Cuba Government Extols Role Of Private Companies- Now 13% Of Official GDP And 8% Of Imports. But, Three Years In And No Authorization For Investment And Financing. Why So Scared?

“Cuba approved 62 new MSME enterprises 

Havana, Apr 18 (Prensa Latina) The Cuban government today approved 62 new economic actors, as micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs), in order to boost production of goods and services in the country.  Through its website, the Ministry of Economy and Planning (MEP) specified that 59 are private MSMEs and three are state-owned. 

With a rapid growth since their approval in 2021, these forms of economic management currently operate in various branches, including food production, recycling and recovery of raw materials, import and export and sale of various assortments, computer programming activities, gardening and manufacturing of construction materials. 

The first 35 MSMEs were authorized in September 2021; two years later (at the close of September 2023), the MEP notified almost 9,000 ventures of this nature in the 15 provinces and in 167 of the country’s 168 municipalities, and the current figure stands at 11,118. 

Analyses on the subject in the National Assembly (Parliament) indicated in 2023 that the private and cooperative sector (to which MSMEs belong) represents around 13 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and approximately eight percent of imports.  The business with the greatest presence of MSMEs on the island are gastronomy, construction, manufacturing industries and industrial food and beverage production.”

The Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) has provided substantive opportunities for individuals subject to United States jurisdiction and United States-based companies to re-engage and to engage with the re-emerging private sector within the Republic of Cuba. 

Micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) are also known as PYMEs (pequeñas y medianas empresas).  There are a reported more than 10,000 registered in the Republic of Cuba, including some Republic of Cuba government-operated companies which have transformed into PYMEs.

  • Authorized the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury to issue first license to a United States-based entity to deliver a direct investment in and provide direct financing to a PYME.

  • Authorized the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce to issue licenses to export vehicles (electric, hybrid, gasoline, diesel), motorcycles (electric, hybrid, gasoline, diesel), and scooters (electric, hybrid, gasoline, diesel) to PYMEs.

  • Authorized the OFAC and BIS to issue licenses, and to use general license procedures to encourage product and service engagement with PYMEs.  During the last two years there has been a substantial increase in the export of agricultural commodities and food products from the United States to PYMEs along with a substantial increase in machinery and other products whereby PYMEs are assembling, manufacturing, and producing products for sale within the Republic of Cuba and for export from the Republic of Cuba.

LINKS TO RELATED ANALYSES 

U.S. To Cuba Exports Increased 10.6% In February. Up 27% Year-To-Year. Products Included Cigarettes, Tea, Apples, Construction Vehicles, Passenger Vehicles & Parts, Confectionery Machines. Apr 8, 2024

Academics Wrong, NGO’s Wrong.  Don’t Blame Diaz-Balart, Blame Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration And Biden-Harris Administration For New Cuba Law. Commercial Malpractice- Easy Carpet Roll-Up Apr 6, 2024

Time For A CRL/BOR List For MSME’s (PYMEs) In Cuba To Provide Confidence And Protection To United States Companies, Entrepreneurs, Financial Institutions, Sources Of Capital, And Suppliers.  Mar 13, 2024

U.S. Department Of State US$400,000.00 “Priority Program” To Support Re-Emerging Private Sector In Cuba; Includes “Shark Tank Style” Recruitment. Does Not Resolve Primary Problem. Mar 9, 2024

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov Today Visits Cuba.  By Focusing Upon Expanding MSMEs, He Can Help Russia Make Money- And Help United States Capital Support MSMEs. Not A Perfect Alliance. Feb 18, 2024

List Of Every Product Exported From U.S. To Cuba In 2023. U.S. Ag Commodity/Food Exports Up 4.2%- Including US$5.4 Million In Coffee. US$24 Million To MSMEs Including US$8 Million In Vehicles. Feb 13, 2024

U.S. To Cuba Exports Increased 10.6% In February. Up 27% Year-To-Year. Products Included Cigarettes, Tea, Apples, Construction Vehicles, Passenger Vehicles & Parts, Confectionery Machines.

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
April 2024

February 2024 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increase 10.6% - 1
54th Of 210 February 2024 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 27.0% - 2
Cuba Ranked 46th Of 210 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets - 2
February 2024 Healthcare Product Exports US$0.00 - 2
February 2024 Humanitarian Donations US$2,934,480.00 - 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue To Increase - 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 19

FEBRUARY 2024 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 10.6% - Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in February 2024 were US$27,204,788.00 compared to US$24,592,601.00 in February 2023 and US$29,812,459.00 in February 2022.  

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

1- Chicken Meat (Frozen)- US$8,832,358.00
2- Chicken Leg Quarters (Frozen)- US$6,639,954.00
3- Chicken Legs (Frozen)- US$2,874,029.00
4- Meat of Swine (Frozen)- US$707,872.00
5- Preserved Chicken Meat Paste- US$686,474.00
6- Powdered Milk- US$651,726.00
7- Fertilized Chicken Eggs For Incubation- US$519,838.00
8- Milk/Cream Sweetened- US$455,761.00
9- Coffee Roasted (Decaffeinated)- US$358,934.00
10- Offal of Sheep (Frozen)- US$353,217.00

Other TSREEA/CDA/OFAC/BIS Authorized items: Black Tea (US$6,336.00): Apples (US$132,323.00); Guts, Bladders & Stomachs of Animals (US$71,640.00); Sardines (US$37,734.00); Cane Sugar (US$818,838.00); Pet Food (US$3,528.00); Cigarettes (US$98,900.00); Knives Blades (US$27,360.00); Rider Type Self-Propelled Electric Trucks (US$21,895.00); Fork-Lifts (US$30,000.00); Front-End Shovel Loaders (US$245,797.00); Confectionery (Cocoa) Manufacturing Machines (US$5,321.00); New Vehicles (US$4,983,708.00); Used Vehicles (US$109,500.00); Special Purpose Vehicles (US$2,881.00).

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA and CDA. The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

January 2024 through February 2024 TSREEA exports were US$72,373,661.00 compared to January 2023 through February 2023 TSREEA exports of US$56,986,797.00.

Total TSREEA exports since first deliveries in December 2001 exceed US$7,318,707,054.00

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

Academics Wrong, NGO’s Wrong.  Don’t Blame Diaz-Balart, Blame Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration And Biden-Harris Administration For New Cuba Law. Commercial Malpractice- Easy Carpet Roll-Up

Academics Are Wrong, NGO’s Are Wrong.  Don’t Blame Representative Diaz-Balart, Blame Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration And Biden-Harris Administration. 

Once Again, Issues Relating To The Republic Of Cuba Are Not That Important- And Whose Fault Is That? 

Cuba Is Not At A Tipping Point.  The Country Has Always Been Near Capsizing.  Always Taking On Water.  Heaving.  Yet, It Continues To Remain Afloat.  Generally, Because Other Governments Save It From Sinking.

If the bilateral commercial, economic, financial, and political relationship, the landscape, for the government of the United States and the government of the Republic of Cuba were important, as some United States-based academics and United States-based non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) and non-profit organizations maintain, then why would not members of the United States House of Representatives and members of the United States Senate object, seek to derail, or impede the recent effort by Mario Diaz-Balart (R- Florida, 26th District), a member of the United States House of Representatives?

The Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) was able to roll-up like a carpet some of the most visually significant and commercially, economically, financially, and politically impactive components of initiatives unfurled during the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017). 

This was possible precisely because from 17 December 2014 through 20 January 2021 neither The White House nor first the Castro-Machado Ventura Administration (2008-2018) and then its successor the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ) provided the United States business community with any depth of re-engagement or engagement- everything authorized was superficial, meaning there was barely a commercial, economic, or financial root system to survive any effort to dislodge it.

Neither the Obama-Biden Administration, Castro-Machado Ventura Administration, nor Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration fully embraced a meaningful presence in the Republic of Cuba for United States-based companies. 

Imagery, yes.  But, United States-based companies with thousands of employees in the Republic of Cuba, with hundreds of offices and operations in Republic of Cuba, that was too far.  The White House never pressed the Palacio de la Revolucion.  Even if it claims it did, the effort was unsuccessful.

Conveniently forgotten is a statement from the Senior Director- Western Hemisphere Affairs at the National Security Council (NSC) in The White House during the Obama-Biden Administration who infamously shared “we have gone as far as we can go” when defending authorizing United States-based financial institutions having operating accounts with Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions, but not permitting Republic of Cuba-based financial institutions from having operating accounts with United States-based financial institutions.  Saying this while knowing doing so negated 100% of the value for the initiative for direct correspondent banking.

The Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) has provided substantive opportunities for individuals subject to United States jurisdiction and United States-based companies to re-engage and to engage with the re-emerging private sector within the Republic of Cuba. 

Micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) are also known as PYMEs (pequeñas y medianas empresas).  There are a reported more than 10,000 registered in the Republic of Cuba, including some Republic of Cuba government-operated companies which have transformed into PYMEs.

  • Authorized the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury to issue first license to a United States-based entity to deliver a direct investment in and provide direct financing to a PYME.

With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022       

Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022  

Biden Administration Will Use Cuba's Authorization Of SMSE's As Means To Expand Support For Cuba Private Sector- U.S. Investments And Loans May Be Next June 02, 2021   

  • Authorized the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce to issue licenses to export vehicles (electric, hybrid, gasoline, diesel), motorcycles (electric, hybrid, gasoline, diesel), and scooters (electric, hybrid, gasoline, diesel) to PYMEs.

First Tesla Model Y Vehicle Authorized By Biden-Harris Administration Scheduled For Delivery To A Cuban National. Maryland-Based Company Received First BIS License. November 30, 2023

  • Authorized the OFAC and BIS to issue licenses, and to use general license procedures to encourage product and service engagement with PYMEs.  During the last two years there has been a substantial increase in the export of agricultural commodities and food products from the United States to PYMEs along with a substantial increase in machinery and other products whereby PYMEs are assembling, manufacturing, and producing products for sale within the Republic of Cuba and for export from the Republic of Cuba.

List Of Every Product Exported From U.S. To Cuba In 2023. U.S. Ag Commodity/Food Exports Up 4.2%- Including US$5.4 Million In Coffee. US$24 Million To MSMEs Including US$8 Million In Vehicles. Feb 13, 2024  

Unfortunately, the Biden-Harris Administration and Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration has adopted portions of the playbook from the Obama-Biden Administration which were the catalyst for enabling the carpet roll-up decisions by the Trump-Pence Administration.  There are two decisions which are the most important- thus most egregious.

First, the government of the Republic of Cuba not yet publishing the regulations for a PYME to accept direct investment and direct financing from outside of the Republic of Cuba.  Now, twenty-three months, nearing two years on 10 May 2024, and a PYME remains unable to cost-effectively, efficiently, officially, securely, and transparently receive a direct investment or receive direct financing from the United States.  A PYME can (and many do) continue to receive funds unofficially- meaning in violation of laws, policies, and regulations in the Republic of Cuba and potentially in violation of regulations in place by the BIS and OFAC.  Until the government of the Republic of Cuba publishes regulations, interest by individuals subject to United States jurisdiction and United States-based companies will remain constrained, stunted, commercially constipated absent legal frameworks.  Why the delay by the government of the Republic of Cuba?  One theory is with the issuance of laws, policies, and regulations the process becomes institutionalized and thus more challenging to alter, criminalize, or rescind.

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov Today Visits Cuba.  By Focusing Upon Expanding MSMEs, He Can Help Russia Make Money- And Help United States Capital Support MSMEs. Not A Perfect Alliance. Feb 18, 2024  

Second, the Biden-Harris Administration continually and inexplicably continues to grasp how requiring funds to be sent from the United States to the Republic of Cuba through a third country and requiring funds to be sent from the Republic of Cuba to the United States through a third country is detrimental to creating an efficient, normal, predictable, secure, and transparent commercial landscape.  When a United States-based investor or United States-based company learns from the OFAC and BIS that to be paid- whether for an investment, loan, product, or service, particularly when the values are small, a third-country financial institution must be engaged- and must receive a fee, the thermometer of interest will quickly plunge from warm to freezing.  There must be direct correspondent banking.

State Department, NSC, OFAC, BIS, USDA Don't Understand Requirements For Financial Plumbing To Function Efficiently.  They Excel In Creating, Maintaining, And Defending Clogs. May 16, 2023 

United States-based exporters increasingly report Republic of Cuba-based customers are seeking to finance purchases, particularly for durables, such as equipment and vehicles.  For a commercial environment which includes the ability of customers to finance a purchase, the value of that commercial market increases exponentially. 

However, the transaction costs are prohibitive when the amount of the payment (for example, monthly) is small- consider US$100.00.  As currently structured by the Biden-Harris Administration, that US$100.00 would need to originate with a Republic of Cuba-based financial institution.  Next, travel to a third-country-based financial institution.  Then travel from that third-country-based financial institution to the United States-based financial institution and into the account of the United States-based exporter.  The transaction fees for the three financial institutions involved in that US$100.00 transfer could be near, at, or more than the value of the US$100.00 transfer.  

NOTE: Denver, Colorado-based Western Union Company (2023 revenue US$4.36 billion) does manage electronic remittance transfers from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  However, the company does not permit commercial transfers.  Essential for the BIS, OFAC, and United States Department of State to create a workable compliance regime within which Western Union would then process commercial transfers from the United States to the Republic of Cuba and from the Republic of Cuba to the United States.  The use of Western Union for commercial transactions is NOT a viable replacement for direct correspondent banking as Western Union transaction costs can be substantially higher.

Returning to Representative Mario Diaz-Balart and his successful insertion into the recent statute governing the 2024 United States Government fiscal year.

  • H.R. 2822: ‘‘Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024’’.  Page 913 (Of 1,012) “LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN SEC. 7045.  (d) CUBA DEMOCRACY PROGRAMS.— Funds appropriated by this Act under the heading ‘‘Economic Support Fund’’ and made available for democracy programs in Cuba may not be made available for business promotion, economic reform, entrepreneurship, or any other assistance that is not democracy building as expressly authorized in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity (LIBERTAD) Act of 1996 and the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992.”  LINK To Complete Text In PDF FORMAT

U.S. Department Of State US$400,000.00 “Priority Program” To Support Re-Emerging Private Sector In Cuba; Includes “Shark Tank Style” Recruitment. Does Not Resolve Primary Problem. Mar 9, 2024

  • Associated Press (2 July 2023): “Benjamin Ziff, Charge d’Affaires at the United States Embassy in Cuba, dismisses claims that the administration has implemented few changes.  He pointed to the resumption of some flights and the sending of remittances, as well as a slew of educational and religious exchanges between both nations.  The embassy’s business training classes, while a small measure to boost the private sector, was one of them.  “Cuba’s future lies in its private sector and those who say it is a necessary evil are completely wrong,” Ziff said in an interview. “It is an increasingly necessary good for the well-being of the people.”

Had the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration and Biden-Harris Administration completed their two most important tasks, 1) issuing regulations for the delivery of direct investment and direct financing, and 2) authorizing direct correspondent banking, respectively, the commercial landscape would have been more resilient, deeper, with more roots.  Potentially, there would have been a member of the United States Congress who would have objected, successfully, to the adoption of Section 7045 (d). 

Again, the commercial landscape was rolled-up like a carpet.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Miel Factory In France Unveils New Cuba Honey Harvest- 7 EUR For 250 Grams

Miel Factory
28 rue de Sévigné
75004 PARIS


20 March 2024

La toute nouvelle récolte du miel de Cuba est arrivée à la Factory
 
Ce miel à la texture claire et légèrement crémeuse aux effluves fruités et épicées, procure des saveurs chaleureuses pleine d’exotisme. On retrouve dans le miel cubain, les saveurs des tropiques avec des notes fruitées et épicées. Les fleurs telles que l’amaryllis, le bougainvillier, l’orchidée, la campanile, l’amandier et toute la biodiversité de la mangrove égaillent le miel cubain.
 
Un miel d'une pureté exceptionnelle

Cuba est un des rares pays sur notre planète à pratiquer une agriculture biologique qui n’utilise aucun pesticide. Cette agriculture raisonnée a été forcée par l’embargo que Cuba a subit suite à la chute de l’union soviétique en 1991.

Le miel de Cuba, d’une rare qualité est une véritable réussite commerciale pour le pays depuis la normalisation des relations diplomatiques et commerciales avec les États unis. Le miel « sans pesticide », représente la quatrième source de revenus pour Cuba après la canne à sucre, les cigares et le rhum. Les récoltes sont abondantes grâce à la vitalité des abeilles cubaines qui vivent dans un biotope riche et propre.  

Google Translate

The brand new honey harvest from Cuba has arrived at the Factory
 
This honey with a clear and slightly creamy texture with fruity and spicy aromas provides warm flavors full of exoticism. In Cuban honey, we find the flavors of the tropics with fruity and spicy notes. Flowers such as amaryllis, bougainvillea, orchid, campanile, almond tree and all the biodiversity of the mangrove enhance Cuban honey.
 
A honey of exceptional purity

Cuba is one of the rare countries on our planet to practice organic agriculture that does not use any pesticides. This sustainable agriculture was forced by the embargo that Cuba suffered following the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

Cuban honey, of rare quality, has been a real commercial success for the country since the normalization of diplomatic and commercial relations with the United States. “Pesticide-free” honey represents the fourth source of income for Cuba after sugar cane, cigars and rum. Harvests are abundant thanks to the vitality of Cuban bees who live in a rich and clean biotope.

Link To Online Store

OFAC Fines Switzerland-Based Company US$3,740,442.00 For Sanctions Violations, Including For Cuba. Potential Fine Was US$276,441,312.00

Office of Foreign Assets Control
United States Department of the Treasury
Washington DC

Enforcement Release: March 14, 2024
EFG International AG Settles with OFAC for $3,740,442 for Apparent Violations of Multiple Sanctions Programs


excerpts:

EFG International AG, a global private banking group based in Switzerland with approximately 40 global subsidiaries (collectively “EFG”), has agreed to pay $3,740,442 to settle its potential civil liability for apparent violations of multiple sanctions programs administered by OFAC. Between 2014 and 2018, EFG caused U.S. securities firms to process 727 securities-related transactions totaling $29,939,701 on behalf of customers in Cuba, 141 securities-related transactions totaling $468,615 for an individual blocked under the Kingpin Act, and, in 2023, five dividend payments, with a combined value of $1,200, for U.S.-custodied securities of a person blocked under Executive Order 14024 of OFAC’s Russia sanctions program.

The settlement amount reflects OFAC’s determination that EFG’s apparent violations were voluntarily self-disclosed and not egregious, and also reflects EFG’s significant remedial measures.

Description of the Apparent Violations

EFG’s subsidiaries and affiliates in various countries provide a range of financial services, including banking, investment, asset management, and securities brokering, to institutional customers and individuals worldwide. As further described below, EFG subsidiaries in several countries purchased and sold securities on behalf of foreign clients. These transactions were
conducted through and held in omnibus accounts with U.S. custodians and other U.S. market participants, including an EFG U.S. subsidiary. Because trades and other corporate actions completed through these omnibus accounts were generally made in the name of EFG, and not its underlying clients, these U.S. market participants were unaware that they were ultimately
processing securities transactions on behalf of persons sanctioned by OFAC.

Cuba Transactions

Between January 2014 and July 2018, EFG subsidiaries located in the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Luxembourg, Monaco, and Switzerland processed 727 securities-related transactions and funds transfers totaling $29,939,701 through omnibus accounts at U.S. custodians or otherwise involving U.S. market participants, including EFG Miami, on behalf of clients who resided in
Cuba or whose beneficial owners were Cuban nationals.1 EFG’s clients included a Panamanian company beneficially owned by a person located in Cuba, two private investment firms domiciled in the British Virgin Islands and Panama whose ultimate beneficial owner was another Cuban national and resident, and individuals who EFG had reason to know resided in Cuba
based on residency cards they provided to their respective EFG subsidiaries. For 404 of these transactions executed on behalf of a family that included Cuban residents, EFG involved EFG Miami in a brokerage capacity. The securities transactions involved the purchase, sale, or redemption of securities positions that EFG had acquired for the clients, as well as corporate
actions such as interest payments or dividend distributions.

As a result of the conduct described above, between approximately January 2014 and September 2023, EFG processed 873 securities-related transactions—totaling $30,409,488—through U.S. custodians or involving U.S. person counterparties, in apparent violation of § 515.201 of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 515 (“CACR”); § 598.202 of the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 598 (“FNKSR”); or § 587.201 of the Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions Regulations, 31 C.F.R. part 587 (“RuHSR”) (the “Apparent Violations”).

Penalty Calculations and General Factors Analysis

The statutory maximum civil monetary penalty applicable in this matter is $276,441,312. OFAC determined that EFG voluntarily self-disclosed the Apparent Violations and that the Apparent Violations constitute a non-egregious case. Accordingly, under OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines (“Enforcement Guidelines”), 31 C.F.R. part 501, app. A, as of 2023, the base civil monetary penalty applicable in this matter equals the sum of one-half of the transaction value for each apparent violation, which is $10,686,977. The settlement amount of $3,740,442, of which $1,000,000 will be suspended pending satisfactory completion of certain compliance commitments, reflects OFAC’s consideration of the General Factors under the Enforcement Guidelines. OFAC determined the following to be aggravating factors: (1) OFAC determined that EFG failed to exercise due caution or care by failing to properly screen for and timely notify U.S. custodians and other U.S. parties about positions of blocked persons held in EFG omnibus accounts in the United States. (2) EFG at all times knew or had reason to know that it held securities on behalf of blocked persons in omnibus accounts at U.S. custodians or counterparties. (3) EFG processed 727 transactions totaling $29,939,701 involving multiple persons located in Cuba over the course of at least four years, thereby conferring economic benefit to a comprehensively sanctioned jurisdiction; EFG’s conduct also increased the nominal value of the blocked persons’ assets, as the transactions were not stopped in the United States and were instead processed through to the blocked customers’ accounts. OFAC determined the following to be mitigating factors: (1) EFG internally restricted the accounts to certain of its blocked clients, preventing them from realizing economic benefit from their accounts. (2) EFG has not received a penalty notice or Finding of Violation from OFAC in the five years preceding the earliest date of the transactions giving rise to the Apparent Violations. (3) EFG has taken significant remedial actions in response to the Apparent Violations, including: o Implementing internal restrictions to prevent credits/debits to sanctioned-client accounts and requiring compliance-function approval for any account activity of customers who are not blocked but present heightened sanctions risk; As of December 2023, EFG and OFAC had agreed to the settlement terms in principle. Therefore, OFAC applied
the 2023 Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Act values for the Apparent Violations.

LINK TO COMPLETE OFAC MEDIA RELEASE

Time For A CRL/BOR List For MSME’s (PYMEs) In Cuba To Provide Confidence And Protection To United States Companies, Entrepreneurs, Financial Institutions, Sources Of Capital, And Suppliers. 

A CRL/BOR List For MSME’s (PYMEs) In Cuba May Be Useful To Provide Confidence And Protection To United States Companies, Entrepreneurs, Financial Institutions, Sources Of Capital, And Suppliers. 

Key To Successful Implementation Of A CRL/BOR List Is For A MSME/PYME To Have An Efficient And Transparent Process To Engage With The United States Embassy In Cuba To Dispute Any Finding And Have Any Finding Corrected Quickly.  

In 2017, the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021) created the Cuba Restricted List (CRL) to be managed by the United States Department of State.  The purpose of the CRL was to identify entities located in the Republic of Cuba with connectivity to the government of the Republic of Cuba, specifically to the Ministry of the Interior (MININT) of the Republic of Cuba and to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the Republic of Cuba (MINFAR).  For most transactions involving individuals subject to United States jurisdiction, an entity on the CRL would be prohibited.  However, in some instances, indirect transactions and subsidiary transactions remained authorized. 

https://www.state.gov/cuba-restricted-list/frequently-asked-questions-on-the-cuba-restricted-list/ 

The government of the Republic of Cuba reports the creation of more than 10,000 registered micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSMEs) also defined as PYMEs (pequeñas y medianas empresas). 

While there continues to be the creation of MSMEs by individual Republic of Cuba nationals, the government of the Republic of Cuba has also commenced an aggressive strategy of converting Republic of Cuba government-operated companies into MSMEs.   

While this transaction was not unexpected- and happens in many countries, one result in the Republic of Cuba has been a conflation as to the identity, the provenance, and the politics of defining a legitimate MSME from a Trojan Horse MSME, with the later of increasing particular concern to members of the United States Congress.  

The private sector in the United States too has increased its awareness as to what defines an MSME- and what should define an MSME. 

Republic of Cuba government-operated companies which transform into MSMEs often have inherent, meaning legacy, connectivity to the mechanisms of the government of the Republic of Cuba.  These MSMEs often have unequal access to commercial, economic, financial, and political access and support which remains unavailable to other MSMEs. 

True that all MSMEs employ Republic of Cuba nationals, so engagement with an MSME, regardless of its roots, is providing value to the employees of MSMEs and to the citizens of the Republic of Cuba.

However, there is a moral hazard issue.  Should United States-based companies, entrepreneurs, financial institutions, and sources of capital avoid some MSMEs while embracing other MSMEs? 

The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FINCEN) within the United States Department of the Treasury, requires certain types of entities subject to United States jurisdiction to file a Beneficial Ownership Report (https://www.fincen.gov/boi) so the true ownership of a company, an LLC for example, may be known.  The United States Department of the Treasury also manages the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) which regulates most transactions with the Republic of Cuba.

A hybrid list incorporating components of the CRL, and the Beneficial Ownership Report (BOR) may serve a critical role to assist individuals subject to United States jurisdiction from ill-advised, inappropriate, or illegal engagement with an MSME.   

A CRL/BOR List would enhance opportunities for MSMEs by gaining a “Good Housekeeping Seal of Approval” from the United States Government, which in turn would not only provide enhanced confidence to United States-based companies, but critically to United States-based financial institutions.   

  • An impediment remains the stubborn refusal by the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) to re-authorize Direct Correspondent Banking.  The Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) authorized United States-based financial institutions to have accounts with Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions, but did not authorize Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions from having accounts with United States-based financial institutions. 

The key to success of a CRL/BOR List is what information is included and how information is maintained. 

The OFAC and the United States Department of State would create a checklist of information an MSME would provide which would be the evidence used to determine if the name of the MSMS is to be included in the CRL/BOR List.  The most critical data would be certification that the MSME has no connectivity (which will need to be defined) with MININT, MINFAR, or Specially Designated National (SDN) List. 

The United States Embassy in Havana, Republic of Cuba, is the natural point of data collection and maintenance as personnel is the nearest to those who own and who manage MSMEs.   

Critical to making the CRL/BOR List of value is to publicize its existence and to provide mechanisms whereby an MSME may update, correct, and dispute information published on the CRL/BOR List.  Equally important is the CRL/BOR List must be updated in real time as an MSME needs to have confidence that latest information will replace old information quickly so no transaction will be impeded.    

A challenge for the United States political process to express and to provide support for some citizens of the Republic of Cuba who work in the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba while maintaining a political Maginot Line and denying support for some individuals working in the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba. 

For example, if a MSME has ten employees and one of them has a blemished work record (employed by MININT, MINFAR, is a SDN as determined by the United States Department of State and the OFAC).  Would that result in disqualification of the MSME from the CRL/BOR List and any engagement with individuals subject to United States jurisdiction? 

If the Biden-Harris Administration genuinely wants the United States business community to increase its engagement with MSMEs located in the Republic of Cuba, then removing as many impediments as possible is essential.  Reputational risk and compliance risk are among the first-tier concerns by the United States business community for any transaction relating to the Republic of Cuba.  The creation of a CRL/BOR List for MSMEs would be a welcome additional tool.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT 

LINKS TO RECENT ANALYSES 

U.S. Department Of State US$400,000.00 “Priority Program” To Support Re-Emerging Private Sector In Cuba; Includes “Shark Tank Style” Recruitment. Does Not Resolve Primary Problem. Mar 9, 2024

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov Today Visits Cuba.  By Focusing Upon Expanding MSMEs, He Can Help Russia Make Money- And Help United States Capital Support MSMEs. Not A Perfect Alliance. Feb 18, 2024  

List Of Every Product Exported From U.S. To Cuba In 2023. U.S. Ag Commodity/Food Exports Up 4.2%- Including US$5.4 Million In Coffee. US$24 Million To MSMEs Including US$8 Million In Vehicles. Feb 13, 2024  

Arrest Of "Super Mule" In Tampa For Illegally Transporting US$100,000.00 To U.S. From Cuba Not Surprising… May Have Transported US$4.5 Million In Last Nine Months. Feb 7, 2024  

Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022  

With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022       

Biden Administration Will Use Cuba's Authorization Of SMSE's As Means To Expand Support For Cuba Private Sector- U.S. Investments And Loans May Be Next June 02, 2021   

U.S. Agricultural Commodity/Food Product Exports To Cuba Increased 39.4% In January 2024. Other Exports: US$3 Million In Vehicles, US$4,887.00 In Umbrellas, US$38,448.00 In Perfumes..

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
March 2024

January 2024 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increase 39.4% - 1
41st Of 207 January 2024 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 39.4% - 2
Cuba Ranked 41st Of 207 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets - 2
January 2024 Healthcare Product Exports US$31,070.00 - 2
January 2024 Humanitarian Donations US$1,920,522.00 - 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue To Increase - 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 19 (awaiting new port data; current data through November 2023)


JANUARY 2024 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 39.4% - Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in January 2024 were US$45,168,873.00 compared to US$32,394,196.00 in January 2023 and US$21,783,159.00 in January 2022. 

Chicken Leg Quarters (Frozen)- US$11,150,925.00
Chicken Meat (Frozen)- US$10,649,852.00
Chicken (Offal)- US$7,605,353.00
Chicken Legs (Frozen)- US$3,288,831.00
Soybeans- US$2,853,680.00
Meat of Swine (Frozen)- US$802,746.00
Bovine Meat (Offal)- US$608,106.00
Meat of Swine (Fresh)- US$481,107.00
Whole Yong Chickens (Frozen)- US$317,407.00
Coffee (Roasted)- US$302,612.00
Ten-Largest U.S. Exports To Cuba- US$38,060,619.00
10 Largest As % of Exports To Cuba- 84.3%

January 2024 exports included: Chicken Wings, Turkey, Bacon, Eggs, Onions, Olives, Apples, Rice, Sausages, Pasta, Potato Chips, Peanut Butter, Ice Cream, Water, Paints, Perfumes, Shampoos, Floor Coverings, Elevator, Excavator, New Vehicles (US$27,400.00), Used Vehicles (US$3,071,032.00), New Vehicles (electric) US$34,000.00, Trucks (US$52,592.00), Umbrellas (US$4,887.00).

Total TSREEA exports since first deliveries in December 2001 exceed US$7,291,502,266.00

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA and CDA. The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

LINK TO COMPLETE REPORT IN PDF FORMAT

T Times

U.S. Department Of State US$400,000.00 “Priority Program” To Support Re-Emerging Private Sector In Cuba; Includes “Shark Tank Style” Recruitment. Does Not Resolve Primary Problem.

United States Department Of State Allocating US$400,000.00 For “Priority Program” To Support The Re-Emerging Private Sector In The Republic Of Cuba And Seeks To Include “Shark Tank Style” Recruitment Progress. 

Does United States Department Of State Want CNBC To Broadcast “Shark Tank Cubano”? 

Yet, Entrenched And Uncreative Foggy Bottom Bureaucracy During Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) Continues To Resist Completing Direct Correspondent Banking Process Commenced During Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017).  Why?     

Most Impactful Issue Remains Delay Of Nearing Three Years For Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ) To Publish Regulations To Authorize Micro, Small, And Medium-Size Enterprises (MSMEs) To Receive Direct Foreign Investment And Direct Foreign Financing.  An Absurd Delay Given The Chronic Decay Continuing To Permeate The Commercial, Economic, And Financial Infrastructure Throughout The Republic Of Cuba. 

According To The United States Department Of State, All programs must… “strengthen private enterprise and build partnerships between citizens of the United States and Cuban citizens living in Cuba” And Show “… how to grow their business, including through developing import/export ties with businesses in the United States,”   

What Is Often Among The First Questions Owners And Managers Of MSMEs Ask About Connectivity With The United States?  How To Efficiently And Cost-Effectively Move Funds From The Republic Of Cuba And To The Republic Of Cuba So They May Receive Direct Investment And Direct Financing From Sources In The United States. 

The Biden-Harris Administration Could Authorize Direct Correspondent Banking, But Has Stubbornly Refused To Do So.  The Obama-Biden Administration Did Authorize United States-Based Financial Institutions To Maintain Accounts With Republic Of Cuba Government-Operated Financial Institutions, But Prohibited Republic Of Cuba Government-Operated Financial Institutions From Maintaining Accounts With United States-Based Financial Institutions.  The Result?  Funds Having To Move Through Third Countries- Costly, Inefficient, Unsecure- And Providing Unnecessary Profits To Third-Country Financial Institutions. 

According To The United States Department Of State, “Since the announcement in March of 2021, the Cuban government has licensed over 10,000 privately owned businesses in every possible sector.”  Not True.  There Are Important Sectors Of The Economy Where The Re-Emerging Private Sector Has Thus Far Been Excluded- And Those Are Sectors Where They Could Have A Profound Impact.  

Links To Related Analyses 

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov Today Visits Cuba.  By Focusing Upon Expanding MSMEs, He Can Help Russia Make Money- And Help United States Capital Support MSMEs. Not A Perfect Alliance. Feb 18, 2024  

List Of Every Product Exported From U.S. To Cuba In 2023. U.S. Ag Commodity/Food Exports Up 4.2%- Including US$5.4 Million In Coffee. US$24 Million To MSMEs Including US$8 Million In Vehicles. Feb 13, 2024  

Arrest Of "Super Mule" In Tampa For Illegally Transporting US$100,000.00 To U.S. From Cuba Not Surprising… May Have Transported US$4.5 Million In Last Nine Months. Feb 7, 2024  

Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022  

With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022       

Biden Administration Will Use Cuba's Authorization Of SMSE's As Means To Expand Support For Cuba Private Sector- U.S. Investments And Loans May Be Next June 02, 2021   

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASHINGTON DC 

U.S. EMBASSY HAVANA, PUBLIC AFFAIRS SECTION 

Notice of Funding Opportunity (NOFO)

Funding Opportunity Title: U.S. Embassy Havana PAS Small Grant Program in Support of the Cuban Private Sector  

Funding Opportunity Number: PAS-HAV-FY24-SG

Deadline for Applications: April 5, 2024 

CFDA Number: 19.040 – Public Diplomacy Programs

Total Amount Available: $400,000

Maximum for Each Award: $150,000

Minimum for Each Award: $50,000 

This notice is subject to the availability of funding. 

https://cu.usembassy.gov/notice-of-funding-opportunity-u-s-embassy-havana-pas-small-grant-program-in-support-of-the-cuban-private-sector/ 

A. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 

The Public Affairs Section (PAS) of the U.S. Embassy in Havana is pleased to announce funding availability through its Public Diplomacy Small Grants Program for projects designed to provide support for Cuba’s emerging private sector.  In the midst of one of the most significant economic downturns in Cuban history, the Cuban government now allows the creation of privately held small and medium-sized enterprises.  Since the announcement in March of 2021, the Cuban government has licensed over 10,000 privately owned businesses in every possible sector.  However, since most Cuban citizens grew up in a communist system that did not allow private business, Cubans often lack the experience required to turn an idea into a thriving business that will provide income to the business owners, employment for other Cuban citizens, and goods and services needed to meet shortfalls in what the government provides.  The Cuban private sector also faces criticism both from internal and external audiences.  In addition, the economic downturn has led hundreds of thousands of Cubans to leave their country through any means available in search of better lives for themselves and their families.  Helping Cuba businesses grow and thrive can provide economically viable opportunities to many who would prefer to stay but see no way to provide for their families. 

Please carefully follow all instructions below. 

Purpose of Small Grants 

PAS Havana invites proposals for programs that will strengthen the emerging Cuban private sector by facilitating the transfer of American know-how and values to emerging entrepreneurs, expanding entrepreneurship opportunities to a broader, more diverse audience, and strengthening ties between American and Cuban businesses to benefit both.  Proposed programs should carefully consider how to provide an effective mix of materials generally applicable to starting and running a business and how those materials must be adapted to the unique and complex Cuban business environment.  To be successful, all programs must include a U.S. business and/or educational element or connection with American expert/s, organization/s, or institution/s, demonstrate a clear understanding of the Cuban context, and demonstrate the capacity to deliver proposed programming in Cuba (ideally in cooperation with a Cuban partner/mentors/instructors, etc.) in a way that will strengthen private enterprise and build partnerships between citizens of the United States and Cuban citizens living in Cuba.  Each proposed project should also include a media strategy designed to expand the project’s impact beyond those who participated in the actual project.  Finally, all proposals must include a plan for vetting potential program participants to ensure grant funds are not used to support businesses or individuals with close ties to the Cuban government or Cuban Communist party. 

Priority Program Areas: This Notice of Funding Opportunity supports U.S. Embassy Havana’s strategic objective of building a healthy private sector in Cuba that will grow the economy, provide access to needed goods and services, and encourage Cubans to stay in Cuba rather than seek to emigrate to the United States.  Through a consultative process, the U.S. Embassy in Havana has determined that it will focus its resources on the following four areas:  Basic information for aspiring entrepreneurs about how to take an idea through the process of starting and running a small business.  More advanced information and networking opportunities, aimed at current small business owners, about how to grow their business, including through developing import/export ties with businesses in the United States, understanding OFAC regulations, inclusion in the workplace, etc.  Information about how to grow a business, aimed at more established medium-sized business owners, including specific training and development for CEOs, line managers, HR professionals, etc., that will allow companies to grow to the next level.  Sector-specific mentoring and networking opportunities that connect Cuban businesses with experienced Americans who have similar kinds of businesses and allow them to benefit from their experience and know-how.  

A wide range of projects related to these priority program areas will be considered, including, but not limited to, the following activities:  A Cuba-specific, monthly, or bi-monthly speaker series featuring American experts who provide information for beginning entrepreneurs as well as more specific and advanced consultations for entrepreneurs with more experience.  Networking events with visiting speakers that connect alumni of USG programs with alumni of other programs active on the island and allow Cuban entrepreneurs opportunities to share their experiences with colleagues and mentor those starting out.  A mentoring program that connects sector-specific American experts with Cubans working in the same sector.  Training for line managers to help companies grow beyond the company’s founders.  Expanding the Cuban private sector’s understanding of Human Resources and topics of workplace inclusion.  Training for new entrepreneurs available online, adapted to and available free of charge for anyone living in Cuba. Work to adapt and “Cubanize” existing Spanish-language online training for entrepreneurs, to include specific examples in the Cuban context and advice, tips, etc., from experienced Cuban entrepreneurs.  Coding bootcamps or other programs designed to encourage IT skills that are marketable to U.S. firms, especially programs that may connect successful participants to jobs that can do from Cuba.  A “Shark Tank” style program that recruits a broad group of entrepreneurs, provides general training to all, then winnows the group, providing more focused training and mentorship at each stage until a small group of winners is awarded seed capital and additional mentoring

Desired Results and Illustrative Indicators: 

By the end of the project, grantees should demonstrate that their project has contributed to advancing the development of the independent private sector in Cuba.  Grant proposals, including a Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (M&E) with regular milestones and end-of-project targets, together with anticipated results and key performance indicators, will be given priority.  Illustrative outcome and output indicators for the projects are provided below.  The recipient is expected to identify targets for project indicators based on what it can reasonably achieve within the project’s performance period and based on the expected overall project results described above. 

Example/Illustrative Outcome Indicators

Illustrative targets:

Percentage of participants who have opened a private business. TBD

Percentage of participants that increased their knowledge about a specific topic. TBD

Percentage of participants who increased the size of their business six months after participation. TBD 

Example/Illustrative Output Indicators 

Illustrative targets:

Number of program participants. TBD

Number of engagements on a social media post. TBD 

Participants and Audiences:  

Embassy Havana encourages projects focusing on a wide range of audiences, with a particular emphasis on expanding the opportunities of entrepreneurship to a broader, more diverse audience, including groups from socially and/or economically disadvantaged communities. 

The following types of programs are not eligible for funding: Programs relating to partisan political activity.  Charitable or development activities.  Construction programs.  Programs that support specific religious activities.  Fundraising campaigns.  Lobbying for specific legislation or programs. Scientific research.  Programs intended primarily for the growth or institutional development of the organization or Programs that duplicate existing programs. 

B. FEDERAL AWARD INFORMATION

Length of performance period: Up to 12 months

Number of awards anticipated: PAS Havana anticipates issuing several awards under this NOFO, pending availability of funds.

Award amounts: $300,000

Maximum for Each Award: $150,000

Minimum for Each Award: $50,000

Type of Funding: Fiscal Year 2024 Public Diplomacy Funding

Anticipated program start date: Grant applications selected for funding under this NOFO (PAS-HAV-FY24-SG) must begin implementation before September 30, 2024. 

This notice is subject to availability of funding. 

Funding Instrument Type: Grant, Sub-Grant, or Cooperative Agreement

Program Performance Period: Proposed programs must be completed in 12 months or less. PAS will entertain applications for continuation grants funded under these awards beyond the initial budget period on a non-competitive basis subject to availability of funds, satisfactory progress of the program, and a determination that continued funding would be in the best interest of the US Department of State. 

C. ELIGILIBITY INFORMATION

Eligible Applicants

The following organizations and entitiesin the United States are eligible to apply. Organizations must be legally registered: Not-for-profit organizations, including think tanks and civil society/non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with programming experience – Non-profit educational and cultural institutions – For-profit or commercial entities are not eligible to apply.

Cost Sharing or Matching

Cost sharing is allowed but not required. This will not impact funding decisions.

Other Eligibility Requirements

To be eligible to receive an award, all organizations must have a Unique Entity Identifier (UEI) number issued via www.SAM.gov and a valid registration on www.SAM.gov. Individuals are not required to have a UEI or be registered on SAM.gov. 

D. APPLICATION AND SUBMISSION INFORMATION

4. Address to Request Application Package

Application must be sent to USEmbassyHavanaGrants@state.gov

5.  Content and Form of Application Submission

Proposals should be submitted in English and be no more than five pages (including all attachments). Please follow all instructions below carefully. Proposals that do not meet the requirements of this announcement or fail to comply with the stated requirements will be ineligible.

Applicant Information

Please ensure: The proposal clearly addresses the goals and objectives of this funding opportunity.

No more than five pages, including attachments.  All documents are in English.  All budgets are in U.S. dollars.  All pages are numbered. Attachments required below (i.e., resumes, support letters from program partners, permission letters) do not count toward the page limit.  All documents are formatted to 8 ½ x 11 paper, and All Microsoft Word documents are single-spaced, 12-point Times New Roman font, with a minimum of 1-inch margins.  The following documents are strictly required for all application submissions:

Descriptive Project Title/Summary Coversheet: Cover sheet stating the applicant’s name and organization (if any), program and year, proposal date, program title, program period proposed start and end date, and brief program purpose.

Any Previous U.S. Government Funding: Year and project title of all previous grants from the US Embassy and/or US government agencies.

Proposal: The proposal should contain sufficient information so anyone unfamiliar with it would understand exactly what the applicant wants to do. You may use your own proposal format, but it must include all the items below.

– Proposal Summary: Provide a short narrative that outlines the proposed program, including program objectives and anticipated impact.

-Introduction to the Organization or Individual applying: Provide a description of past and present operations, showing the ability to carry out the program.

– Problem Statement: Provide a clear, concise, and well-supported statement of the problem to be addressed and why the proposed program is needed.

– Program Goals and Objectives: List the overall project goal and describe what the program is intended to achieve. How does the proposed project connect to the Priority Program Areas described above? Please also list the primary sub-goals or objectives that should be reached as part of the project to show progress toward the overall goal. Objectives should be clearly achievable and measurable. Please also describe the plan for vetting perspective program participants to ensure grant funds are not used to support businesses or individuals with close ties to the Cuban government or Cuban Communist party.

– Program Activities: Describe the program activities and how they will help achieve the objectives.

– Program Methods and Design: Describe how the program is expected to work to solve the stated problem and achieve the goal.

– Proposed Program Schedule: Provide a proposed timeline for the program activities. Include the dates, times, and locations of planned activities and events.

– Media Plan: Describe how the program will make use of media/social media to recruit, share key educational elements with members of the target audience who could not participate, amplify main program messages, etc.

– Key Personnel: List the names, titles, roles, and experience/qualifications of key personnel involved in the program. What proportion of their time will be used in support of this program?

– Program Partners: List the names and type of involvement of key partner organizations and sub-awardees, if any. U.S.-based applicants should describe how they will provide effective programming on the ground in Cuba, including a description of partners in Cuba, where appropriate.

– Program Monitoring and Evaluation Plan: Provide a detailed monitoring and evaluation plan. How will the activities be monitored to ensure they are happening in a timely manner, and how will the program be evaluated to ensure it meets the goals of the grant? How will you measure progress toward the overall goal and toward each objective?

– Future Funding or Sustainability: Describe plans for continuing the program beyond the grant period or the availability of other resources, if applicable.

Budget Justification Narrative: Use the budget categories described in sections H and B. Other Information: Guidelines for Budget Submissions

Attachments

1-page CV or resume of key personnel who are proposed for the programLetters of support from program partners describing the roles and responsibilities of each partner (optional).  Official permission letters, if required, for program activities.

Submission Dates and Times

All application materials must be received by 11:59 pm Eastern time on April 5, 2024.

Funding Restrictions

Grants cannot be used to fund religious or partisan political activity or for:  Fundraising campaigns.

Commercial projects or for-profit ventures.  Individual academic research projects.  Construction projects.  Projects whose primary objective is an organization’s institutional development or an individual’s personal enrichment or career development.

Other Submission Requirements

All application materials must be submitted in English by email to USEmbassyHavanaGrants@state.gov following all requirements described in this notice. 

E. APPLICATION REVIEW INFORMATION

9. Criteria

Each application will be evaluated and rated based on the evaluation criteria outlined below. The criteria listed are closely related and are considered in judging the overall quality of an application.

Organizational capacity and record on previous grants (10 points): The organization has expertise in its stated field, and PAS is confident of its ability to undertake the program. This includes a financial management system and a bank account. The organization has a clear capacity to deliver described programming in Cuba and has adequately described the relationships between US and Cuban partners.

Quality and Feasibility of the Program Idea (20 points): The program idea is well developed, with details about how program activities will be carried out. The proposal includes a reasonable implementation timeline. The proposal includes a clear media/social media plan that expands the project’s reach to include target audience members who could not otherwise participate as well as a clear vetting plan to ensure grant funds are not used to support businesses or individuals with close ties to the Cuban government or Cuban Communist party.

Goals and objectives (20 points): Goals and objectives are SMART (Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant, and Time-Bound). The program approach is likely to achieve the proposed goals and objectives.

Supports Embassy priorities (20 points): The project supports US Embassy Cuba’s priority areas and target audiences based on the materials submitted. The project seeks to expand entrepreneurship opportunities beyond the current economic elite.

Budget (10 points): The budget justification is detailed. Costs are reasonable in relation to the proposed activities and anticipated results. The budget is realistic, accounting for all necessary expenses to achieve proposed activities.

Monitoring and Evaluation Plan (10 points): Applicant demonstrates an ability to measure program success against key indicators and provide milestones to indicate progress toward goals outlined in the proposal. The program includes output and outcome indicators and shows how and when those will be measured.

Sustainability (10 points): Program activities will continue to have a positive impact after the end of the program.

Review and Selection Process

A Grants Review Committee will evaluate all eligible applications.

Federal Awardee Performance & Integrity Information System (FAPIIS)

For any Federal award under a notice of funding opportunity, if the Federal awarding agency anticipates that the total Federal share will be greater than the simplified acquisition threshold on any Federal award under a notice of funding opportunity may include, over the period of performance (see §200.88 Simplified Acquisition Threshold), this section must also inform applicants:  i. That the Federal awarding agency, prior to making a Federal award with a total amount of Federal share greater than the simplified acquisition threshold, is required to review and consider any information about the applicant that is in the designated integrity and performance system accessible through SAM (currently FAPIIS) (see 41 USC 2313); ii. That an applicant, at its option, may review information in the designated integrity and performance systems accessible through SAM and comment on any information about itself that a Federal awarding agency previously entered and is currently in the designated integrity and performance system accessible through SAM; iii. That the Federal awarding agency will consider any comments by the applicant, in addition to the other information in the designated integrity and performance system, in making a judgment about the applicant’s integrity, business ethics, and record of performance under Federal awards when completing the review of risk posed by applicants as described in §200.205 Federal awarding agency review of risk posed by applicants.

Anticipated Announcement and Federal Award Dates

All grant applications will be received and evaluated on a rolling basis and within the cycle they were received. Upon receiving a proposal, the PAS team will review your application for completeness and confirm via email that it has been successfully received. Please allow between 4-6 weeks of the corresponding cycle’s closeout date for information on the outcome of your application. Organizations whose applications will not be funded will also be notified via email. 

F. FEDERAL AWARD ADMINISTRATION INFORMATION

13. Federal Award Notices

The grant award or cooperative agreement will be written, signed, awarded, and administered by the Grants Officer. The assistance award agreement is the authorizing document, and it will be provided to the recipient for review and signature by email. The recipient may only start incurring program expenses beginning on the start date shown on the grant award document signed by the Grants Officer.  If a proposal is selected for funding, the Department of State has no obligation to provide any additional future funding. Renewal of an award to increase funding or extend the period of performance is at the discretion of the Department of State.  Issuance of this NOFO does not constitute an award commitment on the part of the US government, nor does it commit the US government to pay for costs incurred in preparing and submitting proposals. Further, the US government reserves the right to reject any or all proposals received.

Payment Method: Payments will be made in at least two installments, as needed, to carry out the program activities.

Reporting

Reporting Requirements: Recipients will be required to submit financial reports and program reports. Some grants may also require quarterly and other ad hoc reports. The award document will specify how often these reports must be submitted. 

G. FEDERAL AWARDING AGENCY CONTACTS

If you have any questions about the grant application process, please contact PAS at USEmbassyHavanaGrants@state.gov. Note: We do not provide any pre-consultation for application-related questions addressed in the NOFO. Once an application has been submitted, State Department officials and staff — both in the Department and at embassies overseas — may not discuss this competition with applicants until the entire proposal review process is completed. 

H. OTHER INFORMATION

Guidelines for Budget Justification

Personnel: Describe the wages, salaries, and benefits of temporary or permanent staff working directly for the applicant on the program and the percentage of their time spent on the program.

Travel: Estimate the costs of travel and per diem for this program. If the program involves international travel, include a brief justification statement for that travel.

Equipment: Describe any machinery, furniture, or other personal property required for the program which has a useful life of more than one year (or a life longer than the duration of the program), and costs at least $5,000 per unit.

Supplies: List and describe all the items and materials, including any computer devices needed for the program. If an item costs more than $5,000 per unit, then put it in the budget under Equipment.

Contractual: Describe goods and services the applicant plans to acquire through a contract with a vendor. Also, describe any sub-awards to non-profit partners that will help carry out the program activities.

Other Direct Costs: Describe other costs directly associated with the program that do not fit the other categories. For example, shipping costs for materials and equipment or applicable taxes. All “Other” or “Miscellaneous” expenses must be itemized and explained.

Indirect Costs:  These are costs that cannot be linked directly to the program activities, such as overhead costs needed to help keep the organization operating. If your organization has a Negotiated Indirect Cost Rate (NICRA) and includes NICRA charges in the budget, attach a copy of your latest NICRA. Organizations that have never had a NICRA may request indirect costs of 10% of the modified total direct costs as defined in 2 CFR 200.68.  “Cost Sharing” refers to contributions from the organization or other entities other than the US Embassy. It also includes in-kind contributions such as volunteers’ time and donated venues. 

Alcoholic Beverages:  Please note that award funds cannot be used for alcoholic beverages.

Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E): If necessary, please allocate reasonable costs for M&E activities. 

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

LINKS TO RELATED ANALYSES 

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov Today Visits Cuba.  By Focusing Upon Expanding MSMEs, He Can Help Russia Make Money- And Help United States Capital Support MSMEs. Not A Perfect Alliance. Feb 18, 2024  

List Of Every Product Exported From U.S. To Cuba In 2023. U.S. Ag Commodity/Food Exports Up 4.2%- Including US$5.4 Million In Coffee. US$24 Million To MSMEs Including US$8 Million In Vehicles. Feb 13, 2024  

Arrest Of "Super Mule" In Tampa For Illegally Transporting US$100,000.00 To U.S. From Cuba Not Surprising… May Have Transported US$4.5 Million In Last Nine Months. Feb 7, 2024  

Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022    

With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022       

Biden Administration Will Use Cuba's Authorization Of SMSE's As Means To Expand Support For Cuba Private Sector- U.S. Investments And Loans May Be Next June 02, 2021   

Mark The Calendar! May 2024 Oral Arguments Before 11th Circuit Court Of Appeals In Cuba "Trafficking" Libertad Act Lawsuit Against Four Cruise Lines. Nearing Answer For US$439.2 Million Verdict.

USCA11 Case: 23-10151
Document: 59
Date Filed: 02/20/2024
Page: 1 of 1

United States Court of Appeals
Eleventh Circuit
56 Forsyth Street, N.W.
Atlanta, Georgia  30303

David J. Smith- Clerk                                                                                                   
February 20, 2024

NOTICE TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES IN CASES LISTED BELOW:

The following cases are scheduled for oral argument during the week of MAY 13, 2024, IN BIRMINGHAM, ALABAMA.  COURT WILL BE HELD TUESDAY-FRIDAY OF THIS WEEK. COUNSEL WILL RECEIVE A FINAL CALENDAR APPROXIMATELY 6-8 WEEKS IN ADVANCE OF THE SESSION ASSIGNING A SPECIFIC DATE OF ORAL ARGUMENT. IF THERE ARE ANY PENDING RELATED APPEALS, COUNSEL SHOULD NOTIFY THE CLERK AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.  Please note that after an appeal is assigned to a specific day for oral argument, any change in or addition to counsel in the appeal requires leave of court. See 11th Cir.R.34-4(e). If counsel has any insoluble scheduling conflicts which would interfere with argument during that week, please telephone this office AS SOON AS POSSIBLE at 404-335-6166 or email Jenifer_Tubbs@ca11.uscourts.gov JENIFER TUBBS- Court Sessions Supervisor. PLEASE TELEPHONE THIS OFFICE IMMEDIATELY WITH ANY SCHEDULING REQUESTS. PLEASE REFER TO CALENDAR #16.

23-10151 & 23-10171 Havana Docks Corporation v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.

Link To Court Document In PDF Format
Link To Libertad Act Title III Lawsuit Filing Statistics

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. CARNIVAL CORPORATION D/B/A/ CARNIVAL CRUISE LINES [Consolidated to 1:19-cv-23591; 1:19-cv-21724; Southern Florida District; 23-10171, 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]

Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Jones Walker (defendant)
Boies Schiller Flexner LLP (defendant)
Akerman (defendant) 

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. MSC CRUISES SA CO, AND MSC CRUISES (USA) INC. [Consolidated to 1:19-cv-23591; 1:19-cv-23588; Southern Florida District]; Judgement Entered 12/30/22; 23-10171, 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]. 

Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Venable (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION V. NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINE HOLDINGS, LTD. [Consolidated to 1:19-cv-23591; 1:19-cv-23588; Southern Florida District]; Judgement Entered 12/30/22; 23-10171, 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]. 

Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Hogan Lovells US LLP (defendant)

HAVANA DOCKS CORPORATION VS. ROYAL CARIBBEAN CRUISES, LTD. [Consolidated to 1:19-cv-23591; 1:19-cv-23588; Southern Florida District]; Judgement Entered 12/30/22; 23-10171, 11th Circuit Court of Appeals]. 

Colson Hicks Eidson, P.A. (plaintiff)
Margol & Margol, P.A. (plaintiff)
Holland & Knight (defendant) 

LINKS To Related Posts:

Plaintiff In Four Cruise Line Libertad Act Lawsuit Files Appellate Brief: "underscores the need for strong deterrence to counteract the lure of doing business in Cuba" September 29, 2023 

New Filings To Court Of Appeals For Cruise Line Libertad Act US$439.2 Million Verdict. Arguing About Definition Of "Amici" And Planning For 2024 Request By Loser(s) For U.S. Supreme Court Review? August 14, 2023 

Carnival Corporation Secures US$124.6 Million Surety Bond As It Pursues Appeal Of December 2022 Libertad Act Lawsuit Verdict Against It And Three Other Cruise Companies. April 25, 2023 

After 43 Months, Florida District Court Judge Hands First Cuba Libertad Act Verdict- Four Cruise Lines Must Pay US$439,217,424.51 Plus US$11,707,484.31 In Legal Fees. Appeals Probable. December 30, 2022

45th Cuba Libertad Act Lawsuit (Certified Claimant) Filed Against Airbnb For Use Of Interest In Apartment Building In Havana

THE ESTATE OF ALBERT PERREO, BY AND THROUGH JAVIER GARCIA-BENGOCHEA AS ADMINISTRATOR V. AIRBNB INC. (3:24-CV-00229)

Bishop Page & Mills PLLC (plaintiff)
Bishop & Mills (plaintiff)

Excerpt From Complaint:

“38. Airbnb never requested or received permission from the Plaintiff Estate to list or book the Property for rent on the Airbnb platforms.  39. Due to Airbnb’s wrongful trafficking of the Property, counsel sent a certified letter (“the Letter”) to Airbnb CEO Brian Chesky on August 20, 2019, informing Airbnb that it was trafficking in the Property.  40. The Letter specifically identified the Property as “1212 33rd Avenue, Havana, Cuba.”  41. The Letter explained, in part, that the Property had been taken without compensation by the Cuban government in 1960, and that the Claim including the Property had been certified by the Settlement Commission.  42. The Letter also explained that Airbnb had engaged in trafficking of the property as identified in the Helms-Burton Act, and attached copies of the relevant statutes. The Letter provided notice regarding intention to commence an action under the Helms-Burton Act and a demand that the unlawful trafficking cease immediately.  43. Though receipt was confirmed, Airbnb never responded to the Letter and continued to list and book the Property until at least May 21, 2022.  44. Airbnb continued to list and book the Property despite having actual, direct, and express knowledge of the exact property at issue, the confiscation of the Property by the Castro regime, the Property’s certification by the Settlement Commission, and the prohibition on trafficking in the Property by the Helms-Burton Act. 45. Besides Airbnb’s actual knowledge, Airbnb also had constructive knowledge of the Claim because the Claim has been a matter of public record since its issuance on September 16, 1970, and has been publicly available on the Settlement Commission’s website since February 2015.  46. Around the same time as its receipt of the Letter, Airbnb and/or its wholly owned subsidiary Airbnb Payments, Inc., conducted an internal audit regarding its compliance with OFAC requirements for conducting business in Cuba from 2015 through March 2020.  47. On January 3, 2022, OFAC announced a settlement with Airbnb Payments, Inc., for its violations of OFAC regulations, including processing thousands of payments related to Airbnb customers’ travel to Cuba for reasons outside of the limited permitted travel-related transactions, and failing to maintain records.   48. Significantly, OFAC asserted that the violations occurred because: i. Airbnb Inc. conducted business in Cuba without “fully addressing the complexities of operating a Cuba-related sanctions compliance program for internet-based travel services,” and ii. “the scaling up of [Airbnb Inc.’s] services in Cuba appears to have outpaced the company’s ability to manage the associated sanctions risks via its technology platforms.”

U.S. District Court
Middle District of Florida (Jacksonville)
CIVIL DOCKET FOR CASE #: 3:24-cv-00229-HES-PDB

The Estate of Albert Perreo, by and through Javier Garcia-Bengochea as Administrator v. AirBnB Inc.
Assigned to: Senior Judge Harvey E. Schlesinger
Referred to: Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale
Cause: 22:6081 Protection of Property Rights of U.S. Nationals    
Date Filed: 03/04/2024
Jury Demand: Plaintiff
Nature of Suit: 890 Other Statutory Actions
Jurisdiction: Federal Question
Plaintiff: The Estate of Albert Perreo, by and through Javier Garcia-Bengochea as Administrator represented by Frederick Dyer Page

Bishop Page & Mills PLLC
510 North Julia Street Jacksonville, FL 32202
904-598-0034
Email: fpage@bishoppagemills.com
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Katharine Roth
Bishop & Mills
510 North Julia Street
Jacksonville, FL 32202
904-598-0034
Email: kroth@bishoppagemills.com
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Kyle William Mason
Bishop & Mills
510 North Julia Street
32202
Jacksonville, FL 32202
904-416-0938
Email: kmason@bishoppagemills.com
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Thomas Edward Bishop
Bishop & Mills
510 North Julia Street
Jacksonville, FL 32202
904-598-0034
Fax: 904-598-0395
Email: tbishop@bishoppagemills.com
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED

Date Filed  #  Docket Text
03/05/2024- NEW CASE ASSIGNED to Senior Judge Harvey E. Schlesinger and Magistrate Judge Patricia D. Barksdale. New case number: 3:24-cv-229-HES-PDB. (RLK) (Entered: 03/05/2024)
03/04/2024- COMPLAINT against AirBnB Inc. with Jury Demand (Filing fee $405 receipt number AFLMDC-21832466) filed by The Estate of Albert Perreo, by and through Javier Garcia-Bengochea as Administrator. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Civil Cover Sheet Civil Cover Sheet, # 3 Proposed Summons Proposed Summons)(Bishop, Thomas) (Entered: 03/04/2024)

LINK To Court Documents
LINK To Libertad Act Lawsuit Filing Statistics

Why Has Turkiye’s Karadeniz Holding “Karpowership” Removed References To Cuba Where Company Has Been Providing Electricity Since 2019? Political Decision, Financial Decision?  

Why Has Turkiye’s Karadeniz Holding “Karpowership” Removed References To Cuba Where Company Has Been Providing Electricity Since 2019? 

Could The Decision Be Political? Not Wanting To Draw Attention To Company Presence In A Country On The United States Government List Of State Sponsors Of Terrorism? 

Could The Decision Be Financial?  The Government Of The Republic Of Cuba Owes Karadeniz Holding Money So The Company Does Not Want To Promote The Republic Of Cuba As A Customer? 

Could Decision Be At The Request Of The Government Of The Republic Of Cuba- Embarrassed By Its Dependence Upon A Turkiye-Based Company For Potentially More Than 25% Of The Island’s Electricity? 

Government Of Turkiye Has Promoted Its Presence In The Republic Of Cuba, So The Removal Of The Republic Of Cuba By Karadeniz Holding From Its List Of Customers Is Surprising.  

LINK: Turkiye’s Karadeniz Holdings Now Eight “Karpowerships” In Cuba Providing Approximately 25% Of Island’s Electricity. Company Has 22.2% Of Its 36-Vessel Fleet In Cuba. Already Payment Issues. 2 February 2023

  • “In October 2018, Karpowership signed a contract with Unión Eléctrica de Cuba (UNE), the state electricity company of Cuba, to deploy three Powerships of 110 MW in total for a period of 51 months. Karadeniz Powership Barış Bey and Karadeniz Powership Esra Sultan started operation in Port de Mariel in July 2019 and Karadeniz Powership Ela Sultan started operations in November 2019.  In November 2019, the contract capacity was increased to 184 MW.  In November 2021, a new Addendum Agreement was signed to increase the capacity to 300 MW and extend the contract term 18 years. Karpowership currently has 6 Powerships with an installed capacity of 420 MW in the country. Cuba is Karpowership’s first project in Western Hemisphere.”

  • There is speculation that all or a portion of payments from the government of the Republic of Cuba to Istanbul, Turkiye-based Karadeniz Holding [2023 revenue estimated US$560 million] may be guaranteed by the government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and/or government of the Russian Federation. And, that the government of the Republic of Turkiye may be providing a guarantee to Karadeniz Holding or requesting the company be patient with accounts receivable.

From the Internet site of Istanbul, Turkiye-based Karadeniz Holding on 4 March 2024: 

https://www.karadenizholding.com/

https://www.karadenizholding.com/group-companies-powership

https://www.karpowership.com/ 

“POWERSHIP 

Karpowership, one of the subsidiaries of Karadeniz Holding, which owns the world's only floating power plant fleet, is the pioneer of short, medium and long term energy solutions. Its goal is not only to be an electric generator, but also be the solution partner of all its customers in the energy sector.  Karpowership is the designer and builder of the world's first floating power plants, Powerships. Powership is a floating power plant on a barge or a ship, capable of operating with LNG, natural gas and heavy fuel oil.  Operations in 15 Regions.  36 Completed Powership.  6.000 MW Installed Capacity.

Since 2010, 36 Powerships have been completed reaching 6,000 MW installed capacity. 6,000 MW are in the pipeline to be added to the Karpowership fleet in the next few years. Powerships have been supplying 60% of Gambia, 23% of Ghana, 100% of Guinea Bissau, 10% of Guinea, 25% of Lebanon, 23% of Mozambique, 15% of Senegal, 7,5% of Ivory Coast, 80% of Sierra Leone, 30% of Northern Sulawesi, Indonesia, 55% of East Nusa Tenggra, Indonesia, 80% of Ambon, Indonesia, and 10% of Medan, Indonesia's total electricity generation.  By 2018, it has met 15% of Iraq’s and 16% of Zambia’s energy needs.”  

Courtesy of Jorge R. Piñon, Senior Research Fellow, The University of Texas at Austin Energy Institute Flawn Academic Center (FAC); https://energy.utexas.edu/ 

“Best effort audit of the KPS Power ships in Cuba using Google Earth, Vessel Tracking Services and third party independent observations in Cuba.  Even though we do not have reports on the terms and conditions of the contractual agreement most likely it is a “take or pay” contract, where the supplier gets paid for the product amount whether the purchaser takes possession of it or not.   The estimated total installed capacity (MW) of the power ships (730 MW) do not necessarily represent the contracted amount of electricity (Gwh) to be delivered.  KPS has kept an amount of spare generating capacity in the case of maintenance or other downtime to be able to keep their contractual commitments.  Also remember that there must be an additional penalty as Cuba has not been able to deliver fuel to the power ships, which was stipulated in the contract.  Unknown is if KPS received a payment guaranteed from the Turkish government in case Cuba was not able to pay.   

  • KPS Baris Bey (40 MW) and KPS Ela Sultan (65 MW) both in Mariel.  KPS Belgin Sultan (15 MW) Melones, Havana.  KPS Suheyla Sultan (240 MW) Melones, Havana.  KPS Erol Bey (est. 240 MW) in Regla, Havana.  KPS Erin Sultan (130 MW) in Santiago de Cuba."  

Havana Times (23 August 2023): “Despite the risk of toxicity, the authorities- who rent five of the same type from the company Karpowership for an estimated annual price of 31 million dollars- have installed the patanas in the ports of their two most populated cities, Santiago de Cuba and Havana, and in the Mariel Special Development Zone.”

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS WITH IMAGES IN PDF FORMAT

LINKS To Related Analyses 

Turkiye’s Karadeniz Holdings Now Eight “Karpowerships” In Cuba Providing Approximately 25% Of Island’s Electricity. Company Has 22.2% Of Its 36-Vessel Fleet In Cuba. Already Payment Issues. 2 February 2023

President of Cuba Visiting President Of Turkiye. Number One Agenda Item: Paying Istanbul's Karpowership For Providing Nearing 20% Of Cuba's Electricity. What Will He Trade Away? November 22, 2022 

Turkey's Karpowership Delivering Fifth Electric Generation Vessel; More Than 15% Of Cuba's Current Electricity Usage. Company Won't Comment. Contracts Profitable. April 03, 2022 

Turkey's Karpowership Adds Fourth Thermal Power Barge In Cuba. Company Generating More Than 10% Of Cuba's Electricity. Good For Turkish Companies. Reinforces Cuba's Energy Production Issues. November 25, 2021  

Karpowership From Turkey Extends And Expands Floating Electricity Generation In Cuba; Joining Turkey's Global Ports Holding Which Manages Cruise Ship Terminal In Havana. November 19, 2021  

Turkey's Karadeniz Holding May Add To “Karpowership” Fleet In Cuba. December 02, 2020  

Karadeniz Holding Of Turkey Update On "Karpowership" Operations In Cuba. March 09, 2020  

Karadeniz Of Turkey Delivering Floating Power Plant To Cuba For 51-Month Contract. April 23, 2019  

Turkey's Karadeniz Holding Reports Electricity Contract With Cuba In October 2018; But, No Contract Signed Five Months Later. April 01, 2019

In Secret, Two Members Of United States House Of Representatives Visit Cuba.

Miami Herald
Miami, Florida
28 February 2024


“The group of about a dozen people was led by Democratic U.S. Reps. Pramila Jayapal of the state of Washington [7th District] and Ilhan Omar of Minnesota [5th District]. It included a congressional staffer from the office of California Rep. Barbara Lee’s office [12th District], sources with knowledge of the trip told the Miami Herald.”

United Sates Department of State
Washington DC
28 February 2024


QUESTION: There’s some reporting today about a CODEL from last week to Cuba, about ten Democratic members of the House. Did State facilitate any of that or do you have any visibility on that CODEL?
MR MILLER: We did not facilitate any meetings that they held. This is what I think you call a NODEL – the technical term.  Go ahead. [NODEL: Non-Delegation]
QUESTION: Thank you very much.
QUESTION: Really? So they had – they had absolutely no contact with the embassy?
MR MILLER: That’s not what I said. They may have had contact. That I’m not aware of. We did not facilitate any meetings they had with the Cuban Government.

Biden-Harris Administration Continues "National Emergency With Respect To Cuba..."

CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO CUBA AND OF THE EMERGENCY AUTHORITY RELATING TO THE REGULATION OF THE ANCHORAGE AND MOVEMENT OF VESSELS
 
On March 1, 1996, by Proclamation 6867, a national emergency was declared to address the disturbance or threatened disturbance of international relations caused by the February 24, 1996, destruction by the Cuban government of two unarmed, United States-registered civilian aircraft in international airspace north of Cuba.  On February 26, 2004, by Proclamation 7757, the national emergency was expanded to deny monetary and material support to the Cuban government.  On February 24, 2016, by Proclamation 9398, and on February 22, 2018, by Proclamation 9699, the national emergency was further modified based on continued disturbances or threatened disturbances of the international relations of the United States related to Cuba.  The Cuban government has not demonstrated that it will refrain from the use of excessive force against United States vessels or aircraft that may engage in memorial activities or peaceful protest north of Cuba.

Further, the unauthorized entry of any United States-registered vessel into Cuban territorial waters continues to be detrimental to the foreign policy of the United States because such entry could facilitate a mass migration from Cuba.  It continues to be United States policy that a mass migration from Cuba would endanger United States national security by posing a disturbance or threatened disturbance of the international relations of the United States.

Therefore, in accordance with section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), I am continuing the national emergency with respect to Cuba and the emergency authority relating to the regulation of the anchorage and movement of vessels set out in Proclamation 6867, as amended by Proclamation 7757, Proclamation 9398, and Proclamation 9699.

This notice shall be published in the Federal Register and transmitted to the Congress. 

JOSEPH R. BIDEN JR.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 21, 2024.

National Association Of State Departments Of Agriculture Delegation Visits Cuba

State agriculture officials to address trade opportunities between the U.S and Cuba
February 16, 2024|Marketing & International Trade, News
Press Release


WHO: National Association of State Departments of Agriculture CEO, several NASDA members and a NASDA industry guest will host a press conference to discuss learned opportunities and challenges to agricultural trade between the U.S. and Cuba on Feb. 21, 2024, following a NASDA-led trade mission to the country.

Press Conference Participants: Ted McKinney, CEO, NASDA; Amanda Beal, Commissioner, Maine Department of Agriculture, Conservation & Forestry; Bryan Hurlburt, Commissioner, Connecticut Department of Agriculture; Christy Clark, Director, Montana Department of Agriculture; Don Lamb, Director, Indiana State Department of Agriculture; Hugh Weathers, Commissioner, South Carolina Department of Agriculture; Mike Strain, Commissioner, Louisiana Department of Agriculture & Forestry; Thom Petersen, Commissioner, Minnesota Department of Agriculture; Ernesto Baron, FTA International, USA Poultry and Egg Export Council Representative (NASDA industry guest)

WHERE & WHEN: The press conference will be held in Havana, Cuba, at the Grand Aston La Habana starting at 4:30pm ET.  

HOW: Please email Sarah Grace Fowler (Sarah.Fowler@nasda.org) by 5 p.m. ET Tuesday, Feb. 20 to attend.

WHAT: NASDA’s mission in visiting Cuba is to identify and address trade barriers for U.S. agricultural products, gain a better understanding of trade rules and regulations as well as the political and economic environment in order to strengthen the United States’ trade relationship with Cuba. While in-country, NASDA will meet with government officials, as well as industry and private sector leaders, to learn more about how the U.S. and Cuba can collaborate in the future. The delegation will consist of 13 people including NASDA members, an industry representative, supporting NASDA staff and Paul Johnson with FocusCuba. The delegation will be in-country Feb. 18-22, 2024.  Follow NASDA on Instagram, X, LinkedIn and Facebook to follow along with the NASDA delegation as they discuss and tour Cuban food and agricultural businesses.

NASDA is a nonpartisan, nonprofit association which represents the elected and appointed commissioners, secretaries and directors of the departments of agriculture in all 50 states and four U.S. territories. NASDA enhances American food and agricultural communities through policy, partnerships and public engagement. To learn more about NASDA, please visit www.nasda.org.

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov Today Visits Cuba.  By Focusing Upon Expanding MSMEs, He Can Help Russia Make Money- And Help United States Capital Support MSMEs. Not A Perfect Alliance.

Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov Today Visits Cuba.  By Focusing Upon Expanding MSMEs, He Can Help Russia Make Money- And Help United States Capital Support MSMEs. 

Not Ideal, But Nothing Else Thus Far Has Nudged Government Of Cuba. 

On Monday, 19 February 2024, Sergei Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, will visit the Republic of Cuba, then travel to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, and lastly to the Federative Republic of Brazil to attend a gathering of Foreign Ministers representing the G20 where he and Antony Blinken, United States Secretary of State, will have opportunities to converse with one another- should either of them choose to do so- and they should choose to do so

  • Group of Twenty (G20): Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, ​Republic of Korea​,​ Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, ​​​Turkiye, United Kingdom, United States. 

  • BRICS: Argentina, Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Russian Federation, China, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, United Arab Emirates.   

During the last two years, the government of the Russian Federation has yet again revisited the redevelopment of commercial, economic, financial, humanitarian, military, and political connectivity with the government of the Republic of Cuba and with Republic of Cuba government-operated companies.   

Boris Titov, Presidential Commissioner for Entrepreneurs’ Rights in the Russian Federation has been tasked with envisioning “the economic transformation of Cuba based on private companies.” 

To date, other than low-margin tourists from the Russian Federation visiting the Republic of Cuba, government-to-government donations, and provision of loans (which will undoubtedly soon require payment rescheduling, write-offs, or forgiveness as in previous decades), neither the government of the Russian Federation, taxpayers of the Russian Federation, Russian Federation government-owned companies, nor privately-owned companies in the Russian Federation have found demonstrably and sustainably profitable entry points in the Republic of Cuba. 

The Republic of Cuba remains a commercial, economic, and financial landscape of varying depths of quicksand for most who seek opportunities. 

Mr. Titov seems to be advocating for the government of the Republic of Cuba to continue- and do so more rapidly, an expansion of re-emerging micro, small and medium-size enterprises (MSMEs).   

Unfortunately, the government of the Republic of Cuba has an inconsistent tolerance not only for the existence of MSMEs, but a particular aversion to successful MSMEs and any exponential expansion of their numbers- along with increasing the commercial categories within which MSMEs may operate.    

Minister Lavrov should include in his agenda two focuses: First, convince the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration (2019- ) to immediately issue simple-to-understand regulations for the delivery from abroad of direct investment in and direct financing to a MSME.  Second, convince the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration to be positively inclined to test direct correspondent banking amongst a Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institution and a United Sates-based financial institution. 

  • The document, which could be on one 8-inch by 10-inch sheet of paper, would be electronically notarized and submitted to the financial institution where the private company maintained its operating checking account.  The information provided would include the source(s) and amount(s) of the investment, the source(s), and amount(s) of the financing.  Any changes to the investment terms or the financing terms would be provided to the financial institution.  That should be all that is required.  The private company would not be required to pay any fees other than the normal incoming electronic funds transfer fees.  The government of the Republic of Cuba must refrain from over-complicating the process; but, that is fundamental to its DNA, so politically a heavy lift.  This is because the primary political goal is to maintain equality- and a competitive private sector will, by its DNA, result in inequality. 

  • From the United States Department of State (1 December 2022): “Regarding direct correspondent banking, U.S. regulations do of course allow for U.S. banks to establish correspondent accounts in Cuba, but not the other way around, as you note.  Two-way direct correspondent banking would indeed likely decrease transactions costs.  However, it is our understanding that even if the United States were to authorize direct two-way correspondent banking, Cuban banks would not actually establish accounts in the United States due to outstanding legal judgements against the Cuban government that would freeze and collect any funds a state financial institution held in the United States.  Therefore, I expect you're unlikely to see direct correspondent banking on the horizon.”  Critical for the government of the Republic of Cuba to not be dissuaded by hypotheticals.  Create the direct corresponding account, test with authorized transfers (MSME funds, payments for agricultural commodities, food products, healthcare products, etc.) 

On 10 May 2022, the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) directed the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to issue the first license authorizing an entity subject to United States jurisdiction to deliver a direct equity investment in and authorizing direct financing to an officially registered privately-owned company (in the service sector) located in the Republic of Cuba and owned by a Republic of Cuba national.  The license application was submitted to the OFAC on 10 June 2021 and was issued by the OFAC on 10 May 2022. 

Despite three years of public and private indications, the Diaz-Canel-Valdes Mesa Administration has yet to do what was indicated would be authorized.  More than twenty-one (21) months since 10 May 2022 and the government of the Republic of Cuba has yet to publish regulations as to the process for MSMEs to receive from abroad direct investment and direct financing

Both the direct investment and direct financing could have been delivered on 11 May 2022- an envelope filled with currency; a bank transfer through a third country; a United States-based remittance forwarder- though would have required many small denomination transactions given transfer limitations.  However, doing so would have only served to reinforce the present rather than promote the future

Important to reiterate the objective of seeking the license from the OFAC.  The intention was never to quietly, secretly, implement its provisions.  The intention was to actively publicize the existence of the license from the OFAC so everyone would know about it- not only within the State of Florida, but throughout the Republic of Cuba.  That intention was achieved. 

But, there was a failure.  The government of the Republic of Cuba did not respond as expected.  Given the chronic commercial, economic, and financial undesirable results from decisions by the government of the Republic of Cuba, along with continuing changes to laws and regulations impacting MSMEs, there was an expectation of an immediate embrace for what the license from the OFAC could mean in terms delivering desperately required foreign exchange along with desperately required capital goods to redevelop manufacturing and assembly infrastructure.    

During the last twenty-one months, many individuals, and delegations of individuals of Cuban descent have traveled from the United States to the Republic of Cuba.  They meet with senior-level officials.  They report a consistent message- they do not know when or if the government of the Republic of Cuba will publish regulations as to the process for MSMEs to receive from abroad direct investment and direct financing. 

Quietly delivered messages from senior-level officials of the government of the Republic of Cuba conveyed that regulations were probable by the end of 2023.  That possibility too passed unfulfilled.   

The MSME for whom the license from the OFAC authorizes the delivery of direct investment and direct financing continues to wait for the delivery of funds.  Its management is frustrated.  The source of the funding and financing is frustrated.  Both appreciate, however, that implementing any decision absent specific regulatory compliance- required by the OFAC license and required by the government of the Republic of Cuba would only serve to reinforce the status quo:  Where funds are delivered directly from the United States and from the United States through third countries to the Republic of Cuba.  Thus far, the United States government does nothing to physically prevent it and the government of the Republic of Cuba does nothing to institutionalize, regulate it. 

Given the Biden-Harris Administration through licenses and authorizations by the OFAC and United States Department of State has re-authorized Denver, Colorado-based Western Union Company (2023 revenue approximately US$4.3 billion) to re-engage its currency funds transfer services with Cuba government-owned Orbit S.A. which in turn disperses funds from the United States to three Cuba government-owned banks, operational necessity has arrived for the OFAC to authorize Cuba government-owned banks to establish correspondent accounts with United States-based banks. 

The newly constituted Western Union Company currency funds transfer process which importantly delivers to three Cuba government-owned banks, added to the 2022 first license from the OFAC for the delivery of direct investment in and direct financing to a MSME in Cuba, now is essential for Cuba government-owned banks to have the opportunity, not requirement, but opportunity to have correspondent accounts with United States-based banks. 

In 2015, the Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) authorized United States-based financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions, but did not authorize Republic of Cuba government-operated financial institutions to have correspondent accounts with United States-based financial institutions.  That decision was ridiculous then and remains even more so today. 

What is worse?  The initial decision in 2015 or the continued defense of the decision in 2023.  Particularly accounting for the Biden-Harris Administration focus upon supporting the re-emerging private sector in the Republic of Cuba… which requires support from the private sector in the United States… and the cost-effective, efficient, and transparent movement of funds- in two directions. 

Officials of the Biden-Harris Administration curiously question why the United States private sector does not embrace more fulsomely opportunities existing using general license provisions afforded by the OFAC and BIS.  Two answers:   

  • First, prior to and increasing since the Republic of Cuba was returned by the United States Department of State in January 2021 to the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism during the final days of the Trump-Pence Administration (2017-2021), United States-based companies and United States-based financial institutions remain hesitant to engage with transactions involving the Republic of Cuba.  The primary reasons: fear of running afoul of OFAC compliance requirements and the resulting OFAC financial penalties along with limited viable commercial opportunities provided in the Republic of Cuba. 

  • Second, the inability to transfer funds cost-effectively, efficiently, and transparently from the United States to the Republic of Cuba and from the Republic of Cuba to the United States.  The Obama-Biden Administration could have remedied the issue.  They chose not to.  The Biden-Harris Administration can remedy the issue.  They thus far choose not to.  Consistency of nonsensical decisions. 

U.S. Banks And Third Countries  

In 2015, Pompano Beach, Florida-based Stonegate Bank (2017 assets approximately US$2.9 billion) acquired accounts for the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in Washington, DC, and the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Cuba to the United Nations in New York after Buffalo, New York-based M&T Bank Corporation (2023 assets approximately US$200 billion) notified the embassy and mission that it would no longer provide services due to challenges with regulatory compliance for many accounts with embassies and missions.    

Stonegate Bank in 2015 received a license from the OFAC for a correspondent account at Banco Internacional de Comercia SA (BICSA), a member of Republic of Cuba government-operated Grupo Nuevo Banca SA, created by Corporate Charter No. 49 in 1993 and commenced operation in 1994.    

  • According to the Republic of Cuba, “Its [BICSA] main activity is ‘enterprises’ bank’ carried through its central services and five branches based in the country’s capital, Santiago de Cuba and Villa Clara. It records all transactions in real time providing its customers with card and remote banking services while it is working on developing other methods of electronic banking.  Its institutional clients, national or foreign, receive a complete accounting and documentary service, while national entities also enjoy of significant volumes of credit facilities. Practically all sectors of the economy benefit from all this, such as that of agriculture, the food industry, the basic and light industries, transportation, aviation, fishing, construction, domestic and foreign trade, the iron and steel industry, sugar, informatics, communications and others with not only economic importance but also social, such as health, water supply, education, culture and sports.  Credit policy followed by the Bank is dictated in a collegiate way by its Credit Committee on the basis of a strict analysis and control in loan making.  The Bank counts on correspondents in the five continents, the majority are first class banks, mainly Europeans and Americans.  Equity capital of shareholders (Grupo Nueva Banca with the biggest share and Bancholding), near the USD95 millions with a balance ranging from 550 to 600 millions, make sure the Bank has a strong solvency ratio.”  

Without explanation the Obama-Biden Administration did not authorize BICSA under a license from the OFAC to have a correspondent account at Stonegate Bank, so Stonegate Bank routed transactions for approximately eighty (80) customers on a regular basis through Panama City, Panama-based Multibank (2019 assets approximately US$5 billion) which had dealings with the Republic of Cuba.  

In 2017, Conway, Arkansas-based Home BancShares (2023 assets approximately US$22.8 billion) through its subsidiary Centennial Bank purchased Stonegate Bank.  Stonegate Bank operations were absorbed into Centennial Bank.    

On 16 June 2020, Bogota, Colombia-based Grupo Aval Acciones y Valores SA (2023 assets approximately US$90.1 billion) reported that “On May 25th, Banco de Bogotá, through its subsidiary Leasing Bogotá S.A. Panamá, acquired 96.6% of the ordinary shares of Multi Financial Group [Multibank]. As part of the acquisition process, MFG’s operation in Cuba was closed and as part of the transaction. Grupo Aval complies with OFAC regulations and doesn't have transactional relationships with Cuba.”  

In June 2022, Elk Grove Village, Illinois-based Chicago, Illinois-based First American Bank (2023 assets approximately US$6 billion) acquired from Centennial Bank an operating account (and Republic of Cuba-focused branch personnel) for the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba in Washington, DC.  First American Bank has since ceased managing the account for the Embassy of the Republic of Cuba.  If BICSA is authorized by the OFAC to establish a correspondent account with First American Bank and if First American Bank were to establish a correspondent account with BICSA, there would be an opportunity for direct two-way fund transfers for authorized transactions (agricultural commodities, food products, healthcare products (medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, pharmaceuticals, informational materials, (visa processing, overflight fees, landing fees, accommodation payments- Airbnb, etc.), remittances, and entrepreneurial activities (direct investment to and direct financing for privately-owned companies located in the Republic of Cuba, etc.).  This same scenario would apply to almost any United States-based financial institution.    

US$7+ Billion Through Third Countries 

For the period December 2001 through December 2024 (the most recently available trade data) from when the first agricultural commodity and food products were exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under provisions of the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, the value delivered was approximately US$7,246,333,393.00.  

For the period 2003 through December 2023 (the most recently available trade data), the value of healthcare products (medical equipment, medical instruments, medical supplies, pharmaceuticals) delivered from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under provisions of the Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992 was approximately US$37,258,840.00.  

Additional tens of millions of United States Dollars in commercial payments to the Republic of Cuba for telecommunications, aircraft overflights, cargo, informational materials, artwork, aircraft landing, authorized travel, casa particulares (Airbnb), passport renewals, etc. 

All these funds moved not cost-effectively, efficiently, and transparently, but expensively, inefficiently, and absent transparency through third-country financial institutions.  Those third-country financial institutions receive a fee from each transaction.  Undeserved fees thus far on more than U$7 billion in funds. 

From OFAC Frequently Asked Questions  

742. Are financial institutions other than banks permitted to open correspondent accounts in Cuba?  Depository institutions, as defined in 31 CFR § 515.333, which include certain financial institutions other than banks, are permitted to open correspondent accounts at banks in Cuba. See 31 CFR § 515.584(a). Released on September 23, 2020    

743. Are Cuban banks permitted to open correspondent accounts at U.S. banks?  No. U.S. depository institutions are permitted to open correspondent accounts at Cuban banks located in Cuba and in third countries, and at foreign banks located in Cuba, but Cuban banks are not generally licensed to open such accounts at U.S. banks. See note to 31 CFR § 515.584(a). Released on November 8, 2017    

744. May correspondent accounts authorized pursuant to 31 CFR § 515.584(a) or used for transactions authorized by 31 CFR § 515.584(g) be established and maintained in U.S. dollars?  Yes. Correspondent accounts of depository institutions (as defined in 31 CFR § 515.333) at a financial institution that is a national of Cuba authorized pursuant to § 515.584(a) may be established and maintained in U.S. dollars. Such accounts may be used only for transactions that are authorized by or exempt from the CACR. Transactions necessary to establish and maintain such correspondent accounts —– such as originating, processing, and terminating authorized funds transfers in U.S. dollars —– are authorized.  Additionally, correspondent accounts used for transactions authorized by 31 CFR § 515.584(g), which permits banking institutions as defined in 31 CFR § 515.314(g) that are persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction to accept, process, and give credit to U.S. dollar monetary instruments presented indirectly by a financial institution that is a national of Cuba, may be denominated in U.S. dollars.  However, financial institutions that are nationals of Cuba remain prohibited from opening correspondent accounts at a U.S. financial institution. For a complete description of what these general licenses authorize and the restrictions that apply, see 31 CFR § 515.584(a) and (g). § 515.584 Certain financial transactions involving Cuba.  

  • Correspondent accounts. Depository institutions, as defined in § 515.333, are authorized to engage in all transactions necessary to establish and maintain correspondent accounts at a financial institution that is a national of Cuba, provided that such accounts are used only for transactions authorized pursuant to, or exempt from, this part.   

  • (g) Any banking institution, as defined in § 515.314, that is a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction is authorized to accept, process, and give value to U.S. dollar monetary instruments presented for processing and payment by a banking institution located in a third country that is not a person subject to U.S. jurisdiction or a Cuban national and that has received the U.S. dollar monetary instruments from a financial institution that is a national of Cuba for which it maintains a correspondent account and which received the U.S. dollar monetary instruments in connection with an underlying transaction that is authorized, exempt, or otherwise not prohibited by this part, such as dollars spent in Cuba by authorized travelers or a third-country transaction that is not prohibited by this part.  Note to paragraph (g): Correspondent accounts used for transactions authorized pursuant to § 515.584(g) may be denominated in U.S. dollars.” 

 LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Article References

Cuba News Agency
Havana, Republic of Cuba
16 February 2024

Cuba's Chamber of Commerce for a closer link with the country's entrepreneurship


HAVANA, Cuba, Feb 16 (ACN) Ricardo Cabrisas Ruiz, deputy prime minister, called on the Cuban Chamber of Commerce (CCC) to work more closely and cohesively with all the actors of the business system, including MSMEs, in order to promote exports with added value and rational import substitutions, for the benefit of the country.

Cabrisas, also head of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Foreign Investment (Mincex by its Spanish acronym), chaired at the Havana Convention Center the General Assembly of that institution, corresponding to 2023, in which his members from both the state and non-state sector presented experiences, difficulties, good practices and ideas to enrich the projections for the current year.  He highlighted the role that as part of the main tasks or challenges of the CCC, including the training of its members, can play the so-called clusters, a form of business organization by sectors or related activities, to seek common solutions based on science, technology and innovation, and based on the priorities of the nation and the orientation to target markets.

Presenting the report on the work carried out last year, in which the Chamber of Commerce celebrated its six decades in the midst of a war economy, Antonio Luis Carricarte Corona, its president, said that the institution participates in the process of updating the Cuban economic model, promotes exports of goods and services, import substitution and business opportunities with foreign capital.

He pointed out that currently the membership amounts to 1,226 companies, 303 of which are MSMEs, maintaining as one of the main objectives of the year, the attraction of new economic actors, given that the dynamics with the complement of the economy is still insufficient, which provides robustness to the business sector as a living system.  He also announced that in 2024 the CCC will focus its efforts towards the strengthening of relations with sectoral, branch and business associations that contribute to organize direct or reverse missions, exhibitions, forums, events, specialized fairs with projects, and intend to achieve results.

According to Carricarte, the difficult conditions that have characterized the socio-economic context of our country have not prevented the growing interest of foreign businessmen to participate in development programs and investment projects in Cuba.  During 2023, 24 business forums were held, seven of them direct and 17 inverse, where projects of the prioritized sectors of the Cuban economy, main exportable products and investment projects were presented.

Cuban News Agency
Havana, Republic of Cuba
30 January 2024

Cuban deputy PM updates implementation of measures to boost economy


HAVANA, Cuba, Jan 29 (ACN) Alejandro Gil, deputy prime minister and minister of economy and planning, presented to the Council of Ministers an update of the implementation schedule of the decisions approved as part of the Projections to correct distortions and boost the economy, accountability that will take place every month at the meeting of the highest government body.

As reported today by the Presidency of Cuba, so far the salary measures to stimulate the permanence of workers in the Health and Education sectors have been implemented, as well as the extension, until March 31, 2024, of the tariff exemptions for the importation of food and cleaning products by natural persons, without commercial character.  Likewise, the legal norms implementing the reduction of 50 % of the tariffs for the importation of raw materials and intermediate goods, and the increase of tariffs for the importation of tobacco, cigars, rums and spirits have been published in the Official Gazette.

It was learned at the meeting that in February it is planned to update the norms that will allow the reordering of local development projects; as well as to decentralize to the territorial governments the power to approve wholesale and retail prices of Natural and Traditional Medicine, of local dispensary and industrial elaboration.  Next month, progress will also be made in the presentation of proposals to restructure the exchange market, the intervention of the informal market and the control of the exchange rate in the country, which includes the determination of the exchange rate and the formation of prices.

Likewise, he said, emphasis will be placed on recovering remittance flows, encouraging their collection and studying the feasibility of new channels, platforms and the use of digital scenarios for remittances and bank transactions for collections and payments from abroad.  According to the Minister of Economy and Planning, it is a priority to implement the new mechanism for the allocation and management of cash flow for all economic actors, based on the distortions that exist today, in order to achieve a more harmonious functioning of the economy, and thus be able to advance in the autonomy of the state-owned company.

Gil Fernandez highlighted the scope of these Government Projections for 2024, and remarked that they are not fundamentally about price increases, but that they include the necessary impulse to productive activity, the increase of national production, exports and foreign currency income and macroeconomic stabilization.  It is not a matter of raising prices for the sake of raising them, he said, but of encouraging savings, making a more efficient use of resources, and seeking a fairer and more equitable distribution of the wealth generated.

In his presentation to the Council of Ministers of the "Plan of Actions for the Implementation of the Government's Projections to Correct Distortions and Re-launch the Economy", the Deputy Prime Minister pointed out that a key objective is to advance in the macroeconomic stabilization of the country.  "All the actions that are incorporated in the Government's Projections are linked to the Macroeconomic Stabilization Program. What we are doing in terms of price correction, he exemplified, has to do with macroeconomic stabilization, because it eliminates or reduces subsidies, and increases tax revenues.

When we are taking measures to promote and boost production, when we are transforming the exchange market, this has to do with the macroeconomic stabilization of the country, he stressed.  He explained that many of the projections will have more favorable impacts to the extent that more resources are available.

There are actions aimed at increasing the income needed to face a set of issues that we have to deal with in the economy. Having more fuel, more inputs for national production, necessarily involves foreign currency income, external income that must be encouraged, Gil Fernandez pointed out.  Among the objectives of the Government's projections, he added, is the increase of domestic production, with emphasis on the use of the installed capacities.  The measure to reduce tariffs on raw materials, inputs and intermediate goods, he illustrated, has to do precisely with encouraging the import of raw materials to link up with domestic industry. Today we have idle capacities in industry, and we are importing products that can be produced in Cuba.  The deputy prime minister also spoke of further developing social policy and protection mechanisms for individuals, families and households in vulnerable situations. "This makes explicit the distance between our government program and a neoliberal program".

It is also an essential objective to "reduce crime, corruption, illegalities and social indiscipline, through prevention and confrontation, affecting the causes and conditions that generate them". It is necessary to establish order, put an end to the softness, put a strong hand in what corresponds, and demand that what is established be complied with, he specified.

There are high impact projections, he pointed out, among them the mechanism for the allocation and management of foreign currency, which includes the resizing of the exchange market, which is transversal to the whole economy and we are going to face it this year; the transition from subsidizing products to subsidizing people, which implies a change in the distribution of wealth, fairer and more equitable; as well as the transformation of the institutional, regulatory and organizational environment of the economy.

Developing the economy, stressed the Deputy Prime Minister, "means, no more and no less, offering greater welfare to the people, and what we are doing is going in that direction. The worst risk, he said, would be in not changing and not transforming, "everything we are changing is going in the direction of greater welfare for our people".

Prime Minister Manuel Marrero Cruz defined as "a policy of the country" the Government's projections to correct distortions and re-drive the economy, which were first discussed and approved by the Political Bureau, then by the Central Committee Plenary and finally by the National Assembly with the full support of the National Assembly's deputies.

It is a process of transformation of the Government's work in the country, insisted Marrero Cruz, of strengthening its different structures, as the maximum responsible for the economic and social problems that have a direct impact on our population.

When we speak of re-boosting the economy, it is a profound call that goes far beyond waiting for fuels and foreign currency to fall from the sky, emphasized the Prime Minister.  The scenario is not going to change, it will be very complex, but we have to transform our economy, and we are encouraged by the examples of people, collectives, organizations that under these same complexities have done different things, have sought alternatives.

The Prime Minister referred to the role played by cadres and how they should be to face a war economy such as the one Cuba is going through: cadres who do not stop, who have the vocation to look for solutions, who do not set boundaries that prevent them from moving forward.  We have to review everything, he pointed out. Everything that is not going well must be reviewed, "but we must review it in order to look for solutions", he added.

We have said that we are going to go through complex times, Marrero Cruz recalled, that the measures are not going to transform the country's situation from one day to the next, "but they are the way out, of that we are sure, and solutions will be found little by little and the lights will be seen, but that will be when we all unite, and we all join together".

Cuba News Agency
Havana, Republic of Cuba
19 December 2023

We have the potential to move forward, Cuban president affirms


HAVANA, Cuba, Dec 18 (ACN) Miguel Diaz-Canel Bermudez, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba and president of the country, said today that despite the U.S. blockade and other objective problems, the country has the potential to overcome the difficulties and above all to produce more goods and services for the benefit of the people.

Cuban leader spoke at the session of the Economic Affairs Commission of the National Assembly of People's Power (ANPP), which analyzed the estimates for the closing of the economy in 2023 and the goals and objectives for 2024, based on the extensive information provided by Alejandro Gil Fernandez, deputy prime minister and head of economy and planning.

Diaz-Canel stressed that, although many do not consider it so, the intensified US blockade continues to be the main obstacle to the country's development, which is evidenced in the financial and energy persecutions, and in the consequences of Cuba's inclusion in the list of nations sponsoring terrorism.

What country can move forward without credits or bank loans and in the midst of other adverse conditions as is happening to Cuba, he asked, to clarify that mistakes have also been made internally, which will be discussed at all levels in order to rectify them, such as those related to the monetary order, the banking system and the approval of new economic actors.

In this regard, he pointed out that from now on this last task will be assumed by the municipalities, in order to incorporate the contribution of MSMEs and other forms of management to the Local Development Strategies.  Cuban president highlighted the State's efforts to stop inflation, which presupposes, above all, an increase in the production of goods and services.  He clarified that the tightened blockade, internal errors and the worsening of the world economic crisis with the well-known war conflicts have had an impact on the unfavorable results of the economy in 2023, but in the face of such challenges, creative resistance continues to be an important way out of the difficulties.

In this sense, Diaz-Canel pointed out the need to extend the good experiences and existing results in many producers and labor collectives, as he has verified in his tours through the provinces, an expression that we have potentialities but we must turn those exceptions into a rule.  He also said that only Socialism is capable of offering with social justice the wealth that we are capable of producing, for which he reiterated the conviction that with creative resistance we can overcome the blockade because we have many and good ones.

Cuba News Agency
Havana, Republic of Cuba
19 December 2023

Cuban parliamentarians advocate for the role of economic actors in territorial development


HAVANA, Cuba, Dec 18 (ACN) The Cuban deputies in the Commission for attention to the services of the National Assembly of People's Power called today for greater participation of new economic actors in the development of the territories where they are located, in the presence of Manuel Marrero Cruz, Cuban Prime Minister.

In a broad debate, they referred to the linkages between the state and non-state sectors as a possibility to take advantage of capacities in the industry, incorporate social objectives, promote national productions and identify new business opportunities.  Marrero Cruz, deputy for Gibara, in the eastern province of Holguin, asserted that the municipality is in the best conditions to make decisions in line with the economic and social development strategy; and that is one of the problems to correct.

He noted - along these lines - that it is hoped that governments will in the future invite people to create MSMEs linked to activities necessary for the territory, using the local potential in these forms of management.  That in 2024 all productive forces have the basic conditions and powers to produce more and increase the offers of goods and services, at reasonable prices, Marrero Cruz indicated.  Susel Alba Quintana, representative from the eastern province of Santiago de Cuba, addressed the urgency of the link between micro, small and medium-sized businesses (MSMEs) with the rise of each territory in an organized and planned way.

The social responsibility of a private company ranges from the salary of workers, prices, contributions to the community and care for the environment; but social responsibility is defined today by forms of management through spontaneity, Ines Vega, owner of a medium-sized company in Havana dedicated to hygiene and cleaning products and invited to the commission, pointed out.  Other topics focused the discussions of the deputies, among them, the issues that today hinder the work of non-state forms of management, the need to achieve cooperative production, the fluctuation of the workforce from one sector to another and the control system. with the participation of different bodies and organizations.  Cuba currently has more than 9,900 MSMEs and non-agricultural cooperatives, which have 262,000 employees, 25 % of them under 35 years of age.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Moscow, Russian Federation
18 February 2024
 
Press release on Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s upcoming visit to the Republic of Cuba


On February 19, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov will visit the Republic of Cuba.

Sergey Lavrov is scheduled to meet with the President of the Republic of Cuba Miguel Díaz-Canel y Bermudez and hold talks with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba Bruno Rodríguez. The parties are expected to discuss a wide range of topical issues on the global and regional agenda, as well as various aspects of bilateral cooperation, including trade, economic, cultural, and humanitarian matters.

Cooperation with Cuba – Russia’s key partner in Latin America and the Caribbean, to which our country is bound by strong relations of friendship, solidarity, and mutual respect, which are not subject to external factors – is based on the Declaration on the Principles of Relations between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Cuba (1996), the Memorandum on the Principles of Strategic Cooperation (2009), as well as the Joint Statement of the President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin and Chairman of the State Council and Council of Ministers of the Republic of Cuba Miguel Diaz-Canel y Bermudez on Common Approaches in International Affairs (2018) .

Bilateral political contacts are highly dynamic. In 2023, Prime Minister of Cuba Manuel Marrero Cruz paid an official visit to our country (June 6-17). President of the National Assembly of People’s Power of the Republic of Cuba Esteban Lazo took part in the Russia - Latin America International Parliamentary Conference held in Moscow (November 29 - December 2). On October 7, 2023, President of the Russian Federation Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with President of the Republic of Cuba Miguel Díaz-Canel y Bermudez.

Meetings of foreign ministers are held on a regular basis. Russia-Cuba political consultations on international, regional, and bilateral issues are conducted on a regular basis. An inter-ministerial Plan of Political Consultations is also in place (the next one is for the period from 2023 to 2027, signed following the meeting between Sergey Lavrov and Bruno Rodríguez in New York in September 2022).

Along with the key aspects of political interaction, priority attention during the forthcoming meetings will be given to building up trade, economic and investment ties, including taking into account the full-fledged bilateral legal framework that has been developed over the past period to address this issue. The existing Intergovernmental Russian-Cuban Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation plays a crucial role in this work.

A solid basis for deepening Russia-Cuba cooperation in the global arena is the closeness or coincidence of our positions on the main problems of the regional and global agenda, our commitment to strict compliance with the standards and principles of international law, first and foremost the UN Charter, and strengthening of the central role of the United Nations.
Cuba has traditionally supported Russia’s priorities at the UN General Assembly, in particular on countering the glorification of Nazism, confidence-building measures in outer space, particularly not being the first to deploy weapons in space, and international information security.

Moscow and Havana are in solidarity on the unacceptability of interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, the categorical inadmissibility of the use of unilateral sanctions in violation of the UN Charter, and endeavour to work together to build a just multipolar world order based on genuine equality of states.

The Cuban leadership, despite the enormous pressure exerted on it by the “collective West”, openly declares that it was the United States that provoked the current Ukrainian crisis because of NATO’s expansion to our country’s borders and its irresponsible disregard of Russia’s decades-long justified demands for security guarantees. Cuba votes against major anti-Russian initiatives on international platforms.

Russia strongly supports the demands for an immediate end to Washington’s illegal trade, economic, and financial blockade of Cuba, and the removal of the country from the US State Department’s unilateral list of state sponsors of terrorism. We believe that the application of illegal sanctions against Havana, which is causing enormous damage to the island’s economy and restricts the natural rights of Cuban citizens to live in dignity and choose their own path of development, is contrary to the UN Charter fundamental principles and rules.

List Of Every Product Exported From U.S. To Cuba In 2023. U.S. Ag Commodity/Food Exports Up 4.2%- Including US$5.4 Million In Coffee. US$24 Million To MSMEs Including US$8 Million In Vehicles.

ECONOMIC EYE ON CUBA©
February 2024

December 2023 Ag/Food Exports To Cuba Increase 14.8% - 1
44th Of 227 December 2023 U.S. Food/Ag Export Markets- 2
Year-To-Year Exports Increase 4.2% - 2
Cuba Ranked 53rd Of 227 2023 U.S. Ag/Food Export Markets - 2
December 2023 Healthcare Product Exports US$58,472.00 - 2
2023 Healthcare Product Exports US$839,500.00 - 2
December 2023 Humanitarian Donations US$2,643,753.00 - 3
2023 Humanitarian Donations US$36,563,551.00 - 3
Obama Administration Initiatives Exports Continue To Increase - 3
U.S. Port Export Data- 19 (awaiting new port data; current data through November 2023)


DECEMBER 2023 FOOD/AG EXPORTS TO CUBA INCREASE 14.8% - Exports of food products and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba in December 2023 were US$45,229,570.00 compared to US$39,393,828.00 in December 2022 and US$28,091,304.00 in December 2021.

2023 TSREEA exports were US$342,607,027.00 compared to 2022 TSREEA exports of US$328,536,988.00. 2023 ranked 10th in year total since first TSREEA exports in December 2001. Total TSREEA exports since first deliveries in December 2001 exceed: US$7,246,333,393.00.

Humanitarian Donations in 2023 were US$36,563,551.00 compared to US$30,083,306.00 in 2022, US$11,074,090.00 in 2021, and US$4,605,055.00 in 2021.

2023 (Product, U.S. Dollar Value, Percentage Of Total Exports)
1- Chicken Leg Quarters (Frozen); US$136,866,359.00; 43.6%
2- Chicken Meat (Frozen); US$93,942,602.00; 29.9%
3- Chicken Legs (Frozen); US$38,928,985.00; 12.4%
4- Preserved Chicken Meat; US$9,841,876.00; 3.1%
5- Coffee (Roasted/No Roasted/Organic/No Organic); US$5,467,101.00; 1.7%
6- Calcium Phosphates; US$4,573,013.00; 1.5%
7- Meat Of Swine (Frozen); US$4,031,078.00; 1.3%
8- Chicken Meat & Edible Offal (Frozen); US$3,045,932.00; 1.0%
9- Milk/Cream (Concentrated/Non, Sweetened); US$2,914,674.00; 1.0%
10- Meat of Swine (Processed, Frozen); US$2,116,222.00; .70%

Ten-Largest U.S. Agricultural Commodity/Food Product Exports To Cuba: US$301,727,842.00    
Total U.S. TSREEA Exports To Cuba: US$342,607,027.00    
10 Largest As % of TSREEA Exports To Cuba: 88.1%

Obama-Biden Administration (2009-2017) and Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) initiatives focusing on re-emerging micro, small, and medium-size enterprises (MSMEs) in the Republic of Cuba continue to increase. For 2023, the value of related product exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba was approximately US$24,163,312.00.

LINK TO COMPLETE LIST OF PRODUCTS IN 2023 EXPORTED FROM THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA

The data contains information on exports from the United States to the Republic of Cuba- products within the Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSREEA) of 2000, Cuban Democracy Act (CDA) of 1992, and regulations implemented (1992 to present) for other products by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the United States Department of the Treasury and Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) of the United States Department of Commerce.

The TSREEA re-authorized the direct commercial (on a cash basis) export of food products (including branded food products) and agricultural commodities from the United States to the Republic of Cuba, irrespective of purpose. The TSREEA does not include healthcare products, which remain authorized and regulated by the CDA.

The data represents the U.S. Dollar value of product exported from the United States to the Republic of Cuba under the TSREEA and CDA. The data does not include transportation charges, bank charges, or other costs associated with exports; the government of the Republic of Cuba reports unverifiable data that includes transportation charges, bank charges, and other costs.

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Must Have Been A Brief Meeting.... U.S.-Cuba Law Enforcement Dialogue Reported This Morning; Readout At 11:25 AM

United States Department of State
Washington DC
7 February 2024

U.S. – Cuba Law Enforcement Dialogue

Office of the Spokesperson

On February 7, U.S. and Cuban officials met in Washington, D.C. to discuss law enforcement matters of bilateral interest under the U.S. – Cuba Law Enforcement Dialogue.

The U.S. – Cuba Law Enforcement Dialogue enhances the national security of the United States through improved law enforcement coordination, which enables the United States to better protect U.S. citizens and bring criminals to justice.   Establishing and increasing channels for law enforcement cooperation to address transnational threats also enhances U.S. advocacy for human rights.  The United States integrates advocacy for human rights and human rights protections into all interactions with the Cuban government.

The Departments of State, Homeland Security, and Justice co-chaired the dialogue for the United States.  Officials from the U.S. Embassy in Havana also participated.  This meeting was the sixth Law Enforcement Dialogue since 2015.

Engaging in these talks underscores the U.S. commitment to pursuing constructive discussions with the Government of Cuba where appropriate to advance U.S. interests.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Havana, Republic of Cuba
7 February 2024

Authorities from Cuba and the United States hold dialogue on law enforcement and enforcement Havana

Today, February 7, the authorities of the law enforcement and enforcement bodies of Cuba and the United States met in Washington DC, with the purpose of continuing the exchanges on cooperation to confront terrorism, the illicit trafficking of migrants and immigration fraud, drug trafficking, among other scourges that threaten the security of both countries. The meeting took place in a climate of respect and professionalism.

The Cuban delegation conveyed information and cooperation proposals to the US side on the activities of people living in the United States, identified by their links to terrorism, illegal human trafficking and other illicit activities. The realization of this exchange is an expression of the Cuban government's commitment to the fight against terrorism, and its determination to take all necessary steps to combat its perpetrators. It does not contradict the most absolute rejection of the unjustified and arbitrary inclusion of Cuba in the list published by the State Department of States that supposedly sponsor terrorism. This position was duly recorded at the meeting. Both delegations agreed that there are transnational crimes that threaten the security of both countries and that require cooperation to confront them.

They agreed to continue this dialogue and hold other technical meetings between the law enforcement agencies of the two countries to materialize bilateral cooperation. The Cuban delegation was made up of representatives of the Ministries of the Interior and Foreign Affairs, the Attorney General's Office and the General Customs of the Republic. The US side was made up of representatives from the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice and State. (Cubaminrex)

Celal Gunes | Anadolu Agency

Arrest Of "Super Mule" In Tampa For Illegally Transporting US$100,000.00 To U.S. From Cuba Not Surprising… May Have Transported US$4.5 Million In Last Nine Months.

Arrest Of Mirtza Ocana Of Tampa For Illegally Transporting US$100,000.00 To U.S. From Cuba Not Surprising… Mirtza May Have Imported US$4.5 Million In Last Nine Months. 

16 November 2020: “If Western Union Ends Remittance Services To Cuba, That Means A Return Of “Mules On Steroids”” 

Implementing Direct Correspondent Banking Would Mitigate This Type Of Illegal, Non-Transparent, Inefficient, and Unsafe Activity. 

Undermining Argument That U.S. Dollars Generated In Cuba Remain In Cuba 

United States Department of Justice- Middle District of Florida
Tampa, Florida
6 February 2024

“Tampa, Florida –United States Attorney Roger B. Handberg announces the arrest and filing of a criminal complaint charging Mirtza Ocana (38, Tampa) with smuggling over $100,000 of United States currency into the United States from Cuba. If convicted on all counts, Ocana faces a maximum penalty of five years in federal prison. 

According to the complaint, Ocana arrived at Tampa International Airport on an international flight from Cuba on February 5, 2024. She claimed that she did not have more than $10,000 on her person (a limit that would trigger reporting requirements), thus had nothing to declare. However, during a routine inspection of her luggage, agents from the Department of Homeland Security recovered approximately $30,000 in bulk cash concealed in three wrapped packages. Ocana then admitted that she flew from Cuba to Tampa two to three times per month to smuggle cash into the United States and that she knew that bringing bulk cash into the United States without reporting it was illegal. Agents searched Ocana and discovered an additional $70,000 in cash hidden in her clothes. Ocana’s flight history later revealed that she had flown from Cuba to Tampa 45 times since May 2023.

A complaint is merely a formal charge that a defendant has committed one or more violations of federal criminal law, and every defendant is presumed innocent unless, and until, proven guilty.

This case is being investigated by Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) and U.S. Customs and Border Patrol. It will be prosecuted by Assistant United States Attorney Michael J. Buchanan.” 

LINK TO COMPLETE FILED COMPLAINT

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

Links To Related Analyses 

If Western Union Ends Remittance Services To Cuba, That Means A Return Of “Mules On Steroids”- The Impact Could Cripple MIA November 16, 2020 

State Department, NSC, OFAC, BIS, USDA Don't Understand Requirements For Financial Plumbing To Function Efficiently.  They Excel In Creating, Maintaining, And Defending Clogs. May 16, 2023 

Biden Administration To Issue New/Revised MSME Policies. Reversing Trump Administration Decision But Not Obama Administration Decision. Bank Responsibility? OFAC Penalties? September 18, 2023 

Biden-Harris Administration Approves First Equity Investment Since 1960 In A Private Cuban Company May 10, 2022 

With U.S. Government Authorization For First Direct Equity Investment Into A Private Company In Cuba, Here Is Important Context And Details.  About The Parties; About The Message. May 16, 2022

USAID Administrator Samantha Power, A Former Journalist, Expected To Promote Transparency.  For 17 Months, USAID Refuses To Provide Information About PPE Deliveries To Cuba In 2022.

USAID Administrator Samantha Power, A Former Journalist, Is Expected To Promote Transparency. 

However, Now Nearing Seventeen Months And USAID Administrator Samantha Power Continues To Refuse To Provide Information About PPE Deliveries To Cuba In 2022. 

FOIA Filed 14 October 2022.  What Is USAID Hiding?  

USAID Did Permit Photograph For Media Promotion, But Refuses To Provide Details 

The lack of transparency by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) which operates under the auspice of the United States Department of State, is both destructive and malignant for the United States business community.  Executives equate transparency with guidance and support.  When the Biden-Harris Administration (2021- ) decides to provide Made-In-America (although origin has yet to be confirmed by USAID) firefighting equipment (PPE- Personal Protective Equipment) to the government of the Republic of Cuba, executives interpret the motivation in a positive manner.  The United States Embassy in Havana, Republic of Cuba, published images of the delivery presentation.  However, when USAID then refuses for seventeen (17) months to provide basic information about the delivered PPE- manufacturer, quantity, price, and critically the source of funding, the result is destructive because United States-based companies look to the transparency of the United States government as a primary indicator of whether engagement with the Republic of Cuba makes sense.  Lack of transparency equates to a STOP sign.  The malignancy develops because executives speak with one another- and in this instance share a cautionary tale rather than an opportunity for engagement.

La Raza Network- US Embassy Cuba

  • 26 January 2024:My apologies; the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) regrets the delay in responding to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.  Please be advised that FOIA No. X-XXXXX-XX has been escalated and is still being processed.  Unfortunately, USAID is experiencing a backlog of FOIA requests.  The FOIA office will provide you with another status update and an estimated time of completion on or before March 29, 2024.  Thank you for your continued patience.”   

  • 6 December 2023:The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) regrets the delay in responding to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.  Please be advised that FOIA No. X-XXXXX-XX has been escalated and is still being processed.  Unfortunately, USAID is experiencing a backlog of FOIA requests.  The FOIA office will provide you with another status update and an estimated time of completion on or before December 29, 2023.  Thank you for your continued patience.”   

  • 24 August 2023:Thank you for your continued patience while we process your FOIA request. Unfortunately, USAID is experiencing a backlog of FOIA requests.  Please know that USAID management is very committed to providing responses to FOIA requests and remedying the FOIA backlog.  I will provide you with an update on or before September 5, 2023.” 

  • 16 August 2023:Thank you for your continued patience while we process your FOIA request. Unfortunately, USAID is experiencing a backlog of FOIA requests.  Please know that USAID management is very committed to providing responses to FOIA requests and remedying the FOIA backlog.  I will provide you with an update on or before August 23, 2023.” 

  • 17 July 2023:Thank you for your continued patience. Additional search time is needed to complete your request.  I will provide you with an update on or before July 31, 2023.” 

  • 16 June 2023:Greetings, Thank you for your continued patience. Additional search time is needed to complete your request.  I will provide you with an update on or before June 30, 2023.”  

  • 24 May 2023:Greetings, We are still working on your FOIA request and should have a response for you by June 14, 2023.” 

“This acknowledges receipt of your October 14, 2022, Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).  Specifically, you requested all information about the following delivery in August 2022/September 2022/October 2022 from USAID of PPE to Cuba: 1) How was the donation delivered- air, vessel? 2) What is the brand/manufacturer of the PPE? 3) Was the delivery directly to a Republic of Cuba government-operated entity or through first the U.S. Embassy in Havana? 4) What was the U.S. Dollar value of the delivered 43 sets of PPE? 5) What is the U.S. Dollar value of the 57 sets of PPE to be delivered? 6) Did USAID use its government funding for the purchase(s)?   (Date Range for Record Search: From 08/01/2022 To 10/14/2022).  You also requested expedited processing and a fee waiver.

Embassy of cuba

Expedited Processing

The FOIA provides that expedited processing is warranted if the request involves circumstances in which the lack of expedited processing could (1) reasonably be expected to pose an imminent threat to the life or physical safety of an individual, or (2) an urgency to inform the public about an actual or alleged federal government activity, if made by a person primarily engaged in disseminating information.  You indicated you requested expedited processing "because the public has an urgent and compelling need for information about the all information about the following delivery in August 2022/September 2022/October 2022 from USAID of PPE to Cuba: 1) How was the donation delivered- air, vessel? 2) What is the brand/manufacturer of the PPE? 3) Was the delivery directly to a Republic of Cuba government-operated entity or through first the U.S. Embassy in Havana? 4) What was the U.S. Dollar value of the delivered 43 sets of PPE? 5) What is the U.S. Dollar value of the 57 sets of PPE to be delivered? 6) Did USAID use its government funding for the purchase(s)?  (Date Range for Record Search: From 08/01/2022 To 10/14/2022).  After review of your justification, your request for expedited processing is denied.  Your rationale does not articulate an imminent threat to the life or physical safety of an individual, nor is it an urgency to inform the public.  Below is information on how to submit an appeal for this expedited processing denial.

Fee Waiver 

The FOIA provides that fees should be waived or reduced if disclosure of the information is in the public interest because it is likely to contribute significantly to public understanding of the operations and activities of the government and is not primarily in the commercial interest of the requester.  As a member of the media, the only applicable fee is duplication.  Duplication is $0.10 per page, but the first 100 pages are free.  After review of the fee waiver criteria, your fee waiver request is moot.  Since the only applicable fee is duplication, and USAID routinely furnishes responsive records to FOIA requesters in electronic format, it's most likely there will be no duplication fees to assess.

Appeal rights 

You have a right to appeal the denial of expedited processing.  Your appeal must be received by USAID no later than 90 days from the date of this communication.  To protect its workforce from COVID-19, USAID is implementing maximum telework.  Our FOIA professionals are therefore working from home and do not have access to postal mail and fax machine.  Please send your appeal to foia@usaid.gov, and address it to the Deputy Director of the Bureau for Management, Office of Management Services.  In addition, please include your tracking number in your email. 

Extending the FOIA’s Time Limits due to Unusual Circumstances 

The FOIA provides that an agency  may extend its time limits when “unusual circumstances” occur in the processing of a request. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(B)(i) (2016).  Those “unusual circumstances” are set forth in the statute, 5 U.S.C § 552(a)(6)(B)(iii), and are described as: 1) The need to search for records from field facilities or other locations separate from the office processing the request; 2) The need to search, collect and examine voluminous records; and 3) The need for consultation with another agency.   

Based upon the records you have requested, we have determined that one or more unusual circumstances will occur during the processing of your request.  Accordingly, your response time-limit has been extended beyond the 20 days required by statute; therefore, 10 additional processing days have been added to your request.  To mitigate this action, you may limit the scope of the request so that it can be processed more quickly or to arrange an alternative time to respond.” 

LINK: In Controversial Decision, Biden-Harris Administration Directs (Indirectly) US$2 Million In U.S. Taxpayer Funds To Cuba For Hurricane Ian Support. Some Members Of Congress Irate. October 18, 2022 

US Embassy Cuba

United States Department of State
Washington DC
18 October 2022

U.S. Support for Hurricane Ian Recovery Efforts in Cuba
Ned Price, Department Spokesperson

“Following the devastating impact of Hurricane Ian, the United States is providing to the Cuban people critical humanitarian aid to trusted international partners working directly with Cubans whose communities were devastated by the storm. The United States, through the U.S. Agency for International Development, will provide $2 million in funding for emergency relief to those in need in Cuba. The United States will work with trusted, independent organizations operating in the country who have a long presence in hurricane-affected communities. We are currently reviewing applications from organizations such as the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) to provide this assistance. We stand with the Cuban people as they work to recover from this disaster. The United States will continue to monitor and assess humanitarian needs in coordination with our trusted partners and the international community, and we will continue to seek ways to provide meaningful support to the Cuban people, consistent with U.S. laws and regulations.”

Bruno Rodriguez, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba, using Twitter (X): "We appreciate humanitarian assistance offer made by the US. This material contribution that is worth 2 million USD, channelled through the International Federation of Red Cross, will add up to our recovery efforts in support of the victims of the ravages caused by #HurricaneIan."

United States Department of State
Washington DC
19 October 2022

Question Posed: “Prior to today's announcement that USAID was spending US$2 million in taxpayer funds for indirect assistance to Cuba, when was the last time that taxpayer funds were directed, directly or indirectly, by the United States government to Cuba?” 

United States Department of State
Washington DC
21 October 2022

“Thanks for the question and your patience. The following is offered on background and should be attributable to a State Department spokesperson:

"Each year since 1996, USAID and the Department of State have funded democracy programs that support human rights, fundamental freedoms, and democratic values in Cuba.  In September 2022, USAID provided personal protective equipment in response to diminished fire-fighting capacity following the large-scale oil fire at the Matanzas Oil Terminal. 

In 2008, USAID provided $1.6 million to non-governmental organization (NGO) partners for emergency relief supplies in response to the impact of Hurricane Gustav.  USAID also funded emergency relief commodities through a disaster response cable for damages caused by hurricanes in 2004-2006.  USAID provided $50,000 for Hurricane Charley in 2004, $100,000 for Hurricane Dennis in 2005, and $100,000 for Hurricane Wilma in 2006. 

Since early 2021, we have prioritized review of license applications to export privately sourced or donated goods to the Cuban people, focusing specifically on U.S. agricultural and medical exports to Cuba.” 

LINK TO COMPLETE ANALYSIS IN PDF FORMAT

LINKS To Related Analysis 

Why Is USAID Administrator Samantha Power Risking Lawsuit For Failing To Disclose Data Sought By FOIA Request Filed In 2022 About PPE Deliveries In 2022 To Cuba. August 08, 2023 

In Controversial Decision, Biden-Harris Administration Directs (Indirectly) US$2 Million In U.S. Taxpayer Funds To Cuba For Hurricane Ian Support. Some Members Of Congress Irate. October 18, 2022