From Turkiye: Additional Karpowerships Would Help With Cuba's Electrical Issues. Problem: Who Will Pay? Turkiye Government To Provide Support? That's A Challenge.

HAVANA, Aug 31 (Reuters) - Cuba, mired in an energy crisis that has brought frequent blackouts, is negotiating with a Turkish company to have it double the megawatts it currently produces for the country from shipboard generators just offshore, according to two people with knowledge of the discussions.

Cuban officials are in talks with Karpowership, one of the world’s largest operators of floating power plants and part of the Turkey-based Karadeniz Holding, the sources said. The company already has five ships operating off Cuba with a capacity of around 250 megawatts (MW).

The Communist-run country needs to generate more than 3,000 MW to meet minimum demand and currently is producing between 2,000 MW and 2,500 MW. The Cuban National Electric Union did not respond to a request for comment. Karadeniz declined to comment. The sources, who asked not to be identified due to the sensitivity of the negotiations, said the talks centered on how to ensure lease payments from Cuba. "The (U.S. trade) embargo makes Western financial transactions very difficult and Cuba is cash short and behind on payments with many suppliers and joint venture partners,” one source said.

Experts say the Turkish company would need to add to its fleet off Cuba to produce the required amount of energy. Powerships carry their own generator fueled by oil or gas, anchor close to land and connect to the local electricity grid. They are leased by the host country. The deal, if it moves forward, would provide quick and much-needed relief for the embattled Cuban government as power outages have spread across the island and increased in length. Cuba is desperate for more electricity.

The energy crisis, with blackouts in 4 to 6-hour-blocks twice daily or more in most of the country, is perhaps the most painful symptom of a deeper financial crisis caused by external factors such as U.S. sanctions, the COVID-19 pandemic and poor economic management. Cubans are also living through food, medicine and fuel shortages, forcing them to wait in long lines for the basics. There have been scattered, small protests this summer and U.S. authorities registered a record of more than 175,000 Cubans at the U.S.-Mexican border since October, according to U.S. Customs and Border Protection agency statistics.

Cuban power plants are obsolete, averaging 35 years of age, with a backup system of hundreds of smaller generators at least 15 years old. Just 5% of power comes from alternative energy sources. The government blames lack of funds for its inability to update its decrepit grid, and says breakdowns, not fuel shortages, are the main cause of blackouts. Energy and Mining Minister Livan Arronte Cruz said last week that the country hoped to all but eliminate blackouts by the end of the year, in part by adding “531 megawatts to generating capacity through new investments,” a figure reduced to 450 MW by President Miguel Diaz-Canel at the weekend.

Omar Ramirez Mendoza, deputy director of the state electricity monopoly, said on state-run TV that “240 MW {of the 450 MW} will come from mobile generation,” a euphemism used by officials to refer to the powerships and coinciding with the source accounts. The remainder of the new capacity would come from upgrading existing facilities with the help of foreign partners in the Moa nickel region in eastern Cuba and at the Mariel Special Development Zone just west of Havana, Ramirez said.

Jorge Pinon, Senior Research Fellow at The University of Texas at Austin’s Energy Institute specializing in the Latin American region, said he believed the powerships would provide the "mobile generation" referred to by Ramirez, but wondered how the extra capacity would be financed “as the Cubans do not have any money.”

LINKS To Related Analyses 

Turkey's Karpowership Delivering Fifth Electric Generation Vessel; More Than 15% Of Cuba's Current Electricity Usage. Company Won't Comment. Contracts Profitable. April 03, 2022

Turkey's Karpowership Adds Fourth Thermal Power Barge In Cuba. Company Generating More Than 10% Of Cuba's Electricity. Good For Turkish Companies. Reinforces Cuba's Energy Production Issues. November 25, 2021 

Karpowership From Turkey Extends And Expands Floating Electricity Generation In Cuba; Joining Turkey's Global Ports Holding Which Manages Cruise Ship Terminal In Havana. November 19, 2021 

Turkey's Karadeniz Holding May Add To “Karpowership” Fleet In Cuba. December 02, 2020 

Karadeniz Holding Of Turkey Update On "Karpowership" Operations In Cuba. March 09, 2020 

Karadeniz Of Turkey Delivering Floating Power Plant To Cuba For 51-Month Contract. April 23, 2019 

Turkey's Karadeniz Holding Reports Electricity Contract With Cuba In October 2018; But, No Contract Signed Five Months Later. April 01, 2019 

Karpowership Background 

“Karpowership is a member of Karadeniz Energy Group, Istanbul, Turkey. The group is a pioneer in innovative energy projects for the last 20 years, with investments in domestic and international markets. The group started its energy investments in 1996, and is the first private electricity exporter in Turkey. Today, the group owns and operates more than 4,350 MW installed capacity globally. 

Karpowership is the only owner, operator and builder of the first Powership (floating power plant) fleet in the world. Since 2010, 25 Powerships have been completed with total installed capacity exceeding 4,100 MW. Additional 4,400 MW of Powerships are either under construction or in the pipeline. 

Starting from the design, and ending with delivery of electricity, Karpowership fully executes all activities in-house including but not limited to construction, site preparation, commissioning, and fuel supply. Utilizing the highest technology, Karpowership provides fast-track delivery, high efficiency, and all integrated “plug&play” project execution. Via these capabilities, Karpowership is able to successfully undertake a variety of commercial structures such as short term IPPs (Independent Power Producer), long-term IPPs, PPAs (power purchase agreements), and rental contracts with its Powership fleet. 

Powerships supplied and have been supplying 60% of Gambia, 26% of Ghana, 100% of Guinea Bissau, 10% of Guinea, 25% of Lebanon, 10% of Mozambique, 15% of Senegal, 80% of Sierra Leone, 10% of Sudan, 10% of Cuba, 30% of North Sulawesi, Indonesia, 55% of East Nusa Teneggara, Indonesia, 80% of Ambon, Indonesia, 10% of Medan, Indonesia, and 16% of Zambia’s and 30% of Southern Iraq’s total electricity generation. 

As of today, Karpowership has more than 2,600 direct employees from 19 different nationalities, creates employment for additional 10,000 co-workers for the construction of the Powerships and is expanding through renewables, Powerships and other innovative energy supply solutions.”

Third Circuit Court Of Appeals Cuba Lawsuit: "Appellees’ wrongfully profiting from his usurped properties...Unjust enrichment." However, Plaintiff Inherited Property After Required Date.

ROBERT M. GLEN V. EXPEDIA GROUP, INC., EXPEDIA GROUP, INC., TRIP ADVISOR LLC, TRIP ADVISOR, INC., ORBITZ, LLC, TRIP NETWORK, INC. D/B/A CHEAPTICKETS, KAYAK SOFTWARE CORPORATION, BOOKING HOLDINGS, INC., HOTELS.COM GP, LLC, HOTELS.COM L.P., TRAVELSCAPE LLC D/B/A TRAVELOCITY [1:19-cv-01809; Delaware District]

Reid Collins & Tsai (plaintiff)
Rosenthal, Monhait & Goddess, P.A. (plaintiff; law firm since closed; replaced by Andrews & Springer)
Ewusiak Law, P.A. (plaintiff)
Andrews & Springer (plaintiff)
Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell (defendant- Booking Holdings & Kayak Software Corporation)
Baker & McKenzie (defendant- Booking Holdings & Kayak Software Corporation)
Scott Douglass & McConnico (defendant- Expedia, Inc.; Expedia Group, Inc.; Hotels.com, L.P.; Hotels.com GP, LLC; Travelscape LLC d/b/a/ Travelocity; Orbitz, LLC; Trip Network, Inc. d/b/a/ Cheap Tickets)
Potter Anderson & Corroon (defendant- TripAdvisor)
Ballard Spahr LLP (defendant- Expedia, Inc.; Expedia Group, Inc.; Hotels.com, L.P.; Hotels.com GP, LLC; Travelscape LLC d/b/a/ Travelocity; Orbitz, LLC; Trip Network, Inc. d/b/a/ Cheap Tickets)
Cooch & Taylor, P.A. (amicus)

ROBERT M. GLEN V. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC., [1:19-cv-23994 Southern Florida District; 4:20-cv-00482-A Transferred To Northern Texas District; 5th Circuit Court of Appeals 20-10903; 15 December 2021- Seeking Review From United States Supreme Court [Denied 1/18/22]

Reid Collins & Tsai (plaintiff)
Ewusiak Law, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Day (defendant)
Kelly Hart & Hallman LLP (defendant)

ROBERT M. GLEN VS. TRIPADVISOR LLC, TRIPADVISOR, INC., ORBITZ, LLC, TRIP NETWORK, INC. D/B/A CHEAPTICKETS, KAYAK SOFTWARE CORPORATION, BOOKING HOLDINGS, INC., EXPEDIA, INC., EXPEDIA GROUP, INC., HOTELS.COM, L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, LLC, and TRAVELSCAPE LLC D/B/A TRAVELOCITY [2:19-cv-01683; Nevada District] On 16 December 2019, plaintiff requested dismissal without prejudice, which was granted; action consolidated with 1:19-cv-01809 in Delaware District  

Rice Reuther Sullivan & Carroll, LLC (plaintiff)
Reid Collins & Tsai LLP (plaintiff)
Andrews & Springer LLC (plaintiff)
Walden Macht & Haran (defendant- Trip Advisor)
Potter Anderson & Corroon, LLP (defendant- Trip Advisor)
Scott Douglass McConnico (defendant- Expedia)
Morris, Nichols, Arsht & Tunnell LLP (defendant- Booking)
Dubbin & Kravetz (amicus)
Baker McKenzie (defendant- Booking)
Ballard Spahr LLP (defendant- Expedia)
Morris James LLP (defendant- Booking)
Duane Morris LLP (defendant- Booking)
Cooch and Taylor, P.A. (amicus)

ROBERT M. GLEN V. EXPEDIA, INC.; EXPEDIA GROUP, INC.; HOTELS.COM, L.P.; AND HOTELS.COM GP, LLC [2:19-cv-01538; Washington Western District] 

Pacifica Law Group LLP (plaintiff)
Reid Collins & Tsai LLP (plaintiff)

ROBERT M. GLEN V. VISA, INC., VISA U.S.A., INC., VISA INTERNATIONAL SERVICE ASSOCIATION, MASTERCARD INCORPORATED, MASTERCARD INTERNATIONAL INCORPORATED [1:19-cv-01870; Delaware District] 

Reid Collins & Tsai LLP (plaintiff)
Andrews & Springer LLC (plaintiff)
Sidley Austin LLP (defendant- Mastercard)
Akerman (defendant- Visa)
Ballard Shahr LLP (defendant- Visa)
Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor (defendant- Mastercard)

CIVIL CASE DOCKETED. Notice filed by Appellant Robert M Glen in District Court No. 1-19-cv-01809. (CLW) [Entered: 04/30/2021 03:38 PM]

ORDER (Clerk) The actions at Nos. 21-1842 & 21-1843 are hereby consolidated for purposes of scheduling, the filing of a single brief, reply brief, and joint appendix by the appellant and for disposition. The appellees are encouraged to consult with one another regarding the contents of their briefs as the Court disfavors repetitive briefs. The appellees may choose to file a consolidated brief or join in or adopt portions by reference. See Fed. R. App.P. 28(i). [21-1842, 21-1843] SEE DOCKET FOR FULL TEXT OF ORDER (CLW) [Entered: 04/30/2021 05:33 PM]

Appellees Booking Holdings Inc, Expedia Group Inc, Expedia Inc, Hotels.com GP LLC, Hotels.com LP, Kayak Software Corp, Orbitz LLC, Travelscape LLC, Trip Advisor Inc, Trip Advisor LLC and Trip Network LLC in 21-1842, and Appellees Mastercard Incorporated, Mastercard International Inc, Visa Inc, Visa International Service Association and Visa USA Inc in 21-1843 verbally granted an extension of time to file brief until 12/02/2021 pursuant to Third Cir. LAR 31.4. [21-1842, 21-1843] (CJG) [Entered: 11/02/2021 01:43 PM]

Excerpts From Opinion:

Appellant Robert Glen challenges the District Court’s dismissal of his claims against Visa, Mastercard, and several online travel agencies under the Helms-Burton Act, 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(1). For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

The Helms-Burton Act empowers United States nationals whose property has been confiscated by the Castro regime to recover damages from anyone who “traffics” in that property. § 6082(a)(1)(A). However, the Act limits eligible plaintiffs to those who “acquire[] ownership of the claim [to the confiscated property] before March 12, 1996.” § 6082(a)(4)(B). Glen contends that he satisfies this requirement because his aunt and mother acquired ownership in two beachfront properties prior to 1996 that the Castro regime eventually confiscated and developed into hotels. According to Glen, because he inherited those ownership interests upon the deaths of his aunt and mother in 1999 and 2011, respectively, he should also be the beneficiary of their acquisition dates.

Affirming the dismissal, the Fifth Circuit held that Glen actually did have Article III standing but agreed with the District Court that his acquisition date was the date of his inheritance, rendering him ineligible for relief under § 6082(a)(4)(B). Glen v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 7 F.4th 331, 336 (5th Cir. 2021). Glen then filed a petition for certiorari, which the United States Supreme Court denied. 142 S. Ct. 863 (2022).

In the meantime, in the underlying case here, the United States District Court for the District of Delaware also dismissed Glen’s case against Visa, Mastercard, and the travel agencies. In March 2021, before the Fifth Circuit issued its opinion, the District Court likewise ruled that Glen had standing, but that he acquired his ownership interests 4 upon inheriting them, i.e., after the statutory cut-off. Glen then filed this timely appeal.

Here, we agree with the Fifth Circuit that the harm Glen alleges—namely, Appellees’ wrongfully profiting from his usurped properties—“bears a close relationship to unjust enrichment, which has indisputable common-law roots.” Glen, 7 F.4th at 334. As our sister circuit observed, “[t]he Congressional findings of the Helms-Burton Act recognize as much, stating that the international judicial system ‘lacks fully effective remedies for the wrongful confiscation of property and for unjust enrichment from the use of wrongfully confiscated property.’”

On the merits, Glen contests the District Court’s interpretation of the HelmsBurton Act, but we do not reach his statutory arguments because the doctrine of collateral estoppel precludes him from relitigating them here. Collateral estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, prohibits “parties from relitigating an issue that has already been actually litigated” when the following criteria are met: “(1) the issue sought to be precluded [is] the same as that involved in the prior action; (2) that issue [was] actually litigated; (3) it [was] determined by a final and valid judgment; and (4) the determination [was] essential to the prior judgment.”

Because Glen’s statutory argument is collaterally estopped, his claims under the Helms-Burton Act fail on the merits and must be dismissed. 

LINK To Opinion (8/18/22)
LINK To Judgement (8/18/22)
LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics

American Airlines Requests Additional Flights From U.S. To Cuba; Nearing Use Of All Authorized Allocations. Might Other Airlines Object? Re-Negotiate U.S. Arrangement With Cuba?

American Airlines requests DOT for increased services between Miami and Cuba

AeroTime Hib
Vilnius, Lithuania
15 August 2022

American Airlines (A1G) (AAL) has submitted a request to the US Department of Transportation (DOT) for increased flight operations between Miami and Cuba. In a letter addressed to the DOT’s director Benjamin Taylor and division chief Brett Kruger uploaded on regulations.gov, the airline requested the department to “expeditiously grant” its pending application given on January 28, 2020.

American had requested the allocation of 14 roundtrip, weekly combination flights between Miami International Airport (MIA) to Havana Jose Marti International Airport (HAV). The airline said that the COVID-19 global pandemic began before the DOT was able to act on its request.

The airline now plans to initiate two additional daily nonstop MIA–HAV roundtrips, comprising 14 frequencies weekly, within 90 days of the frequency allocation. American Airlines (A1G) (AAL) mentioned that its request remains consistent with the US-Cuba Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) executed on February 16, 2016, pertaining to scheduled air transport services, which allows US carriers to operate up to 20 daily roundtrip frequencies for scheduled combination services to and from Havana.

Due to its geographical proximity, Miami has become a convenient location for Cubans to migrate. Plenty of Cuban families also send their children to Miami for education. In 2019, the Cuban-born population in Miami had exceeded 700,000.

LINK: American Airlines Allocation Request (11 August 2022)
LINK: 2016 U.S.-Cuba Civil Aviation Agreement

14th & 15th Amendments Of U.S. Constitution Protect Canada's Teck Resources From Cuba Libertad Act Lawsuit. No "Personal Jurisdiction" For U.S. Courts.

HEREDEROS DE ROBERTO GOMEZ CABRERA, LLC v. TECK RESOURCES LIMITED [1:20-cv-21630; Southern Florida District]

Hirzel Dreyfuss & Dempsey, PLLC (plaintiff)
Roig & Villarreal, P.A. (plaintiff)
Law Office of David A. Villarreal, P.A. (plaintiff)
Pillsbury Winthrop Shaw Pittman (defendant)

Oral argument held this date. Oral Argument presented by Leon Francisco Hirzel, IV for Appellant Herederos De Roberto Gomez Cabrera, LLC and Robert Sills for Appellee Teck Resources Limited. [Entered: 06/07/2022 02:04 PM]
Opinion issued by court as to Appellant Herederos De Roberto Gomez Cabrera, LLC. Decision: Affirmed. Opinion type: Published. Opinion method: Signed. The opinion is also available through the Court's Opinions page at this link http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/opinions. [Entered: 08/12/2022 09:53 AM]
Judgment entered as to Appellant Herederos De Roberto Gomez Cabrera, LLC. [Entered: 08/12/2022 09:56 AM]

LINK To Opinion of the Court (8/12/22)
LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics

Excerpts from Opinion:

In 1960, the revolutionary Cuban government confiscated Roberto Gomez Cabrera’s mineral mines. Cabrera’s children, who inherited his claim to the mines, allege that Teck, a Canadian cor poration, managed the mines and thereby “traffic[ked]” in them in violation of the Helms-Burton Act.

Cabrera’s children assigned their claims to a Florida LLC, Herederos de Roberto Gomez Cabrera, and Herederos sued Teck under the Helms-Burton Act in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Broadly speaking, the Act imposes li ability on “any person” who “traffics in property which was confis cated by the Cuban Government on or after January 1, 1959.” 22 U.S.C. § 6082. Teck moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdic tion. The district court granted Teck’s motion, holding that Flor ida’s long-arm statute didn’t provide jurisdiction over Teck and, additionally, that Teck lacked the necessary connection to the United States to establish personal jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). For the reasons explained below, we agree with the district court.

The parties here agree that Rule 4(k)(2)’s first condition applies—Teck isn’t “subject to jurisdiction in any state’s courts of general jurisdiction.” Accordingly, we must decide whether exer cising personal jurisdiction here would be “consistent with the . . . Constitution.” For purposes of this case, the relevant constitu tional provision—and we flag this issue because it gets to the nub of the parties’ dispute—is the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which applies to the federal government and its courts, not the Fourteenth’s, which applies to the states.

Despite their agreement that the Fifth Amendment governs the personal-jurisdiction inquiry here, Herederos and Teck ad vance competing jurisdictional analyses. For its part, Teck con tends that we should analyze personal jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment the same way we would under the Fourteenth Amendment—i.e., ask whether the defendant has sufficient “mini mum contacts” with the forum and whether “maintenance of the suit [would] offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Here deros, by contrast, urges us to apply a more lenient “arbitrary or fundamentally unfair” standard that we have sometimes used in what it calls “extraterritorial jurisdiction” cases. See Br. of Appel lant at 15–16; Reply Br. of Appellant at 4. Although the language and logic of the “extraterritorial jurisdiction” cases can be a little confusing, those decisions, as we’ll explain, aren’t really about per sonal jurisdiction at all. Accordingly, we hold that courts should analyze personal jurisdiction under the Fifth Amendment using the same basic standards and tests that apply under the Fourteenth Amendment.

We conclude that the personal-jurisdiction analysis under the Fifth Amendment is the same as that under the Fourteenth for three principal reasons.

What, though, of the “extraterritorial jurisdiction” cases that Herederos cites? In those decisions, Herederos notes, we have said that “the extraterritorial application of the law must comport with due process, meaning that the application of the law must not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair,” United States v. Noel, 893 F.3d 1294, 1301 (11th Cir. 2018), and that the “Due Process Clause pro hibits the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over a defendant when it would be ‘arbitrary or fundamentally unfair,’” United States v. Baston, 818 F.3d 651, 669 (11th Cir. 2016). But a close review of those cases shows that, in fact, they aren’t really about personal jurisdiction at all; rather, at their core, they address what is sometimes called “legislative jurisdiction”—i.e., the power of Congress (or another lawmaking body, as the case may be) to reg ulate conduct extraterritorially.

Applying the minimum-contacts test here is relatively straightforward. We hold that Teck doesn’t have contacts with the United States sufficient to establish either specific or general per sonal jurisdiction over it.

For these reasons, Herederos’s suit doesn’t arise out of or relate to any of Teck’s ties with the United States. And because a relationship between the defendant’s conduct within the forum and the cause of action is necessary to exercise specific jurisdiction, the lack of any such relationship here dooms Herederos’s effort to establish specific personal jurisdiction over Teck.

Herederos hasn’t alleged facts sufficient to allow the United States courts to exercise either specific or general personal jurisdic tion over Teck.5 Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

Chairman Of Committee On Foreign Affairs Of U.S. House Of Representatives May Visit Cuba. This Is What His "Deliverables" Agenda Should Include.

Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House Of Representatives May Visit Cuba. 

For United States Business Community, Deliverables Are Important.  Focus Upon MSMEs. Banking.  Four Important Meetings. 

Chairman Of Congressional Black Caucus May Participate. 

From Biography: “[First elected in 1998], Congressman Meeks [Democrat, 5th District New York] is Chairman [2021- ] of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, the first black Member of Congress to serve as Chair of that committee. Meeks [68] is a multilateralist with decades of experience in foreign policy. He believes that the United States should build coalitions around our interests and work with other countries to build a stable and prosperous future.”  Representative Meeks visited the Republic of Cuba in 2006, 2014, and 2016. 

Chairman Meeks probably has anticipated the following, and his staff has probably included the subjects in his briefing materials, but reinforcement is often useful…  

The Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) is focusing upon supporting the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba: micro, small, and medium-size enterprises (MSMEs).   

Thus, the likelihood and policy initiatives and changes, and regulatory changes supported by The White House will focus upon lessening impediments upon the re-emerging private sectors in the Republic of Cuba. 

In May 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration authorized the first direct equity investment in and the first direct financing to a privately-owned company located in the Republic of Cuba.  Subsequently, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury added opportunities and amended existing regulations to provide mechanisms for further engagement with privately-owned companies located in the Republic of Cuba.  In July 2022, the government of the Republic of Cuba confirmed direct equity investment and direct financing are authorized for MSMEs.  The regulations have yet to be published.      

• To support the commercial and economic bilateral relationship of the United States with the Republic of Cuba, the ideal agenda for Chairman Meeks will include meetings with officials who have direct responsibility for the role of MSMEs in the Republic of Cuba. 

• A goal should be to influence officials of the government of the Republic of Cuba who are crafting regulations for MSMEs to receive direct equity investments from the United States and direct financing from the United States. 

Link To Previous Analysis: Now The Hard Part For Cuba: Implementing Quickly Transparent, Equal-For-All, MSME Investment & Financing Regulations. No Limitations. No Selectivity. No Orwellian Process.   

Suggested Agenda Schedule 

• First meeting with Benjamin Ziff, Chargé d'Affaires of the Embassy of the United States. 

• Second meeting with Alejandro Gil, Minister of Economy and Planning of the Republic of Cuba; Marta Sabina Wilson Gonzalez, President of the Central Bank of the Republic of Cuba; and Ania Carnero Manresa, President of Banco Internacional de Comercio S.A. (BICSA). 

• Third meeting with Rodrigo Malmierca Díaz, Minister of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment of the Republic of Cuba; and Antonio Luis Carricarte, President of the Chamber of Commerce of the Republic of Cuba. 

• Fourth meeting with Miguel Diaz-Canel, President of the Republic of Cuba; Manuel Marrero, Prime Minister of the Republic of Cuba; and Bruno Rodriguez, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba. 

Critical for MSMEs is for the government of the Republic of Cuba to maintain a dynamic and easily accessible online directory of MSMEs with 1) identifiers as to both direct and indirect ownership of each MSME 2) the operational address for each MSME and 3) contact information for each MSME.  An article published on 5 August 2022 by The Miami Herald and El Nuevo Herald illustrates why a directory is required: 

• Link: Miami Herald U.S.-based online food stores were meant to help Cubans. Why are they selling Havana Club?

• Link: El Nuevo Herald Tiendas de alimentos de EEUU debían ayudar a los cubanos. ¿Por qué venden Havana Club?  

For the Biden-Harris Administration, lack of a directory will impede the expansion of engagement with MSMEs and may impact those policy and regulatory changes in place relating to MSMEs- particularly those focused upon direct equity investment in and direct financing to MSMEs authorized by the OFAC. 

A priority for the government of the Republic of Cuba must be transparency as to the ownership and legal status of Republic of Cuba government-operated companies and MSMEs.  Absent self-installed transparency, the United States Department of State is likely to be pressured by members of the United States Congress to create a sub-section to the Cuba Restricted List (CRL) to identify MSMEs prohibited from receiving direct equity investment and direct financing from individuals and entities subject to United States jurisdiction.  Such a sub-section would have a chilling effect and stunt engagement with MSMEs.  The existence of a CRL referencing MSMEs would taint all MSMEs regardless of their ownership and purpose. 

Critical for a result of discussions led by Chairman Meeks is to obtain confirmation that Banco Internacional de Comercio S.A. (BICSA) will grant Elk Grove Village, Illinois-based First American Bank (2021 assets approximately US$5 billion) a correspondent account and BICSA will agree to seek through First American Bank a license from the OFAC to have a correspondent account with First American Bank.  BICSA is not among the financial institutions included in the CRL.  BICSA was vetted previously by the OFAC: Since 2015, Conway, Arkansas-based Home BancShares (2021 assets approximately US$18 billion) through subsidiary Centennial Bank (and before that subsidiary Stonegate Bank) have correspondent accounts with BICSA. 

Once First American Bank and BICSA have accounts with one another, funds to the Republic of Cuba and funds from the Republic of Cuba will move transparently, efficiently, and directly within minutes rather than days through third-countries as currently required by the OFAC- a decision implemented during the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017).  This efficiency is essential for the sustained engagement by United States-based sources of direct equity investment and direct financing to MSMEs. 

• From OFAC: “744. May correspondent accounts authorized pursuant to 31 CFR § 515.584(a) or used for transactions authorized by 31 CFR § 515.584(g) be established and maintained in U.S. dollars?  Yes. Correspondent accounts of depository institutions (as defined in 31 CFR § 515.333) at a financial institution that is a national of Cuba authorized pursuant to § 515.584(a) may be established and maintained in U.S. dollars. Such accounts may be used only for transactions that are authorized by or exempt from the CACR. Transactions necessary to establish and maintain such correspondent accounts- such as originating, processing, and terminating authorized funds transfers in U.S. dollars- are authorized.  Additionally, correspondent accounts used for transactions authorized by 31 CFR § 515.584(g), which permits banking institutions as defined in 31 CFR § 515.314(g) that are persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to accept, process, and give credit to U.S. dollar monetary instruments presented indirectly by a financial institution that is a national of Cuba, may be denominated in U.S. dollars.  However, financial institutions that are nationals of Cuba remain prohibited from opening correspondent accounts at a U.S. financial institution. For a complete description of what these general licenses authorize and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.584(a) and (g).” LINK: https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-31/subtitle-B/chapter-V/part-515/subpart-E/section-515.584 

Resumption of direct correspondent banking will materially impact the flow of remittances.  Important for the government of the Republic of Cuba to authorize a Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institution to receive/send remittances that is not among financial institutions included in the CRL.  BICSA is the logical candidate as it has experience with operating correspondent accounts with United States-based financial institutions, and soon with First American Bank.  The resumption of direct correspondent banking would permit again Denver, Colorado-based Western Union Company (2021 revenues approximately US$5.1 billion) to provide a full suite of services to customers throughout the United States, particularly in support of MSMEs.   

Focusing upon changes to United States statutes relating to payment terms of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 is not today a priority for United States exporters nor viable in terms of legislative success.  The payment process is a priority.  The easier the payment process, the more opportunities for an expansion of the sourcing for exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  

• For example, since December 2001 more than US$6.8 billion in payments by the government of the Republic of Cuba for agricultural commodities, food products, and healthcare products (medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, pharmaceuticals), and other products purchased from United States-based companies have traveled through third-country financial institutions prior to arriving to United States-based financial institutions.  These transactions are authorized by the TSREEA, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and OFAC and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce regulations.  Funds from the United States to the Republic of Cuba have been required to endure the same costly and inefficient triangular payment process.   

• Absent direct correspondent banking, authorized transactions from the Republic of Cuba to the United States are less transparent and are multi-day rather than multi-hour and third parties earn unnecessary fees.  MSMEs will primarily engage in small transactions, so excessive costs and delays associated with receiving and sending funds is impactful to their bottom-line.  The fewer impediments for MSMEs, the more likely they will import more products from the United States.

For the United States business community (companies and individuals), having in place regulations within the Republic of Cuba that make attractive engaging with MSMEs along with regulations in place in the United States that make the movement of funds cost effective, transparent, and efficient, will result in robust engagement between the re-emerging private sectors in the Republic of Cuba and the United States.

LINK To Complete Analysis In PDF Format

On Sunday At Presidential Inauguration, Might U.S. And Cuba Delegations Cross Paths In Bogota, Colombia? Foreign Minister And At Least One Delegation Member Have Met Previously.

His Excellency Bruno Rodriguez, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba, will represent the government of the Republic of Cuba at the 7 August 2022 Inauguration of the 34th President of the Republic of Colombia.

The United States Presidential Delegation includes Representative Gregory Meeks, Chairman of the United States House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs (2021- ) who has engaged previously with Minister Rodriguez. Representative Meeks visited the Republic of Cuba in 2006, 2014, and 2016. LINK

The White House
Washington DC
3 August 2022

President Biden Announces Presidential Delegation to the Republic of Colombia to Attend the Inauguration of His Excellency Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego

President Joseph R. Biden, Jr. today announced the designation of a Presidential Delegation to Bogotá, Colombia to attend the Inauguration of His Excellency Gustavo Francisco Petro Urrego as President of the Republic of Colombia on August 7, 2022.

The Honorable Samantha Power, Administrator for the United States Agency for International Development, will lead the delegation. Members of the Presidential Delegation: The Honorable Gregory Meeks, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee; Mr. Francisco L. Palmieri, Chargé d’Affaires, a.i., United States Embassy in Bogotá, Colombia; Ms. Desirée Cormier Smith, Special Representative for Racial Equity and Justice, U.S. Department of State; and The Honorable Juan Gonzalez, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs, National Security Council.

Cuba's MSMEs Need Ownership Transparency To Prevent New CRL Chilling Interest In Engaging With MSMEs. A Dynamic Online Directory Can Solve That Concern. Not Much Time.

Critical for micro, small, and medium-size enterprises (MSMEs) in the Republic of Cuba is for the government of the Republic of Cuba to maintain a dynamic and easily accessible online directory of MSMEs with 1) identifiers as to both direct and indirect ownership of each MSME 2) the operational address for each MSME and 3) contact information for each MSME. An article published on 5 August 2022 by The Miami Herald and El Nuevo Herald illustrates why a directory is required: 

LINK Miami Herald U.S.-based online food stores were meant to help Cubans. Why are they selling Havana Club?

LINK El Nuevo Herald Tiendas de alimentos de EEUU debían ayudar a los cubanos. ¿Por qué venden Havana Club?

For the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ), lack of a directory will impede the expansion of engagement with MSMEs and may impact those policy and regulatory changes in place relating to MSMEs- particularly those focused upon direct equity investment in and direct financing to MSMEs authorized by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury. 

A priority for the government of the Republic of Cuba must be transparency as to the ownership and legal status of Republic of Cuba government-operated companies and MSMEs.  Absent self-installed transparency, the United States Department of State is likely to be pressured by members of the United States Congress to create a sub-section to the Cuba Restricted List (CRL) to identify MSMEs prohibited from receiving direct equity investment and direct financing from individuals and entities subject to United States jurisdiction.  Such a sub-section would have a chilling effect and stunt engagement with MSMEs.  The existence of a CRL referencing MSMEs would taint all MSMEs regardless of their ownership and purpose. 

The Biden-Harris Administration supports the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.  Policy initiatives and changes, and regulatory changes will continue to focus upon lessening impediments on the re-emerging private sectors in the Republic of Cuba.   

In May 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration authorized the first direct equity investment in and the first direct financing to a privately-owned company located in the Republic of Cuba.  Subsequently, the OFAC added opportunities and amended existing regulations to provide mechanisms for further engagement with privately-owned companies located in the Republic of Cuba.   

In July 2022, the government of the Republic of Cuba confirmed direct equity investment and direct financing are authorized for MSMEs.  The regulations have yet to be published.      

LINK To Related Analysis 

Now The Hard Part For Cuba: Implementing Quickly Transparent, Equal-For-All, MSME Investment & Financing Regulations. No Limitations. No Selectivity. No Orwellian Process. 

U.S. Agricultural Commodity/Food Product Exports To Cuba Decrease 18.4% In June 2022; Decline 9.2% Year-To-Year

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
June 2022

June 2022 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decrease 18.4%- 1
57th Of 223 June 2022 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Decrease 9.2%- 2
Cuba Ranked 56th Of U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets- 2
June 2022 Healthcare Product Exports US$876,983.00- 2
June 2022 Humanitarian Donations US$3,786,513.00- 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue- 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 16

JUNE 2022 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA DECREASE 18.4%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in June 2022 were US$23,055,838.00 compared to US$28,256,268.00 in June 2021 and US$ US$5,507,338.00 in June 2020.

January 2022 to June 2022 exports were US$144,185,093.00 compared to January 2021 to June 2021 exports of US$158,942,168.00. A decrease of 9.2%.

June 2022 Exports Included: Sardines; Olive Oil; Vegetable Fats; Hams; Tuna; Squid; Bamboo Shots; Sweet Corn; Fruit; Chicken Leg Quarters (Frozen); Chicken Meat (Frozen); Chicken Legs (Frozen); Coffee; Deodorants; Soap; Disinfectants; Insecticides; Rodentcides; Shampoo.

This report contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

Click here for a list of agricultural commodities eligible for export to Cuba under Section 902(1) of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000

Complete Report In PDF Format

Cuba Creates New Peso Exchange Rate: Increase From 24 To 120. Helpful To MSMEs. However, 24 Remains In Use.

Cuba more than quadruples dollar/peso exchange rate 

By Marc Frank 

HAVANA, Aug 3 (Reuters) - Cuba announced it will begin purchasing on Thursday dollars and other convertible currencies at nearly five times the current rate in an effort to undercut the informal money market and capture the funds. 

Central Bank President Marta Wilson Gonzalez, appearing on state-run television on Wednesday evening, said the state-run banking system had set a new rate of 120 pesos to the dollar, compared to the official fixed rate of 24 pesos, and 115 pesos on the informal market, according to independent online news outlet El Toque tracker, the most watched in the communist-run country. 

Gonzalez said the new rate would float and did not apply to most activities of the state-dominated economy which would still operate at the fixed rate in effect for more than 18 months. 

Cuba stopped accepting dollars in 2020 citing U.S. sanctions and stopped selling convertible currency for pesos to the public soon after, stating it simply did not have the cash. 

Economy Minister Alejandro Gil, appearing with the central bank president on Wednesday, said in the near future he hoped to resume currency exchanges, but the first step would be capturing the informal market. “Today there is a high level of foreign currency that is entering the country that is not being captured by the national financial system,” he said. 

Hit by harsh new U.S. sanctions, the pandemic and current high international prices for goods and shipping, the near-bankrupt, import-dependent economy grew 1.3% last year after declining 10.9% in 2020. Gil said a gradual if slow recovery continued without giving figures. Shortages of food, medicine, fuel and now electricity have led to scattered protests in recent months. 

Pavel Vidal, a former Cuban central bank economist who teaches at Colombia’s Pontificia Universidad Javeriana Cali, said the measure addressed a major complaint of tourists who exchanged money at the fixed government rate in hotels and then discovered outside on the street everything is pegged at the informal rate. Vidal said it would also benefit "the private sector which often receives foreign currency from tourists and that the banks will once more accept and exchange physical dollars at 120 which unlocks one of the major impediments that remittances had as they were fetching 24 pesos."

Now The Hard Part For Cuba: Implementing Quickly Transparent, Equal-For-All, MSME Investment & Financing Regulations. No Limitations. No Selectivity. No Orwellian Process.

Now The Hard Part For Cuba. Implementing Quickly Transparent, Workable Regulations For Investments In And Financing To Private Companies.

Regulations Must Be The Same For All Countries.
Not Orwellian: All MSMES Are Equal. Some Are Not More Equal Than Others.

The Government Of Cuba Must Refrain To Its Inherent Desire To Determine Winners And Losers; To Determine “Societal Value”

Only Citizens Of Cuba, Voting With Their Spending, Must Determine Success Or Failure Of An MSME.

The Government Of Cuba Sets Rules And Then Must Get Out Of The Way Of Prosperity.

Direct Correspondent Banking Is Essential To Support MSMEs. If Funds Cannot Move Efficiently In Both Directions, No Incentive For Investors And Providers Of Loans.

In May 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) authorized the first direct equity investment in and the first direct financing to a privately-owned company located in the Republic of Cuba.  Subsequently, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury added opportunities and amended existing regulations to provide mechanisms for further engagement with privately-owned companies located in the Republic of Cuba. 

In July 2022, the government of the Republic of Cuba confirmed direct equity investment and direct financing are authorized for micro, small, and medium-size enterprises (MSMEs).    

The government of the Republic of Cuba will publish, and hopefully do so promptly, transparent, and workable regulations for the delivery of direct equity investment in and direct financing to MSMEs.    

• There must be one process for all privately-owned companies.  Visualize simplicity.  Embrace clarity.  Write concisely.  Avoid ambiguity.     

• If the government of the Republic of Cuba is uncommitted to permit the global marketplace to determine if an MSME is attractive for direct equity investment and direct financing, and in its place establishes a decision-making infrastructure to “evaluate” and “approve” which MSME may receive funds from abroad and the amount of funding permitted, then the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ) might reconsider commencing the process. 

Essential for the government of the Republic of Cuba to embrace a mindset appreciating the role of an independent private sector operating in an independent marketplace where marketing and operational skill determines whether a company prospers or fails, rather than trajectories and outcomes determined by third parties subject to political purity testing. 

• Risk must be rewarded, not be suspect.  Success must be rewarded, not punished.  Prosperity must be an example of the possible, not weaponized as an agency of suspicion.

What will, and not exaggerating the potential of a dinosaur extinction-level result, diminish the attractiveness of delivering direct equity foreign investment and direct financing to MSMEs will be connected directly to the government of the Republic of Cuba retaining the same subjective political multi-level, multi-jurisdiction decision-making process currently employed for evaluating the appropriateness of direct equity investment into a joint venture, economic cooperation agreement, management contract, etc., which includes a Republic of Cuba government-operated company.

• Direct equity investment into a MSME is different from direct equity investment into a Republic of Cuba government-operated company. If the government of the Republic of Cuba believes that they are the same, then the government of the Republic of Cuba is not prepared to accept direct equity investment and direct financing for MSMEs.  And going forward under these conditions will severely restrain the delivery of direct equity investment. 

• The government of the Republic of Cuba must not be deciding if an MSME needs direct equity investment, what are the terms of that direct equity investment, what will the MSME do with that direct equity investment.

• The government of the Republic of Cuba should create a transparent, easy-to-understand, list of requirements- and then leave to the MSME to self-comply by certifying compliance with a set of regulations that are the same for every MSME.

• The government of the Republic of Cuba will meaningfully doom, and provide critics with the material they seek, if the government of the Republic of Cuba determines which MSMEs are suitable for direct equity investment and direct financing originating from outside of the Republic of Cuba.

• There must be no discrimination by the government of the Republic of Cuba in terms of restricting/prohibiting the receipt by a MSME of direct equity investment and direct financing because the MSME is now or may compete with a Republic of Cuba government-operated company.

• An MSME must have no limitation as to the amount of direct equity investment and direct financing.  Provided the amounts are disclosed to the relevant Republic of Cuba government-operated entity (but remain confidential from the public to protect business strategy) and provided the MSME maintains proper accounting practices, then there should be no limitation. 

• There must be no number of employee requirement for a privately-owned company to receive direct equity investment and direct financing.  No penalty for being too small and no penalty for being too large.

• There must be no discrimination by the government of the Republic of Cuba in terms of fees, taxes, and other payments towards MSMEs versus Republic of Cuba government-operated companies.

• MSMEs must be permitted to establish operating accounts at Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions and establish operating accounts in financial institutions outside of the Republic of Cuba.  These accounts must be permitted to receive funds in U.S. Dollars, Euros, Lira, Pesos, Pound Sterling, Rubles, Rupees, Yen, Yuan, etc., and be permitted to send funds in U.S. Dollars, Euros, Lira, Pesos, Pound Sterling, Rubles, Rupees, Yen, Yuan, etc.  The transaction fees in the Republic of Cuba should be comparable to those of financial institutions outside of the Republic of Cuba.

• The central tenant for direct equity investment and financing: There must be no doubt that MSME funds in the Republic of Cuba may be used by an MSME to make debt payments as prescribed by the terms of investment contracts and loan agreements.

There will be failures.  Some MSMEs will have terrific ideas that are unable to be profitably executed or the marketplace may have an interest that wanes.  Some investors will lose part or all their investment; some loans will go unrepaid.  Some MSMEs will succeed beyond what an investor or investors expected; and their dividends will be large, their loans will be repaid, the MSME will expand its workforce- who will earn more money.  The marketplace must determine what happens, not the government.

• There must be transparency and efficiencies- all transactions must be delivered through financial institutions. 

Concurrently, the Biden-Harris Administration should correct the error of the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) by directing the OFAC to authorize direct correspondent banking so funds move directly, efficiently, and transparently from the United States to the Republic of Cuba (delivery of direct equity investment and direct financing) and from the Republic of Cuba to the United States (receipt of dividends, profit-sharing, loan payments).

• If the OFAC authorizes by general license direct equity investment in and direct financing to MSMEs in the Republic of Cuba and authorizes direct correspondent banking there will be robust activity in moving funds directly, efficiently, and transparently from the United States to the Republic of Cuba and moving funds directly, efficiently, and transparently from the Republic of Cuba to the United States.  

• The OFAC should continue for a limited time- through the issuance of regulations by the government of the Republic of Cuba, to require specific licenses for the delivery of direct equity investment and direct financing into MSMEs. 

With the 10 May 2022 license from the OFAC authorizing for the first-time direct equity investment in and direct financing to a MSME, the next logical decision by the Biden-Harris Administration is to authorize direct correspondent banking.  The decision requires a mechanism for operability- efficient direct banking. 

Elk Grove Village, Illinois-based First American Bank (2021 assets approximately US$5 billion) will soon obtain a correspondent account with Republic of Cuba government-operated Banco Internacional de Comercia SA (BICSA), a member of Republic of Cuba government-operated Grupo Nuevo Banca SA, created by Corporate Charter No. 49 in 1993 and commenced operation in 1994.  BICSA is not among the financial institutions included in the Cuba Restricted List (CRL) maintained by the United States Department of State. 

• Once First American Bank has the correspondent account with BICSA, First American Bank should immediately seek from the OFAC a license for BICSA to have a correspondent account with First American Bank.

Since the government of Cuba in July 2022 confirmed that direct equity investment and direct financing for MSMEs are authorized, a continued embrace of the non-sensical for the Biden-Harris Administration to continue to require funds moving from the Republic of Cuba to the United States move through financial institutions in third countries- where they then take a fee from every transaction, including fees from, for example, more than US$6.7 billion since December 2001 in payments by the government of the Republic of Cuba for agricultural commodities, food products, and healthcare products (medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, pharmaceuticals), and other products purchased from United States-based companies.  These transactions are authorized by the Trade Sanctions and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and OFAC and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce regulations.  Funds from the United States to the Republic of Cuba have been required to endure the same costly and inefficient triangular payment process. 

Absent Direct Correspondent Banking, authorized transactions from the Republic of Cuba to the United States are less transparent and are multi-day rather than multi-hour and third parties earn unnecessary fees.

Direct Correspondent Banking

In June 2022, Elk Grove Village, Illinois-based First American Bank (2021 assets approximately US$5 billion) acquired the operating accounts (and Republic of Cuba-focused personnel) for the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in Washington, DC, and the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cuba to the United Nations in New York, New York.  In 2019, First American Bank acquired Miami, Florida-based Continental National Bank (2019 assets approximately US$490 million), the first Cuban-American-owned nationally-chartered financial institution in the United States. 

From 2017 to 2022, the accounts were managed by Conway, Arkansas-based Home BancShares (2021 assets approximately US$18 billion) through its subsidiary Centennial Bank (which operates seventy-eight branches in the State of Florida).  In 2017, Home BancShares acquired Pompano Beach, Florida-based Stonegate Bank (2017 assets approximately US$2.9 billion) which had managed the accounts since 2015.  In 2015, the Obama-Biden Administration authorized the OFAC to approve a correspondent account for Stonegate Bank with BICSA. 

Along with providing services to the embassy and mission, Stonegate Bank provided funds transfer services for OFAC-authorized and BIS-authorized transactions.  In 2015, Stonegate Bank acquired the accounts after Buffalo, New York-based M&T Bank Corporation (2021 assets approximately US$150 billion) decided to no longer diplomatic services due to challenges with regulatory compliance.

According to the Republic of Cuba, “Its [BICSA] main activity is ‘enterprises’ bank’ carried through its central services and five branches based in the country’s capital, Santiago de Cuba and Villa Clara. It records all transactions in real time providing its customers with card and remote banking services while it is working on developing other methods of electronic banking.  Its institutional clients, national or foreign, receive a complete accounting and documentary service, while national entities also enjoy of significant volumes of credit facilities. Practically all sectors of the economy benefit from all this, such as that of agriculture, the food industry, the basic and light industries, transportation, aviation, fishing, construction, domestic and foreign trade, the iron and steel industry, sugar, informatics, communications and others with not only economic importance but also social, such as health, water supply, education, culture and sports.  Credit policy followed by the Bank is dictated in a collegiate way by its Credit Committee on the basis of a strict analysis and control in loan making.  The Bank counts on correspondents in the five continents, the majority are first class banks, mainly Europeans and Americans.  Equity capital of shareholders (Grupo Nueva Banca with the biggest share and Banc holding), near the USD95 millions with a balance ranging from 550 to 600 millions, make sure the Bank has a strong solvency ratio.” 

Without explanation the Obama-Biden Administration did not authorize BICSA under a license from the OFAC to have an account at Stonegate Bank, so Stonegate Bank was required to route transactions for approximately eighty (80) customers on a regular basis through a third-country financial institution, selecting Panama City, Panama-based Multibank (2019 assets approximately US$5 billion) which had dealings with the Republic of Cuba. 

In 2020, Bogota, Colombia-based Grupo Aval (2020 assets approximately US$79 billion) reported that “On May 25th, Banco de Bogotá, through its subsidiary Leasing Bogotá S.A. Panamá, acquired 96.6% of the ordinary shares of Multi Financial Group. As part of the acquisition process, MFG’s operation in Cuba was closed and as part of the transaction. Grupo Aval complies with OFAC regulations and doesn't have transactional relationships with Cuba.” 

The Biden-Harris Administration has thus far refused to authorize direct correspondent banking despite its public statements, issued license, and implemented regulatory changes focusing upon support to the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba.      

There is no logic in approving the delivery of direct equity investments and direct financing when “direct” must be defined as moving through a third country.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT