2024 U.S. Cane/Beet Sugar/Syrup/Artificial Honey Exports To Cuba January Through July Were US$1,033,615.00. Cuba Reportedly Allocating 90% Of Honey Production For Export Rather Than Domestic Market.

1701992020: Cane/beet Sug Ref/imp Sug Drawbk No Flv/clr Retail (kg)- US$179,307.00 

1701992040: Cane/beet Sug Ref/imp Sug Drawbk No Flv/clr/retail (kg)- US$3,008.00 

1701994000: Cane/beet Sugar, Solid, Refined, No Flv/clr, Nesoi (kg)- US$215,572.00 

1702905000: Sug/syrup Nt Flav/colr Nesoi; Artfl Honey; Caraml (kg)- US$635,728.00 

From www.cubaheadlines.com 

6 September 2024: Amid a severe food crisis, the Cuban government continues to prioritize honey exports, allocating 90% of the annual production to international markets. Traditionally one of the most valuable products in the Cuban agricultural sector, honey has been listed among the eight priority items in the Comprehensive Export Strategy for Goods and Services for the period 2019-2030. 

Despite production challenges such as shortages of inputs and fuel, as well as the devastating effects of drought and forest fires, beekeeping on the island has remained resilient. According to data from the National Office of Statistics and Information (ONEI), cited by Granma, Cuba managed to collect 9,200 tons of honey in 2022, although this volume was slightly lower than the previous year. By comparison, in 1962, the country achieved a record of more than 10,000 tons of honey produced. 

The export of honey generates significant revenue for the state-owned Cuban Beekeeping Company (APICUBA), part of the Agroforestry Business Group. Its general director, Lázaro Bruno García Castro, and the director of foreign trade, Ramón Hurtado Delgado, are well aware of the volume of business they manage. The Cuban people are not. 

In 2018, the export of Cuban honey to European countries such as Germany, France, and Spain generated around 18 million dollars. At that time, the average export price of Cuban honey was estimated to be 2,655 dollars per ton, with organic honey being particularly prestigious in international markets due to its high quality and distinctive flavor. 

Using these reference values (without considering market fluctuations, global inflation repercussions, and other factors), it is feasible that exporting 90% of the honey produced in Cuba could result in more than 22 million dollars for the state company's coffers. How much of this amount goes to the beekeepers? Once again, based on these relative values, honey production in Cuba would be sufficient to sell one kilogram of honey per year to each Cuban at a price of less than three dollars. Why doesn't the Cuban regime do this? One would have to ask the directors of APICUBA or the elusive Minister of Economy, Joaquín Alonso Vázquez

The emphasis on honey exports has sparked internal criticism due to the severe food shortages affecting the Cuban population. While the government celebrates production and export records, many Cuban families cannot access basic products like honey. This situation is exacerbated by inflation and widespread shortages that are suffocating Cubans.

Impact on Local Populations 

Granma, one of the provinces most affected by the crisis, has become one of the country's largest honey producers. In March 2022, beekeepers in this region achieved a monthly collection record of 220 tons, demonstrating the importance the government continues to place on this activity. However, the impact on the population remains limited, given that 90% of the production is destined for the external market. 

The stark contrast between massive honey exports and the internal food crisis highlights the contradictions of the Cuban economy. While the country positions itself as a competitive honey exporter, Cubans find themselves increasingly restricted in their access to basic foods. This situation raises serious questions about the government's priorities, which continue to focus on earning foreign currency through exports while the population suffers from the lack of essential products. 

At the end of December 2023, the Cuban regime claimed that Cuban rum, honey, and coffee captivated consumers in China, accessed through an online platform. In Cuban markets, there is no coffee or honey for the population, but the regime invests time, money, and resources in promoting the commercialization of its products across the globe. Meanwhile, the Cuban people go through their days without finding coffee, honey, or sugar to sweeten their lives. 

Key Questions About Cuba's Honey Export Strategy

The prioritization of honey exports by the Cuban government amid a severe food crisis has raised several important questions. Here, we address some of the most pressing inquiries. 

Why does the Cuban government prioritize honey exports despite the food crisis?

The Cuban government prioritizes honey exports as part of its strategy to generate foreign currency. Honey is one of the eight priority items in the Comprehensive Export Strategy for the period 2019-2030. 

How much revenue does honey export generate for Cuba?

In 2018, honey exports to European countries generated around 18 million dollars. With 90% of the annual production allocated to exports, it is estimated that this could bring in more than 22 million dollars annually. 

What are the main challenges facing honey production in Cuba?

Honey production in Cuba faces several challenges, including shortages of inputs and fuel, and the devastating effects of drought and forest fires. Despite these issues, beekeeping has remained resilient. 

Is honey available to the Cuban population?

Despite the significant production of honey, it is not readily available to the Cuban population. The majority of the honey produced is exported, leaving many Cuban families unable to access this basic product.

From CiberCuba

How Bad In Cuba? Donations From U.S. Through July 2024 Are US$38.9 Million. For All Of 2023, Donations Were US$36.5 Million.

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
September 2024

July 2024 Humanitarian Donations US$4,290,817.00

HUMANITARIAN DONATIONS- Donated items are neither included in Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSREEA) nor Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 (CDA) calculations.  These items are generally delivered to the Republic of Cuba using air carriers or containers on vessels; do not include personal deliveries (by travelers on flights and through third countries). A meaningful quantity and U.S. Dollar value of items categorized as “humanitarian” are transported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba by passengers on authorized air carriers; thus, the information is not documented.

Donations (food, healthcare, clothing, reading materials, etc.)

2024    US$38,907,503.00
2023    US$36,563,551.00
2022    US$30,083,306.00
2021    US$11,074,090.00
2020    US$4,605,055.00
2019    US$7,150,989.00
2018    US$8,998,855.00
2017    US$6,122,601.00
2016    US$4,755,859.00
2015    US$4,619,588.00
2014    US$939,705.00

For Cuba: Government Regulations For Purchasing, Importing A Vehicle. Thus Far In 2024, US$36 Million In Vehicle Exports From United States To Cuba.

From www.cubaheadlines.com 

Among the new measures adopted by the Cuban government in the transportation sector is the authorization of vehicle sales between individuals and companies. Minister Eduardo Rodríguez Dávila highlighted during the Mesa Redonda on Tuesday that, until now, natural persons could transfer vehicle ownership among themselves, and legal entities could do the same, but legal entities couldn't transfer ownership to natural persons. 

"With the new decisions, ownership transfer is now permitted between all natural and legal persons. However, for legal entities that are state-owned or have state participation, transferring ownership to a natural person requires approval from the Council of Ministers," he stated. 

"For instance, a microenterprise can transfer ownership of a vehicle to a natural person, just like a religious organization, a foreign representative office in Cuba, or a branch," he elaborated. 

The procedure remains the same as the current one for ownership transfer between natural persons: before a notary public, paying the transaction value and the corresponding tax, all through the bank. The prohibition remains for foreign diplomatic legal entities to buy or sell a vehicle to a natural person. 

Rodríguez Dávila also mentioned that natural persons can acquire vehicles from authorized dealers in convertible currencies, like IMPEXPORT and CIMEX S.A. 

Vehicle Pricing and Importation

"The vehicles for sale come from imports and those that conclude their rental period in tourism. The sale prices are formed by market correlation among natural persons, with a margin ranging from 350% to 500%, of which 30% is the commercial margin of the dealer, and the rest forms a special tax. Although this tax is collected in USD or MLC, it is credited in national currency at a rate of 1x24 into a fund managed by the Ministry of Transportation," he explained. 

"For legal entities, the sale price is the acquisition or import cost, plus a commercial margin of up to 30%. Another tax is applied to the classes of motorcycles, cars, rural cars, and trucks, with rates of 100%, 150%, and 200%," he specified. 

This controversial topic has sparked criticism against the regime for the high prices of imported cars in Cuba, making it an almost impossible dream for highly qualified professionals in the country. 

The official also shared recent data on social media regarding vehicle import prices in Cuba, with infographics detailing how the government forms the prices of imported vehicles. He specified that they used a hypothetical value of 10,000 USD "to facilitate understanding." To determine the final price of the vehicles, the Supplier Price in Cuba, which is the initial value of the vehicle including freight and insurance, is considered. This base price in the infographic is 10,000 USD or euros. 

To this base price, Import Costs are added, which include tariffs, customs services, handling, and transportation of the vehicle, representing approximately 6% of the supplier price, equivalent to 600 USD or euros. The next component is the Commercial Margin Rate, a margin applied by the selling entity in Cuba. This margin can reach up to 20% of the base price, resulting in an increase of 2,120 USD or euros, bringing the dealer's sale price to 12,720 USD or euros. 

Additionally, a Special Tax by Segment or Range is applied, varying according to the type of vehicle. For high-end cars, this tax is 35%, equivalent to 4,452 USD or euros, while for other types of vehicles it can be 25% or 15%. The total amount payable by the buyer is determined by summing all these components. For example, a car, rural car, or truck has a final price of 15,900 USD or euros; a high-end car reaches 17,172 USD or euros; while vehicles of other classes like minibuses, motorcycles, or tricycles have prices ranging from 14,628 to 15,264 USD or euros. 

Cubans were unable to buy new and used motorcycles, cars, trucks, and minibuses until 2013, when Raúl Castro allowed the purchase of second-hand and new vehicles, but only through the government and with a 100% tax. Until then, interested parties needed the personal approval of the vice president of the country, commonly known as the "letter." 

In 2011, the regime authorized the sale of used cars between Cubans, but did not eliminate the requirement for the vice president's signature. Furthermore, new cars could not be purchased. 

Understanding Cuba's New Vehicle Sales Policy

Below are some frequently asked questions and answers regarding the recent changes in vehicle sales policy in Cuba. 

Can legal entities now sell vehicles to individuals in Cuba?

Yes, legal entities can now sell vehicles to individuals, but state-owned or state-participated entities need approval from the Council of Ministers for such transactions. 

Where can individuals purchase vehicles in Cuba?

Individuals can buy vehicles from authorized dealers such as IMPEXPORT and CIMEX S.A. in convertible currencies. 

What is the price formation for vehicles sold in Cuba?

The price includes the supplier price, import costs, a commercial margin of up to 30%, and a special tax by vehicle segment or range. This can add up to a final price significantly higher than the base price. 

From www.cubaheadlines.com 

The Minister of Transport, Eduardo Rodríguez Dávila, recently shared a series of updated figures on social media regarding the import prices of vehicles in Cuba. His post included two infographics detailing how the Cuban government sets the prices for imported cars. Rodríguez explained that they used a hypothetical value of $10,000 USD "to facilitate understanding." This contentious issue has sparked criticism against the regime due to the exorbitant prices of imported cars on the island, making it an unattainable dream for many highly qualified professionals in the country. 

Price Formation for Imported Vehicles

The process of determining the final price of vehicles in Cuba involves several components. First, the Supplier Price delivered in Cuba is considered, which is the initial value of the vehicle, including freight and insurance. This base price, as shown in the infographic, is $10,000 USD or euros.  To this base price, Import Costs are added, which include tariffs, customs services, handling, and transportation of the vehicle, representing approximately 6% of the supplier's price, equivalent to $600 USD or euros.  The next component is the Commercial Margin Rate, which is a margin applied by the selling entity in Cuba. This margin can reach up to 20% of the base price, resulting in an increase of $2,120 USD or euros, bringing the selling price of the dealer to $12,720 USD or euros.

United States Export Data (January 2024 Through July 2024)

8701210080 Rd Trctr For Semi-trls,comp-ign, Used (no)- US$220,000
8702400000 Public-trnsprt Typ Pasgnr Veh, Only Electric Motor (no)- US$37,000
8703210100 Pass Mtr Veh, Only Spark Ign Eng, Not Ov 1,000 cc (no)- US$11,920
8703230145 Vehicles,nesoi,new,eng (1500 - 3000 cc) Le 4cyl (no)- US$75,668
8703230160 Pass Veh,ov 4 N/o 6 Cyl,1500-3000cc (no)- US$27,179
8703230190 Used Vehicles, Only Sk Ig (1500-3000 cc), Nesoi (no)- US$30,064,049
8703240160 Pass Veh,only Spk Ign >6 Cyl,>3000cc,new (no)- US$109,500
8703240190 Pass Mtr Veh, Only Spark Ign, Gt 3000 cc, Used (no)-US$4,523,028
8703330185 Pass Veh,diesel,only Comp-ig, > 2,500 cc, Use, Nes (no)- US$9,748
8703600090 Pass Mtr Veh, Sp Ign/elec, Over 3000 cc, Used (no)- US$61,671
8703800000 Passenger Motor Vehicles Only Electrc Motor, Nesoi (no)- US$127,190
8704210100 Trucks, Nesoi, Diesel Eng, Gvw 5 Metric Tons & Und (no)- US$64,075
8704224120 Truck, Diesel Eng, Gvw (5 - 9 Metric Tons) (no)- US$134,564
8704224160 Truck, Diesel Eng,  Gvw (12 - 15 Metric Tons) (no)- US$63,000
8704230100 Truck, Diesel Eng, Gvw Gt 20 Metric Tons (no)- US$35,913
8704310120 Mot Veh For Trnsprt Of Goods, Gvw < 2.5 Met Tons (no)- US$123,028
8704310140 Mot Veh For Trnsprt Of Goods, (2.5-5) Metric Tons (no)- US$73,000
8704320110 Mot Veh For Trnsprt Of Goods, (5-9) Metric Tons (no)- US$43,100
8704410000 Trucks Gvw Lt=5 Tons W/ Diesel Eng And Elec Motor (no)- US$112,800
8704420080 Trucks Gvw (15-20)tons W/diesel Eng And Elec Motor (no)- US$35,200
8704430000 Trucks Gvw Gt 20 Tons W/ Diesel Eng And Elec Motor (no)- US$456,462
8704900100 Trucks/vehicles For The Transport Of Goods, Nesoi (no)- US$99,572
8705900000 Special Purpose Vehicles, Nesoi (no)- US$216,427
8707100020 Bodies For Passenger Autos Of Heading 8703 (no)- US$4,900
8708100010 Stampings Of Bumpers And Parts, Head 8701 To 8705 (no)- US$174,024
8708300050 Brakes And Servo-brakes,parts, Of 8701,8705 (no)- US$3,066
8708502150 Non-driving Axles And Parts For Tractors (no)-US$2,620
8708700050 Road Wheels And Prts For Veh Nesoi,of 8701,8705 (no)- US$85,110
8708998175 Parts And Acessories For Vhcls 8701 To 8705, Nesoi (no)- US$40,984
8709190030 Works Trucks, Exc Elec, Operator Ride,w/o Lift Eqp (no)- US$12,500
8711500000 Motorcycles, Cycl,excd 800 cc (no)- US$30,000
8714100090 Parts, Nesoi, Of Motorcycles (kg)- US$82,245
8716390090 Trailers And Semi-trailers, Nesoi, Tranprt Goods (no)- US$11,130
8716400000 Trailers And Semi-trailers, Nesoi (no)- US$10,000
8716900000 Parts,nesoi,of Trailers,semi-trailers;veh Nesoi (kg)- US$14,838

LINKS TO RELATED ANALYSES

LINK: Home Delivery For Electric Scooters To Cuba: As Biden-Harris Administration Expands U.S. Export Opportunities, A U.S. Company Responds Quickly To Customer Requests. Next Correspondent Banking? December 04, 2022  

LINK: Ten Months After Denial, Biden-Harris Administration Approves Exports Of Electric Motorcycles, Electric Scooters To Cuba Nationals And To Privately-Owned Companies In Cuba October 05, 2022 

LINK: Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022 

LINK: With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022      

LINK: Biden Administration Will Use Cuba's Authorization Of SMSE's As Means To Expand Support For Cuba Private Sector- U.S. Investments And Loans May Be Next June 02, 2021 

U.S. Agricultural Commodity/Food Product Exports To Cuba Remain Up 25.7%. Vehicle (New, Used, Truck) Exports For 2024 Exceed US$36 Million. Tequila Exported In July 2024.

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
September 2024

July 2024 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decrease 2.6% - 1
48th Of 222 July 2024 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 25.7% - 2
Cuba Ranked 50th Of 222 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets - 2
July 2024 Healthcare Product Exports US$3,473.00 - 2
July 2024 Humanitarian Donations US$4,290,817.00 - 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue To Increase - 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 19


JULY 2024 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA DECREASE 2.6% - Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in July 2024 were US$31,457,528.00 compared to US$32,313,837.00 in July 2023 and US$23,468,476.00 in July 2022. 

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA and CDA. The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

January 2024 through July 2024 TSREEA exports were US$242,085,953.00 compared to January 2023 through July 2023 TSREEA exports of US$192,573,390.00. Total TSREEA exports since first deliveries in December 2001 exceed US$7,488,419,346.00.

Other products exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in July 2024 include: Fresh Peaches, Spices, Rice (donated), Olive Oil, Tequila (US$4,338.00), Clothing (Trousers, Blouses, Underpants, Bathrobes), Food Grinder, Solar Cells, Used Vehicles (US$3,705,643.00).

Used Vehicle Exports January 2024 Through July 2024 Are US$34,587,077.00.

Truck Exports January 2024 Through July 2024 Are US$1,457,141.00.

LINK TO MONTHLY REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

Bloomberg References Cuba Coffee Production. Unfortunately, Today Production Is Too Limited To Make A Difference

The World’s Coffee Mostly Comes From Two Countries. That’s a Problem
Consolidation in Brazil, Vietnam poses risk in warming world
Small producers from Cuba to Thailand could be key to future

Bloomberg- 29 August 2024

Workers dump harvested coffee cherries into a truck on a farm in Guaxupe, Minas Gerais state, Brazil.Photographer: Patricia Monteiro/Bloomberg

Coffee from Peru, Thailand and other smaller producers used to be a luxury for dedicated drinkers particular about their morning brew.

Now, in a warming world, it could be key to the industry’s future.

Some 40 countries grow coffee, but more than half of global production has long come from just two: Brazil and Vietnam. And when bad weather hits both — an increasing risk in a destabilized climate — prices soar. Witness this year’s $9 lattes, as drought gripped both nations.

That’s lending new momentum to coffee-industry investments in other countries, from Cuba to Rwanda. There’s clearly a market, as many consumers seek out beans of uncommon origin. And the industry, suffering from consolidation, badly needs a more diverse supply chain.

“There is an urgency now, because this year proves that the impact of climate change cannot be underestimated,” said Andrea Illy, chief executive officer of Illycaffe SpA, in an interview. “It is starting to change the market itself.”

His family-run company, founded in 1933, has re-entered countries in eastern and southern Africa where it used to buy beans, and it’s expanding procurement from current suppliers outside Brazil and Vietnam. Coffee trader Volcafe Ltd. in May secured $60 million in financing to boost its operations in East Africa. Starbucks Corp. has been distributing trees and investing in loans to producers in Peru, Rwanda and Tanzania.

European coffee roaster Lavazza SpA is in the midst of a 20-year project to help revive Cuba’s coffee industry, which faded after the Cuban Revolution in the 1950s. Nestle SA’s Nespresso announced a $20 million investment in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s coffee industry earlier this year. The company already spent 60 million Swiss francs (about $71 million USD) over the last five years as part of its Reviving Origins program, aimed at restoring coffee production in areas like Uganda, Zimbabwe and Cuba.

“Preserving exquisite coffees from adverse circumstances such as conflict, economic or environmental disaster and ensuring a future for the farmers who produce them is a critical part of our business,” a Nespresso spokesperson said.

Workers harvest coffee cherries at a farm in Buon Ma Thuot, Vietnam. Photographer: Maika Elan/Bloomberg

None of this will likely cut prices at the corner cafe, at least not anytime soon. Smaller producers lack the economies of scale boasted by Brazil and Vietnam, often relying on family farms that harvest by hand. Production efficiencies and the lower prices they bring are what led the industry to rely so much on just two countries in the first place.

But consumers today are willing to pay more for top-end, small-origin coffees than they once were, said Peter Radosevich, the head of international sales for California-based importer Royal Coffee Inc. Ever since coffee consumption shifted home during the Covid-19 pandemic, drinkers have been “more discerning and demanding more quality,” as well as variety and traceability, he said. 

Smaller producers have long been associated with “specialty” coffee — beans scoring highest on qualities ranging from fragrance to aftertaste. A June National Coffee Association report found that nearly half of American adults now drink specialty coffee on a daily basis, surpassing mass-market options for the first time. A shift from drip coffees toward espresso-based beverages has prompted drinkers to think more about the taste of their daily cup, said Xavier Alexander, co-founder of Chicago-based Metric Coffee, which sources from countries such as Peru and Honduras.

Small-production countries are reaping the benefits. Honduras, for example, has been increasing coffee output, though farmers have also faced tighter margins as production costs rise, said Miguel Pons, the executive president of the country’s association of coffee exporters.

These countries are still a small subset of the world’s supply, but output is rising “because it is deemed much more profitable to the farmers in general,” said Praewa Boonyawan, a producer with Thabdheva Thapthai Co. in northern Thailand. “There is certainly a higher demand on the consumer side.”

A worker uses a rake to spread coffee cherries in Surin province, Thailand.Photographer: Taylor Weidman/Bloomberg

To keep the momentum going, though, coffee companies will need to continue adding value for customers by touting direct sourcing and sustainability, or emphasizing the personalized, human interactions that comes with going to an old-school coffee shop, said Matthew Barry, an insight manager for food and beverage at research firm Euromonitor International.

Otherwise, consumers may shift toward more affordable drinks that are “easy,” like cold, canned coffee, Barry said. “Grocery shopping is stressful these days,” he said. “Buying your coffee shouldn’t be.”

Higher prices along the entire supply chain are likely to stick around. If they do go down, small farmers would have less incentive to grow coffee – ultimately tightening supplies and sending prices back up again, said Jay Kling, the director of coffee at Irving Farm New York. “Honestly, I hope that the price of coffee stays high in a long-term way, because that’s what the industry needs right now,” he said.

— With assistance from Dayanne Sousa, Mumbi Gitau, and Fred Ojambo

LINKS To Related Analyses

Lavazza Of Italy Continues To Focus On Increasing Coffee Bean Production In Cuba. Lavazza And Nespresso Both Export To Global Markets. April 20, 2024

Might Cubaexport In 2020 Permit “Independent Entrepreneurs” To Export Coffee Beans, Cocoa and Honey To The United States? January 14, 2020

Lavazza From Italy & Nespresso From Switzerland Vie For Cuba's Coffee Production/Exports September 17, 2017

Turkish Airlines Services Five Destinations In Cuba; Including Non-Stop.

From Turkish Airlines: 

“Cuba flight details 

Turkish Airlines flies to five different destinations in Cuba: Havana, Cayo Coco, Holguin, Santa Clara and Vadero. Flights from Istanbul Airport (IST) take nearly thirteen to seventeen hours. Turkish Airlines offers flights to Jardines del Rey Airport (CCC), Jose Marti International Airport (HOG), Abel Santamaria Airport (SNU) and Juan Gualberto Gomez Airport (VRA) ongoing all year long. This beautiful island is flooded by thousands of tourists mostly in the Christmas and during the summer months. 

The political background of the country has an undeniable effect on the tourism. For this reason, many politic events, such as the 1st of May Worker’s Day, the anniversary of Che Guevara’s death held in October 08, the anniversary of Bay of Pigs Victory in April 19, which paved the way for Fidel Castro and friends to come into power in Cuba, toppling the Batista regime, draw heavy attention worldwide. The Carnival taking place in July at Santiago de Cuba, regarded as the birthplace of Salsa dance, is another crowd-pulling event. Moreover, Cuba welcomes its visitors in a magical atmosphere during the Havana Carnival in the first days of August, and Habanos Cigar Festival held in February. 

You may have a chance to see closer the Cuban culture if you happen to visit this adorable country during these events. It would be advantageous to book your flight in advance, taking into account that the country is in high demand during the festival season.” 

https://www.turkishairlines.com/th-int/flights/country/cuba/ 

Turkish Airlines offers four different flight alternatives in average from Moscow to Havana at certain days of the week. All these flights are operated as connecting flights over Istanbul Airport (IST). There may be changes on the number of flights seasonally throughout the year. Moreover, some flights are operated with two connecting flights over Istanbul Airport (IST) and Panama City Tocumen International Airport (PTY). 

Duration of the journeys with Turkish Airlines from Moscow to Havana with a connecting flight over Istanbul Airport (IST) may vary depending on the layover. These flights take nearly 18 to 36 hours. Flights with two transit flights may take up to 45 hours in average. 

If you have a layover between 6 and 24 hours at the magnificent Istanbul during your journey from Moscow to Havana, you may benefit from the service Touristanbul, offered complimentary by Turkish Airlines for its guests, and have a chance to see the notable tourist attractions in the city in a short span of time. If your layover is more than 20 hours, you may make use of the free Stopover service and have a chance to attend the city sightseeing tour and benefit from the accommodation opportunities.” 

https://www.turkishairlines.com/th-int/flights/city/from-moscow-to-havana-flights/ 

Turkiye's Teknokon Endustri Contractor For Sulphuric Acid Plant Project In Moa, Cuba.

Sulfuric Acid Plant Installation 

“Sulfuric acid is a critical chemical used in many sectors such as fertilizer production facilities, thermal power plants, sugar factories, iron and steel industry.  [Istanbul, Turkiye-based] Teknokon Endüstri [https://www.teknokonendustri.com] has become the first Turkish Contractor to do business in Cuba by taking part in the scope of assembly at the Moa Sulfuric Acid Facility in Cuba.  In addition, it provides turnkey construction, mechanical and electrical-instrumentation services to leading technology companies or investors who supply systems from these companies, with the scope of sulfuric acid plant installation, in different points of our country. The heavy lifting plans that will be needed during the installation of the sulfuric acid plant can be easily solved with our own engineer staff.” 

Intecsa Moa Nickel / Sulphuric Acid Plant

Teknokon has become the first Turkish contractor to work in Cuba with the sulphuric acid plant project in Moa, Cuba. Process equipments erection, piping, and structural steel erection were completed by Teknokon. 

https://www.teknokonendustri.com/en/en/intecsa-moa-nickel-sulphuric-acid-plant.html

Client: Moa Nickel
Process Provider: SNC - Lavalin
Location: Moa / Cuba
Status: Completed                       
Detailed Scope Of Work
Fabrication: Stainless steel converter, pipes, tanks
Civil Works: 315 tons of refractory, 445 tons of acid brick lining
Equipment Installation: Drying stack, interpass and final absorbing towers, cooling tower, stainless steel converter, process gas stack, acid pump tank, blower, air filter, hot and cold interpass heat exchanger, drums, acid cooler, pumps, sulphur furnace, agitator, hopers and conveyors
Piping Erection: 300 tons
Insulation: 5,200 m²
Electric & Instrumentation: Distribution panel, cable trays, power and control cables, control units and instruments

Turkiye's ATG (Affiliated With ATG Global In New Albany, Ohio) Reported To Manage Hotel Corona In Cuba. Company Not Confirming.

Travelweek (26 July 2024): “The [147-room] Hotel Corona in Havana, administered by Turkish hotel chain ATG, is expected to open the beginning of next year. It will be a five-star property with 147 rooms.”  The Hotel Corona is owned by Republic of Cuba government-operated Gaviota SA, which is a subsidiary of Grupo de Administración Empresarial S.A. (GAESA) which is controlled by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba (FAR). 

From LinkedIn: “ATG Turkey is a member of ATG Global which is a leading global business travel management company based in New Albany, Ohio, U.S.A.  ATG Global covers the globe with more than 176.000 experienced travel professionals serve in over 72 countries.” 

From Company (2021): “ATG Worldwide B.V. is also a global international franchise of market leading travel management companies, headquartered in Utrecht, Netherlands.  ATG offers regional, company-owned offices in The Americas (USA), Europe/Middle East/Africa (Frankfurt, Germany) and Asia Pacific (Shanghai, China) and franchise partner offices covering 140+ countries with 7,800 global employees and a worldwide turnover representing over $7.2 billion.” 

From LinkedIn: Utrecht, Netherlands-based ATG Travel Worldwide “ATG is a global travel & expense management leader and a technology product powerhouse, offering innovative and proprietary robotic booking solutions, centralized global quality control, data management insights, a true global user platform and a suite of human resources products.” 

From LinkedIn: “ATG Turkey is one of the nation’s largest and fastest-growing business travel management companies offering best-in-class products, services and industry expertise to a diverse portfolio of corporate clients.  ATG Turkey is a member of ATG Global which is a leading global business travel management company based in New Albany, Ohio, U.S.A. ATG Global covers the globe with more than 176.000 experienced travel professionals serve in over 72 countries.  ATG Turkey is committed to offering high quality and unique services to its customers for their travels and events.  At ATG Turkey, our goal is to bring the world closer to you in cost effective way through professional, proactive and personal service. Our professional team has all the experience and knowledge to satisfy all your demands.  We have more than 1 million hotels in our portfolio ranging from standard to deluxe hotels.  Also, our services consists of airfares, transfers, meet and greet, car rental, travel insurance, holiday packages, tickets to various events, visa and passport services and organizations (congress, seminar, meeting, launch and opening etc.).   In addition to its headquarter in İstanbul and Ankara branch office, ATG Turkey opened its London branch in 2015 so as to continue giving the best service to its customers in all around the United Kingdom and Europe.  

Website: http://www.atgturkey.com

Phone: +902122502020

Industry: Travel Arrangements

Company size: 51-200 employees

Headquarters: İstanbul, Beyoglu

Specialties: Corporate Travel Management, Business Travel Management, Corporate Travel Savings Analysis, Hotel Sourcing, Travel Technology, Meetings & Events, Event Management, M.I.C.E., Hotel Reservations, Flight Tickets, Car Rentals, Transfers, Visa, and Duty of Care”

Turkiye's Global Ports Holding Signed 15-Year Management Contract For Cuba's Passenger Ship Operations. Company Has Removed Almost All References From Its Internet Site.

Istanbul, Turkey-based Global Ports Holding (2023 revenues approximately US$213 million) has a registered office in London, United Kingdom, and is listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). 

Link To Company Global Presence Presentation In PDF Format

Global Ports Holding has “a management agreement in Cuba to advise and consult on cruise port management best practice. The cruise terminal is in the Sierra Maestra complex, in San Francisco pier, with a current capacity for two ships.” 

http://www.globalportsholding.com/news-details/113/awarded-agreement-for-operation-of-havana-cruise-port-cuba 

Global Ports Holding Plc ("GPH Plc" or "Group"), the world's largest independent cruise port operator, is pleased to announce that it has signed a 15-year management agreement (“the Agreement”) with the Cuban company Aries S.A., for the operation of the cruise port in Havana, Cuba.

Under the terms of the Agreement, the Group will from 21st June 2018, use its global expertise and operating model to manage all of the cruise port operations over the life of the Agreement. As consideration, the Group will be paid a management fee that is based on a number of factors including passenger numbers, with growth based incentives. In addition to operating the cruise port operations, the Group will continue to work with our Cuban partners on the design and technical specification of the cruise port investment program, including proposed new terminals. Once these have been completed GPH will take responsibility for the marketing and commercialisation of these new facilities.

The Agreement is part of significant investment by Cuba into the port area and the tourism infrastructure in Havana. The port currently has capacity of two berths and in 2017 welcomed c328,000 cruise passengers, a growth rate of 156% compared to 2016, with over 500,000 cruise passengers forecast for 2018. As part of Cuba’s significant investment program into the port and surrounding area the number of berths will increase to six by 2024, significantly increasing the passenger capacity of the Havana port.

Cuba, located in the northern Caribbean, is the largest island in the Caribbean. Havana, the capital city of Cuba, is its major port and commercial centre and offers visitors a truly unique experience. The port itself is situated at the heart of Havana and only a 30-minute drive from Jose Marti International Airport, making it an ideal home porting destination.   

Global Ports Holding, Chairman and Co-Founder Mehmet Kutman said: “I am very happy that we have signed an agreement for Havana Cruise Port, the first step in the Group’s growth strategy for the Americas. This spectacular city and country is becoming an increasingly popular tourist destination, with visitors attracted by world famous architecture, a vibrant music scene and the famous local hospitality. We very much look forward to working with our Cuban partners to deliver a fantastic cruise port experience.” Global Ports Holding, CEO Emre Sayin said: “We are delighted to have been awarded the management contract for the Havana cruise port and look forward to playing our role in developing the cruise port and the wider visitor experience in Havana, as well as Cuba more broadly.

This represents our first Agreement in the Caribbean, in line with our strategy of expansion into the Americas cruise port market and therefore marks an important step in the development of Global Ports Holding. The GPH team looks forward to working with our local partners and local staff to drive continued growth in cruise passenger volumes at Havana Port and deliver both world class cruise port facilities and a great cruise experience for all passengers visiting Havana.” 

According to Global Ports Holding: “In May 2018 Global Ports Holding signed a management agreement in Cuba to advise and consult on cruise port management best practice. The cruise terminal is in the Sierra Maestra complex, in San Francisco pier, with a current capacity for two ships. The building itself is a designed architectural landmark of the city. Located at the historic heart of the city, in the waterfront promenade, in front of San Francisco square and near to other important attractions such as the “Plaza Vieja”, the “Plaza de las Armas” and the Cathedral, it enjoys the unique atmosphere of both the Havana Bay and the old town.” 

“Cuba is located in the main cruise destination, the Caribbean, and its capital Havana very near to the Floridian ports. Thanks to its strategic location in the region, Havana can be included in all kind of itineraries: the longest ones deployed in the West and East Caribbean but also the 3- 4 days itineraries sailing out from Florida. Besides, the cultural richness of the island and its capital is unparalleled anywhere in the Caribbean.”  Link: http://www.globalportsholding.com/ports/17/la-habana-cruise-port

LINKS To Related Analyses 

Why Has Turkiye’s Karadeniz Holding “Karpowership” Removed References To Cuba Where Company Has Been Providing Electricity Since 2019? Political Decision, Financial Decision? March 05, 2024 

Turkiye’s Karadeniz Holdings Now Eight “Karpowerships” In Cuba Providing Approximately 25% Of Island’s Electricity. Company Has 22.2% Of Its 36-Vessel Fleet In Cuba. Already Payment Issues. February 02, 2023 

President of Cuba Visiting President Of Turkiye. Number One Agenda Item: Paying Istanbul's Karpowership For Providing Nearing 20% Of Cuba's Electricity. What Will He Trade Away? November 22, 2022 

From Turkiye: Additional Karpowerships Would Help With Cuba's Electrical Issues. Problem: Who Will Pay? Turkiye Government To Provide Support? That's A Challenge. August 31, 2022 

Istanbul Is Home To First La Bodeguita del Medio Franchise From Cuba. Here Is What Franchisees Must Provide- Monthly Royalty Payment And Spend 2% Of Gross Revenues For Advertising/Promotion September 27, 2021 

Karadeniz Holding Of Turkey Update On "Karpowership" Operations In Cuba March 09, 2020

Karadeniz Of Turkey Delivering Floating Power Plant To Cuba For 51-Month Contract April 23, 2019 

Turkey's Karadeniz Holding Reports Electricity Contract With Cuba In October 2018; But, No Contract Signed Five Months Later April 01, 2019 

France, Russia, Spain, Turkey Selected By Cuba For Airport Contracts August 07, 2016

Turkiye's Karpowership Providing Approximately 25% Of Cuba's Electricity... But, Company Does Not Want To Promote Its Presence In Cuba.

UPDATE: From CiberCuba (14 December 2024)- excerpts: “Cuba’s Electric Union (UNE) announced that the Turkish floating power plant Cankuthan Bey, which arrived in Havana Bay on December 8, is not part of its contract with the Turkish company Karpowership and that it “will leave Cuba” once the commissioning of its units is completed.  “The KPS56 barge (Cankuthan Bey) arrived in Havana on Sunday, December 8, to conduct commissioning work on its units, and once completed, it will leave Cuba. This floating plant is not part of the contract between UNE and the Turkish company Karen Dis Ticaret,” UNE stated on its social media.  The Cankuthan Bey, with a generation capacity of 80 MW, temporarily joined the other five operational floating power plants in Cuba.  

  • Since 2019, Cuba has received eight Turkish floating power plants, of which six are currently operational: three in Havana (Belgin Sultan, Suheyla Sultan, and Erol Bay), one in Mariel (Ela Sultan), another in Santiago de Cuba (Erin Sultan), and for now, the Cankuthan Bey. 

… a floating plant with a capacity of 100 MW cost over 114 million dollars for 18 months of operation, while in the Dominican Republic, two barges with a capacity of 180 MW incurred expenses of 40 million over 42 months.  These findings suggest multibillion-dollar costs that Cuba could hardly manage without external financial support or through opaque agreements made with Turkish authorities.”

From Istanbul, Turkiye-based Karadeniz Holdings (2023 revenue approximately US$560 million): “For the last 74 years Karadeniz Holding has been one of the most innovative companies leading the energy sector not only in Turkey but in the world, as well as having operations in the finance, real estate, and shipbuilding industries.” 

LINK To Company Global Presence Map In PDF Format

“Turkiye’s Karadeniz Holdings Now Has Eight “Karpowerships” In Cuba Providing Approximately 25% Of Island’s Electricity.  In 53 Months, Company Now Has 22.2% Of Its 36-Vessel Fleet In Cuba- And There Have Already Been Payment Issues.” 

"Publication of New Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) on Basic Information and Updated FAQs on Cuba Sanctions"

Publication of New Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) on Basic Information and Updated FAQs on Cuba Sanctions 

“The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is publishing one new, basic information Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 1190). OFAC is also publishing two amended Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ 736 and FAQ 757) related to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR).  For more information on this specific action, please visit our Recent Actions page.”

“1190. Do U.S. sanctions target persons for engaging in political speech, religious practice, or other constitutionally protected activities?

OFAC does not sanction persons for their engagement in activities subject to U.S. constitutional protection, such as protected speech or religious practice or for their religious beliefs; nor do U.S. persons violate OFAC sanctions for engaging in such constitutionally protected activity. Furthermore, additional limitations and authorizations are in place to ensure that U.S. sanctions do not restrict the exchange of information or informational materials, or personal communication. The majority of OFAC sanctions programs are promulgated pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., which limits the authority to “regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly . . . any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication, which does not involve a transfer of anything of value . . . or, the importation from any country, or the exportation to any country, whether commercial or otherwise, . . . of any information or informational materials.” 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(1), (3).  No authorization is necessary for U.S. persons to engage in activities that are not prohibited by or are otherwise exempt from sanctions. If you are concerned that potential sanctions may interfere with constitutionally protected activities, please reach out to OFAC for further guidance as described here.  Date Released August 27, 2024

736. May the U.S. dollar be used to conduct transactions in Cuba or with Cuban nationals?

Yes, under certain circumstances. Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction may engage in transactions in U.S. dollars in Cuba or with Cuban nationals with respect to activity that is authorized pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR). For example, payments for telecommunications services in Cuba provided pursuant to 31 CFR § 515.542 may be provided in U.S. dollars. Further, the use of U.S. dollars for transactions that are exempt from the prohibitions of, or authorized by, the CACR is also allowed. For example, payments related to the importation or exportation of informational materials as defined in 31 CFR § 515.332, such as books or musical recordings, may be made in U.S. dollars.  Additionally, the May 29, 2024 amendment to section 515.584(d) of the CACR authorizes banking institutions subject to U.S. jurisdiction to process transactions originating and terminating outside the United States, provided that neither the originator nor the beneficiary is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction (“U-turn general license”). As a result, transactions related to third-country commerce involving Cuba or Cuban nationals may be processed in U.S. dollars through the U.S. financial system via banking institutions located in the United States that serve as intermediary banks, provided that neither the originator nor the beneficiary is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction. For more information on the “U-turn” general license, please see FAQ 757.  OFAC expects U.S. banks, including their foreign branches and subsidiaries, to conduct due diligence on their own direct customers (including, for example, ownership structure (for entities), proof of citizenship (for individuals), and address information to confirm that the transactions being processed are consistent with the U-turn general license. All banks, including those acting solely as intermediaries, should screen against the OFAC SDN List and their own internal filters. In cases where the remitter or beneficiary of the transaction is not a direct customer, the U.S. banking institution that is acting as an intermediary may rely on the remitter’s or beneficiary’s address as stated in the transaction to determine whether the remitter or beneficiary is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction, unless the U.S. banking institution knows or has reason to know that the remitter or beneficiary of a transaction is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction. OFAC will consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the bank’s processing of transactions where a bank is acting solely as an intermediary and fails to block a prohibited transaction engaged in by a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction, including the factors listed above, to determine what, if any, enforcement action to take against the bank. Note, however, that transactions meeting the requirements of 31 CFR § 515.584(d) may be processed notwithstanding the involvement of a specially designated national of Cuba, as defined in 31 CFR § 515.306, in the transaction. The examples below illustrate some of the transactions and parties that may use the U-turn general license.  Date Updated: August 27, 2024

757. Are U.S. banking institutions authorized to process “U-turn” transactions in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest?

Yes. Effective May 29, 2024, banking institutions subject to U.S. jurisdiction are authorized to process “U-turn” transactions, i.e., funds transfers originating and terminating outside the United States, provided that neither the originator nor the beneficiary is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction. For a complete description of what this general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.584(d). For additional information, see FAQ 736.  Date Updated: August 27, 2024”

Cuba Again Constricts Re-Emerging Private Sector Embracing "Can't Live With It, Can't Live Without It" Strategy. Another Opportunity For Biden-Harris Administration To Embrace "Crock Pot" Theory

As the philosopher Desiderius Erasmus said about women, the government of the Republic of Cuba views the re-emerging private sector from the perspective.... "Can't live with them, can't live without them."

Micro, Small, and Medium-Size Enterprises (MSMEs) may be “state-owned, private, mixed, or owned by political, mass, and social organizations.”

Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
20 August 2024

New restrictions on wholesalers spark fears about Cuban private sector’s future
By Nora Gámez Torres

The Cuban government has announced new measures, including limiting wholesale trade by the private sector, that officials say would “correct economic distortions” but will likely exacerbate shortages and worsen inflation in the midst of a severe economic crisis. 

In a 167-page document published Monday in the official Cuban gazette, the government issued several laws and regulations imposing new taxes, protracted bureaucratic requirements and restrictions on the activities of small and medium enterprises, non-agricultural cooperatives and the self-employed, which comprise the island’s nascent private sector. 

LINK TO 167-PAGE DOCUMENT IN PDF FORMAT 

According to the new rules, which Prime Minister Manuel Marrero hinted at during a National Assembly session last month, small and medium private enterprises, known in Spanish as mipymes, and cooperatives will still be able to import goods from abroad for their business. 

However, they can only import and sell goods in the wholesale market if that is their stated “main activity” as a company and only “through contracts involving state entities.” In an official list of 11,288 existing private enterprises and cooperatives compiled by the Ministry of Economy, only one private enterprise has “wholesale trade” stated as its principal activity. 

The measures could disrupt supply chains in the private sector, because many private enterprises have found it profitable to buy goods abroad to supply not just their own businesses but also to sell to others, including the self-employed. Many self-employed workers have also made fast cash by buying and selling wholesale, but the new regulations, which kick off in 30 days, prohibit that as well. Official figures reveal that the private sector imported food and other goods valued at $1.3 billion in 2023, and another $936 million this year until June, providing a lifeline to the Cuban population during the country’s worst economic crisis in many decades. 

The regulations come after the government imposed price controls last month on some food products sold by the private sector, which is already causing shortages. The government is not even able to pay for the food distributed through rationing cards, but Cuban leaders, who that insist state-owned “socialist enterprises” should be predominant in the economy, have become hostile to the rapid growth of the private sector. Marrero has accused business owners of tax evasion and pledged to enforce stricter controls, sparking concerns about the island’s economic future. 

The private sector has become a formidable competitor to the conglomerate known as GAESA, which is run by the military and which controls large sectors of the Cuban economy. GAESA used to control the foreign currency entering the country in the form of remittances — money sent by Cubans abroad to families on the island. But the Trump administration sanctioned the military company handling remittances, and Cubans in Miami found other informal channels to send money to relatives, which ended up helping finance private businesses. Government stores, including military-run chains such as TRD, are struggling to fill their shelves, while private stores are increasing nationwide. 

By limiting which companies can be involved in wholesale and ensuring state participation, the government may be trying to ensure that goods bought by the private sector are sold in government stores or used to revitalize state industries. Cuban economist Pedro Monreal, who lives in Spain, said on X that the restrictions on wholesale trade could favor big private sector players with connections to the government. However, the impact of the restrictions is not yet fully understood because the Ministry of Domestic Trade has yet to issue its regulations to implement them. Crisis in Cuba Cuba’s economic crisis is worsening. The country lost 10% of its population to migration, but the government announced a crackdown on the private sector. 

The new laws also state that private businesses must use their Cuban checking bank accounts for “all” their business transactions and use only the local currency, the Cuban peso, a measure first announced by Marrero last month that has generated uncertainty among Cuban entrepreneurs. If enforced, this requirement would hinder private businesses’ ability to pay providers abroad. Currently, many use bank accounts in third countries to pay for supplies because Cuban banks do not have dollars to support such operations and do not allow such transfers. 

Many business owners have resisted rules imposing electronic payments as the only way to get paid by clients and customers for goods and services because they need cash to buy dollars in the black market to pay for supplies abroad. “At first glance, these new laws represent another major step backward for the Cuban economy,” said Ric Herrero, the executive director of the Washington-based Cuba Study Group, a Cuban-American organization that supports the island’s private sector. “They generate a lot of uncertainty but do make it clear that their goal is neither economic nor developmental growth. Instead, they appear primarily designed to hinder the growth of the Cuban private sector and protect the interests of under-performing state-owned companies.” 

Herrero also believes the new regulations send the wrong message at a time when the United States and even Cuban allies like Russia and China would like to see the government moving forward with economic reforms. Resisting calls to open the private sector to foreign investment, the new government decree requires that company owners be Cubans with “effective” permanent residence on the island, ruling out that Cubans living abroad can legally own such businesses. 

Some Cuban Americans have tried to bypass such prohibitions — and U.S. embargo restrictions as well — by setting up businesses in Cuba under the name of relatives and friends. But that is also prohibited under new rules that ban company owners from representing someone else’s interests. For the first time, the government will allow foreigners to own private businesses in Cuba, but they must also be permanent residents of the country. 

More significantly, the rules do not even address the possibility that these businesses may receive foreign investment, which most economists agree is essential for the island’s economic development. “These laws also show little concern for the negative impact they will have on the foreign relations of a bankrupt country that should be prioritizing its integration into the global economy,” Herrero said. 

The new regulations increase the number of activities that are prohibited to the private sector, from 112 to 125. Most professions, tourism, banking and anything related to telecommunications or the media remain off-limits. Still, the rationale for some new prohibitions, like a ban on making orthopedic footwear, is unclear. Other rules, like requiring honey producers to sell only to the state, seem designed to stifle competition from the private sector. Other rules will immediately put some companies out of business. For example, the new rules prohibit teachers of languages, music and other arts from forming academies, which many have already done. 

The new legal framework also adds red tape to opening a business, requiring multiple authorizations, including first approval by municipal authorities, which Herrero fears might exacerbate corruption at the local level. 

The government also eliminated tax incentives and imposed an additional 5% workforce tax for self-employed workers, who are allowed to hire up to three employees. Oniel Díaz Castellanos, a Cuban entrepreneur who runs a business helping set up private enterprises, said many regulations are not new and maintain “absurd, regrettable and counterproductive prohibitions.” He believes not much will change for business owners in the upcoming months because many rules come with a 180-day implementation window. Even if not “catastrophic” for the private sector in the short term, the regulations ran counter to the government’s stated goals to improve the economy, he said: “We are going in the wrong direction.” 

Link To Related Analysis

For Cuba: Biden-Harris Administration Should Implement Crock Pot Theory And Quid Pro Quo With Quo Not Giving What Quid Wants. Jul 21, 2024

Other Media Reporting 

Cubaheadlines.com: “The Cuban government, through the Council of Ministers, announced on Monday the publication of Decree 107, which establishes new restrictions on micro, small, and medium-sized private enterprises (MSMEs), non-agricultural cooperatives, and self-employed workers. 

This decree nullifies and replaces Decree 49 of 2021 and identifies a total of 125 activities that these economic actors are not allowed to perform. Among the most notable activities now banned for the private sector are the manufacturing of pharmaceutical products, financial intermediation, book publishing and layout, television programming and broadcasting, telecommunications activities, and various forms of transportation and storage. 

Additionally, sensitive sectors such as defense, public security, and the administration of social services are also off-limits. Decree 107 reflects the regime’s strategy to maintain centralized control over key economic sectors, but it could have adverse effects on economic growth, job creation, and social well-being.  According to prominent economist Pedro Monreal, the decree "confirms the squeezing out of private activity and the market as part of state measures to allegedly 'correct distortions and boost the economy’.” 

The implementation of this decree represents a significant challenge for the development of the private sector in Cuba, as it limits the diversification and growth of new economic initiatives in strategic areas. In a context where the state sector faces significant limitations, preventing private actors from accessing these sectors could perpetuate the lack of competitiveness, innovation, and efficiency in the Cuban economy.  The decree also imposes restrictions on sectors that could have directly benefited local development and employment, such as the production of audiovisual media, transport management, and the provision of technology services. This could result in a lower supply of services and products, negatively impacting the population's well-being. 

The tightening of restrictions could also discourage foreign investment and the participation of Cubans in the diaspora in the national economy, thereby limiting opportunities for financing and the much-needed inflow of foreign currency. 

“It’s time to take action!” With this phrase, Cuban leader Miguel Díaz-Canel confirmed the regime’s shift in its policy of timid economic openness and reiterated his intention to subject the activities of the “new economic actors” to state guidelines and centralized economic planning.  “It’s time to move beyond diagnoses and take action,” said Díaz-Canel at the end of July, during his closing speech of the third regular session of the X Legislature of the National Assembly of People's Power (ANPP). 

The process of “debate and exchange” with the owners of MSMEs to convince them of the need to cap prices of essential products that the state cannot sell through the regulated family basket has ended. The result is another example of the repressive and coercive nature of the Cuban totalitarian regime.  Despite insisting that the government has not started a “witch hunt” against MSMEs, Díaz-Canel emphasized the intention to rein in the commercial activities of the “new actors” that he himself promoted. 

“Regarding our responsibilities in the uncertain and complex realm of the economy, it is necessary to recognize that in the effort to comply with the economic and social policy guidelines of the VIII Congress of the Party, by unblocking processes and promoting the formation of MSMEs, there was not enough firmness in the requirement to create sufficiently robust and comprehensive normative bases to guide the functioning of this form of management that was already operating in the economy but without formal recognition,” he pointed out. 

The lack of regulation of MSMEs, according to the leader, caused chaos in the Cuban economy, driving inflation and accentuating inequality in the country.  “Therefore, we must ensure that what has been approved is fulfilled, clearly defining the objectives, better preparing the executors of each measure, providing political, communicational, material, and financial assurance, and organizing actions with an implementation schedule so that they do not remain just rhetoric. And above all, exert control over corrections and adjustments with the necessary feedback.” 

“Post-controls have shown that many of these businesses did not respond to the state’s trust with the honesty and transparency demanded and required by a minimally organized society. Consequently, no violator of the tax system and legality in general can question the demands arising from the analysis of the errors and distortions of the process. As has been said at this time, the law and order must prevail if we want all forms of economic management to succeed and strengthen,” he added.  “It’s time to take action” is the new slogan of the regime that has been in power for 65 years, but Díaz-Canel does not want to scare the emerging entrepreneurs. “I want to reiterate that there is no and will not be a witch hunt against private MSMEs, as some claim, manipulate, or suggest.” 

According to the also First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), “the confrontation will be against lack of control, illegalities, tax evasion, speculation, and fraud, whether they come from non-state or state companies.” 

“This is a battle against illegality and not against forms of property and management,” concluded the leader appointed by General Raúl Castro to steer the “continuity” and implement the economic measures emanating from the VIII Congress of the PCC, which led to the failed “ordering.” 

“Remember that we are all here to save the Revolution and socialism,” Díaz-Canel warned at the beginning of July during a meeting of the Council of Ministers, reaffirming once again the centrality of the socialist model in Cuba’s economy.  Recently, during his report to the Economic Commission of the ANPP, the Cuban leader announced an "ordering" plan for the private and state sectors, due to the "irresponsible manner" in which some of these institutions are conducting themselves, he noted. 

In this regard, he insisted that it is not a “witch hunt” against any specific form of management or property. However, the official discourse has been attacking MSMEs for months, especially those that import finished products or do not comply with price caps.  “What we are proposing here is an order so that there is the greatest amount of goods and services available at appropriate prices for the population, and that everyone contributes everything they have to contribute,” he stated. 

For now, the “step to action” has resulted in the withdrawal of import licenses from almost a third of the private businesses authorized to do so. According to Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz, “it was decided to close this faculty to 24 of the 73 approved companies for importing, due to low activity levels and poor performance.” 

“In the analysis we conducted, there were many blunders, errors...,” said Marrero Cruz days ago before ANPP deputies. “The resulting document from the work done by MINCEX allowed us to conclude that we had to close this faculty to 24 companies, due to low activity levels and poor performance,” emphasized the prime minister, announcing significant changes in regulations for MSMEs and self-employed work (TCP). 

There is no “witch hunt,” but recently the Minister of Finance and Prices in Cuba, Vladimir Regueiro Ale, warned MSME owners that hiding merchandise and not selling it to the population is a “serious crime.”  The official appeared on Cuban television to explain the initial control actions the regime has agreed upon following the recent implementation of Resolution 225, which imposes a price cap on six essential products in the country. 

Regueiro highlighted that hiding merchandise and obstructing commerce can be considered serious crimes or infringements. “We are warning, and where we have identified these cases, we have summoned the municipal governments to the economic actors who are the owners,” he said. MSME owners are summoned to government headquarters to receive guidance on the measures to follow in each situation. 

“In many cases, we have had to order the forced sale of merchandise. As of July 13, we had ordered 151 forced sale actions of products,” he said. He also specified that the most significant violations are in the commercialization of chicken and oil. 

In an intensive operation conducted between July 12 and 13, the Cuban government shut down 53 private businesses after carrying out 891 inspections across the country. Marrero Cruz reported that during these inspections, more than 4,000 violations were detected, and fines exceeding 13 million pesos were imposed on MSMEs. Among the main infractions detected were the concealment of products following the government-imposed price caps and the sale of goods at unregulated prices.” 

HAVANA, Cuba, Aug 19 (ACN) The Official Gazette number 78 published Monday, with its complementary resolutions, six decree-laws and two decrees aimed at the country's non-state economic actors, as part of the actions aimed at correcting distortions and reviving the economy.

The new legal provisions will enter into force in 30 days and are Decree-Laws 88 “On micro, small and medium-sized enterprises” (MSMEs), 89 “On non-agricultural cooperatives” (CNA), 90 “On the exercise of self-employment” (TCP) and 91 “On contraventions in these three modalities”.

There are also Decree-Laws 92 “On the special social security regime for self-employed workers, members of CNAs and private MSMEs and the owners of local development projects”, and 93 Modifying Law 113 “On the tax system”, all issued by the Council of State.

In turn, the Official Gazette publishes the Decrees of the Council of Ministers 107 “On the activities not authorized to be carried out by micro, small and medium private enterprises, non-agricultural cooperatives and self-employed workers”, and 108 “On the creation of the National Institute of Non-State Economic Actors, to be headed by Mercedes Lopez Acea.

Its creation was announced before the National Assembly of People's Power (ANPP) last July by Manuel Marrero Cruz, member of the Political Bureau and Prime Minister of the Republic, when he updated the Government's projections for correcting distortions and boosting the economy in 2024, with the incorporation of other actions.

At a press conference today in Havana, the president of the new institute and senior officials of the main agencies involved in these forms of management gave details of the importance and necessity of such provisions.

These regulations, aimed at ordering the actions of non-state actors and making them become true complements of the Cuban economy, are not the only ones that apply to them, nor were they conceived now, because since 2021, when the first ones were approved, it was decided to update them every two years. 

This was said at the press conference given by Lopez Acea and by Johana Odriozola Guitart, deputy minister of economy and planning; first deputy ministers Maritza Cruz Garcia, of finances and prices, and Yosvany Pupo Otero, of domestic trade, and by Carmen Rosa Lopez Rodriguez, director of non-state employment of the ministry of labor and social security.  They explained that the six decree-laws, the two decrees and the complementary resolutions are the result of an extensive process of consultations and analysis at all levels, initiated in 2023, with the provincial governments and representatives of those and other agencies and MSMEs, which led to several versions until their recent approval by the country's leadership.

According to the president of the institute, they are a response to distortions or gaps, largely caused by the lack of control, they mark the organization of the non-state activity, in addition to underlining that all the modalities of economic actors are maintained.  In other words, she said, it is a matter of these figures acting within a legal framework, contributing to the treasury and to the welfare not only of themselves but also of society.

In his closing speech at the last ordinary session of the ANPP in July, Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez, first secretary of the Party's Central Committee and president of the country, pointed out that law and order must prevail if we want all forms of economic management to triumph and be strengthened.

U.S. Embassy In Cuba Issuing Work-Related Visas, Providing U.S. Companies With Employment Opportunities

United States Department of State
Washington DC
14 August 2024

U.S. Embassy Havana to Expand Visa Services to Include Some Work and Exchange Visas; B1/B2 Visa Services Remain Suspended

On Monday, August 19 the U.S. Embassy in Havana will expand visa services to include certain categories of temporary work and exchange program visas. Cubans with temporary work petitions approved by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and participants in exchange visitor programs with an approved Certificate of Eligibility will be able to schedule a visa interview at the U.S. Embassy in Havana. This change does not include nonimmigrant visas for persons who want to enter the United States temporarily for business (B-1 visa) or for tourism (B-2 visa). Cubans must still travel to another U.S. Embassy or consulate for routine B1/B2 visa interviews.

The expanded visa services at the U.S. Embassy in Havana will include the following categories: H- Temporary workers or trainees; J- Exchange visitors; L-Intracompany transferees; O- Workers with extraordinary ability or achievement; P- Athletes, artists, and entertainers; Q- International cultural exchange participants; R- Members of a religious denomination performing religious work. A visa appointment is not a guarantee of visa issuance. Applicants must demonstrate their qualifications for the visa under U.S. law and regulations.

To be scheduled for an interview appointment for categories H, L, O, P, Q, and R, applicants will be required to submit evidence of their approved petition (Form I-797 Notice of Action) from USCIS. To apply for an interview for a J visa, applicants must submit a Certificate of Eligibility for Exchange Visitor Status, Form DS-2019, issued by the exchange program sponsor. Interviews will be scheduled only after an approved Form I-797 or Form DS-2019 have been submitted to the Embassy. Applicants also need to provide the required application, fees, a valid passport, and a current photo. For more information, see: https://cu.usembassy.gov/visas/ For more information on USCIS processing of temporary worker petitions, see: https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-nonimmigrant-workers

Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
14 August 2024

U.S. embassy in Havana to start issueing visas suspended since Trump era
By Nora Gámez Torres

Starting on Monday, the U.S. Embassy in Havana will expand its visa services to facilitate cultural and educational exchanges between the two countries, a State Department official told the Miami Herald. Cubans seeking to travel to the United States for academic and cultural exchanges, temporary work, or to study at a U.S. university will now be able to apply for a non-immigrant visa in Havana.

The U.S. Embassy will also process visas for athletes, artists, members of religious groups, those with “extraordinary abilities” and employees transferring to other company positions in the United States. Previously, Cubans had to apply for such visas in third countries.

The Trump administration suspended visa services in Cuba in 2017, citing incidents related to the Havana Syndrome ailment and the need to reduce its staff to a minimum. As a result, Cubans wanting to migrate or visit the United States were asked to travel to a third country to obtain visas. The Biden administration started processing some immigrant visas again in May 2022 and all immigrant visa categories by January of last year.

However, the embassy has not issued non-immigrant visas, except for some activists and private entrepreneurs. The issuing of B1 and B2 tourist visas is still suspended in Havana, and Cubans must still travel to a third country to apply. “There’s no change with B1/B2 visas,” the State Department official said. The visa service expansion responds to increased embassy staffing and efforts to eliminate “barriers” to educational and cultural contacts that the Biden administration wants to support, the official said.

“We thought about how we could make the exchange we want more feasible and fluid,” the official said, adding that in the past, musicians and students, for example, had to spend more money to travel to third countries like Mexico to obtain a U.S. visa. The official noted that all those visa categories required a U.S. sponsor to petition the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

“These are categories where there is not much influx, and our staff can accommodate them,” the official said. “It is important to emphasize that all of them require prior approval from USCIS or an academic institution.” The official said the number of embassy employees has doubled in the last two years, but there are still not enough consular staff to reinstate all visa services fully.

Amid a massive wave of migration from Cuba, the largest since Fidel Castro took power in 1959, the U.S. Embassy in Havana gradually ramped up its visa services to clear a backlog of immigration petition cases that reached 100,000 in 2021. Those included about 22,000 cases from the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program, handled separately by USCIS and suspended by the Trump administration, which closed the USCIS office in Havana in 2018. USCIS reopened it last August to resolve the remaining cases under that program.

The State Department official said the visa backlog affecting Cubans has been cleared, and immigration visa applications currently do not take so long to decide. According to available statistics from the State Department, the U.S. Embassy in Havana issued 28,143 immigrant visas in fiscal year 2023. Still, by the time the embassy in Havana fully resumed immigrant visa processing in January 2023, thousands of Cubans who might have benefited from such legal programs had already opted to journey to South and Central America to make the perilous journey to the U.S. border with Mexico, fleeing from political repression and economic collapse on the island. U.S. Customs and Border Protection registered 535,037 encounters with Cubans at the Mexico border between September 2021 and June 2024. Some entered using a new legal pathway, using the CBPOne app launched in late 2020. Crisis in Cuba Cuba’s economic crisis is worsening.

The country lost 10% of its population to migration, but the government announced a crackdown on the private sector.

According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, another 104,130 Cubans arrived in the United States through a new parole program that began in January 2023. The program allows Cubans, Venezuelans, Haitians and Nicaraguans who have a U.S. sponsor to come to the United States to work in an effort to bring down illegal border crossings. The Department of Homeland Security temporarily suspended the program earlier this month to investigate allegations of fraud. Experts fear Cubans will continue coming in large numbers as the country goes through one of its worst economic crises in decades and the government continues enforcing laws punishing freedom of expression and dissent.

US Exports To Cuba Decreased In June 2024 By 5.8%. Remain Up 31.4% Year-To-Year. Thus Far In 2024- US$31 Million In Vehicles. And, US$4,485.00 In Leaded Gasoline. List Of Everything!

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
August 2024

June 2024 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decrease 5.8% - 1
47th Of 220 June 2024 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 31.4% - 2
Cuba Ranked 49th Of 220 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets - 2
June 2024 Healthcare Product Exports US$89,586.00 - 2
June 2024 Humanitarian Donations US$7,180,213.00 - 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue To Increase - 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 19


JUNE 2024 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA DECREASE 5.8% - Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in June 2024 were US$34,916,865.00 compared to US$37,071,007.00 in June 2023 and US$23,055,838.00 in June 2022. 

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA and CDA. The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

January 2024 through June 2024 TSREEA exports were US$210,628,425.00 compared to January 2023 through June 2023 TSREEA exports of US$160,259,553.00

Total TSREEA exports since first deliveries in December 2001 exceed US$7,456,961,818.00

MONTHLY REPORT IN PDF FORMAT Awaiting Port Data

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS FROM JANUARY 2024 THROUGH JUNE 2024 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

Court Of Appeals "Halts Exxon Mobil Effort To Recoup US$71 Million From Cuba" For Refinery And Service Stations Expropriation

“One of the defendants unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the complaint based on foreign sovereign immunity. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) generally bars United States courts from exercising jurisdiction over foreign sovereign entities like the defendants in this case. The district court held that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act does not itself overcome a foreign sovereign’s general immunity from suit under the FSIA, and that jurisdiction in this case thus depends on the applicability of an FSIA exception. The court determined that the FSIA’s expropriation exception does not apply in the circumstances but that the FSIA’s commercial-activity exception does. We agree with the district court that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act does not confer jurisdiction in this case and that the FSIA’s expropriation exception is inapplicable. As for the commercial-activity exception, we conclude that the district court needed to undertake additional analysis before determining that jurisdiction exists under that exception. We thus vacate the district court’s decision and remand the case for further analysis on the applicability of the FSIA’s commercial-activity exception.”

  • 07/30/2024  Open Document PER CURIAM ORDER [2067290] filed dismissing as moot appellants/cross-appellees Corporacion CIMEX, et al. to strike Section II(c) of Exxon’s reply brief on its cross-appeal or for comparable relief [1970167-2] and, in the alternative, for leave to file a surreply [1970167-3] in light of the court’s opinion issued herein this date. Before Judges: Srinivasan, Pillard and Randolph. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020]

  • 07/30/2024 Open Document PER CURIAM JUDGMENT [2067291] filed that the District Court's denial of CIMEX's motion to dismiss be vacated and the cases be remanded for further proceedings, for the reasons in the accompanying opinion . Before Judges: Srinivasan, Pillard and Randolph. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020]

  • 07/30/2024 Open Document OPINION [2067294] filed (Pages: 36) for the Court by Judge Srinivasan, DISSENTING OPINION (Pages: 10) by Judge Randolph. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020]

  • 07/30/2024    Open Document     CLERK'S ORDER [2067295] filed withholding issuance of the mandate. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020]

LINK To Text From Court Of Opinion And Dissenting Opinion In PDF Format

“DC Circuit Halts Exxon Mobil Effort To Recoup $71 Million From Cuba For Revolution-Era Nationalization 

  • According to a 1969 report by the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, Exxon Mobil, then known as Standard Oil, lost $71,611,002 from Cuba's expropriation of its subsidiaries in the country. 

WASHINGTON (Courthouse News Service)- 30 July 2024: A D.C. Circuit panel temporarily stalled oil giant Exxon Mobil's effort to demand compensation from Cuba for nationalizing a refinery and over a hundred service stations in 1960 following the Cuban Revolution.  

The three-judge panel, made up of Chief U.S. Circuit Judge Sri Srinivasan, U.S. Circuit Judge Cornelia Pillard and Senior U.S. Circuit Judge Raymond Randolph — two Barack Obama appointees and a George H.W. Bush appointee, respectively — ruled 2-1 with Randolph dissenting.  

Exxon Mobil sued three state-owned defendants, Corporacíon CIMEX S.A. of Cuba and Panama and Uníon Cuba-Petroleo, under the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, which created a cause of action against those who traffic in property confiscated by the Cuban government.  

In response, the defendants unsuccessfully tried to dismiss the complaint, claiming foreign sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, or FSIA, which blocks American courts from exercising jurisdiction over foreign entities like the defendants.  

The lower court held that the 1996 law did not clear a foreign sovereign’s general immunity from suit, and that jurisdiction in the case depended on whether an FSIA exception could apply. It found that of two possible exceptions, the “expropriation exception” and the “commercial-activity exception,” only the latter could apply in the case.  

Srinivasan, writing the panel’s majority opinion, agreed that the 1996 statue did not grant a court jurisdiction and that the expropriation exception was inapplicable, but found that court needed additional analysis on the commercial-activity exception. 

The panel thus vacated the lower court’s decision and remanded the case to further analyze the latter exception. 

That exception, the “most significant of the FSIA’s exceptions” strips sovereign immunity due to the commercial activities of another nation that are either carried out in the U.S., performed in the U.S. in connection with activity elsewhere, or performed outside the U.S., are taken in connection with a commercial activity and caused a direct effect in the U.S.  

The panel found that the third clause is the focus of the case, and determined CIMEX’s actions clearly fulfilled the first and second requirements of the clause, as the alleged trafficking occurs in Cuba and involves confiscated property that constitutes commercial activity.  

The question for the lower court to determine is whether CIMEX’s actions caused a direct effect in the U.S. 

After toppling the American-backed dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1959, Fidel Castro and the new Cuban government began expropriating the assets of several subsidies owned by Exxon Mobil, then known as Standard Oil, including Esso Standard Oil S.A., a refinery, multiple bulk-product terminals and over a hundred service stations.

In 1964, Congress created a method for U.S. nationals to submit expropriation claims to the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, including claims for any rights or interests owned “wholly or partially, directly or indirectly.”  

In 1969, the commission found that Standard Oil had lost $71,611,002 due to Cuba’s nationalization of Esso, but neither Standard Oil nor its successor Exxon received any payment from that claim.  

Congress then passed the 1996 statue after Cuban fighter jets shot down two private planes connected to anti-Castro group Brothers to the Rescue which had been dropping propaganda leaflets over Cuba, killing four men. The law created an avenue for private individuals to sue any entity who traffics property confiscated by the Cuban government.  

That avenue, Title III of the statute, could be suspended by the president for up to six months at a time, which it had been between its passage in 1996 until 2019, when former President Donald Trump announced it would no longer suspend the right to bring Title III actions.  

Srinivasan found Exxon’s argument that FSIA is not the exclusive mechanism to secure jurisdiction over civil suits against foreign sovereigns because Title III action grant courts jurisdiction was unconvincing.  

He explained that while Title III creates a cause of action for certain suits against another nation, it does not explicitly say any such action automatically lies within a federal court’s jurisdiction. Rather, it “harmoniously coexists” with the FSIA to allow actions when an exception applies.  

Further, Congress was well aware of the FSIA when crafting the 1996 statute and said nothing about allowing a Title III action to supersede a state’s immunity without a FSIA exemption.  

In his dissent, Randolph disagreed with that determination, finding the Supreme Court precedents the majority based its decision on did not mention Title III, partly because it either did not yet exist, was not in effect due to presidential suspension or the claims in the cases were unrelated to Cuba.  

Therefore, Title III should be considered an “exclusive and independent remedy” that does not rely on the FSIA. He highlighted Congress’ findings and stated purpose when crafting the 1996 statute.  “Congress expressly determined that Cuba’s wrongful takings required a remedy beyond what was then available,” Randolph wrote. “That remedy is Title III, unencumbered by the FSIA.”” 

LINKS To Related Analyses 

Nearing Decision? Updates From U.S. Court Of Appeals In Exxon Mobil Corporation V. Corporacion Cimex (Cuba), et al. February 01, 2024 

Exxon Mobil Libertad Act Lawsuit Against Cuba- Judge- Exxon Has Standing, "Exxon's injury is concrete"; Cuba Wins Too; Court References "mantle of triviality" and baffling" April 21, 2021 

Cuba Government Files 1,919 Pages In Response To Exxon Mobil Libertad Act Lawsuit June 18, 2020 

Waiting Until The Last Minute, Cuba Decides To Defend Against Exxon Mobil In Title III Lawsuit August 05, 2019 

Exxon Mobil Corporation Third Company To Sue Using Title III Of Libertad Act; Cimex & Cupet In Cuba Are Targets May 03, 2019

OFAC Issues Guidance About New Ten-Year Statute Of Limitations For Violations (Mistake Or Intentional)- Including For Cuba.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL (22 July 2024)

Enforcement Release: July 22, 2024 GUIDANCE ON EXTENSION OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS  

This guidance addresses questions raised by recent legislation that extended the statute of limitations for violations of certain sanctions administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).  

On April 24, 2024, the President signed into law the 21st Century Peace through Strength Act, Pub. L. No. 118-50, div. D (the “Act”). Section 3111 of the Act extends from five years to 10 years the statute of limitations for civil and criminal violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) or the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).  

Prior to the Act’s enactment, civil enforcement actions brought by OFAC under IEEPA or TWEA were subject to the five-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2462. The new 10-year statute of limitations—codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1705(d) and 4315(d)—became effective upon the President’s signature on April 24, 2024.  

The Act states that “an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise” brought under IEEPA or TWEA “shall not be entertained unless commenced within 10 years after the latest date of the violation upon which the civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture is based.”  

This new 10-year statute of limitations applies to any violation that was not time-barred at the time of its enactment. Consequently, OFAC may now commence an enforcement action for civil violations of IEEPA- or TWEA-based sanctions prohibitions within 10 years of the latest date of the violation if such date was after April 24, 2019.  

As set forth in the Act, the commencement of a civil enforcement action includes the issuance of a pre penalty notice or a finding of violation.  

To match the new statute of limitations period, OFAC anticipates publishing an interim final rule, with an opportunity to provide comment, extending from five years to 10 years the recordkeeping requirements codified at 31 C.F.R. § 501.601. OFAC anticipates that a 10-year recordkeeping requirement would become effective six months after publication of the interim final rule.” 

Link To OFAC Statement 

LINK TO RELATED ANALYSIS 

Newly-Enacted Foreign Assistance Law Impacts Cuba Transactions For U.S.-Based And Non-U.S.-Based Companies. OFAC Had Five Years. Now Has Ten Years. Another Reason To Avoid Cuba..April 25, 2024

“Important Announcement for Users of OFAC’s Compliance Hotline (2 August 2024)

To improve efficiency in responding to requests for sanctions guidance from the public, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is updating its Compliance Hotline by streamlining and enhancing the query submission process.

Thanks to helpful feedback from Compliance Hotline users, OFAC is transitioning to a single, user-friendly online platform to receive questions from the public. Users can now submit queries—and provide all necessary details—directly through OFAC’s new OFAC Compliance Hotline page. This new platform is designed to improve OFAC’s tracking of queries and help OFAC assess when additional public guidance may be helpful.

OFAC will fully transition its Compliance Hotline to this web form platform by January 1, 2025, and will retire other existing forms of contacting the OFAC Compliance Hotline according to the following schedule: OFAC will retire the Compliance Hotline email (OFAC_Feedback@treasury.gov) on August 16, 2024; and its Compliance Hotline telephone (1-800-540-6322 and 202-622-2490) on December 31, 2024.

Please submit questions about how to comply with OFAC-administered sanctions programs or where to find helpful guidance on OFAC’s website via the new online OFAC Compliance Hotline.

As a reminder, please continue to use OFAC’s License Application page for license applications and requests for formal interpretive guidance. Other information about contacting OFAC, including where to submit voluntary self-disclosures or appeal designations, can be found on our Contact OFAC page.  For more information on this specific action, please visit our Recent Actions page.”

For Cuba: Biden-Harris Administration Should Implement Crock Pot Theory And Quid Pro Quo With Quo Not Giving What Quid Wants.

Implementing Crock Pot Theory 

Quid Pro Quo With Quo Not Giving What Quid Wants.   

  • In Latin, quid pro quo means “something for something.” “Quid pro quo is an arranged exchange of services or favors between two parties.”  “Something given or received for something else.” 

Washington Should Permit MSMEs To Do What Havana Prohibits… And Let Crock-Pot Pressure From Those Decisions By Havana Do The Rest. 

  • The process will take time.  There will be some abuse, no way to prevent it.  The percentage of abuse will be and remain overwhelmed by legitimate activity.  Eventually, the timer reaches its limit.  Critical is maintaining constant activity.  Be disruptive- and like it. 

When The Government Of The Republic Of Cuba Does Something Deemed Harmful To The Re-Emerging Private Sector In The Republic Of Cuba, The Biden-Harris Administration Should Respond By Authorizing An Activity Deemed Beneficial To The Re-Emerging Private Sector In Cuba.   

The Biden-Harris Administration Should Respond To The Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration With Something Helpful To Re-Emerging Private Sector In The Republic Of Cuba Knowing Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration Does Not Want It. 

The More Available And Workable Inventory Of United States Government Policies And Regulations Visible To Those Engaged With The Re-Emerging Private Sector In The Republic Of Cuba, The More Pressure Will Continue Upon The Government Of The Republic Of Cuba To Craft Excuses For Limiting The Role Of The Re-Emerging Private Sector In The Republic Of Cuba.  There Is Not An Inexhaustible Quantity Of Excuses.  

The goal should be to construct layer upon layer of access and workable opportunity for micro, small and medium-size enterprises (MSMEs) in the Republic of Cuba.   

Critical for each access and each workable opportunity to have been first thoroughly vetted not within the United States government inter-agency review process, but outside of the United States government inter-agency review process.  Meaning, have the likely, the expected, the actors whose participation are essential for any access and workable opportunity to be operational.   

Unhelpful and an unwise use of time for the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce to issue guidance and then officials from The White House and United States Department of State reach out and ask the relevant actors how what was published can be improved and implemented. 

More than two years since the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) authorized the OFAC to issue the first license for a direct investment in and direct financing to an MSME located in the Republic of Cuba owned by a Republic of Cuba national. 

Remarkably, the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ) has yet to issue the regulations which would authorize any MSME in the Republic of Cuba to legally receive direct investment and direct financing.   

Statements within the last seven days by officials of the government of the Republic of Cuba suggest those regulations may now be nearer to issuance- not because of a desire to assist the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba, but because of necessity.   

  • Absent a resilient and resistant re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba, the government of the Republic of Cuba has no possibility of repaying either its sovereign debts or its commercial debts, both of which remain overdue in some instances by decades.  

Given the United States domestic political calendar complexities and the willingness by the government of the Republic of Cuba to continue to adhere to decision-making and decision-implementing which is detrimental to MSMEs and to the capabilities of citizens of the Republic of Cuba, the Biden-Harris Administration might consider: 

When the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration implements a decision deemed harmful to the re-emergence of the private sector in the Republic of Cuba, implement quickly a policy and/or regulation designed to assist the re-emergence of the private sector in the Republic of Cuba.  Sort or a quid pro quo where the quo is unwelcomed by the quid. 

For example, as the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration expands pricing restrictions, operational restrictions, and banking requirements, expand supportive mechanisms to the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba- despite expecting or knowing that the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration will not permit those supportive mechanisms to be implemented. 

What the government of the Republic of Cuba fears most is the re-authorization of direct correspondent banking and clarity for MSME account liability responsibilities of United States-based financial institutions.  Each require a level of sustained transparency which is generally considered an anathema to the government of the Republic of Cuba.   

  • For example, the OFAC would require a Republic of Cuba national seeking to establish an account with a United States-based financial institution to present documents from the government of the Republic of Cuba certifying ownership (and good standing) of a MSME and then be required to self-certify, similar to what travelers complete when purchasing an airline ticket from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  The Republic of Cuba national agrees to and accepts liability for any errors and omissions- and would be required to update any change in status, thus shielding a United States-based financial institution from potential OFAC penalties.  If United States-based financial institutions believe, as they do now, that opening a checking account where the balance could be in the thousands of dollars, but could result in penalties in the hundreds of thousands of dollars for a mistake in a filed document, then executives of the financial institution will politely decline to participate.  That has already happened.   

While the Biden-Harris Administration recently expanded authorizations for Republic of Cuba-based MSMEs to establish accounts with United States-based financial institutions, there was no meaningful engagement in advance with representatives of United States-based financial institutions, United States-based companies, and United States-based business organizations resulted in authorizations lacking specificity- and that lack of specificity upon publication resulted in skepticism from those whose buy-in is required for a change in policy to become more than words written on paper.  The new regulations were embraced by the United States private sector more like walking turtle rather than rolling thunder.  

The Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) authorized United States-based financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions.  One did.  But the OFAC did not under a general license authorize Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with United States-based financial institutions.  That technical correction needs to be fixed.   

  • The result was and remains that authorized transactions from the United States to the Republic of Cuba and from the Republic of Cuba to the United States must use financial institutions in third countries, which may receive a fee from the sender and receiver.  These authorized transactions include passport fees, visa fees, citizenship fees, postal fees, remittances, remittance fees, telecommunication fees, and airline fees among others    

  • For example, since December 2001 more than US$7.4 billion in OFAC-authorized and BIS payments from the Republic of Cuba to the United States for agricultural commodities and food products authorized by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 have been routed through third countries- and financial institutions in third countries have received fees.  Those fees could have been used for an increase in purchases from United States-based companies. 

Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
17 July 2024
Despite Worsening Economy, Cuba Announces Crackdown On Growing Private Sector

By Nora Gámez Torres

In a warehouse in Havana, packages of Ocean Spray cranberries stand close to boxes of Country Barn waffle mix, Lipton tea and other products from brands that can be found in U.S. supermarkets. Cuban private businesses are importing food from the United States and other countries at a scale not previously seen. Courtesy.  

The growth of Cuba’s emerging private sector will likely halt if the government enacts new measures announced by the country’s prime minister during a National Assembly address in which he blamed the businesses for evading taxes and tapping into foreign currency that once went to government coffers.  

Prime Minister Manuel Marrero announced Wednesday that private businesses will have to pay for imports “from accounts in Cuban banks,” saying the measure he said will be implemented “gradually” but giving no other details.  

The measure would effectively prevent many enterprises from staying in business because the government does not sell foreign currency to them, and no current mechanism allows a private company to use the Cuban banking system to transfer foreign currency abroad to pay overseas suppliers. Currently, these companies are not allowed to import directly.  

They must use a state importing agency as an intermediary. To pay providers abroad, some business owners use bank accounts in third countries. Others have been buying dollars on the black market and using intermediaries such as small money-transfer agencies that pay providers abroad on their behalf.  

To address the issue and support the private sector, the Biden administration changed the regulations on the U.S. embargo in May to allow Cuban private business owners to open accounts in U.S. banks, although banks have yet to follow through.  

The new requirement by Cuba forcing businesses to use Cuban banks for payment seems to be a response to the Biden administration measures, even though initially Cuban diplomats said the island’s government would not oppose it. “Do you want to import? Well, you’re going to have to use Cuban bank accounts,” the prime minister said with a faint smile. Marrero also said private enterprises will be required to certify the origin of the money they use to pay for imports, customs fees and port duties in dollars.  

They will also be required to get authorization from municipal governments to sell goods or services outside their province of residence. The latter measure, he said, would ensure the businesses do not expand over the current 100-employee limit. The government will also increase monitoring of the bank accounts linked to these enterprises and their owners for tax purposes. Just three years after they were first allowed in 2021, small and medium enterprises have become significant importers of food and other essential goods, filling the gap left by the cash-strapped government and providing a lifeline to many Cuban families. They also provide various services, from construction and transportation to senior care and software programming.  

According to figures shared by Marrero in a PowerPoint presentation, the private sector, including self-employed workers and cooperatives, accounts for 20 percent of the country’s GDP. Private enterprises imported $1.3 billion in goods in 2023 and $936 million so far this year as of June. Their rapid growth has occurred despite the economy’s lagging recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and an almost 2% overall economic contraction last year, according to recent official figures.  

But Marrero portrayed such economic activity in a negative light, accusing the private businesses of evading taxes, driving the price of the dollar up and taking in the foreign currency that used to go to the government. The private sector’s “financial and commercial activity…creates an uncontrollable demand for foreign currency,” he said. “You may say it is good that they import and bring things. Yes, if they paid taxes, if they sold and marketed it at fair prices to the people.  

But this is not really the case, so this is why it must be controlled, regulated — [though] not prohibited.” Since last year, when the government announced the elimination of tax incentives for the private sector and ordered businesses to stop accepting cash as payment, it became clear that some groups in the Cuban leadership were feeling uneasy with the private sector’s unexpected growth, despite the many government-imposed restrictions they were already facing.  

Hardliners have grown worried that the experiment with capitalism could threaten the government’s tight grip on power, and the Cuban military, which used to control most foreign currency coming into the island, is viewing these companies as competition, sources in Cuba said. Earlier this year, the government started auditing private businesses, even arresting some business owners, amid accusations of corruption, tax evasion and price speculation.  

Earlier this month, it imposed caps on some food and goods sold in private stores and limited the amount state companies can pay to private businesses providing supplies or services. But Marrero’s address made clear the extent to which the government is going after these businesses in what he says is not a “crusade” against the private sector but an effort to clamp down on tax evasion.  

He said government inspectors fined more than 1,000 enterprises and 63,000 self-employed workers for tax evasion and shut down 20 businesses. Following the imposition of price caps, he said, the government mobilized around 7,000 inspectors to ensure compliance by private business owners. In just two days, he added, they imposed over 4,300 fines worth over 13 million Cuban pesos.  

Ultimately, he said, the government wanted to make sure that it was property implementing guidelines approved by the Communist Party, so the private sector plays its “assigned role” as a complement to state enterprises, which sometimes, he said, has not been the case. “This is why we have to strengthen the socialist state economy,” Marrero said. 

Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
18 July 2024
Cuba Moves To “Partially” Dollarize Economy As Government Struggles To Make Payments

By Nora Gámez Torres 

Cuban Prime Minister Manuel Marrero said the government will embrace a “partial” dollarization of the economy as it struggles to buy food, oil, and pay creditors in a scenario he described as a “war economy.”  

During a session of the National Assembly on Wednesday, Marrero said the government will start accepting payments in dollars and other foreign currencies at hotels, stores and other venues linked to the island’s tourism industry as a temporary measure. “It is not the government´s vision to pursue a full dollarization of the economy,” he said. Currently, tourists must purchase prepaid cards in a local virtual currency, the MLC, to buy goods, gas and services, as the government has pushed to transition from cash to online payments.  

Cubans often complain about such requirements in a country with a poor technological infrastructure and frequent blackouts, and the country’s prime minister acknowledged that was the case. “It cannot be that [tourists] want to buy an expensive excursion, and at that moment there is no connectivity, and they cannot pay with the card,” he said. “And yet they have cash, but we say no, and we lose the money.”  

For a brief period, the government opened dollar stores in Cuba in 2020, but the dollars had to be deposited to a card linked to a bank account. Marrero said the authorization to pay foreign currency in cash “in some sectors” was one of several measures the government was taking to stabilize the country’s finances. He announced a new policy requiring state enterprises to use only the local Cuban peso for transactions with some exceptions, including wholesale importers, exporting companies and enterprises in the Mariel Special Development Zone, a special economic zone to attract foreign direct investment.  

But the prime minister squarely blamed an informal currency exchange market and the private sector for redirecting and taking in most of the foreign currency entering the country. About $2 billion “previously controlled by the state has gone to that market, partly illegal,” he said. He shared figures showing that the private sector, including small and medium enterprises, self-employed workers and cooperatives imported about $1.3 billion dollars in goods last year. But he said that economic activity has created an “uncontrollable demand” for dollars, driving its price up and depriving the government of foreign currency.  

The minister then announced new restrictions on private enterprises, including tighter controls on their bank accounts, price caps on food and goods they sell, higher taxes, and a ban on using foreign banks to pay providers abroad. If enacted, the measures would significantly thwart any further expansion of private enterprises, even threatening their survival. Some Cuban observers say the crackdown on the private sector makes little sense at a time of significant scarcity, given the gap these businesses are filling as significant importers of food and goods. “It reeks of desperation,” said Ric Herrero, the executive director of the Cuba Study Group, a Cuban American organization that supports private entrepreneurs in Cuba.  

“The Cuban government can defy math laws, but a private business can’t. Private businesses will leave the market and there will be nothing left. The government will see the results of these Draconian measures right away.” A source who has a business in Cuba and asked not to be named said the move seems to be an attempt to fill the government coffers with dollars coming from elsewhere because the government “is bankrupt.” “They have a lot of internal struggles and are trying to calibrate how to stimulate the economy without giving away power,” the source said. Limiting car imports the source said the government is under pressure from state workers, the Communist Party bureaucracy and retired military officers who are now watching how others prosper while earning meager salaries and pensions.  

That tension was evident during Marrero’s address to the National Assembly when he announced restrictions on the cars imported by private enterprises. Business owners have been buying millions of dollars in vehicles from the United States — and Florida in particular — according to U.S. trade statistics, some of them luxury brands like Mercedes Benz and Tesla. “The number and types of vehicles that non-state management firms can import will be limited,” he said. “There are some cars that are entering that are not compatible with our society, they are not necessary. And we also have to limit the number, which should be based on the interests of the country.”  

Marrero said the government lacked foreign currency to fund its budget fully and was open to foreign investment. “But we will never give up sovereignty. We are not giving the country away.” He had a message to foreign creditors: “We ask for understanding regarding the delay in payment, but we reiterate that we will fulfill our commitments to the last cent. When? When our possibilities and conditions improve.” 

Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
19 July 2024

A stunning 10% of Cuba’s population- more than a million people- left the island between 2022 and 2023, the head of the country’s national statistics office said during a National Assembly session Friday, the largest migration wave in Cuban history.  The data confirmed reporting by the Miami Herald and Cuban independent media that sounded the alarm over the mass migration of Cubans amid a severe economic downturn and a government crackdown on dissent in recent years.  

According to the official figures made public for the first time, Cuba’s population went from 11,181,595 on Dec. 31, 2021, to 10,055,968 on December 2023.  

The emigration of 1,011,269 Cubans was the main factor contributing to a massive fall in Cuba’s population by the end of 2023, when the population stood at a number similar to what it was in 1985, said Juan Carlos Alfonso Fraga, the head of the National Statistics and Information Office. Other factors were a high number of deaths, 405,512, and a low birth rate, with only 284,892 children born in that period, according to figures Fraga provided the assembly. 

Excerpts From Other Media Reporting:  

“The Cuban Government has revoked the import licenses of nearly a third of the private businesses that were authorized to conduct such activities.  Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz informed the deputies of the National Assembly of People’s Power that “it was decided to revoke this authorization for 24 out of the 73 approved companies due to low activity levels and poor performance.” 

Marrero emphasized that the State should maintain a monopoly over foreign trade in the country.  However, to facilitate the activities of non-state management forms, the government had authorized 73 companies to import for micro, small, or medium-sized enterprises (mipymes).  “But in our analysis, we found numerous mistakes and mismanagement,” he said.  “The document resulting from the work done by the [Ministry of Foreign Trade] MINCEX led us to the conclusion that we had to revoke this authorization for 24 companies due to low activity levels and poor performance,” Marrero stressed. 

“In an intensive operation conducted between July 12 and 13, the Cuban government shutdown 53 private businesses following 891 inspections nationwide.  Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz reported that more than 4,000 violations were found during these inspections, resulting in fines exceeding 13 million pesos for Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), as cited by Cubadebate.” 

“Among the main infractions detected were the concealment of products following the government's price cap and the sale of goods at unregulated prices.  Marrero Cruz highlighted that 354 forced sales were made at the established prices, and products were confiscated in 21 additional cases.  “We are going where the products are,” the prime minister stated, emphasizing that the objective of these actions “is not to close businesses, but to ensure compliance with regulations.”  However, he stressed the need for firm measures to control prices and guarantee the accessibility of goods for the population.” 

“This inspection and regulation process began on July 8 and has continued, with exchanges and meetings with 4,363 non-state management forms.  Marrero Cruz explained that the price caps were set to curb uncontrolled price growth, although he acknowledged that they still do not reflect the proper relationship between prices and wages.  He also noted that state stores in Freely Convertible Currency (MLC) sell at prices equal to or higher than those of MSMEs.” 

“The prime minister stated that there are currently 7,300 inspectors on the streets, and this number could increase to 20,000.  “The ultimate solution to high prices is to produce more and increase the supply of goods and services to the population,” Marrero Cruz added.  Despite these actions, he clarified that the government does not aim to close businesses indiscriminately but to persuade merchants to comply with established regulations.  “We will continue with this confrontation, carrying out joint and systematic actions.” he concluded.” 

“These measures come in the context of an economic crisis in Cuba, where inflation and the shortage of basic products have severely affected the population.  The day before, President Miguel Díaz-Canel stated that this is not a “witch hunt” against private enterprises but a call to “reorder” these initiatives.” 

“Marrero Cruz maintains that while the prices of state stores in MLC are higher than some capped products, “it is unfair to make that comparative analysis” because the “foreign exchange collecting stores face a scenario as complex as we have expressed here.  They do not buy those resources, like chicken and oil, in the same markets where non-state management forms do,” he emphasized during his address to the National Assembly on Wednesday.” 

“He said state stores “do not operate with the illegal foreign exchange market, they work at 1x120, so the analysis is different.  They have to buy in more distant markets at higher prices because we have had difficulties in paying suppliers, paying very high freight rates, so it is not fair to make that analysis,” he justified.  The Cuban regime capped the prices of several products sold by MSMEs last week and has since fined establishments that fail to comply with the measure.” 

“It’s time to take action!” With this phrase, Cuban leader Miguel Díaz-Canel confirmed the regime’s shift in its cautious economic opening policy, reaffirming his intent to subject the activities of the “new economic actors” to state directives and centralized economic planning.  “It’s time to move beyond diagnoses and take action,” Díaz-Canel stated during his closing speech at the third regular session of the X Legislature of the National Assembly of People's Power (ANPP).” 

“Regarding our responsibilities in the uncertain and complex realm of the economy, it is necessary to acknowledge that in the effort to comply with the economic and social policy guidelines of the VIII Congress of the Party, by unblocking processes and promoting the formation of SMEs, we were not firm enough in demanding robust and comprehensive regulatory bases to guide the functioning of this management form that was already operating in the economy but without formal recognition,” he noted.”

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From U.S. Department Of State: No Imminent Change To Cuba Status On List Of State Sponsors Of Terrorism

United States Department of State
Washington DC
15 July 2024

Media Briefing

QUESTION: All right. And a quick follow-up on Cuba?

MR MILLER: Yeah.

QUESTION: We’re working – we’ve talked to some Cuban business owners in the wake of the State Department moving them off of a list of people who were not helpful with state – with – what is it? The list was states that are not helpful in combating terrorism. They were – they were removed from that.

MR MILLER: Yeah.

QUESTION: The business owners in Cuba are saying that because they’re – Cuba is still on the state sponsor of terrorism list, that it’s harder for them to do business with European countries, with other Latin American countries, than it was even during the Trump administration. Is the State Department still looking at this before the end of Biden’s first term?

MR MILLER: I just don’t have any updates on that process. Sorry.

Trump-Rubio Administration Could Make Trump-Pence Administration Look Mild, Restrained, And Timid, With Respect To Cuba Policy.  From Grammar School To Postdoctoral.  

Trump-Rubio Administration Could Make Trump-Pence Administration Look Mild, Restrained, And Timid, With Respect To Cuba Policy.   

From Grammar School To Postdoctoral.  

The selection of Marco Rubio (R- Florida), a member of the United States Senate (2011- ), who is of Cuban descent, as the 2024 vice president nominee of the Republican Party has the potential for the Trump-Rubio Administration (2025-2029) to make Republic of Cuba policy during the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) resemble a grammar school exercise.

When Mauricio Claver-Carone, of Cuban descent, was installed in 2018 as Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the National Security Council (NSC), he had the mandate of Donald Trump, 45th President of the United States, to craft and to implement revisions to Republic of Cuba-related policies of the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017).  He presided at a dismantling of much, but not all Obama-Biden Administration policies. 

But, Mr. Claver-Carone was not a member of the Trump-Pence Administration cabinet, Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, or a United States Senate confirmed political appointee.  Although lacking each of those, he was able to deliver an immensely impactful series of commercial, economic, financial, and political decisions. 

A Vice President Rubio will be a member of the cabinet, may attend gatherings of the Principals Committee and Deputies Committee, will influence the selection of senior-level, mid-level, and lower-level appointees, and will have the United States Constitution-described responsibility to preside at the United States Senate.  If Senator Rubio chooses, he will have the access to reverse not only decisions by the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ), but also anything remaining in place from the Trump-Pence Administration and Obama-Biden Administration.

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