U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decrease 42% In September; Decrease 12% For Year

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©

November 2018

September 2018 Food/Ag Exports To Cuba Decrease 42.6%- 1

12.2% Decrease Year-To-Year-5

Cuba Ranks 54th Of 224 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2

September 2018 Healthcare Product Exports US$962,509.00- 2

September 2018 Humanitarian Donations US$366,907.00- 3

Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue To Increase- 3

U.S. Port Export Data- 15

 SEPTEMBER 2018 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA DECREASE %- Exports of food products & agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in September 2018 were US$12,226,970.00 compared to US$21,329,099.00 in September 2017 and US$32,170,530.00 in September 2016.   

January 2018 through September 2018 exports were US$187,930,881.00 compared to US$214,122,226.00 for the same period in 2017.

For 2017, exports were US$268,800,005.00 compared to US$170,551,329.00 in 2016.

Agricultural product and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba since December 2001 exceed US$5,746,022,091.00 through September 2018 under provisions of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000.

LINK To Complete Report

Cuba & The 116th U.S. Congress: Who’s Who; Could Farm Bill Provision Be In Jeopardy?

The Democratic Party controls the United States House of Representatives:  

The Honorable Eliot Engel (D- New York) will be chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States House of Representatives. Representative Engel was supportive of Obama Administration initiatives relating to the Republic of Cuba.

The Honorable Albio Sires (D- New Jersey) will likely be chairman of the Western Hemisphere subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs Committee.  Mr. Sires is the ranking Democratic member of the sub-committee.  He is of Cuban descent and was not supportive of Obama Administration initiatives relating to the Republic of Cuba.   

The Honorable Christopher Smith (R- New Jersey) will be ranking Republican on the Foreign Affairs Committee; Representative Smith was not supportive of Obama Administration initiatives relating to the Republic of Cuba.   

The Honorable Carlos Curbelo (R- Florida), who is of Cuban descent, was defeated in his re-election effort on 6 November 2018.  

The Republican Party controls of the United States Senate:  

The Honorable James Risch (R- Idaho), will become Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.  Senator Risch was not supportive of Obama Administration initiatives relating to the Republic of Cuba. 

One member of the United States Senate remains the most influential Member of the United States Congress relating to the Republic of Cuba- The Honorable Marco Rubio (R-Florida).  He is of Cuban descent.  He will become the ranking member of the Committee on Foreign Relations.  He will remain chairman of the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate.  He is thinking about the next opportunity to run for president of the United States; his first effort in 2016 having been unsuccessful.   

The second-most influential member of the United States Senate with respect to the Republic of Cuba is The Honorable Robert Menendez (D- New Jersey), who is also of Cuban descent.  Senator Menendez will remain the ranking minority member of the Committee on Foreign Relations.   

The third-most influential member of the United States Senate with respect to the Republic of Cuba is The Honorable Ted Cruz (R- Texas), who is also of Cuban descent.  They represent three percent (3%) of the one hundred (100)-member United States Senate.  

NOTE: An amendment passed by the United States Senate to what is known as the “Farm Bill” remains expected to be enacted into law during the remaining days of the 115th Congress.   

The amendment, authored by The Honorable Heidi Heitkamp (D- North Dakota), a member of the United States Senate (who lost her re-election effort on 6 November 2018), was made likely (and ironically) to be included in the legislation specifically due to efforts by Senator Marco Rubio.  The amendment will permit United States taxpayer funds to be used for United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) programs managed by independent organizations for agricultural commodity and food product promotion in the Republic of Cuba.  Senator Rubio added language to prohibit any of the USDA funds from being directed to any Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba (FAR)-owned/controlled/affiliated entity.   

There remains a possibility that the United States Senate-approved amendment may be removed by members of the “Farm Bill” conference committee representing the House of Representatives in its current party configuration. 

The Next Months (Or Years) …  

After 6 November 2018, regardless of which political party controls which chamber of the United States Congress, the Trump Administration (with assistance from some members of the United States Congress) will continue to pursue commercial, economic and political policies and regulations designed to promote “regime change” in the Republic of Cuba.  However, according to a senior-level official of the Trump Administration, “the phrase ‘regime change’ will focus upon changing the behavior of the leadership of the regime as we are unlikely to replace those who lead the regime.”   

The Trump Administration’s term ends in 805 days… 

Rules and policies for the United States House of Representatives tend to make easier inserting and retaining a legislative measure while rules and policies for the United States Senate tend to make easier preventing and removing a legislative measure. 

Republic of Cuba-focused legislation is generally hostage to members of the United States Congress believing: 1) a perception that the legislation will benefit the Republic of Cuba and 2) a perception that the legislation will harm the Republic of Cuba.  Both 1 and 2 are not necessarily mutually-exclusive to one another. 

Legislative history has shown the Republic of Cuba to be a low-value commodity; to be traded away in most instances because it lacks importance.  The legislative calendar is littered with Members of Congress pronouncing they would not permit legislation unrelated to the Republic of Cuba to proceed unless issues relating to the Republic of Cuba were resolved.  In the end, no Member of Congress was going to seek to hold appropriation or other legislation of national importance because of the Republic of Cuba. 

Prudent to remember that the last change in United States law relating to the Republic of Cuba was more than 6,585 days ago- nearly eighteen (18) years. 

The Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the National Security Council (NSC) in The White House is The Honorable Mauricio Claver-Carone, a highly competent and skilled political operative… who is of Cuban descent.  His role in shaping the United States relationship with the Republic of Cuba and his relationships with members of the United States Congress should not be undervalued and ignored at one’s peril. 

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, and the Office of Legal Adviser (OLA) at the United States Department of State will continue to be weaponized for use towards the Republic of Cuba.

LINK to complete analysis

8 Days Later, Despite Statement Of Ambassador Bolton, Still No Changes To Cuba Restricted List

On 8 November 2017, the United States Department of State published its List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba (RESAC).  There have been no changes since. 

Changes to the RESAC have not been published on the Internet site of the United States Department of State (https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/cuba/cubarestrictedlist/275331.htm).

In an unpublished restricted draft of prepared remarks by The Honorable John Bolton, Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor, on 1 November 2018 at Miami Dade College (MDC) in Miami, Florida, the text included “Further, today, the State Department added over two dozen additional entities owned or controlled by the Cuban military and intelligence services to the restricted list of entities with which financial transactions by U.S. persons are prohibited.”   

In the published text of the delivered remarks by Ambassador Bolton, the present tense in terms of publication of additions to the RESAC was replaced with the future tense: “In this respect, I believe that within days the administration will add over two dozen additional entities owned or controlled by the Cuban military and intelligence services to the restricted list of entities with which financial transactions by U.S. persons are prohibited. And I believe even more will come as well.  The Cuban military and intelligence agencies must not profit from the United States, its people, its travelers, or its businesses.” 

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2018/11/1/text-of-remarks-by-national-security-advisor-john-bolton-in-florida 

If the United States Department of State was not prepared to release an update to the RESAC, then Ambassador Bolton should not have included the reference in his remarks.

President Diaz-Canel Using Ilyushin 96-300 Aircraft For Official Travel

BBC News

3 March 2006

London, United Kingdom 

Castro buys new presidential jet

Cuba is buying one of Russia's most up-to-date airliners, carefully crafted for President Fidel Castro's personal comfort.  

The purchase is part of an initial Cuban order for two brand new Ilyushin planes worth $110 million (£63 million) which Russian officials say is a shot in the arm for their struggling airline industry.  

To head off criticism that a new presidential jet is an expensive luxury in austere times, Cuba says one of its new planes is being used to ferry workers to and from Venezuela.  

To finance the deal, Cuba has paid 15% of the total sum up front, the rest coming from a 10-year loan from Russian banks.  

Creature comforts  

Russian NTV Mir television said the designers at Ilyushin had worked hard to give Mr Castro as smooth and secure a journey as possible.  

"This is a sofa bed on which he can spend his hours of rest or read a book from his own library. Everything has been designed to be as ergonomic as possible, with a personal reading lamp," designer Aleksandr Kuchukhidze told the channel.  

Principal interior designer Anton Nikolayev added: "Beige colours will predominate. Business meetings and talks can be held here."  

The station showed the little luxuries the president could expect: a DVD player, drinks bar and leather seats. But security is paramount too: the plane comes with armoured cockpit doors and a system for making bombs safe.  

Export breakthrough  

The report showed the Ilyushin Il-96-300, built in Voronezh, being handed over at Havana's Jose Marti airport. It said the order was one of the biggest the Voronezh Ilyushin plant had secured this decade.  

"These are the first Russian civilian aircraft to have been exported in the last 15 years," Ilyushin finance director Aleksandr Rubtsov said.  

"We are convinced that Cuba can become a springboard for exporting our planes, above all in the countries of Latin America."  

Russia and Cuba plan to sign another contract in Cuba on 10 March for the supply of a further five airliners, for an undisclosed sum.  

Cuba has been a key customer of Soviet-built aircraft - whether civilian Ilyushins or military MiGs - since the Cold War era.  

Even today, Cuban pilots for the newest Ilyushins are being trained in Russia, and Ilyushin engineers are in to Havana to school ground crews on maintaining the planes.  

From Wikipedia: 

Transportation for the Cuban President is the responsibility of Cubana de Aviación, one of Cuba's state-owned airlines. Although the entire fleet is available for presidential use, the most commonly used aircraft are 2 Ilyushin Il-96.  

The government of Cuba operated a Ilyushin Il-62 and Ilyushin Il-96 in 2015. 

The Ilyushin Il-96 (Russian: Илью́шин Ил-96) is a Russian four-engined long-haul wide-body airliner designed by Ilyushin in the former Soviet Union and manufactured by the Voronezh Aircraft Production Association in Russia. It is powered by four Aviadvigatel PS-90 two-shaft turbofan engines. 

The Il-96-300 is the initial variant and is fitted with Aviadvigatel (Soloviev) PS-90A turbofans with a thrust rating of 16,000 kgf (157 kN, 35,300 lbf). Development started in the mid-80s while the first prototype flew on 28 September 1988. The first Il-96 entered service with Aeroflot in 1993.  

Range with 262 passengers and fuel reserves (for holding 75 minutes at an altitude of 450 m) in a two-class configuration is about 11,000 km (5,940 nmi), allowing flights from Moscow to US west coast cities, a great improvement over the Ilyushin Il-86. A highly customized version of the Il-96-300, called Il-96-300PU is used as the primary aircraft in the Russian presidential aircraft fleet. Four were used by Russian president Vladimir Putin, and by Dmitry Medvedev as VIP planes. The VIP aircraft is operated by Russia State Transport Company. The Cuban leadership use the IL-96-300.

Cuba Releases 2018-2019 Portfolio Of Opportunities For Foreign Investment

Cuba Portfolios Of Opportunities For Foreign Investment

 LINK To 2018/2019 Document In PDF Format- Part 1, Part 2, Part 3

 LINK To 2017-2018 Document In PDF Format

 LINK To 2016-2017 Document In PDF Format

LINK To 2015 Document In PDF Format

LINK To 2015 Document In PDF Format

LINK To 2014 Document In PDF Format

LINK To Investor Guide

With Ambassador Bolton's Speech, Trump Administration Did Not Project Preparedness

The Dog That Didn’t (yet) Bite

Trump Administration Did Not Project Preparedness

OFAC Is Feared Because It’s Unpredictable With Its SDN List

State Department Has Become Predictable With Its RESAC List

U.S. Companies Prefer Predictability

Trump Administration Seems To Be Accommodating 

An important component of the Trump Administration’s strategy towards the Republic of Cuba is the creation and maintenance of uncertainty.  Absence of predictability is an essential tool for reducing and eliminating commercial interest toward any marketplace. 

On 8 November 2017, the United States Department of State published its List of Restricted Entities and Subentities Associated with Cuba (RESAC).  There have been no changes since. 

In an unpublished restricted draft of prepared remarks by The Honorable John Bolton, Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor, on 1 November 2018 at Miami Dade College (MDC) in Miami, Florida, the text included “Further, today, the State Department added over two dozen additional entities owned or controlled by the Cuban military and intelligence services to the restricted list of entities with which financial transactions by U.S. persons are prohibited.”   

In the published text of the remarks by Ambassador Bolton, released by The White House in the late evening of 2 November 2018, the present tense in terms of publication of additions to the RESAC was replaced with the future tense: “In this respect, I believe that within days the administration will add over two dozen additional entities owned or controlled by the Cuban military and intelligence services to the restricted list of entities with which financial transactions by U.S. persons are prohibited. And I believe even more will come as well.  The Cuban military and intelligence agencies must not profit from the United States, its people, its travelers, or its businesses.” 

Changes to the RESAC have not been published on the Internet site of the United States Department of State (https://www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/cuba/cubarestrictedlist/275331.htm).  If the United States Department of State was not prepared to release an update to the RESAC, then Ambassador Bolton should not have included the reference in his remarks. 

Additionally, neither the prepared nor delivered text of Ambassador Bolton’s remarks was not released by The White House in advance; and were not released on 1 November 2018. 

During the event, Ambassador Bolton shared that “And I believe even more will come as well….  We're going to make sure that we put as much pressure on as we can.” 

Ambassador Bolton confirmed that the Trump Administration has discussed (using a term to create and maintain uncertainty and fear) with members of the United States Congress to permit the implementation of Title III of the Libertad Act of 1996 which would authorize lawsuits in United States Federal Courts for assets expropriated by the government of the Republic of Cuba from individuals who were not United States citizens at the time of expropriation.   

The 5,913 certified claimants (those who were United States citizens at the time of expropriation) oppose the implementation of Title III on the basis that the interests of United States citizens should not be subjugated to the interests of non-United States citizens; and that the certified claimants, whose expropriated assets represent the foundation for United States policies, regulations and laws impacting the Republic of Cuba should remain the primary focus of The White House.  The implementation of Title III has been suspended by the occupant of The White House every six months since 1996.  

While uncertainty can be an effective political tool, when a statement is made about the availability of material information that is critical to real-time decision-making by individuals and companies subject to United States jurisdiction, important for the material information to be available in real-time.   

Normally, when a text is subjected to a thorough multi-week or multi-day inter-agency review, particularly in advance of a high-profile address such as that of Ambassador Bolton, the three (3) primary departments: United States Department of State, United States Department of the Treasury and United States Department of Commerce have their respective notifications issued simultaneously and/or immediately following the high-profile address.  That did not happen on 1 November 2018 or thus far on 2 November 2018.  The event at MDC was in the planning process from at least 18 October 2018 and had been scheduled for 30 October 2018.   

When The Honorable Donald Trump, President of the United States, delivered remarks in Miami, Florida, on 16 June 2017, the United States Department of the Treasury, United States Department of Commerce and United States Department of State each published corresponding regulatory and policy changes on their respective Internet sites.  

A primary reason for the effectiveness of the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury is the absence of predictability when publishing changes to the list of Specially Designated Nationals And Blocked Persons List (SDN). 

If the Trump Administration genuinely wanted to discourage individuals and companies subject to United States jurisdiction from interest towards the Republic of Cuba, it would instruct the United States Department of State to adopt the unpredictability of the OFAC.   

However, when a public statement is delivered, particularly by a senior official at The White House, the information should be immediately available.   

The United States Department of State should announce that changes to the RESAC may be published at any time and then add one or more every month. 

Doing so would then require constant monitoring of the RESAC; and that would require time and money to be allocated by interested parties.  The result would be exhaustion by some individuals and companies. 

OFAC is powerful and feared because it is unpredictable. 

The United States Department of State has become predictable which lessens its power. 

Thus far, for United States companies, the restraint shown through what the Trump Administration has chosen not to do, the bite, is an indication of the limits to which its bark need be feared.

LINK To Complete Text

DHS Reports 92 Students From Cuba Studied In U.S. In 2017; No Data Yet For 2018

From The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS): 

1 November 2018 

“Last week, ICE launched a series of data sets on ICE.gov about the international student population. Here’s a link to that data, https://www.ice.gov/sevis/whats-new#tab2, as well as a link to the news release announcing the data library, https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/sevp-publishes-2017-international-student-data. Per the data, in calendar year 2017, there were 92 international students from Cuba studying at U.S. schools.” 

From The DHS Report 

“North America 

North America saw the largest proportional decline of students coming into the United States to study.  Specifically, the decline in the number of Mexican (-1,120) and Canadian (-357) students accounted for the overall continental trend.  However, there were marginal gains in the number of students from some Latin American and Caribbean countries.  Honduras sent 155 more students, which is a 7 percent increase from last year, and Cuba more than doubled its international student population by sending 25 more students.”

Text of Remarks By National Security Advisor John Bolton In Florida

Assistant to the President and National Security Advisor Ambassador John R. Bolton Delivers Remarks on the Trump Administration’s Policies in Latin America

at

Miami Dade College in Miami, Florida

Thursday, November 1, 2018

NOTE: The White House initially refused to release the text of the delivered remarks by Ambassador Bolton. According to The National Security Council (NSC) on 1 November 2018, the text of the delivered remarks is expected to be released in the afternoon; they were published late in the evening of 2 November 2018. The White House did not provide a reason(s) for not releasing the delivered text in a timely manner.

LINK To Embargoed Text

LINK To Delivered Text

Permitting Other Than U.S. Certified Claimants- Think Texaco & Marriott, To Bring Actions To U.S. Courts Is Self-Defeating

Permitting Other Than U.S. Certified Claimants- Think Texaco & Marriott, To Bring Actions To U.S. Courts Is Self-Defeating

The soil upon which United States policy, regulations and laws sprouted since 1961 was created by the seizure of assets by the government of the Republic of Cuba.

There are 8,821 claims of which 5,913 awards have been certified by the United States Foreign Claims Settlement Commission (USFCSC- https://www.justice.gov/fcsc) at the United States Department of Justice which are valued at US$1,902,202,284.95.

Of these claims, thirty (30) United States-based companies hold 56.85% of the total value. The USFCSC permitted interest to be accrued in the amount of 6% per annum; with the current value ranging from US$6 billion to US$9 billion.

Posts About Certified Claims & Trump Administration

31 August 2018

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2018/8/29/ouktsdg4gyrblq7zudchikvdd6abdo?rq=certified%20claims

June 14 2018

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2018/6/14/trump-administration-may-be-focusing-upon-certified-claims-unlike-obama-administration?rq=certified%20claims

17 July 2017

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/7/11/memo-from-nsc-to-potus-this-week-for-title-iii-suspension-capitulate-incapacitate-or-negotiate?rq=certified%20claims

29 May 2017

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/5/29/0t6ts1bv3by20ot3mi9bydvdqv3e86?rq=certified%20claims

1 January 2017

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2017/1/12/h2uudthnn6be8hfgxifqsrdo4aqpb0?rq=certified%20claims

1 December 2016

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2016/12/1/zigs56x0gme3a9rqg7aecx9vf2gqgk?rq=certified%20claims

13 September 2016

https://www.cubatrade.org/blog/2016/8/6/obama-administration-wont-seek-dismissal-of-civil-judgements-against-cuba-to-help-certified-claimants?rq=certified%20claims

LINK to complete post text

What U.S. Does Towards Venezuela & Cuba Impacts Colombia, Brazil, Peru, Chile, Ecuador

Can Venezuela be repaired without jeopardizing the financial benefits received by Cuba? 

Does Cuba benefit from a crisis-infused Venezuela which creates systemic commercial, economic and political issues for Colombia? 

The government of the Republic of Cuba has no incentive to provoke measures that would replace the Maduro Administration when those measures will result in economic and financial pain for the Republic of Cuba and require the Republic of Cuba to make commercial and economic changes that it does not want to make and has not had to make because other countries (Venezuela, China, Russia, among others) have provided resources to forestall those decisions.   

Since 2000, Venezuela has, beginning with the Chavez Administration and continuing through the Maduro Administration provided the Republic of Cuba with more than US$1 billion to upwards of US$4 billion annually in discounted oil (with multi-year repayment terms), import financing, loans, grants, and employment for thousands of Republic of Cuba nationals. 

The United States government believes that the Maduro Administration remains in place due in large measure to efforts by the government of the Republic of Cuba.   

The United States government believes the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba (FAR) and the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Cuba (MININT) have the capability to organize the replacement of the Maduro Administration which would accelerate a stabilization and subsequent repair to the commercial, economic and political infrastructure within Venezuela. 

The United States government believes that the exodus primarily to Colombia of more than 2 million citizens from Venezuela is a responsibility of the government of the Republic of Cuba.  During the last two years, the exodus has increased the population of Colombia and created employment stresses (decreasing wages and increasing unemployment) and increased crime.  

The government of the Republic of Cuba has a role in the peace process between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the government of Colombia; some FARC members are attending educational workshops in the Republic of Cuba. 

Venezuela & Oil & Cuba: Decisions Have Consequences For The United States

Increasing oil production in the United States creates employment opportunities.  Consistent oil prices are good for United States consumers.  Lower oil prices are good for United States consumers.

 If oil prices become too low and remain too low, there is negative impact upon United States oil producers, particularly those involved in fracking. 

Higher oil prices can permit oil-producing countries to increase their imports.  However, oil prices need be below a level(s) that will decrease the consumption by importers. 

Higher oil prices can increase revenues of United States-based oil producers, but at the potential expense of United States-based oil consumers.  Oil producers prefer to export product when prices are higher rather than direct production within the United States. 

A challenge is how to seek a price level for oil that is low enough to maintain and, if necessary, stimulate economic activity- spending by consumers and companies where oil is a significant input cost, and high enough to retain exploration expenditures and fund purchases by oil-producing countries whose revenues would be strained to manage imports.  

Lower oil prices assist countries with limited or without domestic oil production including China and Republic of Cuba. 

Lower oil prices are challenging for oil-producing countries (OPEC-members, Russia, Iran, Venezuela among others).  Members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): Algeria, Angola, Congo, Ecuador, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela.  OPEC Observers include Egypt, Mexico, Norway, Oman and Russia among other countries. 

Lower oil prices can stimulate a focus upon inefficiencies in oil-producing countries, particularly where governments lack transparency, accountability and democratic institutions.  Those governments will adapt to survive; they are not typically suicidal.  They may refocus on the non-oil-dependent sectors of their economies. 

Higher oil prices can insulate countries considered autocratic or not-ideal democracies to continue behavior deemed detrimental to the interests of democracies.  Venezuela will continue to assist the Republic of Cuba. 

Lower oil prices would lessen revenues for Venezuela, which would complicate the ability for Venezuela to repay loans to China and Russia among others.  Higher oil prices would accelerate the ability of Venezuela to repay China and Russia among others, but higher oil prices negatively impact the economy of China and the Republic of Cuba by increasing the cost of an important import.  

If China and Russia choose not to continue their support the Maduro Administration, Venezuela will need to make survival choices- and a primary one is the elimination financial support to the Republic of Cuba and to other Caribbean Sea-area countries.   

Russia and Saudi Arabia among other OPEC members may desire a hobbled Venezuela as the result is a lessening of oil supplies which assist to maintain higher oil prices. 

The Trump Administration must balance the impact of lessening oil production from Iran, which the Trump Administration supports, with a decrease in global oil production, which may result in higher oil prices.  There is value in an increase in countries contributing oil to the global marketplace- lower and consistent oil prices.   

However, if Venezuela increases its oil production, there could be downward pricing, which would benefit the United States- and allies and foes.  Increasing oil production by Venezuela could also stabilize the Maduro Administration- which would result in the Republic of Cuba continuing to receive financial support from Venezuela.

A stabilized Venezuela may also positively impact Colombia, which would likely see a lessening of migration from Venezuela.   

The impact of decisions by the United States government to influence commercial, economic and political outcomes in Venezuela and the Republic of Cuba cannot today be siloed from collateral impact towards allies and towards foes.

LINK to complete post text

Crowley Reports Approximately 10% Decline In Business With Cuba

Jacksonville, Florida-based Crowley Marine Corporation’s subsidiary Crowley Liner Services, reported that its “business” with the Republic of Cuba (Link To Shipping Page) thus far in 2018 had declined approximately 10% compared to 2017.

United States agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba have declined approximately 8.8% thus far in 2018 compared to 2017.

Crowley Liner Services transports products from the United States to the Republic of Cuba including agricultural commodities (poultry- which represents approximately 61% of all agricultural commodity/food product exports to Cuba thus far in 2018), food products, Obama initiative shipments, and shipments for the United States Embassy in Havana. Crowley Liner Services has also transported charcoal from the Republic of Cuba to the United States for sale by Hialeah, Florida-based Fogo Premium Hardwood.

About Crowley
”Jacksonville-based Crowley Holdings Inc., a holding company of the 126-year-old Crowley Maritime Corporation, is a privately held family and employee-owned company that provides marine solutions, energy and logistics services in domestic and international markets. Crowley operates under four business units: Crowley LOGISTICS, a singular ocean liner and logistics supply chain division; Crowley SHIPPING, which encompasses ownership, operations and management of vessels, including tankers, container ships, tugboats and barges; Crowley FUELS, a fuel transportation, distribution and sales division that also provides liquefied natural gas (LNG) and related services; and Crowley SOLUTIONS, which focuses on government services, including vessel management for government agencies, as well as engineering, project management, naval architecture through its subsidiary Jensen Maritime, and marine salvage and emergency response through its 50 percent ownership in Ardent Global. Additional information about Crowley, its subsidiaries and business units may be found at  www.crowley.com.”