And Now The United States Congress Will Have Ten Members Focusing Upon Cuba Issues

On 3 November 2020, New York State Assemblywoman Nicole Malliotakis (64th District) defeated Representative Max Rose (D- 11th, New York). The following exchange using Twitter confirmed her connectivity with issues relating to the Republic of Cuba.

Gabriella Hoffman
@Gabby_Hoffman
Nov 4

There are two new GOP members who grew up under socialism. Cuban-born @CarlosGimenezFL and Ukrainian-born @Victoria_Spartz . And two children of Cuban immigrants — @NMalliotakis and @MaElviraSalazar. Us descendants of folks who fled socialism have much to rejoice. Love it

Nicole Malliotakis
@NMalliotakis
Nov 12

US House candidate, NY-11
An anti-socialist squad is forming...

From The New York State Assembly Biography: Nicole Malliotakis was first elected to the New York State Assembly on November 2, 2010, defeating a two-term incumbent. She is the daughter of immigrants, her father from Greece and her mother a Cuban exile of the Castro dictatorship. Nicole currently represents a district spanning the boroughs of Brooklyn and Staten Island. She was the first Hispanic-American elected from Richmond County. She was re-elected to her third term in November 2014 with an overwhelming 73 percent of the vote.

From the office of the Representative-elect: “Her mother is Cuban and fled the country in 1959..her father emigrated from Greece in the early 60's ..the Congresswoman-elect refers to herself as an American of Greek & Cuban parents....” and the Representative-elect “has spoken about a being a member of [the]” Congressional Cuba Democracy Caucus.

Representative-elect Malliotakis is expected to seek membership in the Congressional Cuba Democracy Caucus, Congressional Hispanic Conference, and Congressional Hispanic Caucus among others.

Ten (10) Cuban-American members of the United States Congress, three (3) in the United States Senate and seven (7) in the United States House of Representatives, consisting of two (2) members of the Democratic Party and eight (8) members of the Republican Party, will likely oppose most efforts by the Biden Administration to alter Trump Administration policies impacting the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela.

United States Senate
The Honorable Ted Cruz (R- Texas)
The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- Florida)
The Honorable Robert Menendez (D- New Jersey)

United States House of Representatives
The Honorable Albio Sires (New Jersey; D- 8th)
The Honorable Alex Mooney (West Virginia; R- 2nd)
The Honorable Anthony E. González (Ohio; R- 16th)
The Honorable Mario Díaz-Balart (Florida; R-25th)
The Honorable Carlos Gimenez (Florida; R- 26th)
The Honorable Maria Elvira Salazar (Florida; R- 27th)
The Honorable Nicole Malliotakis (New York; R- 11th)

Previous Post:
What The Biden Administration May Do With Cuba (And Venezuela Has A Role)
November 09, 2020

President-Elect Biden Announces 27-Member Agency Review Team For Department Of The Treasury

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
November 10, 2020

Biden-Harris Transition Team Announces Members of Agency Review Teams
Formation of Agency Review Teams Among the First Steps to Building a Successful Administration

WASHINGTON – Today, the Biden-Harris Transition announced key members of the agency review teams (ARTs), which are responsible for evaluating the operations of the federal agencies so that the incoming Biden-Harris administration is prepared to lead our country on Day One. The ARTs are composed of highly experienced and talented professionals with deep backgrounds in key policy areas across the federal government. The teams possess a diversity of perspectives critical to addressing America’s most urgent and complex challenges.

“Our nation is grappling with a pandemic, an economic crisis, urgent calls for racial justice, and the existential threat of climate change. We must be prepared for a seamless transfer of knowledge to the incoming administration to protect our interests at home and abroad. The agency review process will help lay the foundation for meeting these challenges on Day One,” said Senator Ted Kaufman, Co-Chair, Biden-Harris Transition. “The work of the agency review teams is critical for protecting national security, addressing the ongoing public health crisis, and demonstrating that America remains the beacon of democracy for the world.”

The transition’s work continues full steam ahead. The agency review teams will proceed by meeting with former agency officials and experts who closely follow federal agencies, and with officials from think tanks, labor groups, trade associations, and other NGOs. Further, many of the ART members have had long careers in the federal agencies they will now help prepare for the incoming Biden-Harris administration.

Once the GSA Administrator ascertains the results of the election, the ART members will work directly with staff in federal agencies to ensure that the incoming Biden-Harris administration is able to effectively achieve the policy goals of the President and Vice President-elect.

Finally, President-elect Biden and Vice President-elect Harris are proud to have one of the most diverse agency review teams in presidential transition history. Of the hundreds of ART members to be announced, more than half are women, and approximately 40 percent represent communities historically underrepresented in the federal government, including people of color, people who identify as LGBTQ+, and people with disabilities. The President-elect and Vice President-elect are committed to building an administration that looks like America.

Agency review teams are responsible for understanding the operations of each agency, ensuring a smooth transfer of power, and preparing for President-elect Biden and Vice President-elect Harris and their cabinet to hit the ground running on Day One. These teams are composed of highly experienced and talented professionals with deep backgrounds in crucial policy areas across the federal government. The teams have been crafted to ensure they not only reflect the values and priorities of the incoming administration, but reflect the diversity of perspectives crucial for addressing America’s most urgent and complex challenges.

The Presidential Transition Act requires presidential transitions to disclose the “most recent employment” and “sources of funding” for all agency review team members. The Transition Team has three types of agency review team members:

  • Volunteers: Individuals who are volunteering for the Transition in their personal capacity. For these team members, their current or most recent employer is listed (for informational purposes only), and their source of funding is listed as “Volunteer.”

  • Full-Time Transition Employees: Individuals who are full-time paid Transition employees, funded by the Transition entity itself (PT Fund, Inc.). For these team members, their most recent employer prior to joining the Transition is listed (for informational purposes only), and their source of funding is listed as “Transition — PT Fund, Inc.”

  • Detailees: Individuals on detail who will be funded through an appropriation administered by the General Services Administration. For these team members, their current employer is listed, and their source of funding is listed as “Transition — Appropriation.”

Department of the Treasury
Name
Most Recent Employment
Source of Funding

Don Graves, Team Lead
KeyBank
Transition
PT Fund, Inc.
Mehrsa Baradaran
University of California, Irvine School of Law
Volunteer
Michael Barr
University of Michigan, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy
Volunteer
Lily Batchelder
New York University, School of Law
Volunteer
John Bentivoglio
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP
Volunteer
Chris Brummer
Georgetown University
Volunteer
Liyan David Chang
Devoted Health
Volunteer
Heidi Crebo-Rediker
International Capital Strategies, LLC
Volunteer
Will Fields
Sidewalk Labs
Volunteer
Suzanna Fritzberg
Birmingham Strong
Volunteer
Andy Green
Center for American Progress
Volunteer
David Hinson
Ategra Capital Management
Volunteer
Nicole Isaac
LinkedIn Corporation
Volunteer
Simon Johnson
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Volunteer
Helen Kanovsky
Mortgage Bankers Association
Volunteer
Marisa Lago
New York City, Department of City Planning
Volunteer
Nancy Lee
Center for Global Development
Volunteer
Sarah Miller
American Economic Liberties Project
Volunteer
Sophie Raseman
Brightside Benefit, Inc.
Volunteer
Rosie Rios
Self-employed
Volunteer
Buzz Roberts
National Association of Affordable Housing Lenders
Volunteer
Elizabeth Rosenberg
Center for a New American Security
Volunteer
Javier Saade
Impact Master Holdings
Volunteer
Damon Silvers
AFL-CIO Volunteer
Betsey Stevenson
University of Michigan
Volunteer
Jay Williams
Hartford Foundation for Public Giving
Volunteer
Charles Yi
Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer, LLP
Volunteer

Screenshot_2020-11-11 Agency Review Teams President-Elect Joe Biden.png

President-Elect Biden Announces 30-Member Agency Review Team For Department Of State

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
November 10, 2020

Biden-Harris Transition Team Announces Members of Agency Review Teams
Formation of Agency Review Teams Among the First Steps to Building a Successful Administration

WASHINGTON – Today, the Biden-Harris Transition announced key members of the agency review teams (ARTs), which are responsible for evaluating the operations of the federal agencies so that the incoming Biden-Harris administration is prepared to lead our country on Day One. The ARTs are composed of highly experienced and talented professionals with deep backgrounds in key policy areas across the federal government. The teams possess a diversity of perspectives critical to addressing America’s most urgent and complex challenges.

“Our nation is grappling with a pandemic, an economic crisis, urgent calls for racial justice, and the existential threat of climate change. We must be prepared for a seamless transfer of knowledge to the incoming administration to protect our interests at home and abroad. The agency review process will help lay the foundation for meeting these challenges on Day One,” said Senator Ted Kaufman, Co-Chair, Biden-Harris Transition. “The work of the agency review teams is critical for protecting national security, addressing the ongoing public health crisis, and demonstrating that America remains the beacon of democracy for the world.”

The transition’s work continues full steam ahead. The agency review teams will proceed by meeting with former agency officials and experts who closely follow federal agencies, and with officials from think tanks, labor groups, trade associations, and other NGOs. Further, many of the ART members have had long careers in the federal agencies they will now help prepare for the incoming Biden-Harris administration.

Once the GSA Administrator ascertains the results of the election, the ART members will work directly with staff in federal agencies to ensure that the incoming Biden-Harris administration is able to effectively achieve the policy goals of the President and Vice President-elect.

Finally, President-elect Biden and Vice President-elect Harris are proud to have one of the most diverse agency review teams in presidential transition history. Of the hundreds of ART members to be announced, more than half are women, and approximately 40 percent represent communities historically underrepresented in the federal government, including people of color, people who identify as LGBTQ+, and people with disabilities. The President-elect and Vice President-elect are committed to building an administration that looks like America.

Agency review teams are responsible for understanding the operations of each agency, ensuring a smooth transfer of power, and preparing for President-elect Biden and Vice President-elect Harris and their cabinet to hit the ground running on Day One. These teams are composed of highly experienced and talented professionals with deep backgrounds in crucial policy areas across the federal government. The teams have been crafted to ensure they not only reflect the values and priorities of the incoming administration, but reflect the diversity of perspectives crucial for addressing America’s most urgent and complex challenges.

The Presidential Transition Act requires presidential transitions to disclose the “most recent employment” and “sources of funding” for all agency review team members. The Transition Team has three types of agency review team members:

  • Volunteers: Individuals who are volunteering for the Transition in their personal capacity. For these team members, their current or most recent employer is listed (for informational purposes only), and their source of funding is listed as “Volunteer.”

  • Full-Time Transition Employees: Individuals who are full-time paid Transition employees, funded by the Transition entity itself (PT Fund, Inc.). For these team members, their most recent employer prior to joining the Transition is listed (for informational purposes only), and their source of funding is listed as “Transition — PT Fund, Inc.”

  • Detailees: Individuals on detail who will be funded through an appropriation administered by the General Services Administration. For these team members, their current employer is listed, and their source of funding is listed as “Transition — Appropriation.”

Department of State
Name
Most Recent Employment
Source of Funding

Linda Thomas-Greenfield, Team Lead
Albright Stonebridge Group
Volunteer
Hady Amr
Brookings Institution
Volunteer
Susan Biniaz
United Nations Foundation
Volunteer
Oni Blair
LINK Houston
Volunteer
Derek Chollet
The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Volunteer
Frances Colon
Self-employed
Volunteer
Bathsheba Crocker
CARE
Volunteer
Sarah Cross
Open Society Foundations
Volunteer
Michael Guest
Self-employed
Volunteer
Sumona Guha
Albright Stonebridge Group
Volunteer
Peter Harrell
Self-employed
Volunteer
Owen Herrnstadt
International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers
Volunteer
Roberta Jacobson
Albright Stonebridge Group
Volunteer
Bonnie Jenkins
Women of Color Advancing Peace and Security
Volunteer
Alexandra Kahan
Boston Consulting Group
Volunteer
Jeremy Konyndyk
Center for Global Development
Volunteer
Ellison Laskowski
The German Marshall Fund of the United States
Volunteer
Allison Lombardo
Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Limited
Volunteer
Raphael Majma
Alloy
Volunteer
Nancy McEldowney
Georgetown University
Volunteer
Amber McIntyre
HWC, Inc.
Volunteer
Emily Mendrala
Center for Democracy in the Americas
Volunteer
Jane Rhee
The Estee Lauder Companies
Volunteer
Fouad Saad
Self-employed
Volunteer
Gentry Smith
Self-employed
Volunteer
Dana Stroul
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Volunteer
Tom Sullivan
Amazon.com, Inc.
Volunteer
Puneet Talwar
Self-employed
Volunteer
Margaret Taylor
Brookings Institution
Volunteer
Ramin Toloui
Stanford University
Volunteer

Screenshot_2020-11-10 Agency Review Teams President-Elect Joe Biden.png

UK's Imperial Brands Among Increasing Number Of EU-Based Defendants In Libertad Act Lawsuits Seeking Guidance From EC

LUIS MANUEL RODRIGUEZ, MARIA TERESA RODRIGUEZ, a/k/a MARIA TERESA LANDA, ALFREDO RAMON FORNS, RAMON ALBERTO RODRIGUEZ, RAUL LORENZO RODRIGUEZ, CHRISTINA CONROY, and FRANCISCO RAMON RODRIGUEZ, Plaintiffs, v. IMPERIAL BRANDS PLC, CORPORACIÓN HABANOS, S.A., WPP PLC, YOUNG & RUBICAM LLC, and BCW LLC, a/k/a BURSON COHN & WOLFE LLC [1:20-cv-23287; Southern Florida District].

Berenthal & Associates (plaintiff)
Rodriguez Tramont & Nunez (plaintiff)
Nelson Mullins (defendant)
Allen & Overy (defendant)
Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr (defendant)
Broad & Cassel (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)


LINKS:

Defendant Imperial Brands PLC’s First Status Report
Defendant Imperial Brands PLC’s Opposition To Motion To Strike The Declaration Of Andrew Rhys Davies

Excerpts:

Defendant Imperial Brands plc (“Imperial”) respectfully submits this status report pursuant to the Court’s September 23, 2020 Order [D.E. 49] granting Imperial’s motion for a limited stay of proceedings and directing Imperial to submit monthly status reports on its application to the European Commission (the “Commission”) for authorization to defend this lawsuit or, at a minimum, to file and litigate a motion to dismiss. By way of update, Imperial states as follows:

1. As Imperial previously advised the Court [D.E. 14, D.E. 15-1], on August 27, 2020, Imperial submitted an application to the Commission under Article 5 paragraph 2 of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96, Protecting Against the Effects of the Extra-Territorial Application of Legislation Adopted by a Third County, and Actions Based Thereon or Resulting Therefrom, 1996 O.J. (L. 309) 1 (EC) (“Regulation 2271/96”), for authorization to defend this lawsuit or, at a minimum, authorization in the first instance to file and litigate a motion to dismiss (the “Application”).

2. The Commission has acknowledged receipt of Imperial’s Application, and has cautioned Imperial that unless and until the Commission provides authorization Imperial is prohibited from appearing before this Court pursuant to the summons in this action under Title III of the Helms-Burton Act.

3. Imperial notified the Commission of the requirement to file a status report and requested that the Commission therefore provide Imperial an update on the status of its application ahead of the October 23, 2020 due date. On October 21, 2020, the Commission informed Imperial that the Commission is currently analyzing Imperial’s application and will do its utmost to ensure that a decision is made in due course.

ImperialTobacco-20151216080810588.jpg

What The Biden Administration May Do With Cuba (And Venezuela Has A Role)

Nine Cuban-Americans In United States Congress
Biden Policies Center-Rights Rather Than Center-Left
Cuba Policy Based Upon Conditionality
Condition Remittance Level Increase To A Non-Military Partner
Whiplash Unlikely At State Department And Department Of The Treasury
Biden Is Not Obama- Restoring Diplomatic Relations Was Done
United States Congress Divisions Will Be 2% To 3%
2022 And 2024 Will Be Relevant

The Biden Administration will not soon return to the United States-Republic of Cuba bilateral commercial, economic, and political landscape that existed prior to 20 January 2017.   

The Biden Administration will encounter a larger, less-porous, and media-savvy Congressional Firewall that may limit, perhaps consistently or intermittently during his four-year term, robust re-engagement with the Republic of Cuba.  

The 535 members of the 117th United States Congress (House of Representatives and Senate) convene on 3 January 2021. 

Potentially interrupting the imperviousness of opposition to Pre-Trump Administration re-engagement would be unilateral and permanent changes implemented by the Republic of Cuba- particularly those relating to its commercial, economic and political infrastructure and, most importantly, lessening its connectivity with the [Nicolas] Maduro Administration in Caracas, Venezuela. 

If the Republic of Cuba were to exit Venezuela, the Biden Administration would have a relatively free rein to make changes to Trump Administration decisions relating to the Republic of Cuba.  Conditionality would remain, but it would flexible rather than rigid.  

The United States House of Representatives will remain in control of the Democratic Party, although with a meaningfully narrower majority- perhaps 2% to 3%.  The United States Senate, based upon a bipartisan consensus of analysts, may become a 51-49 majority for the Republican Party after two concurrent elections in the State of Georgia on 5 January 2021.   

Nine (9) Cuban-American members of the United States Congress, three (3) in the United States Senate and six (6) in the United States House of Representatives, consisting of two (2) members of the Democratic Party and seven (7) members of the Republican Party, will likely oppose most efforts by the Biden Administration to alter Trump Administration policies impacting the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela.    

United States Senate
The Honorable Ted Cruz (R- Texas)
The Honorable Marco Rubio (R- Florida)
The Honorable Robert Menendez (D- New Jersey)
United States House of Representatives
The Honorable Albio Sires (New Jersey; D- 8th)
The Honorable Alex Mooney (West Virginia; R- 2nd)
The Honorable Anthony E. González (Ohio; R- 16th)
The Honorable Mario Díaz-Balart (Florida; R-25th)
The Honorable Carlos Gimenez (Florida; R- 26th)
The Honorable Maria Elvira Salazar (Florida; R- 27th)

Most significant to developing decisions will be the post-election analyses by the Democratic Party and the Republican Party- what were the reasons for President Donald Trump to win the state of Florida, particularly areas located in the southern portions of the state.   

The Democratic Party, Biden Administration, presumed Biden/Harris Re-Election Committee, individuals who want to run for office in Florida in 2022, and individuals who want the 2024 Democratic Party presidential nomination should President Joseph Biden choose not to seek the nomination, will not want to take any decision to overtly further disrupt electoral opportunities.   

The Biden Administration upon taking office will focus upon the 2022 mid-term elections for the United States Congress, where the political party in control of The White House typically loses seats in each chamber of the United States Congress.  

The Biden Administration will be a single term.  As such, intra-Democratic Party positioning, particularly within the office of Vice President Kamala Harris, will be disruptive to deciding Republic of Cuba-related decisions as any decision will impact Florida. 

The Biden Administration will also be hamstrung by then-candidate Joseph Biden’s statements during the 2020 campaign about the ineffectiveness of Trump Administration policies towards the Republic of Cuba and Venezuela: 

“We have to vote for a new Cuba policy as well,” Biden said. “Trump is the worst possible standard-bearer for democracy in places like Cuba, Venezuela, North Korea. Cuba is no closer to freedom and democracy today than it was four years ago. Trump loves to talk tough, but he doesn’t care about the Cuban and Venezuelan people. He won’t even grant Temporary Protected Status to Venezuelans fleeing the oppressive Maduro regime. I will, but we have to vote.”  The Miami Herald (29 October 2020)  

“Cuba is no closer to freedom and democracy today than it was four years ago.”  “President Trump can’t advance democracy and human rights for the Cuban people or the Venezuelan people, for that matter, when he has praised so many autocrats around the world.”  The New York Times (29 October 2020) 

Despite expectations to the contrary, the Biden Administration will gravitate and navigate an international policy framed by the center-right rather than the center-left.  “Human rights” will be the topic sentence when describing policies towards the Republic of Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua among other countries.  The debate among policymakers and those who vote in the United States Congress will be how to define “human rights” and how to rank the list of priorities. 

The Biden Administration will find a Republic of Cuba again chronically, severely, and negatively self-impacted by its commercial, economic and political decisions which continue to result in a shortage of foreign exchange to make payment for imports, provide inputs to support exports, repay debt, and invest in the redevelopment of infrastructure.   

The Biden Administration will also find a Republic of Cuba that continues to recoil from conditionality, from quid pro quo, as it did throughout the Obama Administration and through the Trump Administration.  The Republic of Cuba believes it a victim- and thus does not need to do anything to get anything.  

The Biden Administration will return to established processes, inter-agency deliberations including career employees and appointees.  Impulsiveness will define the Biden Administration.  The Republic of Cuba will continue to know, as it did with the Trump Administration, that there will be changes to regulations and changes to policies, but the Biden Administration may provide conditionality with options more easily accepted by the Republic of Cuba.   

Outside pressures adding to the less than optimized landscape for the Republic of Cuba include United States statutes, regulations, and policies; the commercial and economic implosion of Venezuela from which the Republic of Cuba has obtained for more than two decades subsidized oil products, loans, grants, and payments for personnel; the impact of the pandemic upon the tourism sector; continued decrease in the number of governments willing to provide financial support to the Republic of Cuba; and lessening tolerance by governments and financial institutions to provide support to the Republic of Cuba when the Republic of Cuba is not implementing permanent structural commercial, economic and political changes which it maintains rather than awaits to undo. 

The Biden Administration will likely witness the impact of how the Republic of Cuba implements the cessation of the dual currencies and many currency exchange rates that exist within the country of 11.2 million citizens.  The process will be acute- inflicting pain upon most of the population.  Remittances from abroad will be important for many to absorb the devaluation of their earnings and savings.  The Biden Administration may find an opportunity for leverage by maintaining or changing existing restrictions upon remittances (US$1,000.00 per quarter versus unlimited during the Obama Administration) sent to the Republic of Cuba. 

The Biden Administration will also be pressured by members of the United States Congress and particularly by Cuban-American members of the United States Congress to leverage any changes to statutes, regulations and policies impacting the Republic of Cuba with assistance from the Republic of Cuba to develop a pathway for the resolution of commercial, economic, and political issues in Venezuela. 

For any cooperation, the Republic of Cuba may require from the United States and Venezuela a multi-year glidepath for decreasing the level of subsidies/discounts provided by Venezuela.  One proposal includes a 25% annual reduction of subsidies which would end in 2024 (the end of the current presidential term in Venezuela) when transactions would become market-based.  A four-year transition would permit the Republic of Cuba to restructure its energy portfolio while maintaining payment schedules.  During this four-year period, the provisions of the bilateral agreement signed with Venezuela in 2000 would remain operational.  There is one immensely critical benefit the Biden Administration will have with the Republic of Cuba that the Trump Administration did not have- absence of a lack of trust.  Any lack of trust will need be earned.   

Will the career employees at the United States Department of State and at the United States Department of the Treasury have whiplash from consequential changes to their “mission set” where they continue to espouse Trump Administration policy decisions until 12:00 pm on Wednesday, 20 January 2021, and then at 12:01 pm on Wednesday, 20 January 2021, they espouse a Biden Administration policy which contradicts what they have enforced and supported during the last four years?  Some will.  

Biden Administration Do Or Not 

·       Legislation to demonstrably alter (expand) the commercial, economic, and political relationship with the Republic of Cuba introduced in either chamber of the United States Congress would likely be defeated with bipartisan participation.  This is particularly true given the closeness of the Democratic Party-Republican Party divisions in each chamber which may be 2% to 3%.  

·       Would the Biden Administration eliminate or modify the Cuba Restricted List maintained by the United States Department of State and again permit individuals subject to United States jurisdiction to use hotels and restaurants and other facilities affiliated with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba?  Unlikely. 

·       Resume the operation of cruise lines?  Unlikely. 

·       Renew the license for hotel management contracts?  Unlikely. 

·       Re-authorize regularly-scheduled commercial flights to cities other than to Havana?  Likely.  The flights may be restricted initially to individuals subject to United States jurisdiction who are of Cuban descent visiting family and friends. 

·       Require the Republic of Cuba to permit United States companies to directly export inputs to any registered self-employed for use in their operations including restaurants, Airbnb residences, and service-focused enterprises.  Possible. 

·       Authorize direct correspondent banking which would permit United States-based financial institutions and Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions to maintain respective accounts so that funds could be electronically transferred transparently and efficiently for use with authorized transactions, particularly supporting the export from the United States of agricultural commodities, food products, healthcare products, and inputs for the self-employed in the Republic of Cuba.  Possible.  The Obama Administration authorized United States-based financial institutions to have accounts with Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions, but without explanation did not permit Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions to have accounts with United States-based financial institutions.   

·       Increase limits on remittances?  Likely.  However, unlikely that Western Union will again be permitted to engage with Fincimex as its partner unless it is decoupled from affiliation with the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) of the Republic of Cuba.  The Trump Administration has been effective in communicating the rationale for and obtaining support for its efforts to decouple the FAR from its role in the economy.  Leadership of United States companies will not publicly oppose a continuation of that policy.  The Biden Administration may condition an increase on limits on remittances, or to removing limits entirely, upon the Republic of Cuba separating Fincimex from the FAR.  With remittances a critical source of foreign exchange for the Republic of Cuba, the Biden Administration may find success that did not materialize during the Trump Administration.   

·       Permit expanded opportunities for individuals subject to United States jurisdiction who are not of Cuban descent to travel to the Republic of Cuba?  Unlikely initially. 

·       Add consular staff at the United States Embassy in Havana specifically for the purpose of processing visas.  Likely. 

·       Return to full staffing levels at the United States Embassy in Havana.  Unlikely.  There remain unanswered questions as to the source(s) of illnesses impacting United States diplomats at the end of the Obama Administration and into the Trump Administration.  Many career employees of the United States Department of State oppose any return of staffing levels until the health issues are resolved. 

·       Appoint a United States Ambassador to The Republic of Cuba.  Unlikely initially.  If the United States Senate is in control of the Democratic Party, then likelihood increases.  Rationale would be that having an Ambassador in Havana, along with the return of a United States Ambassador to Venezuela, may create more useful atmospherics for a resolution of issues. 

·       Again, suspend Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”)?  Unlikely.  Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.  A suspension of Title III is unlikely because there is 1) nothing to gain from suspending as the European Union (EU), where most of the non-United States defendants are located, has not taken any meaningful measures, so the Biden Administration would not have a quid pro quo opportunity 2) no compelling reason not to await the final dispositions of the twenty-nine lawsuits filed, some of which have moved to Courts of Appeals  3) as long as Title III is active, it is a bargaining tool for the Biden Administration, so why loose it prematurely 4) there is no meaningful domestic political pressure to re-suspend it and 5) there would be vocal bipartisan opposition by members of the United States Congress. 

·       Lessen or cease use of Title IV of the Libertad Act that restricts entry into the United States by individuals who have connectivity to unresolved certified claims or non-certified claims in the Republic of Cuba.  One Canada-based company and one Spain-based company are currently known to be subject to this provision based upon a certified claim and non-certified claim.  Unlikely. 

·       A re-energized focus upon negotiating a settlement for the certified claims by individuals and companies against the Republic of Cuba, which the Obama Administration did not chose to connect with its regulatory and policy decisions relating to the Republic of Cuba.  Likely.  There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims US$8.7 billion.  The first asset (along with 382 enterprises the same day) to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery on 6 August 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (valued at US$56,196,422.73).   

LINK TO COMPLETE TEXT IN PDF FORMAT

Previous Posts:  

Cuba Advocates Shouldn't Be So Confident About President Biden 

Biden And Harris Discuss Their (Potential) Policies For Cuba... Many Questions Remain. Should Cruise Lines Rejoice? 

Former U.S. Secretary Of State Kerry Shares A Biden Administration Approach To Cuba- And Cuba Won't Like It 

Biden Criticizes Trump For "Approach" Towards Cuba; Echo Of Kerry Comments Last Month 

Does New Charge d’Affaires in Havana Have An Unspoken Goal? Get Thrown Out By 3 November 2020

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U.S. Agricultural Commodity/Food Product Exports To Cuba Decline By 43.9% In September; Down 48.8% Year-To-Year

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
November 2020

September 2020 Food/Ag Exports To Cuba Decrease 43.9%- 1
57th Of 224 September U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Decrease 48.8%- 2
Cuba Ranks 58th Of 224 Ag/Food Export Markets- 2
September 2020 Healthcare Product Exports US$10,463.00- 2
September 2020 Humanitarian Donations US$143,309.00- 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue- 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 16

SEPTEMBER 2020 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA DECREASE 43.9%- Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in September 2020 were US$16,117,329.00 compared to US$28,779,856.00 in September 2019 and US$12,226,970.00 in September 2018.

Agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba thus far in 2020 are US$126,262,312.00 compared to US$255,360,721.00 in 2019, representing a decrease of 48.8%.

Since December 2001, agricultural commodity and food product exports reported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba is US$6,259,135,008.00

This report contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

Complete Report In PDF Format

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President Biden Suspending Title III of the Libertad Act? Might Clarence Thomas Supreme Court Nomination Hearing Provide Clues

Might President Joseph Biden suspend Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 (known as “Libertad Act”)?

The Trump Administration on 2 May 2019 made operational Title III of the Libertad Act. Title III authorizes lawsuits in United States District Courts against companies and individuals who are using a certified claim or non-certified claim where the owner of the certified claim or non-certified claim has not received compensation from the Republic of Cuba or from a third-party who is using (“trafficking”) the asset.

Thus far, twenty-nine lawsuits have been filed- eleven certified claimants (there are 5,913 certified claimants) and eighteen non-certified claimants (estimates as high as 200,000). Four of the lawsuits are at Courts of Appeals. There are nearing two hundred attorneys from sixty-seven law firms representing more than one hundred plaintiffs and defendants; and nearing sixty defendants are located in twenty-eight countries. LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Statistics

The U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council interacts with a larger number of attorneys on Republic of Cuba-related matters than does any organization in the United States. There does not exist a consensus from Libertad Act lawsuit attorneys representing plaintiffs and defendants who believe that Title III would again be suspended by a Biden Administration.

The most consistent reasoning by the attorneys includes 1) nothing to gain from suspending as the European Union (EU), where most of the non-United States defendants are located, has not taken any meaningful measures as of yet, so a Biden Administration would not have a quid pro quo opportunity 2) no compelling reason not to await the final dispositions of the twenty-nine lawsuits filed 3) as long as Title III is active, it is a bargaining tool for a Biden Administration, so why loose it prematurely and 4) there is no meaningful domestic political pressure to re-suspend it.

Is Joseph Biden hostile to property rights? Could be. However, not outlandish to believe him saying: “Come on man, Castro stole those folks’ property. Here’s the deal: Not on my watch. Not OK with a guy like me who got up as a kid every morning and hustled to help my family keep a roof over their heads. Not OK to take the house or business of a hard-working family.

Biden on Property Rights
By Michael M. Berger
Senior Counsel- Appellate
Manatt LLP
August 25, 2020


Manatt appellate senior counsel Michael Berger authored an article for Daily Journal about Democratic presidential nominee Joe Biden’s historical stance on property rights. In particular, Berger analyzed Biden’s questioning during a hearing to determine whether presidential nominee Clarence Thomas should be confirmed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which concerned the protection afforded property owners by the 5th Amendment's guarantee that private property will not be taken for public use without the payment of just compensation and the 14th Amendment's guarantee that no state can deprive anyone of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Berger also noted the importance of this line of questioning, saying, “the ascent of Joe Biden to the top spot on a presidential ticket has caused many people to review the half-century of Biden's public life for possible clues as to future actions.” LINK TO COMPLETE ARTICLE

Joe Biden and Limited Government
By David Boaz
Cato Institute
24 August 2008


Barack Obama and Joe Biden both get a perfect 100 from the big-government liberal Americans for Democratic Action, which probably tells you all you need to know. But I remember a dramatic moment back in 1991 when Biden made his commitment to unlimited government clear and dramatic. Clarence Thomas had been nominated for the Supreme Court, and Biden, then chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, was questioning him. Biden bore in on the possibility that Thomas might believe in "natural law," the idea, as Tony Mauro of USA Today summarized it, that "everyone is born with God-given rights - referred to in the Declaration of Independence as 'inalienable rights' to 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' - apart from what any law or the Constitution grants." Biden singled out Cato adjunct scholar Richard Epstein and Cato author Stephen Macedo and demanded to know if Thomas agreed with them that the Constitution protects property rights. Waving Epstein's book Takings in the air like Joe McCarthy with a list of communists, Biden demanded to know, as we very loosely paraphrased it in Cato's 25-year Annual Report (pdf; page 14), "Are you now or have you ever been a libertarian?" As most judicial nominees do when pursued by a senator roused to defend his power like a mama bear, Thomas assured Senator Biden that he wouldn't take the Constitution too seriously.

Was Biden right to worry? Well, as we said in the Annual Report, four years later Thomas joined the Court in declaring, "We start with first principles. The Constitution creates a Federal Government of limited powers." But ten years later the Court finally considered whether the Constitution protects property rights and said, "Ehh, not so much." Thomas protested, "Something has gone seriously awry with this Court’s interpretation of the Constitution. Though citizens are safe from the government in their homes, the homes themselves are not." Biden was right to worry that Thomas's understanding of individual rights and the Constitution just might put some limits on the power of government.

Title III Suspension History 

Title III has been suspended every six months since the Libertad Act was enacted in 1996- by President William J. Clinton, President George W. Bush, President Barack H. Obama and President Donald J. Trump.  

  • On 16 January 2019, The Honorable Mike Pompeo, United States Secretary of State, reported a suspension for forty-five (45) days. 

  • On 4 March 2019, Secretary Pompeo reported a suspension for thirty (30) days. 

  • On 3 April 2019, Secretary Pompeo reported a further suspension for fourteen (14) days through 1 May 2019. 

  • On 17 April 2019, the Trump Administration reported that it would no longer suspend Title III. 

  • On 2 May 2019 certified claimants and non-certified claimants were permitted to file lawsuits in United States courts. 

Certified Claims Background 

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards valued at US$1,902,202,284.95 were certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC) and have not been resolved for nearing sixty years (some assets were officially confiscated in the 1960’s, some in the 1970’s and some in the 1990’s).  The USFCSC permitted simple interest (not compound interest) of 6% per annum (approximately US$114,132,137.10); with the approximate current value of the 5,913 certified claims US$8.7 billion.  

The first asset (along with 382 enterprises the same day) to be expropriated by the Republic of Cuba was an oil refinery on 6 August 1960 owned by White Plains, New York-based Texaco, Inc., now a subsidiary of San Ramon, California-based Chevron Corporation (USFCSC: CU-1331/CU-1332/CU-1333 valued at US$56,196,422.73).  

From the certified claim filed by Texaco: “The Cuban corporation was intervened on June 29, 1960, pursuant to Resolution 188 of June 28, 1960, under Law 635 of 1959.  Resolution 188 was promulgated by the Government of Cuba when the Cuban corporation assertedly refused to refine certain crude oil as assertedly provided under a 1938 law pertaining to combustible materials.  Subsequently, this Cuban firm was listed as nationalized in Resolution 19 of August 6, 1960, pursuant to Cuban Law 851.  The Commission finds, however, that the Cuban corporation was effectively intervened within the meaning of Title V of the Act by the Government of Cuba on June 29, 1960.” 

The largest certified claim (Cuban Electric Company) valued at US$267,568,413.62 is controlled by Boca Raton, Florida-based Office Depot, Inc.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International; the certified claim also includes land adjacent to the Jose Marti International Airport in Havana, Republic of Cuba.  The third-largest certified claim valued at US$97,373,414.72 is controlled by New York, New York-based North American Sugar Industries, Inc.  The smallest certified claim is by Sara W. Fishman in the amount of US$1.00 with reference to the Cuban-Venezuelan Oil Voting Trust. 

The two (2) largest certified claims total US$449,377,207.76, representing 24% of the total value of the certified claims.  Thirty (30) certified claimants hold 56% of the total value of the certified claims.  This concentration of value creates an efficient pathway towards a settlement.   

Title III of the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (Libertad) Act of 1996 requires that an asset had a value of US$50,000.00 when expropriated by the Republic of Cuba without compensation to the original owner.  Of the 5,913 certified claims, 913, or 15%, are valued at US$50,000.00 or more.  Adjusted for inflation, US$50,000.00 (3.70% per annum) in 1960 has a 2019 value of approximately US$427,267.01.  The USFCSC authorized 6% per annum, meaning the 2019 value of US$50,000.00 is approximately US$1,649,384.54.  

The ITT Corporation Agreement 

In July 1997, then-New York City, New York-based ITT Corporation and then-Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based STET International Netherlands N.V. signed an agreement whereby STET International Netherlands N.V. would pay approximately US$25 million to ITT Corporation for a ten-year right (after which the agreement could be renewed and was renewed) to use assets (telephone facilities and telephone equipment) within the Republic of Cuba upon which ITT Corporation has a certified claim valued at approximately US$130.8 million.  ETECSA, which is now wholly-owned by the government of the Republic of Cuba, was a joint venture controlled by the Ministry of Information and Communications of the Republic of Cuba within which Amsterdam, the Netherlands-based Telecom Italia International N.V. (formerly Stet International Netherlands N.V.), a subsidiary of Rome, Italy-based Telecom Italia S.p.A. was a shareholder.  Telecom Italia S.p.A., was at one time a subsidiary of Ivrea, Italy-based Olivetti S.p.A.  The second-largest certified claim (International Telephone and Telegraph Co, ITT as Trustee, Starwood Hotels & Resorts Worldwide, Inc.) valued at US$181,808,794.14 is controlled by Bethesda, Maryland-based Marriott International. 

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Cuba Libertad Act Defendants Differ To Court Of Appeals: Booking.com Says No Oral Arguments Required; Expedia Entites Say Otherwise

MARIO DEL VALLE, ENRIQUE FALLA, MARIO ECHEVARRIA V. EXPEDIA, INC., HOTELS.COM L.P., HOTELS.COM GP, ORBITZ, LLC, BOOKING.COM B.V., BOOKING HOLDINGS INC. Initial defendants were: TRIVAGO GMBH, BOOKING.COM B.V., GRUPO HOTELERO GRAN CARIBE, CORPORACION DE COMERCIO Y TURISMO INTERNACIONAL CUBANACAN S.A., GRUPO DE TURISMO GAVIOTA S.A., RAUL DOE I-5, AND MARIELA ROE 1-5, [1:19-cv-22619 Southern Florida District; 20-12407 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]

Rivero Mestre LLP (plaintiff)
Manuel Vazquez, P.A. (plaintiff)
Baker & McKenzie, LLP (defendant)
Scott Douglass & McConnico (defendant)
Akerman (defendant)

Notice Of Incorrect Statement Of Related Case (10/6/20)
Brief Of Defendants-Appellees Booking.Com B.V. And Booking Holdings Inc. (11/2/20)
Supplemental Appendix Of Defendants- Appellees Booking.com B.V. And Booking Holdings Inc. (11/2/20)
Brief Of Appellees Expedia Group, Inc., Hotels.com, L.P., Hotels.com GP, LLC, And Orbitz, LLC (11/2/20)

LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics

Excerpts From Filings:

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Appellees Booking.com B.V. and Booking Holdings Inc. submit that oral argument is unnecessary in this case because it is a straightforward appeal concerning personal jurisdiction. This Court should affirm the district court’s judgment without argument.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue I: The first issue, reviewed de novo, is whether personal jurisdiction can be maintained over foreign defendants based on the accessibility of a website in Florida, under Sections 48.193(1)(a)(1) (the “doing business” section) and 48.193(1)(a)(2) (the “committing a tort” section) of the Florida long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause.

Issue II: The second issue is whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint without granting a conditional request for jurisdictional discovery contained solely in the plaintiffs’ response in opposition to a motion to dismiss.

Issue III: The third issue is whether the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the Second Amended Complaint without leave to amend where plaintiffs did not move the district court for leave to amend.

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
The Expedia Entities respectfully submit that oral argument would be helpful to the Court in deciding this appeal. While the personal jurisdiction issue does not in-volve any novel or unusual questions, the issues regarding standing and failure to state a claim present issues of first impression regarding the proper interpretation of the Helms-Burton Act. Though the Act was adopted in 1996, the private right of action in Title III was suspended until May 2019. As such, most courts have not yet ad-dressed or resolved fundamental aspects of the statute’s enforcement. This appeal presents one of the first opportunities for this Court to address certain of those is-sues.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether the second amended complaint contains factual allegations as to each of the Expedia Entities sufficient to make out a prima facie case of specific per-sonal jurisdiction under Florida’s long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause.

2. Whether Plaintiffs lack standing under Article III of the Constitution and, thus, the federal courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over this case.

3. As an alternative ground for affirmance, whether Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6) because Plaintiffs failed to allege facts showing that a. Plaintiffs own “the claim[s]” to the allegedly confiscated properties and acquired ownership of those claims before March 12, 1996, as required by 22 U.S.C. § 6082(a)(4)(B); b. the Expedia Entities “knowingly and intentionally” engaged in or profit-ed from commercial activity concerning confiscated property, as required by the Act’s definition of traffics, 22 U.S.C. § 6023(A); c. the Expedia Entities engaged in conduct that falls outside the lawful-travel clause in the Act’s definition of traffics, 22 U.S.C. § 6023(13)(B)(iii); d. the allegedly confiscated properties meet the Act’s definition of property, which excludes most “real property used for residential purposes.”

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