268,800,005.00.  

Since December 2001, more than US$6,061,327,697.00 (through 30 July 2019) in ag/food products have been exported to Cuba.  Link To monthly report: https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2019/9/6/us-ag-exports-to-cuba-increased-1002-in-july-remain-up-10-year-to-year  

For many years, through the Bush-Cheney Administration, Obama-Biden Administration and thus far through the Trump-Pence Administration, United States exporters have been encouraged by the United States Department of Commerce to submit export license requests with gross estimates, often aspirational, so that they would not need to repeatedly seek licenses.  Most licenses are valid for two years.    

During the Bush-Pence Administration, the process was initiated at the recommendation of United States exporters to lessen often repetitive paperwork and was enthusiastically accepted by the United States Department of Commerce.  

Important to note that the values placed in the license applications often are done without any input from the Cuba-based importer.  As a result, the overall authorized values are often inflated.  This is not the first time an administration has misused the data- and previous administrations have corrected the context by which they have used the data.”

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

U.S. Department Of State Confirms "No" Vote Today At United Nations On Cuba Government-Sponsored Resolution

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United States Department of State
Washington DC
29 October 2024
Press Briefing- Matthew Miller, Spokesperson

QUESTION: Before we get into the Middle East, I just wanted to ask you if you got an answer to my question about the Cuba vote, UN.

MR MILLER: I know there’s going to be a vote today. I don’t believe it’s happened yet; it’s occurring this afternoon.

QUESTION: Yes.

MR MILLER: So what was your question? How we will vote?

QUESTION: Yeah.

MR MILLER: We will vote no, but –

QUESTION: You’ll vote no?

MR MILLER: We will vote no.

QUESTION: And have you lined up anyone to – other –

MR MILLER: As I said – as I previewed yesterday, it was likely.

QUESTION: Have you lined up anyone –

MR MILLER: I didn’t think we were going to vote, I think —

QUESTION: Okay.

MR MILLER: — for a resolution condemning ourself.

QUESTION: Fine. But —

MR MILLER: And in fact, we will vote no.

QUESTION: But have you lined up anyone to vote with you?

MR MILLER: I think I’ll wait until we see the vote results to talk about the outcome.

QUESTION: So no, you’re not sure if you’ll get one or two others?

MR MILLER: I would not expect an outcome –

QUESTION: Dissimilar to previous –

MR MILLER: — dissimilar – as I was saying, inconsistent – “dissimilar” is a better word – to previous outcomes. This is a resolution –

QUESTION: In other words, it will be another demonstration of the entire – virtually the entire world’s opposition to this, to the embargo. Right?

MR MILLER: I wouldn’t expect a dissimilar result, but we have made our position clear —

QUESTION: All right.

MR MILLER: — on it for some time, and we’ll continue in our vote at the UN today.

LINKS TO RELATED ANALYSES

U.S. Department Of State: Cuba UN Vote Not On Spokesperson's "Bingo Card" Oct 29, 2024

Cuba Is Governance Example Of The Medical Term “Failure To Thrive”  United Nations Resolution Will Not Fix Cuba- Nor Force Others To Fix Cuba. Python Suffocating Re-Emerging Private Sector. Oct 27, 2024

United Nations Vote This Week On Resolution Submitted Annually By Government Of Cuba About Relationship With The United States. Vote Outcome Certainty. Impact Not. Oct 27, 2024

Hesitant To Engage With Cuba? Read Second Paragraph Of Forward-Looking Statements In Sherritt International Corporation's Cuba Impact Statement. Cringeworthy For Legal Counsel

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Sherritt Reaffirms 2024 Guidance Following the Nationwide Power Outage in Cuba

NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION TO UNITED STATES NEWSWIRE SERVICES OR FOR DISSEMINATION IN THE UNITED STATES
October 28, 2024 05:05 PM Eastern Daylight Time

TORONTO--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Sherritt International Corporation (“Sherritt” or the “Corporation”) (TSX:S) today announced an update on its operations in Cuba following the nationwide power outage that began on October 18, 2024 (please refer to Sherritt’s press release dated October 21, 2024 titled “Sherritt Provides an Operational Update”). Despite the power outage and adverse weather from the tropical storm that occurred shortly after, Sherritt maintains its 2024 guidance ranges.

The Moa nickel mine and all Energas S.A. (“Energas”) facilities returned to full operating capacity on October 27, 2024. Following the power outage, the Moa nickel mine was operating at a reduced capacity of 50% to 60% with power sourced from the mine site’s own power generating capabilities. Despite this, there was not a material impact to mixed sulphides production. Moreover, the Corporation’s refinery in Alberta had strategically built-up feed inventory earlier in the year, ensuring reliable feed throughput for finished nickel production. At Energas, operations had partially resumed by Saturday, October 19, 2024 although some temporary disruptions continued due to the complexities involving the power grid. Energas was instrumental in assisting to restore power to the Cuban national grid. The Energas facilities, which are comprised of two reliable combined cycle plants, generate low-cost electricity from domestically sourced natural gas and are among the lowest carbon emitting power sources in Cuba.

Throughout the nationwide power outage, all environmental protection and safety activities at sites in Cuba continued uninterrupted, and there were no environmental incidents or injuries reported among personnel.

About Sherritt International

Sherritt is a world leader in using hydrometallurgical processes to mine and refine nickel and cobalt – metals deemed critical for the energy transition. Sherritt’s Moa Joint Venture has a current estimated mine life of 25 years and has embarked on an expansion program focused on increasing annual mixed sulphide precipitate production by approximately 20% of contained nickel and cobalt. The Corporation’s Power division, through its ownership in Energas S.A., is the largest independent energy producer in Cuba with installed electrical generating capacity of 506 MW, representing approximately 10% of the national electrical generating capacity in Cuba. The Energas facilities are comprised of two combined cycle plants that produce low-cost electricity from one of the lowest carbon emitting sources of power in Cuba. Sherritt’s common shares are listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange under the symbol “S”.

Forward-Looking Statements

This press release contains certain forward-looking statements. Forward-looking statements can generally be identified by the use of statements that include such words as “believe”, “expect”, “anticipate”, “intend”, “plan”, “forecast”, “likely”, “may”, “will”, “could”, “should”, “suspect”, “outlook”, “potential”, “projected”, “continue” or other similar words or phrases. Specifically, forward-looking statements in this document include, but are not limited to, statements regarding, the Corporation’s 2024 guidance.

Forward-looking statements are not based on historical facts, but rather on current expectations, assumptions and projections about future events, including commodity and product prices and demand; the level of liquidity and access to funding; share price volatility; production results; realized prices for production; earnings and revenues; global demand for electric vehicles and the anticipated corresponding demand for cobalt and nickel; the commercialization of certain proprietary technologies and services; advancements in environmental and greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction technology; GHG emissions reduction goals and the anticipated timing of achieving such goals, if at all; statistics and metrics relating to Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) matters which are based on assumptions or developing standards; environmental rehabilitation provisions; environmental risks and liabilities; compliance with applicable environmental laws and regulations; risks related to the U.S. government policy toward Cuba; and certain corporate objectives, goals and plans for 2024. By their nature, forward-looking statements require the Corporation to make assumptions and are subject to inherent risks and uncertainties. There is significant risk that predictions, forecasts, conclusions or projections will not prove to be accurate, that the assumptions may not be correct and that actual results may differ materially from such predictions, forecasts, conclusions or projections.

The Corporation cautions readers of this press release not to place undue reliance on any forward-looking statement as a number of factors could cause actual future results, conditions, actions or events to differ materially from the targets, expectations, estimates or intentions expressed in the forward-looking statements. These risks, uncertainties and other factors include, but are not limited to, uncertainty in the ability to accurately forecast the timing of operations operating at full capacity following the power outages of the Cuban national grid, security market fluctuations and price volatility; level of liquidity and the related ability of the Moa Joint Venture to pay dividends; access to capital; access to financing; the risk to Sherritt’s entitlements to future distributions (including pursuant to the Cobalt Swap) from the Moa Joint Venture, the impact of infectious diseases, the impact of global conflicts; changes in the global price for nickel, cobalt, oil, gas, fertilizers or certain other commodities; risks related to Sherritt’s operations in Cuba; risks related to the U.S. government policy toward Cuba, including the U.S. embargo on Cuba and the Helms-Burton legislation; political, economic and other risks of foreign operations; uncertainty in the ability of the Corporation to enforce legal rights in foreign jurisdictions; uncertainty regarding the interpretation and/or application of the applicable laws in foreign jurisdictions; compliance with applicable environment, health and safety legislation and other associated matters; risks associated with governmental regulations regarding climate change and greenhouse gas emissions; risks relating to community relations; maintaining social license to grow and operate; risks related to environmental liabilities including liability for reclamation costs, tailings facility failures and toxic gas releases; uncertainty about the pace of technological advancements required in relation to achieving ESG targets; risks to information technologies systems and cybersecurity; identification and management of growth opportunities; the ability to replace depleted mineral reserves; risk of future non-compliance with debt restrictions and covenants; risks associated with the Corporation’s joint venture partners; variability in production at Sherritt’s operations in Cuba; risks associated with mining, processing and refining activities; potential interruptions in transportation; uncertainty of gas supply for electrical generation; reliance on key personnel and skilled workers; growth opportunity risks; the possibility of equipment and other failures; uncertainty of resources and reserve estimates; the potential for shortages of equipment and supplies, including diesel; supplies quality issues; risks related to the Corporation’s corporate structure; risks associated with the operation of large projects generally; risks related to the accuracy of capital and operating cost estimates; foreign exchange and pricing risks; credit risks; shortage of equipment and supplies; competition in product markets; future market access; interest rate changes; risks in obtaining insurance; uncertainties in labour relations; legal contingencies; risks related to the Corporation’s accounting policies; uncertainty in the ability of the Corporation to obtain government permits; failure to comply with, or changes to, applicable government regulations; bribery and corruption risks, including failure to comply with the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act or applicable local anti-corruption law; the ability to accomplish corporate objectives, goals and plans for 2023; and the ability to meet other factors listed from time to time in the Corporation’s continuous disclosure documents.

In addition to the risks noted above, factors that could, alone or in combination, prevent the Corporation from successfully achieving the benefits from expansion opportunities may include, without limitation: identifying suitable commercialization and other partners; successfully advancing discussions and successfully concluding applicable agreements with external parties and/or partners; successfully attracting required financing; successfully developing and proving technology required for the potential opportunity; successfully overcoming technical and technological challenges; successful environmental assessment and stakeholder engagement; successfully obtaining intellectual property protection; successfully completing test work and engineering studies, prefeasibility and feasibility studies, piloting, scaling from small scale to large scale production; procurement, construction, commissioning, ramp-up to commercial scale production and completion; unanticipated cost increases; supply chain challenges and securing regulatory and government approvals. There can be no assurance that any opportunity will be successful, commercially viable, completed on time or on budget, or will generate any meaningful revenues, savings or earnings, as the case may be, for the Corporation. In addition, the Corporation will incur costs in pursuing any particular opportunity, which may be significant. Readers are cautioned that the foregoing list of factors is not exhaustive and should be considered in conjunction with the risk factors described in the Corporation’s other documents filed with the Canadian securities authorities, including without limitation the “Managing Risk” section of the Management’s Discussion and Analysis for the three and six months ended June 30, 2024 and the Annual Information Form of the Corporation dated March 21, 2024 for the period ending December 31, 2023, which is available on SEDAR at www.sedarplus.ca.

The Corporation may, from time to time, make oral forward-looking statements. The Corporation advises that the above paragraph and the risk factors described in this press release and in the Corporation’s other documents filed with the Canadian securities authorities should be read for a description of certain factors that could cause the actual results of the Corporation to differ materially from those in the oral forward-looking statements. The forward-looking information and statements contained in this press release are made as of the date hereof and the Corporation undertakes no obligation to update publicly or revise any oral or written forward-looking information or statements, whether as a result of new information, future events or otherwise, except as required by applicable securities laws. The forward-looking information and statements contained herein are expressly qualified in their entirety by this cautionary statement.

For further information, please contact:
Tom Halton
Director, Investor Relations and Corporate Affairs
Email: investor@sherritt.com
Telephone: (416) 935-2451
www.sherritt.com

U.S. Department Of State: Cuba UN Vote Not On Spokesperson's "Bingo Card"

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United States Department of State
Washington DC
28 October 2024
Press Briefing- Matthew Miller, Spokesperson

QUESTION:  Tomorrow, as you may know, is the annual vote in the UN General Assembly condemning the U.S. embargo on Cuba.  You were aware of that?

MR MILLER:  I was not tracking this on my bingo card, so go right ahead.

QUESTION:  I’m just wondering how the U.S. is going to vote this year.

MR MILLER:  I doubt we’ll be voting to condemn ourselves, so —

QUESTION:  Well, you abstained one year.  The last year of Obama’s presidency, you guys abstained on it and it caused a bit of a ripple.  But as you probably know, it’s basically the entire world votes to condemn it, and you and Israel – and in some cases, Palau or another Pacific Island nation joins in voting against.  This year it’s most likely just going to be U.S. and Israel.  So do you have anything to say about this —

MR MILLER:  I don’t —

QUESTION:  — yearly display of isolation on the international stage —

MR MILLER:  I don’t.

QUESTION:  — at least in terms of this one policy?

MR MILLER:  I’m sure I will tomorrow – I’m sure I will tomorrow if the vote takes place, but no, not today.  So —

QUESTION:  Yeah?  Okay.  Thank you.

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The White House Answers Questions About Providing Assistance To Cuba- And Reinforces Cuba Is Victim Of Its Own Decisions. Oct 22, 2024

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U.S. Department Of Commerce Seeking Comments On "Effectiveness of Licensing Procedures for the Export and Reexport of Agricultural Commodities to Cuba" Oct 16, 2024

U.S. Exports To Cuba Decrease, But Remain Up 20% Year-To-Year. Another US$8.7 In Vehicle Exports. Razors Too Oct 11, 2024

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Cuba Foreign Minister In Interview Reinforces Reasons For Unease By U.S. Companies Toward Cuba- Despite Their Wanting To Support Re-Emerging Private Sector. Sep 29, 2024

Cuba Government Describes Commercial, Economic, Financial Impact Of U.S. Policies, Regulations, And Statutes Sep 29, 2024

U.S. Senator From Nevada Newest Co-Sponsor For Bacardi Trademark Legislation. Unlikely To Become Law In 2024... But In 2025? Sep 29, 2024

2024 Address By Minister Of Foreign Affairs To The United Nations General Assembly Sep 29, 2024

Cuba Is Governance Example Of The Medical Term “Failure To Thrive”  United Nations Resolution Will Not Fix Cuba- Nor Force Others To Fix Cuba. Python Suffocating Re-Emerging Private Sector.

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Cuba Is Governance Example Of The Medical Term “Failure To Thrive” 

A UNGA Resolution Will Not Fix Cuba- Nor Force Others To Fix Cuba 

Forcefully Embracing The Anachronistic Rather Than Chasing The Dynamic 

Cuba’s Government Decisions Resembling A Public Sector Python Suffocating Private Sector Prey- Excruciatingly Painful And Slow 

“Failure to Thrive” in older adults “may represent a final common pathway toward death unless interventions can reverse the course.”   

For a government, “Failure to Thrive” is defined as a pathway toward ruin where a government continues to repeat mistakes despite knowing in advance the outcome of those decisions.  Or worse- a failed state. 

For a government official in the city of Havana, Republic of Cuba, taking a sedative, falling asleep and hoping the morning brings news that 25 December 1991 was only a horrible nightmare is not an effective strategy for governance.  11,997 days ago, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.) ceased to exist, and its fifteen republics became fifteen countries.  The U.S.S.R. was created on 30 December 1922. 

The government of the Republic of Cuba will find broad support this week for its resolution submitted annually to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) which criticizes policies, regulations, and statutes of the United States government which impact the Republic of Cuba. 

There will also be a less visible question each of the 193-member country delegations of the UNGA will discuss among themselves.   

That question is why does the government of the Republic of Cuba not avail itself, and actively so, to all of the commercial, cultural, economic, financial, and political opportunities for engagement with the United States which are specifically authorized by policies, regulations, and statutes as implemented by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, and United States Department of State? 

  • “The meaningful part of the relationship- the economic blockade and the aggression against the Cuban economy- has not changed” since the end of the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021).  “It has been faithfully applied by the Biden administration.”  Carlos Fernandez de Cossio, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba 

  • “Economic blockade means #Cuba can’t sell any product in the US or export any product to any company in any country that exports to the US.”  Senior Official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba.  Fact Check:  In 2016, coffee was first authorized for import to the United States.  Since 2016, healthcare products have been imported to the United States for evaluation.  In 2017, charcoal was first authorized for import to the United States.  New York, New York-based Nespresso USA Inc., a subsidiary of Lausanne, Switzerland-based Nestle S.A. (2023 revenue approximately US$105 billion) exports products to the United States and imports products from the Republic of Cuba. 

Most egregious remains the unwillingness of successive governments in the Republic of Cuba, beginning with the [Raul] Castro-Machado Ventura Administration (2006-2018) and continuing with the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2018- ) to embrace fully commercial opportunities authorized during the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) and continuing thus far through the Biden-Harris Administration (2021-2025).   

Whereas the [Fidel] Castro-[Raul] Castro Administration (1976-2008) knew how to create and then use leverage, subsequent governments in the Republic of Cuba only knew and know how to abdicate the creation of and use of leverage.   

For example, when the Trade Sanctions Reform and Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 was signed into law during the final months of the Clinton-Gore Administration (1993-2001), President Fidel Castro proclaimed that since the law required payment of cash in advance and did not permit payment terms or provision of financing, there would be no purchases of agricultural commodities or food products from United States-based companies.  However, sensing opportunities to create a commercial constituency throughout the United States, the first purchase of US$4.8 million in December 2001 described as a “one-off” due to the impact of a hurricane has since cumulatively totaled more than US$7.5 billion twenty-three years later with the Republic of Cuba ranking annually within the top sixty of two hundred and twenty United States agricultural commodity and food product export markets.  The Republic of Cuba has ranked as high as 25th.  The first export of corn from the United States was sourced from nine states, thus crystalizing what would become a substantive agriculturally based advocacy constituency.   

If the Castro-Machado Ventura Administration and then Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration permitted fully those commercial opportunities authorized during the Obama-Biden Administration and thus far during Biden-Harris Administration, the impact of decisions by the Trump-Pence Administration could have been mitigated.  Important to note that not all Obama-Biden Administration Republic of Cuba-focused decisions were halted or reversed by the Trump-Pence Administration.   

Had there been by 20 January 2017 hundreds of United States-based companies with operations throughout the Republic of Cuba employing tens of thousands of Republic of Cuba nationals, the Trump-Pence Administration may have been constricted in what it decided to excise from then-authorized policy and regulations relating to the Republic of Cuba.      

From 17 December 2014 to 20 January 2017 the government of the Republic of Cuba failed to authorize United States-based companies to create a presence that would be resistant to being rolled-up like a carpet.  What the government of the Republic of Cuba did authorize was not wide, was not deep.  There were no roots.  The marquee examples consisted of one hotel management contract and port calls for cruise ships.  All were easily cancelled- and they were.   

Hundreds of small, medium, and large United States-based accountancies, assemblers, law firms, manufacturers, retailers, service providers, and wholesalers were prepared to establish a presence within the Republic of Cuba.  They were rebuffed.  

Additionally, from 2015 there were United States-based companies engaging and re-engaging with the Republic of Cuba who had claims certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC). 

·       There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the USFCSC and have not been resolved for more than sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims is approximately US$10 billion.  

The government of the Republic of Cuba had opportunities to provide some certified claimants with full or partial settlements at little out-of-pocket cost to the government of the Republic of Cuba.   

During the Obama-Biden Administration, some of the most high-profile certified claimants had engaged or re-engaged with the Republic of Cuba marketplace.  The revenues earned in the Republic of Cuba by these claimants would have easily provided funding for not only the original value of the certified claim, but for the interest-compiling value of the certified claim.   

The decision by the government of the Republic of Cuba to ignore those entreaties was the commercial equivalent of self-flagellation.  The takeaway was then and remains today that the government of the Republic of Cuba would rather its people suffer.   

Had that small number of certified claimants settled their claims against the government of the Republic of Cuba, a result would have been a substantial increase in interest by United States-based companies.   

A settlement of certified claims would have also provided an opportunity landscape whereby United States-based companies could develop quickly a deep and wide presence not only throughout the Republic of Cuba, but throughout the economy of the Republic of Cuba. 

There is no minimizing the commercial, economic, and financial impairment to the Republic of Cuba since 1960 by policies, regulations, and statutes implemented by successive occupants of The White House.  Most, but not all the policies, regulations, and statutes implemented are designed to be coercive, even punitive. 

However, not all can be rationally viewed as without off-ramps.  These choices are not ideal from the perspective of successive administrations in the Republic of Cuba, but if engaged they would not singularly or collectively guarantee the demise of the political infrastructure within the country.  Managed improperly, there would continue suffering.  Managed with dexterity, there could be prosperity, depending of course upon one’s definition of prosperity.    

GlobalPost, Boston, Massachusetts, 4 October 2024: “Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel, meanwhile, is looking to China and Russia for help.  If the US won’t permit American companies to invest and operate in Cuba, Newsweek magazine reported, the Cuban government has little choice but to seek out other powerful patrons whose governments share its autocratic bent.  That is called “doubling down” in geopolitical parlance.” 

What GlobalPost reported is untrue.  What Newsweek was reported as writing was untrue.  On 10 May 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration instructed the OFAC to issue the first license authorizing direct investment in and direct financing to a privately-owned company located in the Republic of Cuba owned by a Republic of Cuba national.   

More than two years later, the government of the Republic of Cuba has yet to publish the regulations for delivering the investment and the financing.  The delay does not only impact investors in the United States, but in all countries.  The government of the Republic of Cuba is engaging in collective punishment of its entrepreneurs. 

And recently the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration prohibited privately-owned companies in the Republic of Cuba from maintaining commercial bank accounts in the United States- which was recently authorized by the Biden-Harris Administration. 

The government of the Republic of Cuba had means, motive, and opportunity during Obama-Biden Administration and continuing through the Biden-Harris Administration to create a commercial, economic, and financial landscape- both wide and deep throughout the country from Havana to Santiago de Cuba.  All three were painfully squandered. 

The Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration not only wants it both ways, it wants it all ways.  Embracing governments which are in conflict with the government of the United States and then seeking commercial, economic, financial, military, and political support from those governments.   

  • Simultaneously, the messaging from officials in Havana that the Republic of Cuba is “open for business” with United States companies and entrepreneurs.   

  • Simultaneously, continuing for more than two years its refusal to enact laws and regulations which would make transparent, which would create accountability, and permit direct investment in and direct financing to privately-owned companies in the Republic of Cuba, which the Biden-Harris Administration first authorized on 10 May 2022.   

In August 2024, the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration further restricted the re-emerging private sector by identifying one hundred and twenty-five sectors within which the re-emerging private sector is prohibited from operating in “forms of agriculture, manufacturing of pharmaceutical products, financial intermediation, trade, book editing and layout, television programming and broadcasting, telecommunications activities, forms of transportation and storage, defense, public security, and provision of social services.  While the goals of the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration may not be to deprive the re-emerging private sector of the oxygen required for not only sustainability, but for prosperity and expansion, the result of decisions by the government of the Republic of Cuba is likened to constricting the caloric intake of a child- the result is stunted growth, anemic functioning, and potentially death. 

The decisions by the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration resemble a public sector python suffocating its private sector prey… a slow and painful process for the prey. 

Because Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration continues to recoil from sustainable commercial, economic, financial, and political reforms, its options for survival narrow to seeking disguised charity from governments and organizations whose interests are unaligned with those of the United States.  Thus, China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Turkiye, and Venezuela become, for the government of the Republic of Cuba, its personal United Nations.   

The Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration knows fully how these decisions reverberate throughout Washington DC and specifically in the State of Florida, home to the largest population of individuals of Cuban descent outside of the Republic of Cuba itself.  A reported one million Republic of Cuba nationals have departed the island during the last four years- approximately 10% of its population. 

On the one side of the “Pushmi-Pullyu” from the 1967 motion picture Doctor Doolittle is the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration continuing to publicly espouse for an improved commercial, economic, financial, and political relationship with the Biden-Harris Administration which will at 12:00 pm on 20 January 2025 transition to either the Harris-Walz Administration (2025-2029) or the Trump-Vance Administration (2025-2029). 

On the other side of the “Pushmi-Pullyu” is the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration doing and saying about everything that might be included on a how-to list specifically drafted to antagonize The White House and the United States Congress. 

  • Engage and Support China, Iran, North Korea, Russia.  Check. 

  • Criticize Israel.  Check. 

  • Support (or not condemn) Hezbollah and Hamas.  Check. 

  • Not robustly support Ukraine.  Check. 

  • Permit Russian naval vessels to visit ports in the Republic of Cuba.  Check. 

  • Not enacting laws and publishing regulations which would respond positively to licenses issued by the OFAC authorizing direct investment in and direct financing to the re-emerging private sector in Cuba.  Check. 

  • Refusing to authorize private companies to have operating bank accounts in the United States.  Check.

  • Failing to embrace all the decisions by the Biden-Harris Administration which benefit the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.  Check. 

When a resolution submitted annually to the UNGA receives a substantial number of votes for, with some voting against and some abstaining, but what the resolution calls for is ignored year after year, probably an indicator that a new approach is required.  

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

United Nations Vote This Week On Resolution Submitted Annually By Government Of Cuba About Relationship With The United States. Vote Outcome Certainty. Impact Not.

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United Nations
New York, New York
29 October 2024
10:00 am to 13:00 pm
General Assembly Hall
29th Plenary Meeting

Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba - Item 38: Report of the Secretary-General (A/79/80); Draft resolution (A/79/L.6) 

  • Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba (A/79/80) 

  • Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba (A/79/L.6) 

Debate on the item.  

LINK To United Nations Schedule 

United Nations
New York, New York
30 October 2024
10:00 am to 13:00 pm
General Assembly Hall
30th Plenary Meeting

Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba - Item 38 : Report of the Secretary-General (A/79/80); Draft resolution (A/79/L.6) 

  • Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba (A/79/80)

  • Necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States of America against Cuba (A/79/L.6)  

Debate on the item (continued) and action on the draft resolution.  

LINK To United Nations Schedule 

Cuba Obtains "Partner" Status With BRICS. Cuba Does Not Bring Anything To BRICS Members. Cuba Wants Access To Funds From NDB.

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Prensa Latina News Agency
Havana, Republic of Cuba
25 October 2024

“Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel today has highlighted his country's joining the BRICS+ as an associate member, which was approved at the group's 16th Summit held in Kazan, Russia.  

In his profile on X social media, the Head of State wrote: “Cuba is honored to join the Brics+ as a partner country, five letters and a great hope for the countries of the South, in the arduous path towards a more just, democratic, equitable and sustainable international order.” 

Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez also reaffirmed Cuba’s interest and commitment to work together with the members of this group in defense of multilateralism, peace, international law and the construction of a development and cooperation agenda that responds to the priorities of the South. 

The Caribbean nation was admitted as an associate member of the BRICS together with 12 other countries; these are Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam.” 

BRIC/BRICS/BRICS+ 

BRIC was created in September 2006 and officially organized in June 2009 by the governments of Brazil, Russia, India, and China.   

In December 2010, the government of South Africa became a member; and BRIC became BRICS.   

In January 2024, the governments of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia became members of BRICS.  The government of Argentina was granted an invitation to membership in BRICS, but the invitation was declined in December 2023.   

In September 2024, the government of Turkiye applied for membership in BRICS. 

In October 2024, the governments of Algeria, Belarus, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkiye, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam were granted “partner” status in BRICS.  

Government connectivity with BRICS is by consensus. 

New Development Bank (NDB)

The president of NDB is H.E. Mrs. Dilma Rousseff, President of Brasil (2011-2016) and chief of staff to President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva from 2005 to 2010. The NDB was created in 2014.

“The New Development Bank (NDB) is a multilateral development bank established by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) with the purpose of mobilising resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs).  Our strong mandate and potential put us in a unique position to contribute to global growth and development.”

Cruise Lines Win Most Arguments Before 11th Circuit Court Of Appeals. Does Havana Docks Corporation Seek En Banc Review, U.S. Supreme Court Review, Or Accept Decision?

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Can Accept Decision, Appeal For En Banc Review- All Twelve Members Of The 11th Circuit Court Of Appeals, Or Can Seek Writ of Certiorari From The U.S. Supreme Court

No. 23-10171: HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Appellee Cross Appellant, versus ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD., NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD., CARNIVAL CORPORATION, a foreign corporation doing business as Carnival Cruise Lines, MSC CRUISES S.A. CO., MSC CRUISES (USA), INC., et al., Defendants-Appellants Cross Appellees.

Excerpts

After a review of the record, and with the benefit of oral argument, we hold that Havana Docks’ limited property interest had expired, for purposes of Title III, at the time of the alleged trafficking by the cruise lines. We therefore set aside the judgments in favor of Havana Docks and remand for further proceedings as to its other claims against Carnival.

We affirm the district court’s ruling that Havana Docks is a U.S. national under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act but reverse the judgments in favor of Havana Docks and against the cruise lines for conduct taking place between 2016 and 2019. We remand for further proceedings as to the trafficking claims against Carnival based on conduct taking place from 1996 to 2001.

10/22/2024- Opinion issued by court as to Appellant RCL in 23-10151, Appellant-Cross Appellee RCL in 23-10171. Decision: Affirmed in part, Reversed in part, and Remanded. Opinion type: Published. Opinion method: Signed. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions. [23-10151, 23-10171]
10/22/2024- Judgment entered as to Appellant RCL in 23-10151, Appellant-Cross Appellee RCL in 23-10171. [23-10151, 23-10171]

Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd. 23-10151; 1:19-cv-23590-BB; Court Opinion; 10-22-2024; Hon. Adalberto J. Jordan authoring; Hon. Andrew Lynn Brasher dissenting

Dissent Excerpts

In my view, there are three problems with this judicially created prove-a-counterfactual requirement. First, it is not supported by the statute’s text. The text of the statute says that the trafficking must occur when a plaintiff “owns the claim,” not when the plaintiff would have owned the property. Second, the majority is focused on the wrong confiscated property. Here, Havana Docks argues that the cruise lines trafficked by using the physical docks that the Cuban Government confiscated, not by using its concessionary interest in those docks. Third, this test effectively voids many of the property interests that are expressly protected by the statute. The statute was enacted in 1994 and it expressly protects interests that were contingent, future, and time limited when the underlying property was confiscated in 1959, but none of those interests are protectible under the majority’s rule. I’ll address each of these issues in turn.

Unless and until the property confiscation claims of U.S. nationals are paid, those claims continue to exist and are enforceable under the Helms-Burton Act. But the majority opinion’s interpretation means that the Act provides no remedy for U.S. nationals with property interests that were confiscated in 1959 but, absent confiscation, would have “expired” before the present day. It does so even though there is no textual support for that result and even though the Act expressly protects interests that were contingent or time-limited when they were confiscated. And it adopts that rule even though there is a perfectly rational alternative that better conforms to the Act—that the time-limited nature of an interest in confiscated property goes to the value of a claim, not to the claim’s existence.

I believe the district court correctly interpreted the Act in this respect, and I would go on to address the other issues in the appeal. Because the majority opinion instead reverses on this ground, I respectfully dissent.

LINK TO COMPLETE OPINION IN PDF FORMAT

The White House Answers Questions About Providing Assistance To Cuba- And Reinforces Cuba Is Victim Of Its Own Decisions.

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The White House
Washington DC
21 October 2024

Briefing By Karine Jean-Pierre, Press Secretary

Q Thank you. I have a question about Cuba. There have been multiple power outages on the island in recent days. So, I was wondering: Is the White House monitoring the situation, particularly for signs of unrest? Thank you.

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: So, we are closely monitoring the blackouts on the island. And so, we are concerned about the potential humanitarian impacts on the Cuban people.  And like we have seen over the past few years, Cuba’s economic condition stemming from long-term mismanagement of its economic policy and resources has certainly increased the hardship of the people in Cuba.  And so — so — and so, certainly, just want to make clear that this is not — the U.S. is not to — is not to blame for the blackouts on the island or the overall energy situation in Cuba.  So, the Cuban — the Cuban government has not requested any assistance at this time, and so we will assess the appropriate next steps if they do request any assistance.  And so, a critical tenet of the Biden-Harris administration policy as it relates to — to — towards Cuba is to always advocate for the support of the Cuban people, and we’ve been always very clear about that. And so, we’ll continue.

Q — this is a hypothetical. But if the Cuban government were to request assistance, would the Biden-Harris administration be willing to provide it?

MS. JEAN-PIERRE: So, we’re going to — if that were to happen, we’re — certainly would assess the next best steps. I just — they have not. Again, it’s a hypothetical. And so, we’re going to assess what’s the next best step to do.

Thus Far In 2024, Cubans Imported More Than US$200,000.00 In Generators; More Than US$1 Million In Air Conditioners And Parts

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January 2024 through August 2024 United States Exports To The Republic Of Cuba

Air Cond Mach, Wndw Wall Type,not Slf Cntd, Nesoi (no) Miami, FL- US$169,923.00

Air Cond Machs Not Incorporat A Refrig Unit, Nesoi (no) Miami, FL- US$48,600.00

Parts, Nesoi, Of Air Conditioning Machines (kg) Miami, FL- US$732,968.00

Refrig-freez Comb, Sep Ext Doors, Exc Compress Typ (no) Miami, FL- US$140,743.00

Refrigerators, Household,comp Typ,vol Lt 184 Liter (no) Miami, FL- US$24,050.00

Refrig, household, Comp Typ, Vol 382 Liters & Over (no) Houston-Galveston, TX- US$7,000.00

Refrigerators, Household, Absorption, Electrical (no) Miami, FL- US$7,790.00

Freezers, Chest Type, Capacity Not Exc 800 Liters (no) Miami, FL- US$15,220.00

Reciprocating Liquid Chilling Refrigerating Units (no) Miami, FL- US$25,930.00

Refrig/freezing Equip, Nesoi (no) Miami, FL- US$71,216.00

Dc Generators, Not Exceeding 750 W, Nesoi (no) Miami, FL- US$26,216.00

Ac Generators (alt) Gt 10000 Kva But Lt= 40000 Kva (no) Miami, FL- US$120,430.00

Ac Generators (alternators) Exceeding 40,000 Kva (no) Miami, FL- US$39,605.00

Generating Sets, Elc, Diesel, Lt= 75kva Output (no) Miami, FL- US$2,700.00

Electric Generating Sets Except Gas Turbines Nesoi (no) Miami, FL- US$64,200.00

Electric Rotary Converters (no) Miami, FL- US$5,080.00

Batteries, Lead-acid, Piston Engine, Nesoi (no) Miami, FL- US$47,134.00

Storage Battery Parts (except Lead-acid Type) (kg) Miami, FL- US$3,209.00

U.S. Department Of Commerce Seeking Comments On "Effectiveness of Licensing Procedures for the Export and Reexport of Agricultural Commodities to Cuba"

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AGENCY: Bureau of Industry and Security, Commerce.

ACTION: Request for comments.

SUMMARY: The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) is requesting public comments on the effectiveness of its licensing procedures as defined in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) for the export and reexport of agricultural commodities to Cuba. BIS will include a description of any comments it receives in its biennial report to Congress, as required by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000, as amended (TSRA).

DATES: Comments must be received by November 15, 2024.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this notice may be submitted by either of the following methods:

Electronic Submission: Submit all electronic public comments via the Federal rulemaking portal. Visit http://www.regulations.gov and type “BIS-2024-0049” in the search box to find this notice.

Mail: Submit written comments by mail or delivery to Regulatory Policy Division, Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Room 2099B, 14th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Washington, DC 20230. Refer to RIN 0694-XC108.  Comments sent by any other method, to any other address or individual, or received after the end of the comment period, may not be considered by BIS. All comments (including any personal identifying information) will be made public.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Jerry Huang, Office of Nonproliferation and Foreign Policy Controls, Telephone: (202) 482-4252. Additional information on BIS procedures and previous biennial reports under TSRA is available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/​index.php/​policy-guidance/​country-guidance/​sanctioned-destinations/​13-policy-guidance/​country-guidance/​426-reports-to-congress. Copies of these materials may also be requested by contacting the Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant to section 906(a) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSRA) (22 U.S.C. 7205(a)), the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) authorizes exports and reexports of agricultural commodities, as defined in part 772 of the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) (15 CFR parts 730-774), to Cuba. Requirements and procedures associated with such authorization are set forth in § 740.18 of the EAR (15 CFR 740.18). These are the only licensing procedures in the EAR currently in effect pursuant to the requirements of section 906(a) of TSRA. Under the provisions of section 906(c) of TSRA (22 U.S.C. 7205(c)), BIS must submit a biennial report to Congress on the operation of the licensing system implemented pursuant to section 906(a) for the preceding two-year period. This report must include the number and types of licenses applied for, the number and types of licenses approved, the average amount of time elapsed from the date of filing of a license application until the date of its approval, the extent to which the licensing procedures were effectively implemented, and a description of comments received from interested parties during a 30-day public comment period regarding the effectiveness of the licensing procedures. Consistent with TSRA's requirements, BIS is currently preparing a biennial report on the operation of the licensing system for the two-year period from October 1, 2022 through September 30, 2024.

Request for Comments

By this notice, BIS requests public comments on the effectiveness of the licensing procedures for the export and reexport of agricultural commodities to Cuba set forth under § 740.18 of the EAR. Parties submitting comments are asked to be as specific as possible. All comments received by the close of the comment period will be considered by BIS in developing the report to Congress. All comments will be publicly available. Any information that the commenter does not wish to be made available to the public should not be submitted to BIS.

Thea D. Rozman Kendler,
Assistant Secretary for Export Administration.
[FR Doc. 2024-23828 Filed 10-15-24; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 3510-33-P

LINK TO COMPLETE PUBLICATION IN PDF FORMAT

LINK: U.S. Exports To Cuba Decrease, But Remain Up 20% Year-To-Year. Another US$8.7 In Vehicle Exports. Razors Too Oct 11, 2024

U.S. Exports To Cuba Decrease, But Remain Up 20% Year-To-Year. Another US$8.7 In Vehicle Exports. Razors Too

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ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
October 2024

August 2024 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decrease 5.4% - 1
46th Of 222 August 2024 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 20.0% - 2
Cuba Ranked 48th Of 222 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets - 2
August 2024 Healthcare Product Exports US$0.00 - 2
August 2024 Humanitarian Donations US$6,801,111.00 - 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue To Increase - 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 19

AUGUST 2024 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA DECREASE 5.4% - Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in August 2024 were US$37,729,568.00 compared to US$39,913,983.00 August 2023 and US$29,383,675.00 August 2022. 

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA and CDA. The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

January 2024 through August 2024 TSREEA exports were US$279,815,521.00 compared to January 2023 through August 2023 TSREEA exports of US$232,487,373.00. Total TSREEA exports since first deliveries in December 2001 exceed US$7,526,148,914.00

Other products exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in August 2024 include: Turkey (US$176,682.00), Eggs, Chickpeas, Black Beans, Lentils, Safflower Oil, Human Blood (US$11,905.00), Handbags (US$9,749.00), Razors (US$17,160.00), Fork Lift (US$17,000.00), Ink Cartridges (US$7,587.00), Part of Cotton Gins (US$8,000.00), Used Vehicles (US$8,688,439.00).

Used Vehicle Exports January 2024 Through August 2024 Are US$38,752,488.00.

Truck Exports January 2024 Through August 2024 Are US$16,075,524.00

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

Cuba Included In U.S. Presidential Determination Regarding Trafficking In Persons

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The White House
Washington DC
September 30, 2024

Presidential Determination
No. 2024-14        

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
 
SUBJECT: Presidential Determination with Respect to the Efforts of Foreign Governments Regarding Trafficking in Persons
 
Consistent with section 110 of the Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000 (22 U.S.C. 7107) (the "Act"), as amended, I hereby determine as follows:
 
As provided for in section 110(d)(1)(A)(i) of the Act, that the United States will not provide nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related assistance to the Governments of Burma and Iran for Fiscal Year (FY) 2025 until such governments comply with the Act's minimum standards or make significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with the minimum standards;
 
As provided for in section 110(d)(1)(A)(ii) of the Act, that the United States will not provide nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related assistance to, or allow funding for participation in educational and cultural exchange programs by officials or employees of, the Governments of Belarus, Cuba, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Eritrea, Macau (Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of China (PRC)), Nicaragua, the PRC, Russia, and Syria for FY 2025 until such governments comply with the Act's minimum standards or make significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with the minimum standards;
 
As provided for in section 110(d)(1)(B) of the Act, I hereby instruct the United States Executive Director of each multilateral development bank, as defined in the Act, and of the International Monetary Fund to vote against and use best efforts to deny any loan or other utilization of the funds of the respective institution (other than for humanitarian assistance; for trade‑related assistance; or for development assistance that directly addresses basic human needs, is not administered by the government of such country, and confers no benefit to that government) for the Governments of Belarus, Burma, Cuba, the DPRK, Eritrea, Iran, Macau (Special Administrative Region of the PRC), Nicaragua, the PRC, Russia, South Sudan, and Syria for FY 2025 until such governments comply with the Act's minimum standards or make significant efforts to bring themselves into compliance with the minimum standards;
 
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, I determine that the provision of all nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related foreign assistance programs, projects, activities, and funding for educational and cultural exchange programs described in sections 110(d)(1)(A) and 110(d)(1)(B) of the Act to Brunei, Djibouti, Papua New Guinea, Turkmenistan, and Venezuela would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States;
 
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, I determine that providing the assistance described in section 110(d)(1)(B) of the Act to Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Sudan would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States;
 
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, I determine that a partial waiver with respect to Belarus, Eritrea, Macau (Special Administrative Region of the PRC), the PRC, and Russia to allow funding for educational and cultural exchange programs described in section 110(d)(1)(A)(ii) of the Act would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States;
 
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, with respect to Afghanistan, I determine that a partial waiver of the restriction described in section 110(d)(1)(A)(i) of the Act to allow for Economic Support Fund and Global Health Programs (GHP) assistance would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States;
 
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, with respect to Cambodia, I determine that a partial waiver of the restriction described in section 110(d)(1)(A)(i) of the Act to allow for all assistance and programs other than education programs funded from Development Assistance (DA) would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States;
 
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, with respect to South Sudan, I determine that a partial waiver of the restriction described in section 110(d)(1)(A)(i) of the Act to allow for GHP assistance would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States; and
 
Consistent with section 110(d)(4) of the Act, with respect to Sudan, I determine that a partial waiver of the restriction described in section 110(d)(1)(A)(i) of the Act to allow for DA and GHP assistance would promote the purposes of the Act or is otherwise in the national interest of the United States.
 
In addition, with respect to the Government of Sint Maarten, consistent with the United States Government's firm stand against human trafficking, and until such government takes steps consistent with compliance with the minimum standards of the Act or makes significant efforts to do so, I hereby:  (i) direct that executive departments and agencies shall not provide nonhumanitarian, nontrade-related foreign assistance, as described in section 110(d)(1)(A) of the Act, to the Government of Sint Maarten; (ii) instruct the United States Executive Director of each multilateral development bank, as defined in the Act, and of the International Monetary Fund to vote against and use best efforts to deny any loan or other utilization of the funds of the respective institution (other than for humanitarian assistance, for trade-related assistance, or for development assistance that directly addresses basic human needs, is not administered by such government, and confers no benefit to that government) to Sint Maarten, as described in section 110(d)(1)(B) of the Act; and (iii) direct that funding for participation by officials or employees of the Government of Sint Maarten in educational and cultural exchange programs shall continue to be permitted in FY 2025, consistent with the foreign policy and all applicable laws of the United States.
 
You are authorized and directed to submit this determination, the certification required by section 110(e) of the Act, and the Memorandum of Justification, on which I have relied, to the Congress, and to publish this determination in the Federal Register.

JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.