Turkiye's Global Ports Holding Signed 15-Year Management Contract For Cuba's Passenger Ship Operations. Company Has Removed Almost All References From Its Internet Site.

Istanbul, Turkey-based Global Ports Holding (2023 revenues approximately US$213 million) has a registered office in London, United Kingdom, and is listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). 

Link To Company Global Presence Presentation In PDF Format

Global Ports Holding has “a management agreement in Cuba to advise and consult on cruise port management best practice. The cruise terminal is in the Sierra Maestra complex, in San Francisco pier, with a current capacity for two ships.” 

http://www.globalportsholding.com/news-details/113/awarded-agreement-for-operation-of-havana-cruise-port-cuba 

Global Ports Holding Plc ("GPH Plc" or "Group"), the world's largest independent cruise port operator, is pleased to announce that it has signed a 15-year management agreement (“the Agreement”) with the Cuban company Aries S.A., for the operation of the cruise port in Havana, Cuba.

Under the terms of the Agreement, the Group will from 21st June 2018, use its global expertise and operating model to manage all of the cruise port operations over the life of the Agreement. As consideration, the Group will be paid a management fee that is based on a number of factors including passenger numbers, with growth based incentives. In addition to operating the cruise port operations, the Group will continue to work with our Cuban partners on the design and technical specification of the cruise port investment program, including proposed new terminals. Once these have been completed GPH will take responsibility for the marketing and commercialisation of these new facilities.

The Agreement is part of significant investment by Cuba into the port area and the tourism infrastructure in Havana. The port currently has capacity of two berths and in 2017 welcomed c328,000 cruise passengers, a growth rate of 156% compared to 2016, with over 500,000 cruise passengers forecast for 2018. As part of Cuba’s significant investment program into the port and surrounding area the number of berths will increase to six by 2024, significantly increasing the passenger capacity of the Havana port.

Cuba, located in the northern Caribbean, is the largest island in the Caribbean. Havana, the capital city of Cuba, is its major port and commercial centre and offers visitors a truly unique experience. The port itself is situated at the heart of Havana and only a 30-minute drive from Jose Marti International Airport, making it an ideal home porting destination.   

Global Ports Holding, Chairman and Co-Founder Mehmet Kutman said: “I am very happy that we have signed an agreement for Havana Cruise Port, the first step in the Group’s growth strategy for the Americas. This spectacular city and country is becoming an increasingly popular tourist destination, with visitors attracted by world famous architecture, a vibrant music scene and the famous local hospitality. We very much look forward to working with our Cuban partners to deliver a fantastic cruise port experience.” Global Ports Holding, CEO Emre Sayin said: “We are delighted to have been awarded the management contract for the Havana cruise port and look forward to playing our role in developing the cruise port and the wider visitor experience in Havana, as well as Cuba more broadly.

This represents our first Agreement in the Caribbean, in line with our strategy of expansion into the Americas cruise port market and therefore marks an important step in the development of Global Ports Holding. The GPH team looks forward to working with our local partners and local staff to drive continued growth in cruise passenger volumes at Havana Port and deliver both world class cruise port facilities and a great cruise experience for all passengers visiting Havana.” 

According to Global Ports Holding: “In May 2018 Global Ports Holding signed a management agreement in Cuba to advise and consult on cruise port management best practice. The cruise terminal is in the Sierra Maestra complex, in San Francisco pier, with a current capacity for two ships. The building itself is a designed architectural landmark of the city. Located at the historic heart of the city, in the waterfront promenade, in front of San Francisco square and near to other important attractions such as the “Plaza Vieja”, the “Plaza de las Armas” and the Cathedral, it enjoys the unique atmosphere of both the Havana Bay and the old town.” 

“Cuba is located in the main cruise destination, the Caribbean, and its capital Havana very near to the Floridian ports. Thanks to its strategic location in the region, Havana can be included in all kind of itineraries: the longest ones deployed in the West and East Caribbean but also the 3- 4 days itineraries sailing out from Florida. Besides, the cultural richness of the island and its capital is unparalleled anywhere in the Caribbean.”  Link: http://www.globalportsholding.com/ports/17/la-habana-cruise-port

LINKS To Related Analyses 

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Turkiye's Karpowership Providing Approximately 25% Of Cuba's Electricity... But, Company Does Not Want To Promote Its Presence In Cuba.

From Istanbul, Turkiye-based Karadeniz Holdings (2023 revenue approximately US$560 million): “For the last 74 years Karadeniz Holding has been one of the most innovative companies leading the energy sector not only in Turkey but in the world, as well as having operations in the finance, real estate, and shipbuilding industries.” 

LINK To Company Global Presence Map In PDF Format

“Turkiye’s Karadeniz Holdings Now Has Eight “Karpowerships” In Cuba Providing Approximately 25% Of Island’s Electricity.  In 53 Months, Company Now Has 22.2% Of Its 36-Vessel Fleet In Cuba- And There Have Already Been Payment Issues.” 

"Publication of New Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) on Basic Information and Updated FAQs on Cuba Sanctions"

Publication of New Frequently Asked Question (FAQ) on Basic Information and Updated FAQs on Cuba Sanctions 

“The Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is publishing one new, basic information Frequently Asked Question (FAQ 1190). OFAC is also publishing two amended Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ 736 and FAQ 757) related to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR).  For more information on this specific action, please visit our Recent Actions page.”

“1190. Do U.S. sanctions target persons for engaging in political speech, religious practice, or other constitutionally protected activities?

OFAC does not sanction persons for their engagement in activities subject to U.S. constitutional protection, such as protected speech or religious practice or for their religious beliefs; nor do U.S. persons violate OFAC sanctions for engaging in such constitutionally protected activity. Furthermore, additional limitations and authorizations are in place to ensure that U.S. sanctions do not restrict the exchange of information or informational materials, or personal communication. The majority of OFAC sanctions programs are promulgated pursuant to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq., which limits the authority to “regulate or prohibit, directly or indirectly . . . any postal, telegraphic, telephonic, or other personal communication, which does not involve a transfer of anything of value . . . or, the importation from any country, or the exportation to any country, whether commercial or otherwise, . . . of any information or informational materials.” 50 U.S.C. § 1702(b)(1), (3).  No authorization is necessary for U.S. persons to engage in activities that are not prohibited by or are otherwise exempt from sanctions. If you are concerned that potential sanctions may interfere with constitutionally protected activities, please reach out to OFAC for further guidance as described here.  Date Released August 27, 2024

736. May the U.S. dollar be used to conduct transactions in Cuba or with Cuban nationals?

Yes, under certain circumstances. Persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction may engage in transactions in U.S. dollars in Cuba or with Cuban nationals with respect to activity that is authorized pursuant to the Cuban Assets Control Regulations (CACR). For example, payments for telecommunications services in Cuba provided pursuant to 31 CFR § 515.542 may be provided in U.S. dollars. Further, the use of U.S. dollars for transactions that are exempt from the prohibitions of, or authorized by, the CACR is also allowed. For example, payments related to the importation or exportation of informational materials as defined in 31 CFR § 515.332, such as books or musical recordings, may be made in U.S. dollars.  Additionally, the May 29, 2024 amendment to section 515.584(d) of the CACR authorizes banking institutions subject to U.S. jurisdiction to process transactions originating and terminating outside the United States, provided that neither the originator nor the beneficiary is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction (“U-turn general license”). As a result, transactions related to third-country commerce involving Cuba or Cuban nationals may be processed in U.S. dollars through the U.S. financial system via banking institutions located in the United States that serve as intermediary banks, provided that neither the originator nor the beneficiary is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction. For more information on the “U-turn” general license, please see FAQ 757.  OFAC expects U.S. banks, including their foreign branches and subsidiaries, to conduct due diligence on their own direct customers (including, for example, ownership structure (for entities), proof of citizenship (for individuals), and address information to confirm that the transactions being processed are consistent with the U-turn general license. All banks, including those acting solely as intermediaries, should screen against the OFAC SDN List and their own internal filters. In cases where the remitter or beneficiary of the transaction is not a direct customer, the U.S. banking institution that is acting as an intermediary may rely on the remitter’s or beneficiary’s address as stated in the transaction to determine whether the remitter or beneficiary is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction, unless the U.S. banking institution knows or has reason to know that the remitter or beneficiary of a transaction is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction. OFAC will consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding the bank’s processing of transactions where a bank is acting solely as an intermediary and fails to block a prohibited transaction engaged in by a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction, including the factors listed above, to determine what, if any, enforcement action to take against the bank. Note, however, that transactions meeting the requirements of 31 CFR § 515.584(d) may be processed notwithstanding the involvement of a specially designated national of Cuba, as defined in 31 CFR § 515.306, in the transaction. The examples below illustrate some of the transactions and parties that may use the U-turn general license.  Date Updated: August 27, 2024

757. Are U.S. banking institutions authorized to process “U-turn” transactions in which Cuba or a Cuban national has an interest?

Yes. Effective May 29, 2024, banking institutions subject to U.S. jurisdiction are authorized to process “U-turn” transactions, i.e., funds transfers originating and terminating outside the United States, provided that neither the originator nor the beneficiary is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction. For a complete description of what this general license authorizes and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.584(d). For additional information, see FAQ 736.  Date Updated: August 27, 2024”

Cuba Again Constricts Re-Emerging Private Sector Embracing "Can't Live With It, Can't Live Without It" Strategy. Another Opportunity For Biden-Harris Administration To Embrace "Crock Pot" Theory

As the philosopher Desiderius Erasmus said about women, the government of the Republic of Cuba views the re-emerging private sector from the perspective.... "Can't live with them, can't live without them."

Micro, Small, and Medium-Size Enterprises (MSMEs) may be “state-owned, private, mixed, or owned by political, mass, and social organizations.”

Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
20 August 2024

New restrictions on wholesalers spark fears about Cuban private sector’s future
By Nora Gámez Torres

The Cuban government has announced new measures, including limiting wholesale trade by the private sector, that officials say would “correct economic distortions” but will likely exacerbate shortages and worsen inflation in the midst of a severe economic crisis. 

In a 167-page document published Monday in the official Cuban gazette, the government issued several laws and regulations imposing new taxes, protracted bureaucratic requirements and restrictions on the activities of small and medium enterprises, non-agricultural cooperatives and the self-employed, which comprise the island’s nascent private sector. 

LINK TO 167-PAGE DOCUMENT IN PDF FORMAT 

According to the new rules, which Prime Minister Manuel Marrero hinted at during a National Assembly session last month, small and medium private enterprises, known in Spanish as mipymes, and cooperatives will still be able to import goods from abroad for their business. 

However, they can only import and sell goods in the wholesale market if that is their stated “main activity” as a company and only “through contracts involving state entities.” In an official list of 11,288 existing private enterprises and cooperatives compiled by the Ministry of Economy, only one private enterprise has “wholesale trade” stated as its principal activity. 

The measures could disrupt supply chains in the private sector, because many private enterprises have found it profitable to buy goods abroad to supply not just their own businesses but also to sell to others, including the self-employed. Many self-employed workers have also made fast cash by buying and selling wholesale, but the new regulations, which kick off in 30 days, prohibit that as well. Official figures reveal that the private sector imported food and other goods valued at $1.3 billion in 2023, and another $936 million this year until June, providing a lifeline to the Cuban population during the country’s worst economic crisis in many decades. 

The regulations come after the government imposed price controls last month on some food products sold by the private sector, which is already causing shortages. The government is not even able to pay for the food distributed through rationing cards, but Cuban leaders, who that insist state-owned “socialist enterprises” should be predominant in the economy, have become hostile to the rapid growth of the private sector. Marrero has accused business owners of tax evasion and pledged to enforce stricter controls, sparking concerns about the island’s economic future. 

The private sector has become a formidable competitor to the conglomerate known as GAESA, which is run by the military and which controls large sectors of the Cuban economy. GAESA used to control the foreign currency entering the country in the form of remittances — money sent by Cubans abroad to families on the island. But the Trump administration sanctioned the military company handling remittances, and Cubans in Miami found other informal channels to send money to relatives, which ended up helping finance private businesses. Government stores, including military-run chains such as TRD, are struggling to fill their shelves, while private stores are increasing nationwide. 

By limiting which companies can be involved in wholesale and ensuring state participation, the government may be trying to ensure that goods bought by the private sector are sold in government stores or used to revitalize state industries. Cuban economist Pedro Monreal, who lives in Spain, said on X that the restrictions on wholesale trade could favor big private sector players with connections to the government. However, the impact of the restrictions is not yet fully understood because the Ministry of Domestic Trade has yet to issue its regulations to implement them. Crisis in Cuba Cuba’s economic crisis is worsening. The country lost 10% of its population to migration, but the government announced a crackdown on the private sector. 

The new laws also state that private businesses must use their Cuban checking bank accounts for “all” their business transactions and use only the local currency, the Cuban peso, a measure first announced by Marrero last month that has generated uncertainty among Cuban entrepreneurs. If enforced, this requirement would hinder private businesses’ ability to pay providers abroad. Currently, many use bank accounts in third countries to pay for supplies because Cuban banks do not have dollars to support such operations and do not allow such transfers. 

Many business owners have resisted rules imposing electronic payments as the only way to get paid by clients and customers for goods and services because they need cash to buy dollars in the black market to pay for supplies abroad. “At first glance, these new laws represent another major step backward for the Cuban economy,” said Ric Herrero, the executive director of the Washington-based Cuba Study Group, a Cuban-American organization that supports the island’s private sector. “They generate a lot of uncertainty but do make it clear that their goal is neither economic nor developmental growth. Instead, they appear primarily designed to hinder the growth of the Cuban private sector and protect the interests of under-performing state-owned companies.” 

Herrero also believes the new regulations send the wrong message at a time when the United States and even Cuban allies like Russia and China would like to see the government moving forward with economic reforms. Resisting calls to open the private sector to foreign investment, the new government decree requires that company owners be Cubans with “effective” permanent residence on the island, ruling out that Cubans living abroad can legally own such businesses. 

Some Cuban Americans have tried to bypass such prohibitions — and U.S. embargo restrictions as well — by setting up businesses in Cuba under the name of relatives and friends. But that is also prohibited under new rules that ban company owners from representing someone else’s interests. For the first time, the government will allow foreigners to own private businesses in Cuba, but they must also be permanent residents of the country. 

More significantly, the rules do not even address the possibility that these businesses may receive foreign investment, which most economists agree is essential for the island’s economic development. “These laws also show little concern for the negative impact they will have on the foreign relations of a bankrupt country that should be prioritizing its integration into the global economy,” Herrero said. 

The new regulations increase the number of activities that are prohibited to the private sector, from 112 to 125. Most professions, tourism, banking and anything related to telecommunications or the media remain off-limits. Still, the rationale for some new prohibitions, like a ban on making orthopedic footwear, is unclear. Other rules, like requiring honey producers to sell only to the state, seem designed to stifle competition from the private sector. Other rules will immediately put some companies out of business. For example, the new rules prohibit teachers of languages, music and other arts from forming academies, which many have already done. 

The new legal framework also adds red tape to opening a business, requiring multiple authorizations, including first approval by municipal authorities, which Herrero fears might exacerbate corruption at the local level. 

The government also eliminated tax incentives and imposed an additional 5% workforce tax for self-employed workers, who are allowed to hire up to three employees. Oniel Díaz Castellanos, a Cuban entrepreneur who runs a business helping set up private enterprises, said many regulations are not new and maintain “absurd, regrettable and counterproductive prohibitions.” He believes not much will change for business owners in the upcoming months because many rules come with a 180-day implementation window. Even if not “catastrophic” for the private sector in the short term, the regulations ran counter to the government’s stated goals to improve the economy, he said: “We are going in the wrong direction.” 

Link To Related Analysis

For Cuba: Biden-Harris Administration Should Implement Crock Pot Theory And Quid Pro Quo With Quo Not Giving What Quid Wants. Jul 21, 2024

Other Media Reporting 

Cubaheadlines.com: “The Cuban government, through the Council of Ministers, announced on Monday the publication of Decree 107, which establishes new restrictions on micro, small, and medium-sized private enterprises (MSMEs), non-agricultural cooperatives, and self-employed workers. 

This decree nullifies and replaces Decree 49 of 2021 and identifies a total of 125 activities that these economic actors are not allowed to perform. Among the most notable activities now banned for the private sector are the manufacturing of pharmaceutical products, financial intermediation, book publishing and layout, television programming and broadcasting, telecommunications activities, and various forms of transportation and storage. 

Additionally, sensitive sectors such as defense, public security, and the administration of social services are also off-limits. Decree 107 reflects the regime’s strategy to maintain centralized control over key economic sectors, but it could have adverse effects on economic growth, job creation, and social well-being.  According to prominent economist Pedro Monreal, the decree "confirms the squeezing out of private activity and the market as part of state measures to allegedly 'correct distortions and boost the economy’.” 

The implementation of this decree represents a significant challenge for the development of the private sector in Cuba, as it limits the diversification and growth of new economic initiatives in strategic areas. In a context where the state sector faces significant limitations, preventing private actors from accessing these sectors could perpetuate the lack of competitiveness, innovation, and efficiency in the Cuban economy.  The decree also imposes restrictions on sectors that could have directly benefited local development and employment, such as the production of audiovisual media, transport management, and the provision of technology services. This could result in a lower supply of services and products, negatively impacting the population's well-being. 

The tightening of restrictions could also discourage foreign investment and the participation of Cubans in the diaspora in the national economy, thereby limiting opportunities for financing and the much-needed inflow of foreign currency. 

“It’s time to take action!” With this phrase, Cuban leader Miguel Díaz-Canel confirmed the regime’s shift in its policy of timid economic openness and reiterated his intention to subject the activities of the “new economic actors” to state guidelines and centralized economic planning.  “It’s time to move beyond diagnoses and take action,” said Díaz-Canel at the end of July, during his closing speech of the third regular session of the X Legislature of the National Assembly of People's Power (ANPP). 

The process of “debate and exchange” with the owners of MSMEs to convince them of the need to cap prices of essential products that the state cannot sell through the regulated family basket has ended. The result is another example of the repressive and coercive nature of the Cuban totalitarian regime.  Despite insisting that the government has not started a “witch hunt” against MSMEs, Díaz-Canel emphasized the intention to rein in the commercial activities of the “new actors” that he himself promoted. 

“Regarding our responsibilities in the uncertain and complex realm of the economy, it is necessary to recognize that in the effort to comply with the economic and social policy guidelines of the VIII Congress of the Party, by unblocking processes and promoting the formation of MSMEs, there was not enough firmness in the requirement to create sufficiently robust and comprehensive normative bases to guide the functioning of this form of management that was already operating in the economy but without formal recognition,” he pointed out. 

The lack of regulation of MSMEs, according to the leader, caused chaos in the Cuban economy, driving inflation and accentuating inequality in the country.  “Therefore, we must ensure that what has been approved is fulfilled, clearly defining the objectives, better preparing the executors of each measure, providing political, communicational, material, and financial assurance, and organizing actions with an implementation schedule so that they do not remain just rhetoric. And above all, exert control over corrections and adjustments with the necessary feedback.” 

“Post-controls have shown that many of these businesses did not respond to the state’s trust with the honesty and transparency demanded and required by a minimally organized society. Consequently, no violator of the tax system and legality in general can question the demands arising from the analysis of the errors and distortions of the process. As has been said at this time, the law and order must prevail if we want all forms of economic management to succeed and strengthen,” he added.  “It’s time to take action” is the new slogan of the regime that has been in power for 65 years, but Díaz-Canel does not want to scare the emerging entrepreneurs. “I want to reiterate that there is no and will not be a witch hunt against private MSMEs, as some claim, manipulate, or suggest.” 

According to the also First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC), “the confrontation will be against lack of control, illegalities, tax evasion, speculation, and fraud, whether they come from non-state or state companies.” 

“This is a battle against illegality and not against forms of property and management,” concluded the leader appointed by General Raúl Castro to steer the “continuity” and implement the economic measures emanating from the VIII Congress of the PCC, which led to the failed “ordering.” 

“Remember that we are all here to save the Revolution and socialism,” Díaz-Canel warned at the beginning of July during a meeting of the Council of Ministers, reaffirming once again the centrality of the socialist model in Cuba’s economy.  Recently, during his report to the Economic Commission of the ANPP, the Cuban leader announced an "ordering" plan for the private and state sectors, due to the "irresponsible manner" in which some of these institutions are conducting themselves, he noted. 

In this regard, he insisted that it is not a “witch hunt” against any specific form of management or property. However, the official discourse has been attacking MSMEs for months, especially those that import finished products or do not comply with price caps.  “What we are proposing here is an order so that there is the greatest amount of goods and services available at appropriate prices for the population, and that everyone contributes everything they have to contribute,” he stated. 

For now, the “step to action” has resulted in the withdrawal of import licenses from almost a third of the private businesses authorized to do so. According to Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz, “it was decided to close this faculty to 24 of the 73 approved companies for importing, due to low activity levels and poor performance.” 

“In the analysis we conducted, there were many blunders, errors...,” said Marrero Cruz days ago before ANPP deputies. “The resulting document from the work done by MINCEX allowed us to conclude that we had to close this faculty to 24 companies, due to low activity levels and poor performance,” emphasized the prime minister, announcing significant changes in regulations for MSMEs and self-employed work (TCP). 

There is no “witch hunt,” but recently the Minister of Finance and Prices in Cuba, Vladimir Regueiro Ale, warned MSME owners that hiding merchandise and not selling it to the population is a “serious crime.”  The official appeared on Cuban television to explain the initial control actions the regime has agreed upon following the recent implementation of Resolution 225, which imposes a price cap on six essential products in the country. 

Regueiro highlighted that hiding merchandise and obstructing commerce can be considered serious crimes or infringements. “We are warning, and where we have identified these cases, we have summoned the municipal governments to the economic actors who are the owners,” he said. MSME owners are summoned to government headquarters to receive guidance on the measures to follow in each situation. 

“In many cases, we have had to order the forced sale of merchandise. As of July 13, we had ordered 151 forced sale actions of products,” he said. He also specified that the most significant violations are in the commercialization of chicken and oil. 

In an intensive operation conducted between July 12 and 13, the Cuban government shut down 53 private businesses after carrying out 891 inspections across the country. Marrero Cruz reported that during these inspections, more than 4,000 violations were detected, and fines exceeding 13 million pesos were imposed on MSMEs. Among the main infractions detected were the concealment of products following the government-imposed price caps and the sale of goods at unregulated prices.” 

HAVANA, Cuba, Aug 19 (ACN) The Official Gazette number 78 published Monday, with its complementary resolutions, six decree-laws and two decrees aimed at the country's non-state economic actors, as part of the actions aimed at correcting distortions and reviving the economy.

The new legal provisions will enter into force in 30 days and are Decree-Laws 88 “On micro, small and medium-sized enterprises” (MSMEs), 89 “On non-agricultural cooperatives” (CNA), 90 “On the exercise of self-employment” (TCP) and 91 “On contraventions in these three modalities”.

There are also Decree-Laws 92 “On the special social security regime for self-employed workers, members of CNAs and private MSMEs and the owners of local development projects”, and 93 Modifying Law 113 “On the tax system”, all issued by the Council of State.

In turn, the Official Gazette publishes the Decrees of the Council of Ministers 107 “On the activities not authorized to be carried out by micro, small and medium private enterprises, non-agricultural cooperatives and self-employed workers”, and 108 “On the creation of the National Institute of Non-State Economic Actors, to be headed by Mercedes Lopez Acea.

Its creation was announced before the National Assembly of People's Power (ANPP) last July by Manuel Marrero Cruz, member of the Political Bureau and Prime Minister of the Republic, when he updated the Government's projections for correcting distortions and boosting the economy in 2024, with the incorporation of other actions.

At a press conference today in Havana, the president of the new institute and senior officials of the main agencies involved in these forms of management gave details of the importance and necessity of such provisions.

These regulations, aimed at ordering the actions of non-state actors and making them become true complements of the Cuban economy, are not the only ones that apply to them, nor were they conceived now, because since 2021, when the first ones were approved, it was decided to update them every two years. 

This was said at the press conference given by Lopez Acea and by Johana Odriozola Guitart, deputy minister of economy and planning; first deputy ministers Maritza Cruz Garcia, of finances and prices, and Yosvany Pupo Otero, of domestic trade, and by Carmen Rosa Lopez Rodriguez, director of non-state employment of the ministry of labor and social security.  They explained that the six decree-laws, the two decrees and the complementary resolutions are the result of an extensive process of consultations and analysis at all levels, initiated in 2023, with the provincial governments and representatives of those and other agencies and MSMEs, which led to several versions until their recent approval by the country's leadership.

According to the president of the institute, they are a response to distortions or gaps, largely caused by the lack of control, they mark the organization of the non-state activity, in addition to underlining that all the modalities of economic actors are maintained.  In other words, she said, it is a matter of these figures acting within a legal framework, contributing to the treasury and to the welfare not only of themselves but also of society.

In his closing speech at the last ordinary session of the ANPP in July, Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez, first secretary of the Party's Central Committee and president of the country, pointed out that law and order must prevail if we want all forms of economic management to triumph and be strengthened.

U.S. Embassy In Cuba Issuing Work-Related Visas, Providing U.S. Companies With Employment Opportunities

United States Department of State
Washington DC
14 August 2024

U.S. Embassy Havana to Expand Visa Services to Include Some Work and Exchange Visas; B1/B2 Visa Services Remain Suspended

On Monday, August 19 the U.S. Embassy in Havana will expand visa services to include certain categories of temporary work and exchange program visas. Cubans with temporary work petitions approved by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and participants in exchange visitor programs with an approved Certificate of Eligibility will be able to schedule a visa interview at the U.S. Embassy in Havana. This change does not include nonimmigrant visas for persons who want to enter the United States temporarily for business (B-1 visa) or for tourism (B-2 visa). Cubans must still travel to another U.S. Embassy or consulate for routine B1/B2 visa interviews.

The expanded visa services at the U.S. Embassy in Havana will include the following categories: H- Temporary workers or trainees; J- Exchange visitors; L-Intracompany transferees; O- Workers with extraordinary ability or achievement; P- Athletes, artists, and entertainers; Q- International cultural exchange participants; R- Members of a religious denomination performing religious work. A visa appointment is not a guarantee of visa issuance. Applicants must demonstrate their qualifications for the visa under U.S. law and regulations.

To be scheduled for an interview appointment for categories H, L, O, P, Q, and R, applicants will be required to submit evidence of their approved petition (Form I-797 Notice of Action) from USCIS. To apply for an interview for a J visa, applicants must submit a Certificate of Eligibility for Exchange Visitor Status, Form DS-2019, issued by the exchange program sponsor. Interviews will be scheduled only after an approved Form I-797 or Form DS-2019 have been submitted to the Embassy. Applicants also need to provide the required application, fees, a valid passport, and a current photo. For more information, see: https://cu.usembassy.gov/visas/ For more information on USCIS processing of temporary worker petitions, see: https://www.uscis.gov/working-in-the-united-states/temporary-nonimmigrant-workers

Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
14 August 2024

U.S. embassy in Havana to start issueing visas suspended since Trump era
By Nora Gámez Torres

Starting on Monday, the U.S. Embassy in Havana will expand its visa services to facilitate cultural and educational exchanges between the two countries, a State Department official told the Miami Herald. Cubans seeking to travel to the United States for academic and cultural exchanges, temporary work, or to study at a U.S. university will now be able to apply for a non-immigrant visa in Havana.

The U.S. Embassy will also process visas for athletes, artists, members of religious groups, those with “extraordinary abilities” and employees transferring to other company positions in the United States. Previously, Cubans had to apply for such visas in third countries.

The Trump administration suspended visa services in Cuba in 2017, citing incidents related to the Havana Syndrome ailment and the need to reduce its staff to a minimum. As a result, Cubans wanting to migrate or visit the United States were asked to travel to a third country to obtain visas. The Biden administration started processing some immigrant visas again in May 2022 and all immigrant visa categories by January of last year.

However, the embassy has not issued non-immigrant visas, except for some activists and private entrepreneurs. The issuing of B1 and B2 tourist visas is still suspended in Havana, and Cubans must still travel to a third country to apply. “There’s no change with B1/B2 visas,” the State Department official said. The visa service expansion responds to increased embassy staffing and efforts to eliminate “barriers” to educational and cultural contacts that the Biden administration wants to support, the official said.

“We thought about how we could make the exchange we want more feasible and fluid,” the official said, adding that in the past, musicians and students, for example, had to spend more money to travel to third countries like Mexico to obtain a U.S. visa. The official noted that all those visa categories required a U.S. sponsor to petition the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services.

“These are categories where there is not much influx, and our staff can accommodate them,” the official said. “It is important to emphasize that all of them require prior approval from USCIS or an academic institution.” The official said the number of embassy employees has doubled in the last two years, but there are still not enough consular staff to reinstate all visa services fully.

Amid a massive wave of migration from Cuba, the largest since Fidel Castro took power in 1959, the U.S. Embassy in Havana gradually ramped up its visa services to clear a backlog of immigration petition cases that reached 100,000 in 2021. Those included about 22,000 cases from the Cuban Family Reunification Parole Program, handled separately by USCIS and suspended by the Trump administration, which closed the USCIS office in Havana in 2018. USCIS reopened it last August to resolve the remaining cases under that program.

The State Department official said the visa backlog affecting Cubans has been cleared, and immigration visa applications currently do not take so long to decide. According to available statistics from the State Department, the U.S. Embassy in Havana issued 28,143 immigrant visas in fiscal year 2023. Still, by the time the embassy in Havana fully resumed immigrant visa processing in January 2023, thousands of Cubans who might have benefited from such legal programs had already opted to journey to South and Central America to make the perilous journey to the U.S. border with Mexico, fleeing from political repression and economic collapse on the island. U.S. Customs and Border Protection registered 535,037 encounters with Cubans at the Mexico border between September 2021 and June 2024. Some entered using a new legal pathway, using the CBPOne app launched in late 2020. Crisis in Cuba Cuba’s economic crisis is worsening.

The country lost 10% of its population to migration, but the government announced a crackdown on the private sector.

According to U.S. Customs and Border Protection, another 104,130 Cubans arrived in the United States through a new parole program that began in January 2023. The program allows Cubans, Venezuelans, Haitians and Nicaraguans who have a U.S. sponsor to come to the United States to work in an effort to bring down illegal border crossings. The Department of Homeland Security temporarily suspended the program earlier this month to investigate allegations of fraud. Experts fear Cubans will continue coming in large numbers as the country goes through one of its worst economic crises in decades and the government continues enforcing laws punishing freedom of expression and dissent.

US Exports To Cuba Decreased In June 2024 By 5.8%. Remain Up 31.4% Year-To-Year. Thus Far In 2024- US$31 Million In Vehicles. And, US$4,485.00 In Leaded Gasoline. List Of Everything!

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
August 2024

June 2024 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Decrease 5.8% - 1
47th Of 220 June 2024 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 31.4% - 2
Cuba Ranked 49th Of 220 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets - 2
June 2024 Healthcare Product Exports US$89,586.00 - 2
June 2024 Humanitarian Donations US$7,180,213.00 - 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue To Increase - 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 19


JUNE 2024 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA DECREASE 5.8% - Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in June 2024 were US$34,916,865.00 compared to US$37,071,007.00 in June 2023 and US$23,055,838.00 in June 2022. 

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA and CDA. The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

January 2024 through June 2024 TSREEA exports were US$210,628,425.00 compared to January 2023 through June 2023 TSREEA exports of US$160,259,553.00

Total TSREEA exports since first deliveries in December 2001 exceed US$7,456,961,818.00

MONTHLY REPORT IN PDF FORMAT Awaiting Port Data

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS FROM JANUARY 2024 THROUGH JUNE 2024 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

Court Of Appeals "Halts Exxon Mobil Effort To Recoup US$71 Million From Cuba" For Refinery And Service Stations Expropriation

“One of the defendants unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the complaint based on foreign sovereign immunity. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) generally bars United States courts from exercising jurisdiction over foreign sovereign entities like the defendants in this case. The district court held that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act does not itself overcome a foreign sovereign’s general immunity from suit under the FSIA, and that jurisdiction in this case thus depends on the applicability of an FSIA exception. The court determined that the FSIA’s expropriation exception does not apply in the circumstances but that the FSIA’s commercial-activity exception does. We agree with the district court that the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act does not confer jurisdiction in this case and that the FSIA’s expropriation exception is inapplicable. As for the commercial-activity exception, we conclude that the district court needed to undertake additional analysis before determining that jurisdiction exists under that exception. We thus vacate the district court’s decision and remand the case for further analysis on the applicability of the FSIA’s commercial-activity exception.”

  • 07/30/2024  Open Document PER CURIAM ORDER [2067290] filed dismissing as moot appellants/cross-appellees Corporacion CIMEX, et al. to strike Section II(c) of Exxon’s reply brief on its cross-appeal or for comparable relief [1970167-2] and, in the alternative, for leave to file a surreply [1970167-3] in light of the court’s opinion issued herein this date. Before Judges: Srinivasan, Pillard and Randolph. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020]

  • 07/30/2024 Open Document PER CURIAM JUDGMENT [2067291] filed that the District Court's denial of CIMEX's motion to dismiss be vacated and the cases be remanded for further proceedings, for the reasons in the accompanying opinion . Before Judges: Srinivasan, Pillard and Randolph. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020]

  • 07/30/2024 Open Document OPINION [2067294] filed (Pages: 36) for the Court by Judge Srinivasan, DISSENTING OPINION (Pages: 10) by Judge Randolph. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020]

  • 07/30/2024    Open Document     CLERK'S ORDER [2067295] filed withholding issuance of the mandate. [21-7127, 22-7019, 22-7020]

LINK To Text From Court Of Opinion And Dissenting Opinion In PDF Format

“DC Circuit Halts Exxon Mobil Effort To Recoup $71 Million From Cuba For Revolution-Era Nationalization 

  • According to a 1969 report by the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, Exxon Mobil, then known as Standard Oil, lost $71,611,002 from Cuba's expropriation of its subsidiaries in the country. 

WASHINGTON (Courthouse News Service)- 30 July 2024: A D.C. Circuit panel temporarily stalled oil giant Exxon Mobil's effort to demand compensation from Cuba for nationalizing a refinery and over a hundred service stations in 1960 following the Cuban Revolution.  

The three-judge panel, made up of Chief U.S. Circuit Judge Sri Srinivasan, U.S. Circuit Judge Cornelia Pillard and Senior U.S. Circuit Judge Raymond Randolph — two Barack Obama appointees and a George H.W. Bush appointee, respectively — ruled 2-1 with Randolph dissenting.  

Exxon Mobil sued three state-owned defendants, Corporacíon CIMEX S.A. of Cuba and Panama and Uníon Cuba-Petroleo, under the 1996 Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act, which created a cause of action against those who traffic in property confiscated by the Cuban government.  

In response, the defendants unsuccessfully tried to dismiss the complaint, claiming foreign sovereign immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, or FSIA, which blocks American courts from exercising jurisdiction over foreign entities like the defendants.  

The lower court held that the 1996 law did not clear a foreign sovereign’s general immunity from suit, and that jurisdiction in the case depended on whether an FSIA exception could apply. It found that of two possible exceptions, the “expropriation exception” and the “commercial-activity exception,” only the latter could apply in the case.  

Srinivasan, writing the panel’s majority opinion, agreed that the 1996 statue did not grant a court jurisdiction and that the expropriation exception was inapplicable, but found that court needed additional analysis on the commercial-activity exception. 

The panel thus vacated the lower court’s decision and remanded the case to further analyze the latter exception. 

That exception, the “most significant of the FSIA’s exceptions” strips sovereign immunity due to the commercial activities of another nation that are either carried out in the U.S., performed in the U.S. in connection with activity elsewhere, or performed outside the U.S., are taken in connection with a commercial activity and caused a direct effect in the U.S.  

The panel found that the third clause is the focus of the case, and determined CIMEX’s actions clearly fulfilled the first and second requirements of the clause, as the alleged trafficking occurs in Cuba and involves confiscated property that constitutes commercial activity.  

The question for the lower court to determine is whether CIMEX’s actions caused a direct effect in the U.S. 

After toppling the American-backed dictator Fulgencio Batista in 1959, Fidel Castro and the new Cuban government began expropriating the assets of several subsidies owned by Exxon Mobil, then known as Standard Oil, including Esso Standard Oil S.A., a refinery, multiple bulk-product terminals and over a hundred service stations.

In 1964, Congress created a method for U.S. nationals to submit expropriation claims to the U.S. Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, including claims for any rights or interests owned “wholly or partially, directly or indirectly.”  

In 1969, the commission found that Standard Oil had lost $71,611,002 due to Cuba’s nationalization of Esso, but neither Standard Oil nor its successor Exxon received any payment from that claim.  

Congress then passed the 1996 statue after Cuban fighter jets shot down two private planes connected to anti-Castro group Brothers to the Rescue which had been dropping propaganda leaflets over Cuba, killing four men. The law created an avenue for private individuals to sue any entity who traffics property confiscated by the Cuban government.  

That avenue, Title III of the statute, could be suspended by the president for up to six months at a time, which it had been between its passage in 1996 until 2019, when former President Donald Trump announced it would no longer suspend the right to bring Title III actions.  

Srinivasan found Exxon’s argument that FSIA is not the exclusive mechanism to secure jurisdiction over civil suits against foreign sovereigns because Title III action grant courts jurisdiction was unconvincing.  

He explained that while Title III creates a cause of action for certain suits against another nation, it does not explicitly say any such action automatically lies within a federal court’s jurisdiction. Rather, it “harmoniously coexists” with the FSIA to allow actions when an exception applies.  

Further, Congress was well aware of the FSIA when crafting the 1996 statute and said nothing about allowing a Title III action to supersede a state’s immunity without a FSIA exemption.  

In his dissent, Randolph disagreed with that determination, finding the Supreme Court precedents the majority based its decision on did not mention Title III, partly because it either did not yet exist, was not in effect due to presidential suspension or the claims in the cases were unrelated to Cuba.  

Therefore, Title III should be considered an “exclusive and independent remedy” that does not rely on the FSIA. He highlighted Congress’ findings and stated purpose when crafting the 1996 statute.  “Congress expressly determined that Cuba’s wrongful takings required a remedy beyond what was then available,” Randolph wrote. “That remedy is Title III, unencumbered by the FSIA.”” 

LINKS To Related Analyses 

Nearing Decision? Updates From U.S. Court Of Appeals In Exxon Mobil Corporation V. Corporacion Cimex (Cuba), et al. February 01, 2024 

Exxon Mobil Libertad Act Lawsuit Against Cuba- Judge- Exxon Has Standing, "Exxon's injury is concrete"; Cuba Wins Too; Court References "mantle of triviality" and baffling" April 21, 2021 

Cuba Government Files 1,919 Pages In Response To Exxon Mobil Libertad Act Lawsuit June 18, 2020 

Waiting Until The Last Minute, Cuba Decides To Defend Against Exxon Mobil In Title III Lawsuit August 05, 2019 

Exxon Mobil Corporation Third Company To Sue Using Title III Of Libertad Act; Cimex & Cupet In Cuba Are Targets May 03, 2019

OFAC Issues Guidance About New Ten-Year Statute Of Limitations For Violations (Mistake Or Intentional)- Including For Cuba.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY OFFICE OF FOREIGN ASSETS CONTROL (22 July 2024)

Enforcement Release: July 22, 2024 GUIDANCE ON EXTENSION OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS  

This guidance addresses questions raised by recent legislation that extended the statute of limitations for violations of certain sanctions administered by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).  

On April 24, 2024, the President signed into law the 21st Century Peace through Strength Act, Pub. L. No. 118-50, div. D (the “Act”). Section 3111 of the Act extends from five years to 10 years the statute of limitations for civil and criminal violations of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) or the Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA).  

Prior to the Act’s enactment, civil enforcement actions brought by OFAC under IEEPA or TWEA were subject to the five-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2462. The new 10-year statute of limitations—codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1705(d) and 4315(d)—became effective upon the President’s signature on April 24, 2024.  

The Act states that “an action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise” brought under IEEPA or TWEA “shall not be entertained unless commenced within 10 years after the latest date of the violation upon which the civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture is based.”  

This new 10-year statute of limitations applies to any violation that was not time-barred at the time of its enactment. Consequently, OFAC may now commence an enforcement action for civil violations of IEEPA- or TWEA-based sanctions prohibitions within 10 years of the latest date of the violation if such date was after April 24, 2019.  

As set forth in the Act, the commencement of a civil enforcement action includes the issuance of a pre penalty notice or a finding of violation.  

To match the new statute of limitations period, OFAC anticipates publishing an interim final rule, with an opportunity to provide comment, extending from five years to 10 years the recordkeeping requirements codified at 31 C.F.R. § 501.601. OFAC anticipates that a 10-year recordkeeping requirement would become effective six months after publication of the interim final rule.” 

Link To OFAC Statement 

LINK TO RELATED ANALYSIS 

Newly-Enacted Foreign Assistance Law Impacts Cuba Transactions For U.S.-Based And Non-U.S.-Based Companies. OFAC Had Five Years. Now Has Ten Years. Another Reason To Avoid Cuba..April 25, 2024

“Important Announcement for Users of OFAC’s Compliance Hotline (2 August 2024)

To improve efficiency in responding to requests for sanctions guidance from the public, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is updating its Compliance Hotline by streamlining and enhancing the query submission process.

Thanks to helpful feedback from Compliance Hotline users, OFAC is transitioning to a single, user-friendly online platform to receive questions from the public. Users can now submit queries—and provide all necessary details—directly through OFAC’s new OFAC Compliance Hotline page. This new platform is designed to improve OFAC’s tracking of queries and help OFAC assess when additional public guidance may be helpful.

OFAC will fully transition its Compliance Hotline to this web form platform by January 1, 2025, and will retire other existing forms of contacting the OFAC Compliance Hotline according to the following schedule: OFAC will retire the Compliance Hotline email (OFAC_Feedback@treasury.gov) on August 16, 2024; and its Compliance Hotline telephone (1-800-540-6322 and 202-622-2490) on December 31, 2024.

Please submit questions about how to comply with OFAC-administered sanctions programs or where to find helpful guidance on OFAC’s website via the new online OFAC Compliance Hotline.

As a reminder, please continue to use OFAC’s License Application page for license applications and requests for formal interpretive guidance. Other information about contacting OFAC, including where to submit voluntary self-disclosures or appeal designations, can be found on our Contact OFAC page.  For more information on this specific action, please visit our Recent Actions page.”

For Cuba: Biden-Harris Administration Should Implement Crock Pot Theory And Quid Pro Quo With Quo Not Giving What Quid Wants.

Implementing Crock Pot Theory 

Quid Pro Quo With Quo Not Giving What Quid Wants.   

  • In Latin, quid pro quo means “something for something.” “Quid pro quo is an arranged exchange of services or favors between two parties.”  “Something given or received for something else.” 

Washington Should Permit MSMEs To Do What Havana Prohibits… And Let Crock-Pot Pressure From Those Decisions By Havana Do The Rest. 

  • The process will take time.  There will be some abuse, no way to prevent it.  The percentage of abuse will be and remain overwhelmed by legitimate activity.  Eventually, the timer reaches its limit.  Critical is maintaining constant activity.  Be disruptive- and like it. 

When The Government Of The Republic Of Cuba Does Something Deemed Harmful To The Re-Emerging Private Sector In The Republic Of Cuba, The Biden-Harris Administration Should Respond By Authorizing An Activity Deemed Beneficial To The Re-Emerging Private Sector In Cuba.   

The Biden-Harris Administration Should Respond To The Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration With Something Helpful To Re-Emerging Private Sector In The Republic Of Cuba Knowing Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration Does Not Want It. 

The More Available And Workable Inventory Of United States Government Policies And Regulations Visible To Those Engaged With The Re-Emerging Private Sector In The Republic Of Cuba, The More Pressure Will Continue Upon The Government Of The Republic Of Cuba To Craft Excuses For Limiting The Role Of The Re-Emerging Private Sector In The Republic Of Cuba.  There Is Not An Inexhaustible Quantity Of Excuses.  

The goal should be to construct layer upon layer of access and workable opportunity for micro, small and medium-size enterprises (MSMEs) in the Republic of Cuba.   

Critical for each access and each workable opportunity to have been first thoroughly vetted not within the United States government inter-agency review process, but outside of the United States government inter-agency review process.  Meaning, have the likely, the expected, the actors whose participation are essential for any access and workable opportunity to be operational.   

Unhelpful and an unwise use of time for the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce to issue guidance and then officials from The White House and United States Department of State reach out and ask the relevant actors how what was published can be improved and implemented. 

More than two years since the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) authorized the OFAC to issue the first license for a direct investment in and direct financing to an MSME located in the Republic of Cuba owned by a Republic of Cuba national. 

Remarkably, the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ) has yet to issue the regulations which would authorize any MSME in the Republic of Cuba to legally receive direct investment and direct financing.   

Statements within the last seven days by officials of the government of the Republic of Cuba suggest those regulations may now be nearer to issuance- not because of a desire to assist the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba, but because of necessity.   

  • Absent a resilient and resistant re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba, the government of the Republic of Cuba has no possibility of repaying either its sovereign debts or its commercial debts, both of which remain overdue in some instances by decades.  

Given the United States domestic political calendar complexities and the willingness by the government of the Republic of Cuba to continue to adhere to decision-making and decision-implementing which is detrimental to MSMEs and to the capabilities of citizens of the Republic of Cuba, the Biden-Harris Administration might consider: 

When the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration implements a decision deemed harmful to the re-emergence of the private sector in the Republic of Cuba, implement quickly a policy and/or regulation designed to assist the re-emergence of the private sector in the Republic of Cuba.  Sort or a quid pro quo where the quo is unwelcomed by the quid. 

For example, as the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration expands pricing restrictions, operational restrictions, and banking requirements, expand supportive mechanisms to the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba- despite expecting or knowing that the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration will not permit those supportive mechanisms to be implemented. 

What the government of the Republic of Cuba fears most is the re-authorization of direct correspondent banking and clarity for MSME account liability responsibilities of United States-based financial institutions.  Each require a level of sustained transparency which is generally considered an anathema to the government of the Republic of Cuba.   

  • For example, the OFAC would require a Republic of Cuba national seeking to establish an account with a United States-based financial institution to present documents from the government of the Republic of Cuba certifying ownership (and good standing) of a MSME and then be required to self-certify, similar to what travelers complete when purchasing an airline ticket from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  The Republic of Cuba national agrees to and accepts liability for any errors and omissions- and would be required to update any change in status, thus shielding a United States-based financial institution from potential OFAC penalties.  If United States-based financial institutions believe, as they do now, that opening a checking account where the balance could be in the thousands of dollars, but could result in penalties in the hundreds of thousands of dollars for a mistake in a filed document, then executives of the financial institution will politely decline to participate.  That has already happened.   

While the Biden-Harris Administration recently expanded authorizations for Republic of Cuba-based MSMEs to establish accounts with United States-based financial institutions, there was no meaningful engagement in advance with representatives of United States-based financial institutions, United States-based companies, and United States-based business organizations resulted in authorizations lacking specificity- and that lack of specificity upon publication resulted in skepticism from those whose buy-in is required for a change in policy to become more than words written on paper.  The new regulations were embraced by the United States private sector more like walking turtle rather than rolling thunder.  

The Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) authorized United States-based financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions.  One did.  But the OFAC did not under a general license authorize Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with United States-based financial institutions.  That technical correction needs to be fixed.   

  • The result was and remains that authorized transactions from the United States to the Republic of Cuba and from the Republic of Cuba to the United States must use financial institutions in third countries, which may receive a fee from the sender and receiver.  These authorized transactions include passport fees, visa fees, citizenship fees, postal fees, remittances, remittance fees, telecommunication fees, and airline fees among others    

  • For example, since December 2001 more than US$7.4 billion in OFAC-authorized and BIS payments from the Republic of Cuba to the United States for agricultural commodities and food products authorized by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 have been routed through third countries- and financial institutions in third countries have received fees.  Those fees could have been used for an increase in purchases from United States-based companies. 

Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
17 July 2024
Despite Worsening Economy, Cuba Announces Crackdown On Growing Private Sector

By Nora Gámez Torres

In a warehouse in Havana, packages of Ocean Spray cranberries stand close to boxes of Country Barn waffle mix, Lipton tea and other products from brands that can be found in U.S. supermarkets. Cuban private businesses are importing food from the United States and other countries at a scale not previously seen. Courtesy.  

The growth of Cuba’s emerging private sector will likely halt if the government enacts new measures announced by the country’s prime minister during a National Assembly address in which he blamed the businesses for evading taxes and tapping into foreign currency that once went to government coffers.  

Prime Minister Manuel Marrero announced Wednesday that private businesses will have to pay for imports “from accounts in Cuban banks,” saying the measure he said will be implemented “gradually” but giving no other details.  

The measure would effectively prevent many enterprises from staying in business because the government does not sell foreign currency to them, and no current mechanism allows a private company to use the Cuban banking system to transfer foreign currency abroad to pay overseas suppliers. Currently, these companies are not allowed to import directly.  

They must use a state importing agency as an intermediary. To pay providers abroad, some business owners use bank accounts in third countries. Others have been buying dollars on the black market and using intermediaries such as small money-transfer agencies that pay providers abroad on their behalf.  

To address the issue and support the private sector, the Biden administration changed the regulations on the U.S. embargo in May to allow Cuban private business owners to open accounts in U.S. banks, although banks have yet to follow through.  

The new requirement by Cuba forcing businesses to use Cuban banks for payment seems to be a response to the Biden administration measures, even though initially Cuban diplomats said the island’s government would not oppose it. “Do you want to import? Well, you’re going to have to use Cuban bank accounts,” the prime minister said with a faint smile. Marrero also said private enterprises will be required to certify the origin of the money they use to pay for imports, customs fees and port duties in dollars.  

They will also be required to get authorization from municipal governments to sell goods or services outside their province of residence. The latter measure, he said, would ensure the businesses do not expand over the current 100-employee limit. The government will also increase monitoring of the bank accounts linked to these enterprises and their owners for tax purposes. Just three years after they were first allowed in 2021, small and medium enterprises have become significant importers of food and other essential goods, filling the gap left by the cash-strapped government and providing a lifeline to many Cuban families. They also provide various services, from construction and transportation to senior care and software programming.  

According to figures shared by Marrero in a PowerPoint presentation, the private sector, including self-employed workers and cooperatives, accounts for 20 percent of the country’s GDP. Private enterprises imported $1.3 billion in goods in 2023 and $936 million so far this year as of June. Their rapid growth has occurred despite the economy’s lagging recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and an almost 2% overall economic contraction last year, according to recent official figures.  

But Marrero portrayed such economic activity in a negative light, accusing the private businesses of evading taxes, driving the price of the dollar up and taking in the foreign currency that used to go to the government. The private sector’s “financial and commercial activity…creates an uncontrollable demand for foreign currency,” he said. “You may say it is good that they import and bring things. Yes, if they paid taxes, if they sold and marketed it at fair prices to the people.  

But this is not really the case, so this is why it must be controlled, regulated — [though] not prohibited.” Since last year, when the government announced the elimination of tax incentives for the private sector and ordered businesses to stop accepting cash as payment, it became clear that some groups in the Cuban leadership were feeling uneasy with the private sector’s unexpected growth, despite the many government-imposed restrictions they were already facing.  

Hardliners have grown worried that the experiment with capitalism could threaten the government’s tight grip on power, and the Cuban military, which used to control most foreign currency coming into the island, is viewing these companies as competition, sources in Cuba said. Earlier this year, the government started auditing private businesses, even arresting some business owners, amid accusations of corruption, tax evasion and price speculation.  

Earlier this month, it imposed caps on some food and goods sold in private stores and limited the amount state companies can pay to private businesses providing supplies or services. But Marrero’s address made clear the extent to which the government is going after these businesses in what he says is not a “crusade” against the private sector but an effort to clamp down on tax evasion.  

He said government inspectors fined more than 1,000 enterprises and 63,000 self-employed workers for tax evasion and shut down 20 businesses. Following the imposition of price caps, he said, the government mobilized around 7,000 inspectors to ensure compliance by private business owners. In just two days, he added, they imposed over 4,300 fines worth over 13 million Cuban pesos.  

Ultimately, he said, the government wanted to make sure that it was property implementing guidelines approved by the Communist Party, so the private sector plays its “assigned role” as a complement to state enterprises, which sometimes, he said, has not been the case. “This is why we have to strengthen the socialist state economy,” Marrero said. 

Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
18 July 2024
Cuba Moves To “Partially” Dollarize Economy As Government Struggles To Make Payments

By Nora Gámez Torres 

Cuban Prime Minister Manuel Marrero said the government will embrace a “partial” dollarization of the economy as it struggles to buy food, oil, and pay creditors in a scenario he described as a “war economy.”  

During a session of the National Assembly on Wednesday, Marrero said the government will start accepting payments in dollars and other foreign currencies at hotels, stores and other venues linked to the island’s tourism industry as a temporary measure. “It is not the government´s vision to pursue a full dollarization of the economy,” he said. Currently, tourists must purchase prepaid cards in a local virtual currency, the MLC, to buy goods, gas and services, as the government has pushed to transition from cash to online payments.  

Cubans often complain about such requirements in a country with a poor technological infrastructure and frequent blackouts, and the country’s prime minister acknowledged that was the case. “It cannot be that [tourists] want to buy an expensive excursion, and at that moment there is no connectivity, and they cannot pay with the card,” he said. “And yet they have cash, but we say no, and we lose the money.”  

For a brief period, the government opened dollar stores in Cuba in 2020, but the dollars had to be deposited to a card linked to a bank account. Marrero said the authorization to pay foreign currency in cash “in some sectors” was one of several measures the government was taking to stabilize the country’s finances. He announced a new policy requiring state enterprises to use only the local Cuban peso for transactions with some exceptions, including wholesale importers, exporting companies and enterprises in the Mariel Special Development Zone, a special economic zone to attract foreign direct investment.  

But the prime minister squarely blamed an informal currency exchange market and the private sector for redirecting and taking in most of the foreign currency entering the country. About $2 billion “previously controlled by the state has gone to that market, partly illegal,” he said. He shared figures showing that the private sector, including small and medium enterprises, self-employed workers and cooperatives imported about $1.3 billion dollars in goods last year. But he said that economic activity has created an “uncontrollable demand” for dollars, driving its price up and depriving the government of foreign currency.  

The minister then announced new restrictions on private enterprises, including tighter controls on their bank accounts, price caps on food and goods they sell, higher taxes, and a ban on using foreign banks to pay providers abroad. If enacted, the measures would significantly thwart any further expansion of private enterprises, even threatening their survival. Some Cuban observers say the crackdown on the private sector makes little sense at a time of significant scarcity, given the gap these businesses are filling as significant importers of food and goods. “It reeks of desperation,” said Ric Herrero, the executive director of the Cuba Study Group, a Cuban American organization that supports private entrepreneurs in Cuba.  

“The Cuban government can defy math laws, but a private business can’t. Private businesses will leave the market and there will be nothing left. The government will see the results of these Draconian measures right away.” A source who has a business in Cuba and asked not to be named said the move seems to be an attempt to fill the government coffers with dollars coming from elsewhere because the government “is bankrupt.” “They have a lot of internal struggles and are trying to calibrate how to stimulate the economy without giving away power,” the source said. Limiting car imports the source said the government is under pressure from state workers, the Communist Party bureaucracy and retired military officers who are now watching how others prosper while earning meager salaries and pensions.  

That tension was evident during Marrero’s address to the National Assembly when he announced restrictions on the cars imported by private enterprises. Business owners have been buying millions of dollars in vehicles from the United States — and Florida in particular — according to U.S. trade statistics, some of them luxury brands like Mercedes Benz and Tesla. “The number and types of vehicles that non-state management firms can import will be limited,” he said. “There are some cars that are entering that are not compatible with our society, they are not necessary. And we also have to limit the number, which should be based on the interests of the country.”  

Marrero said the government lacked foreign currency to fund its budget fully and was open to foreign investment. “But we will never give up sovereignty. We are not giving the country away.” He had a message to foreign creditors: “We ask for understanding regarding the delay in payment, but we reiterate that we will fulfill our commitments to the last cent. When? When our possibilities and conditions improve.” 

Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
19 July 2024

A stunning 10% of Cuba’s population- more than a million people- left the island between 2022 and 2023, the head of the country’s national statistics office said during a National Assembly session Friday, the largest migration wave in Cuban history.  The data confirmed reporting by the Miami Herald and Cuban independent media that sounded the alarm over the mass migration of Cubans amid a severe economic downturn and a government crackdown on dissent in recent years.  

According to the official figures made public for the first time, Cuba’s population went from 11,181,595 on Dec. 31, 2021, to 10,055,968 on December 2023.  

The emigration of 1,011,269 Cubans was the main factor contributing to a massive fall in Cuba’s population by the end of 2023, when the population stood at a number similar to what it was in 1985, said Juan Carlos Alfonso Fraga, the head of the National Statistics and Information Office. Other factors were a high number of deaths, 405,512, and a low birth rate, with only 284,892 children born in that period, according to figures Fraga provided the assembly. 

Excerpts From Other Media Reporting:  

“The Cuban Government has revoked the import licenses of nearly a third of the private businesses that were authorized to conduct such activities.  Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz informed the deputies of the National Assembly of People’s Power that “it was decided to revoke this authorization for 24 out of the 73 approved companies due to low activity levels and poor performance.” 

Marrero emphasized that the State should maintain a monopoly over foreign trade in the country.  However, to facilitate the activities of non-state management forms, the government had authorized 73 companies to import for micro, small, or medium-sized enterprises (mipymes).  “But in our analysis, we found numerous mistakes and mismanagement,” he said.  “The document resulting from the work done by the [Ministry of Foreign Trade] MINCEX led us to the conclusion that we had to revoke this authorization for 24 companies due to low activity levels and poor performance,” Marrero stressed. 

“In an intensive operation conducted between July 12 and 13, the Cuban government shutdown 53 private businesses following 891 inspections nationwide.  Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz reported that more than 4,000 violations were found during these inspections, resulting in fines exceeding 13 million pesos for Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs), as cited by Cubadebate.” 

“Among the main infractions detected were the concealment of products following the government's price cap and the sale of goods at unregulated prices.  Marrero Cruz highlighted that 354 forced sales were made at the established prices, and products were confiscated in 21 additional cases.  “We are going where the products are,” the prime minister stated, emphasizing that the objective of these actions “is not to close businesses, but to ensure compliance with regulations.”  However, he stressed the need for firm measures to control prices and guarantee the accessibility of goods for the population.” 

“This inspection and regulation process began on July 8 and has continued, with exchanges and meetings with 4,363 non-state management forms.  Marrero Cruz explained that the price caps were set to curb uncontrolled price growth, although he acknowledged that they still do not reflect the proper relationship between prices and wages.  He also noted that state stores in Freely Convertible Currency (MLC) sell at prices equal to or higher than those of MSMEs.” 

“The prime minister stated that there are currently 7,300 inspectors on the streets, and this number could increase to 20,000.  “The ultimate solution to high prices is to produce more and increase the supply of goods and services to the population,” Marrero Cruz added.  Despite these actions, he clarified that the government does not aim to close businesses indiscriminately but to persuade merchants to comply with established regulations.  “We will continue with this confrontation, carrying out joint and systematic actions.” he concluded.” 

“These measures come in the context of an economic crisis in Cuba, where inflation and the shortage of basic products have severely affected the population.  The day before, President Miguel Díaz-Canel stated that this is not a “witch hunt” against private enterprises but a call to “reorder” these initiatives.” 

“Marrero Cruz maintains that while the prices of state stores in MLC are higher than some capped products, “it is unfair to make that comparative analysis” because the “foreign exchange collecting stores face a scenario as complex as we have expressed here.  They do not buy those resources, like chicken and oil, in the same markets where non-state management forms do,” he emphasized during his address to the National Assembly on Wednesday.” 

“He said state stores “do not operate with the illegal foreign exchange market, they work at 1x120, so the analysis is different.  They have to buy in more distant markets at higher prices because we have had difficulties in paying suppliers, paying very high freight rates, so it is not fair to make that analysis,” he justified.  The Cuban regime capped the prices of several products sold by MSMEs last week and has since fined establishments that fail to comply with the measure.” 

“It’s time to take action!” With this phrase, Cuban leader Miguel Díaz-Canel confirmed the regime’s shift in its cautious economic opening policy, reaffirming his intent to subject the activities of the “new economic actors” to state directives and centralized economic planning.  “It’s time to move beyond diagnoses and take action,” Díaz-Canel stated during his closing speech at the third regular session of the X Legislature of the National Assembly of People's Power (ANPP).” 

“Regarding our responsibilities in the uncertain and complex realm of the economy, it is necessary to acknowledge that in the effort to comply with the economic and social policy guidelines of the VIII Congress of the Party, by unblocking processes and promoting the formation of SMEs, we were not firm enough in demanding robust and comprehensive regulatory bases to guide the functioning of this management form that was already operating in the economy but without formal recognition,” he noted.”

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

From U.S. Department Of State: No Imminent Change To Cuba Status On List Of State Sponsors Of Terrorism

United States Department of State
Washington DC
15 July 2024

Media Briefing

QUESTION: All right. And a quick follow-up on Cuba?

MR MILLER: Yeah.

QUESTION: We’re working – we’ve talked to some Cuban business owners in the wake of the State Department moving them off of a list of people who were not helpful with state – with – what is it? The list was states that are not helpful in combating terrorism. They were – they were removed from that.

MR MILLER: Yeah.

QUESTION: The business owners in Cuba are saying that because they’re – Cuba is still on the state sponsor of terrorism list, that it’s harder for them to do business with European countries, with other Latin American countries, than it was even during the Trump administration. Is the State Department still looking at this before the end of Biden’s first term?

MR MILLER: I just don’t have any updates on that process. Sorry.

Trump-Rubio Administration Could Make Trump-Pence Administration Look Mild, Restrained, And Timid, With Respect To Cuba Policy.  From Grammar School To Postdoctoral.  

Trump-Rubio Administration Could Make Trump-Pence Administration Look Mild, Restrained, And Timid, With Respect To Cuba Policy.   

From Grammar School To Postdoctoral.  

The selection of Marco Rubio (R- Florida), a member of the United States Senate (2011- ), who is of Cuban descent, as the 2024 vice president nominee of the Republican Party has the potential for the Trump-Rubio Administration (2025-2029) to make Republic of Cuba policy during the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) resemble a grammar school exercise.

When Mauricio Claver-Carone, of Cuban descent, was installed in 2018 as Senior Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the National Security Council (NSC), he had the mandate of Donald Trump, 45th President of the United States, to craft and to implement revisions to Republic of Cuba-related policies of the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017).  He presided at a dismantling of much, but not all Obama-Biden Administration policies. 

But, Mr. Claver-Carone was not a member of the Trump-Pence Administration cabinet, Principals Committee, Deputies Committee, or a United States Senate confirmed political appointee.  Although lacking each of those, he was able to deliver an immensely impactful series of commercial, economic, financial, and political decisions. 

A Vice President Rubio will be a member of the cabinet, may attend gatherings of the Principals Committee and Deputies Committee, will influence the selection of senior-level, mid-level, and lower-level appointees, and will have the United States Constitution-described responsibility to preside at the United States Senate.  If Senator Rubio chooses, he will have the access to reverse not only decisions by the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ), but also anything remaining in place from the Trump-Pence Administration and Obama-Biden Administration.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increase 30.7% In May 2024; Up 42.6% Year-To-Year. Vehicle Exports (88% Used) In 2024 Exceed US$24.6 Million.

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
July 2024

May 2024 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increase 30.7% - 1
46th Of 220 May 2024 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 42.6% - 2
Cuba Ranked 47th Of 220 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets - 2
May 2024 Healthcare Product Exports US$5,337.00 - 2
May 2024 Humanitarian Donations US$8,627,515.00 - 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue To Increase - 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 19


MAY 2024 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 30.7% - Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in May 2024 were US$34,611,474.00 compared to US$26,476,991.00 in May 2023 and US$25,514,586.00 in May 2022. 

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA and CDA. The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

January 2024 through May 2024 TSREEA exports were US$175,711,560.00 compared to January 2023 through May 2023 TSREEA exports of US$123,188,456.00

Total TSREEA exports since first deliveries in December 2001 exceed US$7,422,044,953.00

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

USDA Reports Updated Cuba Usages Of FMD And MAP Programs Authorized In Five-Year 2018 Farm Bill. There Is Substantial Room For Improvement. 

United States Department Of Agriculture (USDA) Reports Updated Republic Of Cuba Usages Of FMD And MAP Programs Authorized In Five-Year 2018 Farm Bill. 

Problem? In Six Years, Anemic Uses Of FMD And MAP Programs Defined In 2018 As “Laying The Groundwork” And “Important” By Legislative Advocates.   

Approximately Ninety (Or More) Entities Could Have Used FMD And MAP. 

Six FMD Usage In Six Years, Some Entities Used More Than Once.

Ten MAP Usage In Six Years, Some Entities Used More Than Once. 

Good News: All Applications For FMD Funds Were Used In Cuba.

Bad News: Applications For MAP Funds Usage In Cuba Ranged From 100% To 20%. 

Will Cuba FMD And MAP Provisions In 2018 Farm Bill Be Retained In 2023 Farm Bill (Which Remains Unapproved By The 118th United States Congress)?  

Thus Far, FMD And MAP Provisions Remain In 2023 Farm Bill Drafts Considered By United States House Of Representatives And United States Senate. 

During 2018, legislative advocates maintained that inserting a Market Access Program (MAP) and Foreign Market Development (FMD) provision in H.R. 2, the five-year Agriculture Improvement Act, known as the Farm Bill, signed into law on 20 December 2018 by Donald Trump, 45th President of the United States, was critical to “laying the groundwork” for increasing exports of agricultural commodities and food products to the Republic of Cuba.  Statements from members of the United States Congress included: “… an important first step to regaining our presence in Cuba.”      

For Fiscal Year 2024, sixty-eight United States-based entities (primarily trade promotion organizations) are identified by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) as receiving funding for MAP and twenty entities are identified as receiving funding for FMD.  The Fiscal Year 2024 numbers are consistent with years since 2018.    

Leading to the enactment of the 2018 Farm Bill, most observers reasonably concluded that legislative advocates- within the United States Congress and organizations in Washington DC and outside of the beltway would have prominently teed-up at least one high-profile applicant to publicize in advance they would use the provision if it became law or at least one high-profile applicant to immediately and publicly request funding when the 2018 Farm Bill became law on 21 December 2018.  

  • NOTE: The global pandemic, COVID-19, commenced in early 2020 and continued to impact travel worldwide through 2022- and in some countries into early 2023.  The government of the Republic of Cuba did implement arrival restrictions during these periods; and the United States implemented travel restrictions during these periods.  Thus, there were non-marketplace disincentives for commerce-related visits to the Republic of Cuba by delegations from the United States.  However, they remained unconstrained 2019, 2022, and 2023. 

The most significant impact of an anemic number of MAP/FMD requests and usage in 2018, 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, 2023, and 2024 is what the lack of interest portends for other legislative efforts in the United States Congress relating to the Republic of Cuba, particularly those focused upon changes to cash-in-advance payment terms for agricultural commodity and food product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba required by the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act of 2000 (TSREEA).  The question opponents will ask: “If authorizing MAP/FMD for Cuba was so important, why have so few organizations used it?”      

The cash-in-advance terms were supported by United States-based exporters while opposed by United States-based agricultural commodity and food product trade promotion organizations.  United States-based exporters were concerned in 2000 and remain concerned in 2024 that with Republic of Cuba government-operated entities maintaining a chronic inability to abide by payment terms other than cash-in-advance, more prudent to retain a perhaps smaller market share with no payment issues rather than a larger market share with endemic, and necessarily publicly-disclosed payment issues.      

Link To Complete List Of Products In 2023 Exported From The United States To Cuba 

Under the Market Access Program, USDA provides competitive, cost-share assistance to U.S. exporters and agricultural, fish, and forest product trade organizations for international marketing and promotion of U.S. commodities and products. More information about the program and the FY 2024 funding opportunity is available at:  https://www.fas.usda.gov/programs/market-access-program-map.    

Under the Foreign Market Development Program, USDA partners with nonprofit agricultural and forest product trade associations to build longer-term international demand for U.S. commodities. More information about the program and the FY 2024 funding opportunity is available at: https://www.fas.usda.gov/programs/foreign-market-development-program-fmd.”  

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

LINKS To Related Analyses

USDA Accepting Applications For 2024 Export Programs- Cuba Again Authorized For Participation. Since 2018 Farm Bill, FMD And MAP Focus On Cuba Remains Anemic. Will 2024 Be Different?  March 20, 2023  

Defining Anemic: In Five Years, 2018 Farm Bill USDA Provision For Cuba Had No Use Of FMD And Two Uses Of MAP. Approximately 90 U.S.-Based Entities Could Have Participated. That’s A 2.2% Use Rate.  February 03, 2023  

Cuba Provision In Farm Bill A Confliction Of Accuracy By Senators Heitkamp & Rubio; OFAC Rule Making Could Be ProblematicJune 29, 2018  

Members Of U.S. Senate Advocate For Regulatory Changes To Commercial Relationship With Cuba. But, A Significant Part Of What They Seek In Washington Await Decisions In Havana.  March 16, 2023 

U.S. Ag/Food Exports Increase 35.8% In August 2023; Up 17.9% Year-To-Year. Puddings, Coffee Extract, Cleaning Preparations (US$1.1 Million), Used Excavating Machines, Used Tractors, Car Parts.  Oct 5, 2023  

Surprises? U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increased 37.6% In July; Up 14.8% Year-To-Year. Coin Operated Washing Machines, Refrigerant, Microwave Ovens, Manicure/Pedicure Preps, Vehicles, Tires, Sugar.  Sep 20, 2023

New Regulation Interpretation Decision By U.S. Supreme Court Could Impact Cuba-Related Decisions (Commerce And Travel) By Biden-Harris Administration And A Potential Second Trump Administration. 

New Regulation Interpretation Decision By United States Supreme Court Could Impact Cuba-Related Decisions By Biden-Harris Administration And Potential Trump Administration. 

Potential To Reverse, Authorize Despite Preference By The White House.  

Federal Court Judges Could Be Asked To Decide Issues Relating To Commerce And Travel.  

Trading with the Enemy Act (TWEA) of 1917, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Libertad) of 1996, and Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000 each have Republic of Cuba-centric provisions which have been implemented by United States government agencies, departments, and other entities. 

In some instances, the language in the statute provides clarity, provides a requirement as to how a provision is to be defined, is to be interpreted, and is to be implemented.

In other instances, the language in the statute permits, specifically or by interpretation, the executive branch to determine if, when, and how a provision is adopted.

Members of the United States Congress (House of Representatives and Senate) who have an interest in Republic of Cuba-centric and Republic of Cuba-related legislation focus upon how a statute may be implemented by the executive branch.

The primary executive branch entities which manage and implement Republic of Cuba-centric and Republic of Cuba-related statues are the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce, Office of Cuban Affairs (OCA), Office of the Legal Adviser (OLA), and other offices within United States Department of State.

The 28 June 2024 decision by the United States Supreme Court which returns to the judicial branch a role in interpreting statutory provisions which have been previously interpreted by instrumentalities of the executive branch does not necessarily mean there will be an immediate document avalanche arriving on the steps of ninety-four (94) United States District Courts.

However, there may be court filings, particularly in the three (3) U.S. District Courts located in the State of Florida.  The Northern District with four (4) offices.  The Middle District with five (5) offices. The Southern District with five (5) offices- importantly the cities of Miami, Fort Lauderdale, West Palm Beach, Fort Pierce, and Key West.  

Plaintiffs (with prodding and assistance from members of the United States Congress) could focus upon how TWEA, CDA, Libertad, and TSREEA statutes have provisions interpreted by the executive branch that 1) Authorize rather than prohibit and 2) Not authorize rather than permit United States-based public sectors and private sectors re-engagement with Republic of Cuba-based public sectors and re-emerging private sectors.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

LOPER BRIGHT ENTERPRISES ET AL. v. RAIMONDO, SECRETARY OF COMMERCE, ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 22–451. Argued January 17, 2024—Decided June 28, 2024*

excerpts

The Court granted certiorari in these cases limited to the question whether Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U. S. 837, should be overruled or clarified. Under the Chevron doctrine, courts have sometimes been required to defer to “permissible” agency interpretations of the statutes those agencies administer—even when a reviewing court reads the statute differently. Id., at 843. In each case below, the reviewing courts applied Chevron’s framework to resolve in favor of the Government challenges by petitioners to a rule promulgated by the National Marine Fisheries Service pursuant to the Magnuson-Stevens Act, 16 U. S. C. §1801 et seq., which incorporates the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U. S. C. §551 et seq.

Held: The Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous; Chevron is overruled. Pp. 7–35.

Chevron is overruled. Courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, as the APA requires. Careful attention to the judgment of the Executive Branch may help inform that inquiry. And when a particular statute dele gates authority to an agency consistent with constitutional limits, courts must respect the delegation, while ensuring that the agency acts within it. But courts need not and under the APA may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous. Because the D. C. and First Circuits relied on Chevron in deciding whether to uphold the Rule, their judgments are vacated, and the cases are remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. 

LINK TO COMPLETE DECISION IN PDF FORMAT

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

U.S. Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increased 45.9% In April 2024; Up 45.8% Year-To-Year. Additionally, US$3.3 Million In Vehicles (Including Motorcycles). Private Companies Driving Diversity In Exports.

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©

June 2024

April 2024 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increase 45.9% - 1

53rd Of 219 April 2024 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2

Year-To-Year Exports Increase 45.8% - 2

Cuba Ranked 48th Of 219 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets - 2

April 2024 Healthcare Product Exports US$0.00 - 2

April 2024 Humanitarian Donations US$7,930,672.00 - 3

Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue To Increase - 3

U.S. Port Export Data- 19

APRIL 2024 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 45.9% - Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in April 2024 were US$28,102,367.00 compared to US$19,248,734.00 in April 2023 and US$18,089,515.00 in April 2022.

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA and CDA. The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

January 2024 through April 2024 TSREEA exports were US$141,100,086.00 compared to January 2023 through April 2023 TSREEA exports of US$96,711,465.00.00.

Total TSREEA exports since first deliveries in December 2001 exceed US$7,387,433,479.00.

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

Russia's Novikombank, Sanctioned By OFAC, Opens Office In Cuba.  Develop Further Investment/Financing For SME’s In Cuba, Connect Them With Entrepreneurs In Russia?

Russian Federation-Based Novikombank, Sanctioned By OFAC, Opens Office In Cuba.   

New Conduit For Commercial Transactions Into And Out Of Cuba.   

Helping Develop Further Investment And Financing For SME’s In Cuba And Connect Them With Entrepreneurs In Russian Federation?

On November 23, 2007, Vladimir Putin, President of the Russian Federation (2000-2008 and 2012- ), signed Federal Law № 270-FZ to create the State Corporation for the Promotion of the Development, Manufacture, and Export of High-Tech Products (Rostec).  Moscow, Russian Federation-based Rostec is the majority shareholder in Moscow, Russian Federation-based Novikombank (Novikom).

Wikipedia: “Rostec comprises about 800 enterprises, which together form 15 holding companies: eleven in the defense-industry complex and three in civil sectors.  Rostec's organizations are located in 60 constituents of the Russian Federation and supply goods to over 70 countries worldwide…  2014 EU sanctions listing for Chemezov describes how Rostec subsidiaries supported Russia's annexation of Crimea.”

  • “On 24 February 2022 the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned Novikombank under E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the financial services sector of the Russian Federation economy. Subsidiary companies were also sanctioned.”  

  • “On 28 June 2022, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated 70 entities, many of which are critical to the Russian Federation’s defense industrial base, including State Corporation Rostec, the cornerstone of Russia’s defense, industrial, technology, and manufacturing sectors, as well as 29 Russian individuals.”

  • From OFAC: “State Corporation Rostec (Rostec) is a massive Russian state-owned enterprise formed to consolidate Russia’s technological, aerospace, and military-industrial expertise. Rostec is a holding company whose subsidiaries are engaged in a wide range of industries, including automotive, defense, aviation, and metals. In addition to leading Russia’s domestic defense production, Rostec also facilitates foreign trade in defense and related materiel as well as civilian and dual-purpose products. Rostec’s management umbrella includes more than 800 entities across a wide range of sectors…  Rostec was designated pursuant to E.O. 14024 for operating or having operated in the defense and related materiel sector of the Russian Federation economy. As a result, all entities owned 50 percent or more, directly or indirectly, by Rostec are blocked, even if not identified by OFAC.  Today’s action built upon previous designations of certain Rostec’s holdings pursuant to E.O. 14024 in recent months and Rostec’s previous addition to OFAC’s Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List (“SSI List”) pursuant to Directive 3 of E.O. 13662 following Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine. Rostec is also sanctioned by Australia, Canada, the European Union (EU), New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom (UK).”

From Novikom Internet Site:

”Novikom today:  Since its foundation in 1993, Novikom has been financing strategic high-tech industries of the real sector of the Russian economy, facilitating implementation of ambitious national-wide projects, investing in the future of the country.

Our benefits:  Bank of the Russian industry and high technologies.  Novikom offers efficient financial instruments for leading national enterprises and is a reliable partner in addressing challenges facing the Russian industry.

2023 Assets: 530.5 billion Rubles (among twenty largest banks in the Russian Federation)
2023: 362 billion Rubles- credits issued to machine-building and hi-tech companies account for 85.6% of the loan portfolio of the bank.

Small And Medium-Size Enterprises (SME): Novikom maintains its comprehensive program of cooperation with small and medium enterprises.  The small and medium business program of Novikom targets companies and individual entrepreneurs with an annual revenue of up to 2.0 billion roubles.  The main benefit of the Novikom Program in terms of crediting are simple and clear credit and guaranty products meeting all requirements of business, individual work of personal managers with each client, short Time To Yes.  We are ready to offer your company the whole range of banking services and we will be glad to see you among our clients.  We strive to consider the needs of our clients in the most flexible way: in addition to standard banking and investment products and services we offer non-standard solutions, often acting as innovators in the Russian market.

The Bank’s full trade name: Joint-Stock Commercial Bank «NOVIKOMBANK»
Contracted name: JSCB “NOVIKOMBANK”
Date of state registration: October 25, 1993
Authorised capital: 11,750,822,000 roubles
Legal address: Russia, 119180, Moscow, 50/1, bld.1, Polyanka Bolshaya str.
Actual address: Russia, 119180, Moscow, 50/1, bld.1, Polyanka Bolshaya str.
Telephone: +7 (800) 250-70-07, +7 (495) 974-71-87
Telex: 611691 NVKOM
SWIFT: CNOVRUMMXXX
Reuters Dealing: NOVM
Код Reuters Dealing: NOVM
E-mail: office@novikom.ru
Web-site: https://novikom.ru/

Requisites
Correspondent account: 30101810245250000162 with GU of the Bank of Russia in CFO
BIK: 044525162
INN: 7706196340
KPP: 770601001
OGRN: 1027739075891

Statistic codes
OKPO: 17541272
OKOGU: 1500010
OKATO: 45286596000
OKTMO: 45384000
OKFS: 16
OKOPF: 67
OKVED: 64.19
Date of registration: August 15, 2002

Corporates

Novikom’s customer policy is focused on rendering technology-intensive banking services in all segments of the financial market.  Since its foundation in 1993, Novikom has been financing strategic high-tech industries of the real sector of the Russian economy, facilitating implementation of ambitious national-wide projects, investing in the future of the country.  State Corporation Rostec is a key partner of Novikom. The Bank provides services to more than 700 enterprises and holdings of the State Corporation, and manages its investment flows.  Integration with Rostec contributes to the growth of Novikom capitalization and its further successful development as one of the leading financial institutions of the country.

Financial institutes

Services for financial institutions:

Settlements in rubles. An extended operating day is set until 19.00 Moscow time. Interbank and client payments are transferred without commissions. Interest accrued on LORO-balances; Establishment of correspondent relations. JSCB “NOVIKOMBANK” will be pleased to see your reputable bank among our correspondents. JSCB “NOVIKOMBANK” is ready to offer cooperation with your bank on beneficial terms; Financing of export-import contracts of partner banks’ customers on comfortable terms. It is practicable to provide own liquidity on a bilateral basis for these purposes. It is possible to attract blank credit lines from the world's largest financial institutions, if necessary.  JSCB “NOVIKOMBANK” has vast experience in arranging financing of short-term export and import operations (letters of credit, guarantees, pre-financing) and it offers services in the structuring of trade finance transactions in close cooperation with the largest foreign financial institutions; A variety of Treasury operations allow to close FX-position for almost any pair of currencies or to hedge it with the help of swap deals by market quotes. We offer our own FX-platform. Having vast experience in the field and an impeccable business reputation, JSCB “NOVIKOMBANK” offers mutually advantageous cooperation on interbank, currency and equity markets.  JSCB “NOVIKOMBANK” offers the opportunity to jointly build mobile, high-quality and optimal solutions for customers.

Transactions with securities

Novikom, being a professional participant of the securities market, performs the following operations: Broker activity (licence No. 177-06-439-100000); Dealer activity (licence No. 077-06-443-010000); Securities management (licence No. 177-10-203-001000); Custody operations (licence No. 177-06-450-000100).  Novikom is one of the leading operators of the secondary bond market in terms of trade volumes in the MICEX, MICEX stock exchange, over-the-counter transactions, and MICEX REPO transactions.  Novikom makes transactions with securities in the MICEX and RTS stock exchange and offers the following services: Brokerage operations; Storage and/or title record to securities; Trust management; Other transactions with securities.

Shares: Purchase/sale of Russian shares on customer request; Market-maker functions; Liquidity supply; Redemption of securities of various companies.

Bonds: Purchase/sale of bonds on customer request; Market-maker functions; Liquidity supply; Redemption of securities of various companies.

Conversion transactions: The bank has many years’ experience of working in the financial markets. For corporate and institutional customers the Bank provides a wide range of conversion services – spot, forward and foreign exchange options. Novikom endeavours to help its customers to find optimal and qualitative decisions for foreign exchange and interest rate risk hedging.  USD/EURO conversion operations; Minimisation of expenses from conversion operations.

Broker service: Based on the licences of a professional participant of the securities market Novikom renders broker and depositary service to individuals: In the state securities market; In the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange market of corporate securities (shares and bonds); In the over-the-counter market of corporate securities (shares and bonds).  Customers are served based on broker service agreements. The Bank specialists provide the customers with all necessary information about market conditions and give consultation on the issues related to securities market transactions.

Being in a state of constant growth, the Corporation creates conditions for further development of its employees, enterprises, and entire domestic industries, contributing to positive changes in the country as a whole."  Sergey Chemezov, General Director

In accordance with the latest strategy, Rostec's mission is to improve people's lives by creating high tech, "smart" products

In its business operations, Rostec brings together the best traditions of the Russian engineering thought, the latest technological developments, and in-depth expertise.  The Corporation successfully links science and manufacturing, develops advanced, forward-looking technologies, implements state-of-the-art know-how, and promotes productive cooperation between Russian enterprises.  Rostec staff's wealth of experience and depth of expertise are instrumental in creating unique products and opening up new export opportunities. This is precisely why the State Corporation's overarching goal is to establish Russia's leading positions in the fields of high tech and engineering on the global scene.

Core Areas of Business: Having brought together under its umbrella many unique production facilities and technologies as well as a significant share of the country's scientific potential, Rostec became a reliable partner to the state in facilitating the innovative development of Russia's industries. The Corporation operates in the following areas: Automotive engineering and manufacturing; Aircraft engineering; Engine manufacturing; Metallurgy; Construction; Optics; Composite and other advanced structural materials; Medical equipment; Pharmaceuticals; Industrial biotechnologies; Radioelectronics; Instrument engineering and manufacturing; Information technology and telecommunications; Machine tool building and equipment manufacturing for industry upgrade; Arms and military equipment manufacturing.

Corporation's Mission: Facilitating the development, manufacture, and export of high tech products.  Supporting Russian high tech industrial products designers and manufacturers on domestic and foreign markets.  Retooling the production.  Developing the country's scientific and human resources potential.  Promoting the cooperation with major international and Russian manufacturers.

Corporation's Core Functions: Promoting and selling high- tech industrial products on domestic and foreign markets.  Participating in the implementation of the state policy in the field of military and technical cooperation between the Russian Federation and foreign states as well as the State Armament Plan.  Attracting investments to create competitive high tech industrial products.  Advertising, exhibition, and marketing activities; showcasing civil, military, and dual-purpose products both in Russia and abroad.  Supporting applied research in promising areas of scientific and technological development.  Implementing advanced production technologies in order to improve domestic engineering designs and reduce the time and cost of product development and manufacture.  Facilitating foreign trade in military commodities

The Corporation was established and is operating in accordance with Federal Law of November 23, 2007 No. 270-FZ "On the State Corporation for the Promotion of the Development, Manufacture, and Export of High Tech Products "Rostec." The Corporation is a legal entity established by the Russian Federation in the legal form of a state corporation.  The Corporation's full name in the Russian language is Государственная корпорация по содействию разработке, производству и экспорту высокотехнологичной промышленной продукции «Ростех».  The Corporation's abbreviated name in the Russian language is Государственная корпорация «Ростех».  The Corporation's full name in the English language is State Corporation for the Promotion of the Development, Manufacture, and Export of High Tech Products "Rostec."  The Corporation's abbreviated name in the English language is State Corporation "Rostec."  State registration information : State Registration Certificate series 77, number 011483840, issued by the Federal Tax Service Directorate for the city of Moscow on December 3, 2007. Primary state registration number (OGRN): 1077799030847, assignment date December 3, 2007.  INN/KPP: 7704274402/770401001.”

Russian State-Owned Novikombank Opens Havana Office

HAVANA, June 20 (Reuters) - Russia's Novikombank said on Thursday it had become the first bank from the country to open a representative office in Cuba as part of growing economic ties between the former Cold War allies.  The Russian state-owned bank said in a statement that Cuba's central bank had granted it a license on June 7. There was no immediate comment from Cuban authorities or the central bank.  "The opening of a Novikom representative office in the Republic of Cuba is not only a new stage for the bank, but also an important step in Russian-Cuban relations," board chairwoman Elena Georgieva was quoted as saying in the announcement.  Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Moscow's already warm relations with the Communist-run Caribbean nation have strengthened into a "strategic partnership," with a number of possible investment projects in sugar, transportation and energy under discussion.  Last week, a Russian navy frigate and a nuclear-powered submarine docked in Havana, a move widely seen as a show of force from Moscow amid tensions with the West over the Ukraine conflict.  Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel has visited Moscow four times in the last few years.  Novikombank said it planned to support Russian clients' trade and investment activity in Cuba.  "The governments of both countries are increasing the volume of cooperation in every way," the statement said.  Since 2022 Russian tourists have visited the island in greater numbers and oil and wheat shipments have provided some relief amid a grueling crisis characterized by shortages of basic goods, inflation and power outages that has sparked record migration.  Cuba is one of just a handful of countries that accepts the Russian MIR credit card.  Cuba first opened to foreign banks in the 1990s after the fall of the Soviet Union. Most European and Canadian banks have left in recent years due to the crisis and fear of U.S. sanctions. But that is unlikely to deter Novikombank, which is already under sanctions by the United States and other countries over the Ukraine war.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

2024 Trafficking in Persons Report: "...Cuba does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so..."

LINK TO REPORT

CUBA (Tier 3)

  • Tier 3: Afghanistan, Djibouti, Russia, Belarus, Eritrea, Sint Maarten, Brunei, Iran, South Sudan, Burma, Korea- Democratic People’s Republic of, Sudan, Cambodia, Macau, Syria, China- People’s Republic of, Nicaragua, Turkmenistan, Cuba, Papua- New Guinea, Venezuela.

The Government of Cuba does not fully meet the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking and is not making significant efforts to do so; therefore Cuba remained on Tier 3. Despite the lack of significant efforts, the government took some steps to address trafficking, including approving the 2023-2026 NAP. However, there was a government policy or pattern to profit from forced labor in Cuba’s labor export program, which included foreign medical missions. The government continued to deploy government-affiliated Cuban workers to foreign countries using deceptive and coercive tactics. In the majority of cases, the government kept a significant amount of workers’ wages; confiscated workers’ passports and professional credentials; subjected workers to surveillance and strict curfews; and did not consistently inform participants of the terms of their contracts, which varied from country to country. The government failed to address trafficking crimes despite an increasing number of allegations from survivors, credible NGOs, international organizations, and foreign governments of Cuban officials’ involvement in facilitating serious human rights abuses and forced labor. The government threatened, coerced, and punished government-affiliated workers, including medical professionals, and their family members if participants left the program. Authorities did not make efforts to address labor trafficking crimes, and identified the fewest number of victims and had the lowest number of prosecutions and convictions in a decade.

PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS:

Ensure government-sponsored labor export programs comply with international labor standards – specifically ensure participants receive fair wages that are fully paid into bank accounts the workers can control; retain personal passports, contracts, and professional and academic credentials in their possession; ensure a work environment safe from violence, harassment, free from surveillance and arbitrary curfews; and have freedom of movement to leave the program or refuse an assignment without penalties, such as being threatened, imprisoned, harmed, or banned from returning to Cuba. * Cease the use of Article 176.1 to penalize government-affiliated workers who leave the labor export program. * Investigate potential official complicity in the alleged fraudulent recruitment of Cubans to fight in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. * Vigorously investigate and prosecute sex and labor trafficking crimes and convict traffickers. * Implement formal policies and procedures to identify trafficking victims proactively, including among vulnerable populations, refer those identified to appropriate services, and train officials, including first responders, in their use. * Adopt policies and programs that provide trafficking-specific, specialized assistance for male, female, and LGBTQI+ trafficking victims. * Cease the recruitment of children for military activities before the mandatory military service age. * Screen individuals charged or detained for commercial sex-related crimes for trafficking indicators and refer identified victims to care. * Allow an independent international commission to monitor the government-sponsored labor export program. * Train those enforcing the labor code to screen for trafficking indicators and educate all Cuban workers about trafficking indicators and how to report trafficking-related violations. * Revise Article 363.1 of the penal code to remove the requirement to prove force, fraud, or coercion in child sex trafficking offenses. * Establish a permanent inter-ministerial anti-trafficking committee.

PROSECUTION

The government decreased prosecution efforts. Authorities in the Ministry of Justice continued to be complicit in state labor export schemes by prosecuting people who left government-sponsored labor export programs due to abuses and exploitative practices with strong indicators of human trafficking. The government criminalized sex trafficking and labor trafficking through various provisions of its penal code. Article 363.1 of the 2022 penal code criminalized all forms of labor trafficking and some forms of sex trafficking and prescribed penalties ranging from seven to 15 years’ imprisonment for offenses involving an adult victim and 10 years to life in prison for those involving a child victim. These penalties were sufficiently stringent and, with regard to sex trafficking, commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. The definition in Article 363.1 correctly established the use, force, fraud, or coercion as an essential element of an adult trafficking offense; however, the law did not include the necessary provision indicating the elements of force, fraud, or coercion were unnecessary in cases of sex trafficking offenses involving children. However, Article 402.1 (“corruption of minors”) criminalized the use of a person younger than 18 “in prostitution” and prescribed penalties of seven to 15 years’ imprisonment, which were sufficiently stringent and commensurate with those prescribed for other grave crimes, such as rape. The penal code criminalized labor trafficking offenses under Article 363.1. Article 176.1 prescribed penalties ranging from three to eight years’ imprisonment to government-affiliated workers who did not complete their mission in another country or did not return to Cuba upon completion of the mission – thereby penalizing potential victims of labor trafficking.

In December 2023, the government published official data for calendar year 2022 on prosecutions and convictions, the most recent data available. The government’s annual report was the primary source of information on its efforts. The government suppressed independent domestic sources, but some independent sources provided information on trafficking efforts and trends. The government investigated seven transnational trafficking cases involving eight alleged Cuban traffickers and five foreign nationals, who allegedly had ties to trafficking networks in 10 different countries; however, the government did not report investigating any domestic trafficking cases in 2022. This was compared with no investigations in 2021. Authorities prosecuted six suspects for possible trafficking crimes in 2022, compared with 12 prosecutions in 2021; officials did not report if any of the alleged perpetrators in the seven transnational cases were prosecuted or convicted. Officials reported convicting six sex traffickers, compared with convicting 10 sex traffickers in 2021. According to government reporting, sentences ranged from five to 15 years’ imprisonment. This was the lowest number of prosecutions and convictions in a decade. Authorities did not report investigating any cases of labor trafficking and did not prosecute or convict any labor traffickers in 2022.

The government organized and sponsored training for law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges on investigating and prosecuting sex trafficking crimes. In 2022, the government cooperated with INTERPOL to investigate 10 alleged Cuban traffickers. Authorities had 20 bilateral cooperation agreements or MOUs that included trafficking; however, the government did not report tangible results associated with these agreements.

Authorities did not report any investigations, prosecutions, or convictions of government officials complicit in trafficking, despite persistent allegations officials threatened and coerced participants to remain in the government-sponsored labor export program. According to official sources, the government allegedly identified a trafficking ring involved in the fraudulent recruitment of Cuban men coerced into fighting in Ukraine on behalf of Russian military forces; the government reportedly arrested 17 individuals, but officials did not provide additional details. It was unclear if Cuban official complicity played a role in the recruitment of fighters to support of Russia’s full-scale invasion in Ukraine. However, some observers believed the Cuban government was involved or, at a minimum, aware of Cuban fighters traveling to support Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. According to contacts, Cuban authorities allegedly expedited the issuance of passports to recruits, who had minimal income and no means to pay for travel independently, and claimed Cuban authorities knowingly declined to place exit stamps in the Cuban potential victims’ passports to claim no knowledge of their travel. Moreover, months after the government allegedly took action against those facilitating trafficking to Ukraine, credible media reports indicated Cubans were still traveling to Russia to fight in Ukraine.

PROTECTION

The government decreased efforts to identify and protect trafficking victims and continued to coerce individuals – using deceptive, manipulative, and exploitative tactics – to participate and remain in government-sponsored labor export programs. In 2022, the most recent year for which data was available, authorities identified six victims of sex trafficking, one woman and five girls, compared with 10 victims in 2021. In previous years, the government reported having procedures to proactively identify and refer sex trafficking victims to care; however, the government lacked formal procedures to identify victims in police law enforcement actions and relied on victims to self-identify. The government did not report having procedures to identify forced labor victims. Government- or communist party-organized and controlled NGOs, such as the Federation of Cuban Women (FMC), the Prevention and Social Assistance Commission, and the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution could identify and refer trafficking victims to state authorities and provide some victim services, including psychological treatment, health care, skills training, and assistance in finding employment. However, these services were often politicized and unavailable to people the government and/or Communist Party deemed subversive.

Authorities did not report protecting the victims identified in 2022; however, in the government’s report, officials indicated survivors from the previous reporting period had received services, including permanent housing for two, while others received educational support and job placement. Neither the government nor the government-organized NGOs operated shelters or provided services specifically for adult male or LGBTQI+ victims. Police encouraged child sex trafficking victims younger than 16 to assist in prosecutions of traffickers by gathering testimony through psychologist-led videotaped interviewing, usually removing the need for children to appear in court; however, the government did not report using these tools. Observers reported law enforcement did not proactively screen for indicators of trafficking. As a result, police may have detained unidentified sex trafficking victims for commercial sex offenses or charged them with crimes. The government did not report identifying any foreign trafficking victims in 2022.

PREVENTION

The government maintained insufficient efforts to prevent trafficking, particularly forced labor. At the end of 2023, authorities approved the new 2023-2026 NAP and published the annual report on anti-trafficking efforts, covering 2022. Authorities held awareness sessions for government employees, students, and tourist industry employees on the prevention and identification of trafficking crimes. The government and the FMC continued to operate a 24-hour hotline for individuals needing legal assistance, including sex trafficking victims; for the third year in a row, none of the calls to this hotline resulted in trafficking investigations or victim identification.

State media continued to produce newspaper articles and television and radio programs, including public service announcements, to raise public awareness about sex trafficking. The FMC raised public awareness through workshops and training with government officials, social workers, educators, and students, as well as the distribution of materials explaining trafficking and its risks; however, there were no publicly available materials that showed the effectiveness or impact of these programs. The Ministry of Tourism provided training for workers in the tourism sector on the prevention of extraterritorial child commercial sexual exploitation and abuse. Authorities did not make any efforts to reduce the demand for commercial sex acts.

The Ministry of Labor and Social Security (MOL) did not make sufficient efforts to address forced labor. In 2022, MOL officials conducted 1,150 labor inspections and issued more than 7,753 labor violations but did not identify any cases of forced labor. Authorities did not report screening workers traveling abroad for trafficking indicators and did not report identifying any concerns with employment contracts. In the past, officials may have used these authorities to target those who might want to leave the country. The government did not implement policies to prohibit force, fraud, or coercion by foreign labor recruiters and state-owned or controlled enterprises in recruiting and retaining employees, despite persistent allegations Cuban officials threatened, manipulated, and coerced participants to remain in government-sponsored labor export programs. The government did not explain international labor standards to participants in its labor export schemes working in conditions with strong trafficking indicators. Government policy indicated males older than age of 16 must register with the country’s armed forces and prepare for mandatory military conscription starting at the age of 17; however, in previous years some reports noted the government’s involvement in the forced recruitment of children to serve in military community brigades.

TRAFFICKING PROFILE:

As reported over the past five years, human traffickers exploit domestic and foreign victims in Cuba, and traffickers exploit victims from Cuba abroad. Sex trafficking and extraterritorial commercial sexual exploitation and abuse, including of child victims, occurs within Cuba. Traffickers exploit Cuban citizens in sex trafficking and forced labor in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, the Mediterranean, Latin America, and the United States. Traffickers exploit foreign nationals from Africa and Asia in sex trafficking and forced labor in Cuba to pay off travel debts. The government identified children, young women, elderly, and disabled persons as the most vulnerable to trafficking. LGBTQI+ individuals and economic migrants are vulnerable to sex trafficking. Government officials may be forcibly recruiting children to join community military brigades charged with repressing citizens who gathered in protest against the regime. Cuban citizens reported being recruited by Russia-affiliated private military companies or by the Russian military with fraudulent employment contracts to later be coerced to fight in Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. For example, two young Cuban men reported being deceptively recruited to work in Russia as construction workers; however, upon arriving to Moscow, they were allegedly coerced into fighting in Ukraine on behalf of Russian military forces. Some of these individuals reported Cuban authorities were aware of their recruitment and may have facilitated their travel, and they were received in Moscow by a Cuban military official. According to stakeholders, approximately 750 and 1,000 Cubans had traveled to Russia to serve as foreign fighters.

International observers and former participants reported government officials force or coerce individuals to participate and remain in the Cuban government’s labor export programs, particularly the foreign medical missions program, managed by the Unidad Central de Cooperación Médica, the Ministry of Health, and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Investment. Government-affiliated Cuban workers serving abroad were subjected to forced labor by inherently coercive laws and regulations authorities used to manipulate workers to remain in the program. The Ministry of Interior labeled workers that left the program without completing their assignment as “deserters,” a category that made them “undesirable” under Cuban immigration law, and banned workers from returning to Cuba for eight years. Cuban nationals who did not return to the country within 24 months were categorized as having “emigrated.” Individuals who “emigrated” lost all their citizen protections; rights, including custodial rights over children; and any property left behind, and – if they also defected from a civilian mission – were not allowed to visit their families remaining in Cuba. These government provisions coerced workers and punished those who sought to exercise freedom of movement and will. A report on the rights of the child – published by an international organization – noted concern over Cuba’s policy to prohibit parents who terminated a civilian contract abroad from reuniting with their children. According to an international NGO, by 2021, the Cuban government had sanctioned 40,000 government-affiliated workers under these provisions. In 2022, there were approximately 5,000 children forcibly separated from their parents due to the government’s provisions for the program. The government promoted the program as altruistic, sought new partner countries, and increased its profit at the expense of desperately vulnerable and disempowered workers. The Cuban government reported $4.9 billion in revenue from the export of medical services in 2022 (the last year for which data is currently available) out of a total of $7 billion in service exports. According to the government, medical professionals comprise 75 percent of its exported workforce. According to a government report, there were roughly 22,000 workers in more than 53 countries by the end of 2023. Over the last five years, the labor export program operated or currently operates in Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, The Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belize, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Chad, People’s Republic of China , Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Eswatini, Ethiopia, France, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Italy, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liberia, Maldives, Mauritania, Mexico, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nicaragua, Palau, Panama, Peru, Portugal, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, , Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Spain, Suriname, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Türkiye, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. Cuban authorities employ workers through contracts with foreign governments and, in some countries, international organizations serve as intermediaries or provide funds for their work. The Cuban government confiscates between 75 and 95 percent of each worker’s salary, leaving government-affiliated workers with compensation that in many places is an inadequate living wage. Officials retain a portion of each worker’s salary in Cuban bank accounts, and funds can only be paid to the workers when the mission has been successfully completed and the workers have returned to Cuba. Salaries are often paid in Cuban pesos rather than the currency the host government uses to pay Cuba for their services. Survivors of the labor export program reported government minders coerced them into criminal activity by making them falsify patient records, manipulate medical files, report procedures that did not take place, and dispose of medications to corroborate fraudulent records and inflated statistics. In 2023, the U.N. Special Rapporteur (SR) on Contemporary Forms of Slavery sent a letter to Cuban authorities raising concerns over the alleged human rights abuses suffered by government-affiliated Cuban workers, including medical professionals and other civilian personnel. In the letter, the SR focused on abuses documented in Italy, Qatar, and Spain, including insufficient wages paid to workers, exhaustive work hours without adequate remuneration, the confiscation of passports, precarious work conditions, and the retaliation workers faced if they left the program.

In 2021, and with the support of an international NGO, 1,111 alleged trafficking victims filed a complaint with the International Criminal Court and the UN, claiming the Cuban government exploited them and forced them to work in the labor export programs. The complaint stated 75 percent of participants did not volunteer for the program, 33 percent never saw a contract, 69 percent did not know their final destination, 38 percent had their passport confiscated by Cuban officials once they arrived at their destination, 76 percent had “minders,” 76 percent could not freely associate with locals, 79 percent had restrictions on their movement, 91 percent were told they could not return to Cuba if they defected, 75 percent suffered threats or witnessed coworkers being threatened, and 40 percent were separated from their children as punishment for defecting. In 2023, this NGO noted the number of testimonies increased to 1,402. The Cuban government acknowledges it withholds passports of overseas medical personnel in Venezuela, the largest mission, with approximately 19,000 workers. Many Cuban medical personnel claim they work long hours without rest and face substandard and dangerous working and living conditions in some countries, including a lack of hygienic conditions and privacy, and are forced to falsify medical records. Many medical professionals reported being sexually abused by their supervisors.

While the medical missions remain the most prevalent and visible, the government profited from other similarly coercive labor export programs; professional baseball players and coaches, teachers, artists, musicians, architects, engineers, forestry technicians, construction workers, nearly 7,000 sea mariners, and all other government-affiliated workers are vulnerable to forced labor and coercive, fraudulent practices by the Cuban government. In 2023, an online media network aired an anonymous interview with a government-affiliated Cuban engineer previously assigned to a mission in Saint Lucia. According to the worker, he was assigned to a construction project with Cuban firm, UNECA, SA. This individual reported having to transfer most of his salary directly to UNECA, SA, receiving threats from heads of mission, and being prohibited from befriending locals and leaving his residence after 6 p.m. In 2024, three government-affiliated Cuban workers in Spain, including an electrical engineer, a naval mechanic, and a sports specialist, alleged concerning exploitative conditions that may amount to forced labor by the Cuban government. Workers reported not having full awareness of the contracts they signed or knowing their destination until their time of travel, working between 54 and 77 hours a week under deplorable conditions, and withholding of half their wages by Cuban authorities.

Might Cuba Finally Be Ready To Authorize From Abroad Direct Investment And Direct Financing Into Re-Emerging Private Sector? First U.S. OFAC License Issued In 2022. Investor Still Waiting.

The Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
21 June 2024

Cuba Immigration Proposal Seeks To Lure Foreign Investors And Keep Critics At Bay


BY NORA GÁMEZ TORRES
 
A proposed Cuban law would grant permanent residence to foreigners ready to invest in state or private enterprises and special immigration status to Cubans living in the United States and other countries with businesses on the island, a move suggesting the government might be getting ready to open its emerging private sector to foreign investment.

At the same time, the draft of the law, published this week by the National Assembly, would allow authorities to continue using travel bans to punish critics on the island and abroad.

Current laws generally prohibit Cubans living abroad and foreign investors from legally owning or investing in the small- and medium-sized private enterprises that have mushroomed nationwide since they were authorized in 2021.

However, many Cubans abroad have done so anyway through informal channels, using relatives and friends. The current laws must also be modified to implement the changes teased in the immigration proposal. The extent of the immigration benefits for investors is unclear because the draft text leaves key details to be regulated later by the government. The proposal is expected to be voted on by the National Assembly in July.

The draft document offers permanent residence to foreigners “who prove they have assets to use for the purposes of undertaking businesses or making investments in projects or priorities for the country’s development or that may be linked to state or private economic sectors.” It also proposes creating a new “business” or “investor” migration status for Cubans who live permanently abroad but “participate in the Cuban economic model according to ... the law.”

The text, however, does not describe the rights associated with such a status nor how to acquire it. The new status seems designed to offer a “privilege, an incentive to Cubans living abroad and who want to invest in Cuba,” said Eloy Viera Cañive, a Cuban lawyer who contributes to the Cuban news outlet El Toque. “This is also flirting with the Biden administration’s decision to allow investments in [Cuba’s] private sector.”

The decades-old U.S. economic embargo on Cuba is still in place, but the Biden administration has recently eased some restrictions to help the private sector. It has also issued at least two licenses to authorize Americans to invest in a private enterprise in Cuba — to John Kavulich, the head of the U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, and to former Miami Congressman Joe García.

Despite the island’s growing economic problems, about three years have passed since the authorization of private enterprises on the island and the Cuban government has yet to allow foreign investment in the private sector.

But experts note that the proposal, already green-lit by the country’s Council of Ministers and the Ministry of Interior, has done little to address much of what many Cuban Americans have been advocating for. It has quickly received criticism from human-rights activists because it will give Cuban authorities ample leeway to continue banning Cubans from entering or leaving the country due to their political opinions, citing “national security and public order.”

The proposal also maintains travel restrictions on doctors and other professionals in Cuba, citing the need to protect the workforce. Cuban authorities would also deny entry to foreign visitors who have “promoted” or been involved in “hostile actions against the political, economic and social foundations of the Cuban state.” The text also does not say how authorities define “promoted” or “hostile actions,” but the country’s laws punish people for publishing criticism of the government on social media.

There was an expectation that the Cuban government would allow Cubans with citizenship in the U.S. and elsewhere to enter the country with non-Cuban passports. (Current law mandates Cubans born on the island to use Cuban passports to enter the country even if they are citizens of another country.)

That would allow Cuban Americans to be considered U.S. citizens while on the island and receive services from the U.S Embassy in Havana. However, the proposal contemplates that possibility only if a Cuban national legally renounces his or her citizenship under procedures that will be included in a future citizenship law that has not been published.

A senior Interior Ministry said Thursday on state television that Cubans who live abroad and want to visit the island must do so with their Cuban passports and must abide by Cuban laws while in the country.

The ministry’s chief legal advisor, Lt. Col. Raylan Hernández Concepción, said the country’s 2019 Constitution establishes that the island’s nationals maintain their Cuban citizenship even when they become citizens of other countries. “It follows that while Cubans are in the national territory, they must act as Cuban citizens, they cannot exercise another citizenship,” he said. “From the moment a Cuban enters the country, he must identify himself with the Cuban passport, not with a passport from another country.”

LINK To Article

LINKS To Related Analyses 

Cuba Authorizes Advertising In And On Government-Controlled Media, Yet Continues To Block Direct Investment And Direct Financing To MSMEs- Which Could Be Used For Marketing. Jun 9, 2024

Cuba Government Responds To Biden-Harris Administration Newest Initiatives Towards Re-Emerging Private Sector. May 29, 2024

Biden-Harris Administration Issues OFAC Regulations To Help Cuba's "Entrepreneurs" But Again Fails To Make The Most Important Change. May 28, 2024

10 May 2024 Marked Two-Year Anniversary Since OFAC Issued First License To Authorize Investment And Financing Into A Private Company In Cuba. Funding Waits Because Havana Has Yet To Issue Regulations May 13, 2024

Cuba Government Extols Role Of Private Companies- Now 13% Of Official GDP And 8% Of Imports. But, Three Years In And No Authorization For Investment And Financing. Why So Scared? Apr 19, 2024

U.S. To Cuba Exports Increased 10.6% In February. Up 27% Year-To-Year. Products Included Cigarettes, Tea, Apples, Construction Vehicles, Passenger Vehicles & Parts, Confectionery Machines. Apr 8, 2024

Academics Wrong, NGO’s Wrong.  Don’t Blame Diaz-Balart, Blame Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration And Biden-Harris Administration For New Cuba Law. Commercial Malpractice- Easy Carpet Roll-Up Apr 6, 2024

Miel Factory In France Unveils New Cuba Honey Harvest- 7 EUR For 250 Grams Mar 20, 2024

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"Soul Of Havana" Coffee Sold At Supermarket In Moscow... Package Lists Russia As Source- And Mentions Belarus..

“Soul of Havana” coffee is 449.99 Rubles (US$5.16) for 200 grams (7 ounces) at a supermarket in Moscow, Russian Federation. The package does not indicate the coffee beans are sourced in the Republic of Cuba. The package wording suggests the coffee is inspired by the Republic of Cuba in terms of taste, intensity.